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ABSTRACT
This thesis is about the co-evolution of non-interventionist norms and interventionist 
practice among Aûican states in the post-colonial era. To understand this co-evolution, this 
study begins from the year 1957, when the first post-colonial state emerged, and is divided 
into three phases: the early post-colonial period (1957-1970), the post-independence period 
(1970-mid 1980), and the post-Cold War period (1990-April 1998). Each phase looks at 
examples of Afiican involvement in internal disputes to consider how the practice of 
intervention has evolved alongside the clause of non-intervention in Article 3(2) of the 
Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (GAU).
The cases studied illustrate the view that African leaders, to justify intervening in 
internal disputes, have often cited two persistent and recurrent themes: ''African exclusivity” 
(often defined as "Afiican solutions for Afiican problems”) and "Afiican Unity” (often called 
"solidarity”). These however are not the only themes that explicate how intervention has 
evolved in Afiican affairs. There are complex regional political realities and sensitivities and 
factors such as the problem of regional instability posed by internal disputes, the spread of 
arms and the overflow of refugees into neighbouring countries that impinge on the thinking 
of intervention and non-intervention.
While there is an apparent contradiction between non-interventionist norms and 
interventionist practice in the history under investigation, the thesis concludes that instead, 
it represents a careful and pragmatic balance of coping with short-term contingencies 
(through intervention) and longer-term security (through strengthening the norm) without 
undermining the undoubted interest of African leaders to secure non-interventionist norms 
for Afiica.
In memory o f my dear Father, 
Dr Gilbert A. Ayaru-Ero
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INTRODUCTION
This study is concerned with the practice of intervention in the internal affairs of 
Afiican states by other Afiican states. At the start of the post-Cold War era, Afiican leaders 
took action to deal with internal conflicts on the Afiican continent. Most notable was the 
intervention by the Economic Community of West Afiican States (ECOWAS) in Liberia in 
1990 and the creation of mechanisms within the Organisation of Afiican Unity (OAU) since 
1990-1991 to respond to internal conflicts on the continent. We generally thought of both 
events as ‘new’ or innovative, signalling a kind of proactiveness by Afiican leaders in 
responding to, and taking charge of, internal conflicts on the continent. The idea that these 
acts were ‘new’ was linked to the belief that the Afiican continent was facing increased 
marginalisation from the major powers of the international community. Consequently, it 
appeared that the continent was re-examining its institutional mechanisms within the area of 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution.
Main Questions and Thesis Argument
It is, however, the contention of this study that while these two events may have 
signalled some kind of proactiveness within the continent, they were not necessarily ‘new’. 
Rather, we should see them as forming part of, or belonging to, a tradition of intervention 
as practised by African states. The central aim of this thesis is to try to identify and 
understand this tradition. How has intervention evolved alongside the principle of non­
intervention since the end of colonial rule in Africa? More important for this study, is it 
possible to find sources fi'om which to understand the practice of intervention in Africa by 
Afiican states?
This study attempts to identify underlying themes, justifications and reasons for what 
they might tell us about the nature of intervention in intra-Afiican affairs.  ^This study argues 
that alongside the principle of non-intervention, there are other norms and values used to
' Within this stucfy, intra-African affairs, refers to affairs within the African continent. Furthermore, because 
our principle discussion is with rules governing the conduct of states when dealing with internal rather than 
inter-state disputes, we use the term intra-African affairs as opposed to inter-African affairs which refers to 
rules governing relations between states.
justify or legitimise intervention by African states. While non-intervention is a well- 
established (though not wholly clear) norm among the member-states of the OAU, Sam 
Nolutshungu observes that it ‘operates alongside other emergent [equally ambiguous] norms 
and values that are often in conflict with it, producing a convoluted discourse in which 
contradictory actions can be justified according to some principle or shade of emphasis.’^  It 
is these other emergent norms and values that this study focuses on to understand how the 
practice of intervention exists alongside non-intervention on the Afiican continent. The study 
thus draws on the approach used by Martin Wight in his article ‘Western Values in 
International Relations.’^
Wight remarked that his discussion on Western values was not to be limited to ‘the 
record of [Western] practice, nor even in the simple doctrines which,...are mainly a 
codification of practice, as in the history of ideas.’ Rather, there is ‘a certain coherent pattern 
of ideas that may be detected from time to time in Western statesmen, political philosophers 
and jurists. ’ Wight observed that these ideas were ‘persistent and recurrent.’ Although they 
might at times seem ‘eclipsed and distorted’, these ideas have ‘constantly reappeared and 
reasserted [their] authority, so that it may even seem something like a consensus of Western 
diplomatic opinion.’^  Western leaders and policymakers have translated these ideas into 
normative thinking on aspects of international relations. By normative, we mean an 
established standard of behaviour, pattern or a value that is frequently asserted and 
recognisable by statesmen. As Wight’s article illustrates, a range of ideas, values, rules (i.e. 
normative thinking) has developed over time in the West in relation to questions concerning 
international order, intervention, and international morality.
If we follow Wight’s approach of understanding how a ‘pattern of ideas’ or normative 
thinking has evolved in Western thought, what are ‘African’ ideas on intervention? This at 
once prompts the question: how does one know what these ideas are, since there is scarcely 
any large-scale theorizing by Africans themselves on these matters? According to Ali Mazrui,
 ^S. Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad (Charlottesville and London: 
University Press of Virginia, 1996), p. 5.
^M. Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’ in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, (eds.) Diplomatic 
Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1966), 
pp. 89-131.
^M. Wight, (1966), pp. 90-91.
ideas, at least African ideas, are ‘not merely...what African leaders say.’ We need also to 
consider the ‘general behaviour’ of African states and the ‘emotional orientation [of African 
leaders] in specific situations.’^  Large parts of African thought, diplomatic opinion and 
attitudes on world politics are still written from the perspective of the colonial experience.^ 
Analysis must therefore start with the anti-colonialist thought of the liberation movements 
of the late 1950s and early 1960s. We therefore need to expand Wight’s ‘persistent and 
recurrent’ ideas to include diplomatic opinion and the record o f ‘Afiican’ practices.
Purpose o f study
By exploring if there are ‘persistent and recurrent’ ideas by Afiican leaders on the 
question of intervention, the purpose of this study is to present another way of categorising 
the history of intervention within the continent beyond the usual perspective of North-South 
relations. This study may also provide useful insights into the nature of the debates that were 
taking place at the OAU, particularly at the level of the Secretariat, in the post-Cold War era. 
An analysis of Afiican thought on intervention, as opposed to non-intervention, has received 
little attention in the field of international relations. There are, to be sure, many studies on the 
subject of foreign intervention in Afiican states.  ^However, none of these has as their primary 
purpose an examination of the evolution of intervention as practised by African states, nor 
the development of a ‘pattern of ideas’ or normative thinking. Much of the literature tends 
to start from the point of view of non-intervention and the traditional debate of the sovereign 
equality of states when presenting non-Westem attitudes to intervention. These studies have 
also focussed on how developing countries perceive intervention by the North and the sets
’ A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition, (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1969), p. ix.
® A. Mazrui, On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship: Essays on Independent Africa, (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co. Ltd, 1967), p. 35.
’ For example, see D. Smock, (ed.) Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa, (United 
States Institute for Peace, 1993); H. Ekwe-Ewke, Conflict and Intervention in Africa: Nigeria, Angola and 
Zaire, (London: Macmillan, 1990) and K. Somerville, Foreign Military Intervention in Africa (London: 
Pinter Publishers, 1990).
of associated problems with such perceptions. * Throughout the continent’s forty years post­
colonial history, and especially during the 1970s and 80s, observers noted that Afiican states 
held on to the sanctity of non-intervention while conflicts spread throughout the region.
In the past, there has often been criticism of the continent’s own regional 
organisation, the OAU, for failing to maintain peace while shoring up the principle of 
sovereignty. The OAU Charter itself prohibits the practice of intervention in the domestic 
affairs of states, and in this sense, the OAU has been unable to involve itself in the resolution 
of internal conflicts. However, bearing this in mind, a few writers have opened the door for 
further research on how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non­
intervention in Sub-Saharan Afiica and more will be said about such work in Chapter One.  ^
The literature on Africa’s involvement in internal conflicts has usually, however, tended to 
focus on the nature of the operations, and their success or failure. Similarly, analysis of the 
OAU’s earlier efforts to establish mechanisms for conflict management has focussed on the 
organisation’s successes or failures.“
* For example see V. Gamba, ‘Justified Intervention? A View from the South’ in L. Reed and C. Kaysen, 
(eds.) Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, 1993), pp. 115-125.
® See A. Hughes and R. May, ‘Armies on Loan: Toward an Explanation of Transnational Military 
Intervention Among Black African States: 1960-1985’ in S. Baynham, (ed.) Military Power and Politics in 
Black Africa (London and Sydney: Groom and Helm, 1986), pp. 177-202; S. N. MacFarlane, ‘Africa’s 
Decaying Security System and the Rise of Intervention’, International Security, Vol. 8, No. 4, Spring 1984, 
pp. 127-151 and ‘Intervention and Security in Africa’, International Affairs (RHA), Vol. 60. No. 1, Winter 
1983/4, pp. 53-73; C. Thomas, The Debate on Intervention in World Politics: Challenge from the Developing 
World (London School of Economics: Unpubhshed Thesis, August 1983) and New States, Sovereignty and 
Intervention, (Aldershot: Gower, 1985) and I. W. Zartman, ‘Intervention Among Developing States’, Journal 
of International Affairs, (Columbia), Vol. XXII, No. 2, 1968, pp. 188-197 dud International Relations in the 
New Africa (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2nd edn., 1987). Appendix II provides a list of cases 
where African states have intervened in internal conflicts or civil wars within the African continent.
The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia provides examples of this type of research. For example, see W. 
Ofuatey-Kodjoe, ‘Regional Organisations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention 
in Liberia’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. I, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 261-302; M. Vogt, (ed.) The 
Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping (Lagos: Gambumo Publishing, 
1992) and D. Wippman, ‘Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War’ in L. Fisler Damrosch, 
(ed.) Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1993), pp. 157-203.
" G. Achuku, ‘Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Unsolved Problem for the ONUf Africa Today, Vol. 24, No. 
4,1977, pp. 39-57; S. Amoo, ‘Role of the OAU: Past, Present, and Future’, in D. Smock, (ed.) Making War 
and Waging Peace, pp. 239-261; B. Bukarambe, ‘The Role and Impact of the OAU in the Management of 
African Conflicts,’ Survival, Vol. XXV, No. 2, 1983, pp. 50-58; J. Jonah, ‘The OAU: Peacekeeping and 
Conflict Resolution,’ in Y. El-Ayouty, (ed.) The Organization o f African Unity after Thirty Years (Westport,
Two notes of caution as to what this thesis is not about. First, this thesis is not 
suggesting that there is something exceptionally African about the idea and practice of 
intervention within the continent. The study does not assume that there is something uniquely 
African about dealing with problems of intervention in internal conflicts. Pace James Mayall, 
we need to avoid any note of exceptionalism attached to African attitudes and approaches 
in resolving conflict situations. Having said this, the use of heads of state in resolving 
conflicts is a feature said to be unique to Afiican mediation. The involvement of heads of 
state is seen as being ‘in accordance with Africa’s traditional and pre-colonial methods of 
dispute settlement whereby elders, regarded as wise, and commanding [the] respect and 
confidence of their respective societies, intervened to resolve differences.’^^
Second, and more important, while the principle aim of this thesis is to try to find a 
‘pattern of ideas’ or normative thinking, this alone is not enough to understand the practice 
of intervention on the continent. We can examine intervention by states from two levels. The 
first level involves an examination of what states ‘really do’, or the ‘real’ motivations of 
states when they choose to intervene. This level concentrates on state action and the 
behaviour of states, (i.e. realpolitik). The second level focuses on the justifications or 
normative aspects of the intervention. On this level, states tend to invoke, respond and appeal 
to other recognisable norms and justifications such as self-defence or protecting the territorial 
integrity of another state. This second level generates manifold scrutiny, focussing as it does
Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), pp.3-13 and A. Sesay, ‘The OAU and Continental Order’ in T. Shaw and S. 
Oyo, ipAs.) Africa and the International Political System (Washington, DC.: University Press of America, 
1982), pp. 162-225.
J. Mayall, ‘The Problem of Security and Peacekeeping in Contemporary Africa. ’ Seminar presentation at 
the Regional Security in a Global Context Seminar, King’s College London, War Studies Department, 20 
November 1996. For a different view however on responding to conflict in Africa by African states, see A. 
Bozeman, Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).
Organization of Afiican Unity, Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options (Addis Ababa: OAU 
Information Services Publication - Series (II), 1993), p. 21 .1. William Zartman states that, ‘mediation [in 
Afiica] is a personal affair, conducted by Afiican heads of state. It does not lend itself to practice by lesser 
officials’, whereas in the West, senior officials and diplomats are regular participants of any conflict 
mediation process. So for example, the OAU Special Envoy to the civil war in Liberia was the former 
President of Zimbabwe, Canaan Banana. Similarly, President Nelson Mandela took the lead role in seeking 
a resolution to the internal conflict in Zaire between 1996 and 1997, while Julius Nyerere of Tanzania became 
an active mediator in the Great Lakes region, especially in Burundi. See I. W. Zartman, ‘Inter-African 
Negotiation’ in J. Harbeson and D. Rothchild (eds.) Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995a), p. 237.
on the reasons given by states for intervening in the affairs of another state. As Sam 
Nolutshungu states.
The interest of norms and values in international as well as domestic politics 
does not lie only in how they compete with realpolitik or whether and when 
they outweigh realist concerns. It is not necessary to resolve the interminable 
debate between realism and idealism, in order to recognize that they are 
important in other ways. They may shape desires and interests by suggesting 
to each actor the range of objectives that others might tolerate, provide a 
shared language of claims and counter claims, help to define the terrain of 
possible agreement among allies and antagonists in conflict, and, at the lowest 
estimate, provide each side with cues for propaganda.
At best, the normative aspects of intervention are dealt with post facto, within official 
statements or press releases from the intervening state. It is this normative level that this 
thesis concentrates on, but it is not necessarily simple to separate it or distinguish it from the 
first level.The normative level can be used as a ‘political strategy’ or a means from which 
to pursue a particular act by the intervening state. Again, Nolutshungu proves instructive 
when he states that;
However skeptical one might be about their independent force, norms and 
values are so intricately interwoven with political action that most political 
events are unintelligible when their discursive context is ignored.^*
From this point of view, it is necessary to consider how states have used normative 
justifications as a cloak in which to hide their political motives or ‘true’ intentions. It is by 
using this second level that we can see if a ‘pattern of ideas’ is recurring among African 
statesmen. This study does not attempt to separate state action from the level of normative
There is a third level, although it is not discussed in this thesis, which focuses predominantly on the nature 
of the operation and considers the successes, failures and capacity of the interveners.
S. Nolutshungu, (1996), p. 5.
See I. W. Zartman, (1968), p. 188 who disagrees with this and suggests that a distinction should be made 
between ‘normative judgements’ and ‘empirical observations. ’
I am indebted to Bruce Jones for suggesting this point in response to a presentation of an earlier version 
of this Chapter and to members of the 1996-97 Conflict and Peace Workshop at the Department of 
International Relations, London School of Economics for discussions on the same subject.
S. Nolutshungu, (1996), p. 5.
thinking; rather, both levels are interdependent. Furthermore, the normative level serves not 
only as a political strategy, but also as an umbrella of legitimacy for states performing acts 
that are at best frowned upon by African states and the wider international community. Why 
the focus on this second level?
The reason some states intervene in another country’s internal dispute depends on a 
whole series of factors that occur simultaneously. We argue that generally the reason states 
intervene is from a perception of national interest or the fact that conflicts impinge on the 
security and political-military issues of states. This study however argues that there are other 
justifications and norms that leaders cite to explain how the principle of intervention existed 
alongside that of non-intervention. These norms and justifications are largely dormant and 
raise their head on specific occasions. In this study, the suggestion is made that there are two 
persistent and recurrent themes that are useful to our understanding of how the practice of 
intervention has evolved in intra-Afiican affairs. These are African exclusivity (often defined 
as “African solutions for African problems”) and ‘continental’ or African Unity (often 
referred to as ‘solidarity’). This study shows how African leaders have used these ideas and 
broadened their meaning to justify intervening in the internal affairs of states on the continent.
Finally, although this thesis is in search of a ‘pattern of ideas’ or normative thinking 
on Afiican thoughts on intervention, this is undertaken without passing judgement on the act 
of intervention itself or questioning the merit of the intervener’s goal. Put another way, this 
study does not make any ethical nor normative judgement for or against the act of 
intervention. The present discussion makes no inroad into the question of how or when to 
intervene; neither does it question the desirability of intervening to maintain world order, nor 
the implications of pursuing such an act.^  ^We consider the goals of the intervener only to the 
extent that they might provide some insight on how the principle of intervention operates in 
intra-African affairs.
The literature on the ethical and normative aspects of intervention is extensive. For a comprehensive 
analysis on the various dimensions in the debate, see I. Forbes and M. Hofftnan, (eds.) Political Theory, 
International Relations, and the Ethics o f Intervention (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1993), J. 
McMahan, ‘The Ethics of Intervention’ in A. Ellis, (ed.) Ethics and International Relations (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 24-51, M. Smith, ‘Ethics and Intervention’, Ethics and International 
Affairs, Vol. 3, 1989, pp. 1-26 and M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, Edn. 1992), Chapter 6.
Scope o f Study
The geographical location of this study is Afiica south of the Sahara, although we will 
make reference where appropriate to North Afiican states (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya 
and Egypt). However, omitting the northern parts of Afiica from this study does not remove 
the insurmountable task ahead of any researcher who attempts to understand how the 
practice of intervention has evolved in a region as vast as Sub-Saharan Afiica. Even in the 
West, we still need to make inroads into a complex subject like intervention that combines 
various schools of thought and opinion that have evolved over the centuries. There are deep 
divisions and much ambivalence between the major political (e.g. liberals and conservatives) 
and ethical (e.g. utilitarians, Kantians and Rawlsians) traditions in the West on the issue of 
intervention. The African continent also plays host to a diverse array of cultures, political 
systems and differing historical experiences. The only similarities are that the states share the 
experience of subjugation under colonial rule and are among the poorest countries in the 
world. However, to define or view the African continent (and the West) as having one 
singular homogenous thought on intervention or any aspect of international affairs would be 
misleading. On occasion, however, and this is one of them, the conventional forms of address 
have to be used for convenience of exposition, and on such occasions, the ‘West’ means the 
tradition and practice of Graeco-Judaic-Christian thought, and ‘Sub-Saharan Afiica’, a 
combination of Occidental, Islamic and indigenous thought.
Methodology
The analysis of ideas or principles relating to international relations in a continent as 
varied and complex as Afiica raises other fundamental methodological problems as well. To 
understand how the practice of intervention has evolved in Sub-Saharan Afiica, this study 
will in large part be historical. That is to say that it focuses on instances of Afiican 
intervention within the historical context of internal disputes. However, with forty years and 
several examples of internal disputes to cover, a comprehensive historical analysis is 
impossible. We vrill look at cases of African involvement in internal disputes (e.g. the 
Congolese and Chadian civil wars) for what they might tell us about the practice of 
intervention in intra-African affairs.
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As the approach we adopt is largely historical, much of what is written here needs to 
acknowledge the wider international context in which these interventions took place. Most 
of the case studies fall within the context of Cold War politics. However, while the impact 
of the Cold War is relevant to understanding the development of African international 
relations, this study attempts to isolate its impact to examine how the practice of intervention 
evolved within the African continent. On this point, it is worth repeating what Fred 
Northedge and NCchael Donelan said in their study of post-Second World War intervention 
in international disputes:
To understand as fully as possible why the Soviet Union countered Belgian 
intervention in the Congo in 1960, or why it intervened in Hungary in 1956, 
it is necessary to consider the wider setting of international politics that 
preceded and accompanied and followed the outbreak of the dispute. We 
have not been seeking here to give a history of post-War intervention and 
counter-intervention. We have sought to isolate and discuss the general 
factors that explain any intervention...We must leave to historians the work 
of showing how each intervention in its unique circumstances and setting 
came about.^°
However, it should be noted that this isolation is not to disregard the importance of 
international politics and the Cold War within Africa. As Robert Good notes, ‘...the post 
colonial era coincides with the era of the Cold War. The two are closely related.W here 
necessary, we will discuss the politics of the Cold War as a factor contributing to the 
understanding of African thought on intervention and African international relations in 
general.
Structure o f the thesis
To identify a ‘pattern of ideas’ and a record of historical practices, this study divides 
the period between the end of colonialism through to the post-Cold War period into three 
historical phases: the early liberation and post-colonial period (1957-1970), the period of
^ F. Northedge and M. Donelan, International Disputes: The Political Aspects (London: Europa Publications, 
1971), p. 130.
R. Good, ‘The Congo Crisis: A Study of Post Colonial Politics’ in L. Martin, (ed.) Neutralism and 
Nonalignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 38.
post-independence (1970-to the mid 1980s) and the post-Cold War period (1990-April 
1998).
The opening Chapter of this study is divided into three parts. Part one gives a general 
account of intervention. Part two is designed to give an overview of how intervention and 
non-intervention are traditionally discussed within the African continent, while part three 
provides a brief review of work already conducted on intervention by African states in 
internal disputes of other African states. While there exists no definite philosophical or 
theoretical framework from which to direct the discussion of intervention by African states, 
Chapter Two sets the debate within the context of Pan-Africanism. It argues that two themes 
within Pan-Africanism - ‘African Exclusivity’ and ‘African Unity’ - can be used as a 
normative foundation to discuss the principle of intervention in intra-African affairs. The 
successive Chapters of this study throw light on whether these themes can answer the 
questions: How has the principle of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non­
intervention since the end of colonial rule in Afiica? Is it possible to find sources from which 
to understand the evolution of the practice of intervention in Afiica by Afiican states?
Chapter Three argues that the early stages of the liberation movement and the 
dilemmas posed by independence (1957-1970) are areas from which to explore how the 
principle of intervention evolved on the continent. Within this Chapter, specific reference is 
made to the civil war in the Congo and apartheid South Africa as areas from which to note 
emerging thought on intervention. It considers what themes or norms were used by individual 
African states to justify their intervention. It also notes the arguments about intervening in 
the Nigerian civil war.
Chapter Four examines the period between the 1970s and the mid-1980s. Afiica 
witnessed a simultaneous rise in internal conflicts and regional insecurity. It was during this 
time that the doctrine of non-intervention was seriously challenged by the foreign policy 
activities of some African leaders, most notably in Uganda (1978-1979) and Chad (1979- 
1981).^^ This is a period when the politics of the Cold War was more pronounced on the 
Afiican continent. More specific, it was a period where Afiican states were confronted with 
the question of foreign military assistance in African conflicts.
It is worth noting that during this period, other non-westem states were challenging this doctrine, most 
notably India in East Pakistan (1971) and Vietnam in Kampuchea (1978-1979).
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Chapters Five and Six consider discussions that emerged among African leaders in 
the post-Cold War era on intervention and non-intervention within the continent. The post- 
Cold War discussion of interventionary practices by African leaders in Africa was informed 
by ECOWAS in Liberia between 1990-1997, (Chapter Five), and the OAU in Rwanda and 
Burundi (Chapter Six). What was signifrcant about the discussions in the post-Cold War 
period, was that they were described as representing a period of ‘new thinking’ among 
African leaders in response to internal conflicts. However, the aim of Chapter Six is to 
suggest that this period be seen as part of a continuum of the thinking on intervention that 
existed in African international relations, but was never easily identifrable in the same way as 
we would identify the evolution of interventionary thought in Western international relations.
The concluding Chapter (Seven), is split into two parts. In part one, we consider 
again the claim that there is a ‘pattern of ideas’ that has developed and might prove useful 
in understanding the how intervention and the principle of non-intervention evolved in intra- 
African affairs. In part two, we point to future research when we consider the question of 
outside assistance in post-Cold War Africa. While this study is not suggesting that African 
interventions in internal conflicts are more likely to succeed than Western interventions, this 
study ends by arguing that attempts to prevent widespread internal conflicts are also 
dependent on help coming from the international community.
Conclusion
In sum, the purpose of this study is twofold:
1) to examine how intervention has evolved alongside the 
principle of non-intervention, and through such examination,
2) to try to identify if there exists ‘pattern of ideas’ or 
‘persistent and recurrent’ themes that can help us understand 
African thought on this subject matter.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTERVENTION AND THE VIEW FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Introduction
This Chapter is divided into three parts. In Part One, the purpose is to define how 
intervention will be used in this study. Part One is further divided into four parts. It begins 
by defining the type of conflicts with which this study is concerned. We then draw on the 
various debates between Western states and the ‘new’ countries of Africa and Asia in the 
United Nations (UN) during the 1960s and early 1970s on intervention and non-intervention. 
This is primarily because the various meanings attached to intervention by these ‘new’ states 
prove instructive in understanding the principles that govern intra-African affairs. This is 
followed by a discussion on how the debate on intervention and non-intervention continued 
in the post-Cold War era. It however concludes that no single definition on intervention 
exists; rather a spectrum of activities is defined as intervention in this study. Finally in this 
part of the Chapter, we examine the host of motives and justifications given for intervening 
in the internal affairs of other states as another way of understanding intervention and the 
principle of non-intervention. In Part Two, we consider in more specific terms how the norm 
of non-intervention has evolved and has traditionally been discussed among African leaders. 
Part Three of the Chapter provides a short review of existing work on African states 
intervening in the internal affairs of other Afiican states.
I. Intervention and the Principle of Non-Intervention
Intervention in Internal Conflicts
This study is primarily concerned with intervention in the internal dispute of a state, 
or as Fred Northedge and Michael Donelan say, ‘conflicts within states.’  ^This study is not
 ^F. Northedge and M. Donelan, (1971), pp. 36-38.
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concerned with intervention in ‘conflict between states.’  ^ So for example, we exclude 
intervention in conflicts such as the Algeria-Morocco border dispute (1963-1964) or the 
Ethiopia-Somalia war (1964-1965 and 1977-1978). Most of the disputes on the African 
continent since the beginning of decolonisation in 1957 have been within states. As Sam 
Amoo remarks, they are ‘the most heinous source of human misery’ and ‘by far the most 
common and the bitterest of conflicts in Africa.’^  It is because of this that this study is 
concerned with examining the response of African states to internal disputes.
Northedge and Donelan define three situations that can lead to internal dispute: 
situations where men do not have the same opportunities such as in employment; where 
man’s desire for possessions can lead to a conflict of interest between those who have and 
those who do not have; and finally where man not only seeks power, but desires to be 
honoured or esteemed by members of a society. These points of conflict may not necessarily 
affect society as a whole and may amount to ‘disputes in which particular individuals or 
groups or sides of some sort are in conflict about a particular thing which may be addressed 
through law.’ In the end, these can be called ‘private disputes’ though as Northedge and 
Donelan remark, they may ‘in some way or other have a public significance.’* We are, 
however, concerned with internal disputes which affect the whole of society and which can 
lead to the breakdown of society and unfold into a violent fission. Again, Northedge and 
Donelan prove instructive in the definition they provide. Such disputes they argue, ‘involve 
most of the interests of the members of the groups’ within the society and may result in the 
overthrow of an established government, the disintegration of civil order, and other violent 
acts. What is of interest to us here is the role of external intervention in these internal 
disputes.
More specifically, we are interested here in the intervention of African states in these 
internal disputes. One state may perform the intervention, thus making it a unilateral action. 
For example, the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1978 can be defined as unilateral
F^. Northedge andM. Donelan, (1971), pp. 38-43. R. J. Vincent, Non-intervention and International Order, 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 6. Also see S. Hoffman, ‘The Problem of Intervention’, 
in H. Bull, (ed.) Intervention in World Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 10.
 ^S. Amoo, The OAU and African Conflicts: The Political and Institutional Dynamics o f Regional Conflict 
Management, (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University, Unpubhshed Thesis, 1989), p. 292.
 ^F. Northedge and M. Donelan, (1971), pp. 36-37.
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intervention. A collection of states such as a sub-regional group, or an international 
organisation or a multinational force that acts under the authority of the international 
community may also perform interventions. Here, we may include the intervention by 
ECOWAS in Liberia (1990), as subregional, the OAU Inter-Africa Force in Chad (1981-82) 
as regional, and the UN in the Congo (1960) as an international organisation intervening on 
behalf of the international community.^ The various analyses in Chapters Three to Six will 
consider intervention in terms of unilateral state intervention, sub-regional intervention and 
intervention by regional organisations.
The debate on Intervention and Non-intervention at the UN: seeking a definition
On the definition of intervention and the principle of non-intervention, this Chapter 
will not add to the innumerable definitions or give the reader a critical exposition of what 
writers have said in the past.  ^ Instead, it discusses intervention and the principle of non­
intervention within the context of two UN resolutions: General Assembly Resolution 2131 
(XX) on the Declaration on Inadmissibility o f Intervention in Domestic Affairs o f States and 
Protection o f their Independence and Sovereignty (1965) and General Assembly Resolution 
2625 (XXV) on the Declaration on Principle o f International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter o f the United 
Nations (1970). These two documents are central to this study because the ‘new’ states of 
the African continent that emerged to take their place in the international system of states 
largely advocated the main tenets of both resolutions with the support of Asian, Eastern 
European and Latin American countries and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, several key 
principles and definitions within both resolutions are relevant to our understanding of how 
the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention on the African 
continent. The aim of this section will only be to draw out the essential ingredients of both
 ^For examples of collective intervention, see E. Luard, ‘Collective Intervention’ in H. Bull, (ed.), (1984), pp. 
157-179 and L. Fisler Damrosch, (ed ), (1993).
® For a comprehensive analysis on intervention and non-intervention, see H, Bull, (ed.), (1984); R  Little, 
‘Recent Literature Intervention and Non-intervention’ in 1. Forties and M, Hofiman, (eds ), (1993), pp. 13-31; 
R. J. Vincent, (1974) and O. Young, ‘Intervention and International Systems’, Journal o f International 
Affairs, Vol. XXU, No. 2, 1968, pp. 177-187.
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texts, and, will not immerse itself in a critical examination of the debate at the UN/ Before 
we focus on these documents, we need to consider the nature of the international political 
arena at the time that these UN resolutions were introduced.
The establishment of the 1965 declaration was, according to the Soviet Union and 
other Communist states, a response to a series of events that were of pressing concern in the 
international arena during the 1960s. In explaining why a declaration on non-intervention was 
necessary beyond the ruling in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, Mr Fedorenko of the Soviet 
Union declared, ‘the question had become urgent...because....certain Western Powers were 
intervening by force in the domestic affairs of States’, particularly in the newly independent 
nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The main ‘Western Power’ who had caused the 
Soviet Union to seek further clarification on the principle of non-intervention was the United 
States (US). The ‘proof of US intervention, argued Mr Fedorenko, ‘could be seen in the 
tragic events’ of Vietnam, the Congo and the Dominican Republic.* The Soviet delegation 
also cited the use of armed force by some Western governments to suppress the movement 
of national liberation in South Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola. The Soviet delegation felt 
it was imperative that a declaration reaffirming the key principles enshrined in the UN Charter 
be produced as certain members ‘were defying and violating the principles of international 
law.’^
^For a comprehensive analysis of these resolutions, see W. Friedman, ‘Intervention, Civil War and the Rôle 
of International Law’, Proceedings of the American Society o f International Law at its Fifty-Ninth Annual 
Meeting, April 22-24,1965, pp. 67-75; L. Lee, ‘The Mexico City Conference of the United Nations Special 
Committee on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations among States,’ The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 14, Part 4, October 1965, pp. 1296-1313; E. 
McWhinney, ‘The “New” Countries and the “New” International Law: The United Nations’ Special 
Committee on Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States,’ American Journal o f International Law, 
Vol. 60, No. 1, January 1966, pp. 1-33,1. Sinclair, ‘Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States’ in M. Nawaz, (ed.) Essays on International Law In Honour of  
Krishna Rao (The Netherlands: Sijhofif-Leyden, 1976), pp. 107-140 and R.J. Vincent, (1974), Chapter Seven.
® First Committee, 1395*** Meeting, Friday, 3 December 1965, (statement by Mr Fedorenko, representative 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), United Nations General Assembly Official Records, (hereafter 
GAOR) para. 1 and 2, p. 243. (Hereafter statement by Mr Fedorenko).
® Statement by Mr Fedorenko, para.4, p. 243. Various parts of Article 2 of the UN Charter sets out the rules 
governing the relations between member states of the UN. Article 2(4) require all members to ‘refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territoriM integrity or political independence 
of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations.’ Article 2(7) 
declares that ‘nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require Members to submit 
such matters to settlement under the present Charter.’
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It was in this context that the Soviet Union requested that the question of ‘The 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their 
Independence and Sovereignty’ be placed on the agenda of the twentieth session the UN 
General Assembly in 1965 so that it might ‘help give more concrete form to the principles 
of the [UN] Charter.’ ®^ The Soviet Union, Africa, Asia and Latin American submitted four 
draft resolutions during the twentieth session, all of which were rigorously debated by the 
‘First’ (Political) Committee of the UN. In fact, the ‘new’ countries of Afiica and Asia 
formed a powerful bloc in the UN and became known as the Afro-Asian bloc.^ ^
The Soviet Union draft declaration set the tone of the debate within the First 
Committee. Two proposals are of interest to us: (a) the ‘demand that acts constituting armed 
or any other type of intervention in the domestic affairs of States, as well as those against the 
just struggle of peoples for national independence and freedom, should be halted forthwith 
and not be permitted in the future’, and (2) that all States should ‘abide by the principle of 
mutual respect and non-intervention in domestic affairs for any reason whatsoever.States 
from Latin America, Africa and Asia submitted two other draft declarations supporting the 
Soviet Union. Afiican states supported the rule on the inadmissibility of armed intervention 
stating that not to do so would pose a threat to international peace and security, and 
encourage the possibility of counter-intervention and further violence. The ruling on armed
Statement by Mr Fedorenko, para. 21, p. 246.
“ The Afro-Asian bloc emerged as a distinct group in 1950s during the decolonisation process. It was part 
of a loose association of ‘third world’ or under-developed states known as the non-aligned who declared 
cooperation on principles of inter-state relations and the promotion of international peace and security. The 
main activists were Egypt, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. In 1955 an Afro-Asian conference was called 
at Bandung (Indonesia) to declare inter alia ‘abstention from intervention or interference in the internal 
affairs of another country.’ See the Declaration of the Bandung Conference in I. Brownlie, (ed.) Basic 
Documents on African Affairs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 456. In the early 1960s, these states 
formalised their association into the ‘Non-Aligned Movement,’ (NAM) and included many of the newly 
independent states of Africa, Asia and Latin America.
The main paragraphs of the Soviet draft resolution (A/C. 1/L. 343/Rev. 1) can be found in the Yearbook of 
the United Nations (New York: Office of Public Information, UN, 1965), p. 88.
18 Latin American states sponsored the Soviet declaration, while the third draft was submitted and 
sponsored by 16 Africa states which included states from the Middle East and Asia: Algeria, Burma, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cyprus, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Repubhc of 
Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia
Yearbook of the United Nations, (1965), p. 91.
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intervention was not only intended to protect states, but also as the United Arab Republic 
(UAR) asserted, ‘peoples and movements whose efforts were directed towards achieving and 
exercising an inherent right of self-determination and independence.’^^ The UAR felt that this 
point was particularly relevant to those Western governments who threatened the progress 
of those peoples, particularly in South Rhodesia, who were trying to free themselves from 
the aegis of colonialism on the African continent.
On this very point, some African states sought to qualify what did and did not 
constitute intervention. Regarding ‘oppressed peoples struggling under colonialism’, the 
delegation from Tanzania asserted that external assistance was justified when aimed at 
granting freedom and justice. This, Mr Seaton of Tanzania argued, was recognised at the 
Second Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in 
Cairo, Egypt from 3-10 October 1964. Afiican states could also rely on General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration on the Granting o f Independence o f Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (1960) which had, among other things, condemned colonialism, but 
also regarded the policy of apartheid and racial discrimination as a threat to fundamental 
human rights.
In the debate that followed in the First Committee, Mr. Idzumbuir of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo wondered, however, why the UAR did not include the whole question 
of subversive activities in its draft declaration, especially as the OAU Assembly of Heads of 
State had adopted a solemn declaration against this problem at its meeting in Accra, Ghana 
on 24 October 1965.^  ^Many Afiican leaders feared that they were particularly vulnerable to 
subversive activities that foreign states organised or financed. Directly related to this were 
what Afiican and Latin American states described as new forms of intervention that emerged 
since the end of the Second World War.^* These included acts of sabotage, infiltration.
The draft resolution of the UAR (A/C. 1/L.353) can be seen in the Yearbook o f the United Nations, (1965), 
p. 91.
First Committee, 1401** Meeting, Wednesday, 8 December 1965, (statement by Mr Seaton, representative 
of the United Republic of Tanzania), GAOR, paras. 1-5, p. 283.
First Committee, 140(f Meeting, Tuesday, 7 December 1965, (statement by Mr Idzumbuir, representative 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo), GAOR, para. 39, p. 280. We shall discuss the Accra meeting in 
Part Two of this Chapter.
First Committee, 1400“* Meeting, Tuesday, 7 December 1965, (statement by Mr. Sette Camara, 
representative of Brazil), GAOR, paras. 11-13, p. 276.
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terrorism, training, financing or supporting movements that threatened the political existence 
of newly independent states, and indirect forms of intervention aimed at the overthrow of 
legitimate governments in an attempt to impose another political system on independent 
states. All these were defined as either subtle forms of aggression or new forms of 
intervention.
In an attempt to widen the definition of intervention, a fourth draft declaration was 
introduced on 18 December 1965. The Afiican, Asian and Latin American states largely 
wrote this draft, which the First Committee later adopted and which formed the basis of the 
1965 declaration.^  ^The preamble to the draft declaration incorporated the existing principles 
of the UN and those from other regional arrangements, notably the Charters of the 
Organization of American States, the OAU and the League of Arab States. The draft 
declaration stated that ‘armed intervention is synonymous with aggression,’ that ‘all other 
forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State’ or ‘the use of 
economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain 
from it the subordination of exercise of its sovereign right’ or the attempt to ‘organize, assist, 
foment, finance, incite’, were contrary to the basic principles of international co-operation 
between States and consequently a violation of the Charter of the UN.^° In the end, the draft 
declaration, which became General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), was a mixture of 
political and legal concepts.
The resolution revealed the reahties that lay behind each argument presented by the 
57 states that participated in the discussions. It covered issues that vexed the Soviet Union 
and the ‘new’ nations of Afiica and Asia, while still reaffirming the core principles of the UN 
Charter. The discussion and adoption of the draft resolution clearly illustrated that states 
were concerned with new forms of intervention - subversion and terrorism - and attempts by 
outsiders to interfere with the political, economic, social and cultural systems of particular
The declaration was sponsored by Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Repubhc of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, 
Dahomey, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, 
the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Repubhc, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia. See the Yearbook of the United Nations, (1965), pp. 92-93.
“ Yearbook of the United Nations, (1965), pp. 92-93.
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States. Its aim was to go beyond the narrow definition that the use of mihtary force alone is 
intervention. It was felt that there were other forms of intervention that did not require the 
use of military force, hence the inclusion on a prohibition on subversive activities. The 
significance of the 1965 declaration lay in the fact that those states who sponsored, supported 
and agreed on the final text were mainly ‘new’ states who were adding to norms and 
principles established before they emerged on the international stage.^^
Five years later, on 24 October 1970, the UN General Assembly passed another 
resolution entitled ‘Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co­
operation among States.’ The whole question of principles relating to fiiendly relations had 
been assigned for study to the Sixth (Legal) Committee in 1962, three years before the 1965 
declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention and eight years before member states finally 
passed it in 1970. Again, it was influenced by the efforts of the strong Afi-o-Asian bloc who 
had gradually gained prominence in the UN. These states argued that they ‘had been 
confi’onted with a pre-existing social, political and economic order based on established rules 
and principles of international conduct’, none of which they had formulated. So, they 
contended that they were ‘not to be expected to accept these rules and principles as 
irrevocable’, but look at some areas that were in need of revision and development in a new 
international environment.^  ^Essentially, what these ‘new’ states wanted was to find another 
way of ensuring an effective application of the instruments governing friendly relations among 
states as set out in the UN Charter.
Consequently, the preamble to General Assembly Resolution 1815 (XVII) of 18 
December 1962 noted the ‘significance of the emergence of many ‘new’ States and of the 
contribution which they are in a position to make on the progressive development and 
codification of international law.’^  ^ To this end, member states resolved to study seven 
fundamental principles of international law concerning fiiendly relations and co-operation 
among states. On 16 December 1963, General Assembly Resolution 1966 (XVni) gave 
further priority to the study of four of the seven proposed principles because they not only
The full text of Resolution 2131 (XX) can be seen in Yearbook of the United Nations, (1965), pp. 94-95.
Yearbook of the United Nations, (1962), p. 487.
^ General Assembly Resolution 1815 (XVII), 18 December 1962. The full text is in Yearbook of the United 
Nations, (1962), pp. 494-495.
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‘constituted corner-stones of peaceful relations among States,’ but were ‘binding upon all 
States as general principles of law.’ The four principles were: the prohibition of the threat or 
use of force, peacefiü settlement, non-intervention, and sovereign equality. We are primarily 
concerned with the principle of non-intervention. '^  ^A Special Committee was set up with the 
mandate to study these four principles. Resolution 1966 expressed the view that the 
composition of this Special Committee should take ‘into consideration the principle of 
equitable geographical representation and the necessity that the principle legal systems of the 
world should be represented.’^  ^Between 1964 and 1970, the Special Committee met on six 
occasions, with its first meeting at Mexico City from 27 August to 2 October 1964.
Although it is seen as a fundamental principle within international law, no consensus 
was reached on the question on non-intervention in the ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of any state. 
The issue was particularly important to newly independent states who had just emerged from 
colonial domination. Consequently, their aim was to produce a document that not only 
guaranteed their sovereign independence, but as Edward McWhinney notes, complemented 
the ‘principle of self-determination.’^  ^Just like the 1965 declaration, ‘new’ states argued for 
a categorical statement prohibiting intervention, and then went on to enumerate the main 
types of actions which they felt constituted intervention. The fundamental issues raised by the 
‘new’ states were contained in the combined proposal submitted by Ghana, India and 
Yugoslavia which noted that:
^ The other three principle were: ‘(a) The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; (d) The duty of States to co-operate with 
one another in accordance with the Charter; (e) The principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples; and (g) The principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in 
accordance in accordance with the Charter.’ Thirty-seven states, many from Africa, submitted the draft 
principles before they were approved by the General Assembly. These states were: Afghanistan, Algeria, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, the Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chile, the Congo (Leopoldville), 
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Hungaiy, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Japan, Liberia, Mah, Mongoha, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Phihppines, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Syria, Tanganyika, Turkey, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia.
^ General Assembly Resolution 1966 (XVllI), 16 December 1963. The full text is in Yearbook of the United 
Nations, (1963), p. 518. Twenty-seven states were appointed by the President of the Generzd Assembly: 
Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, France, Ghana, 
Guatemala, India, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the USSR, the 
United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, the US, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
E. McWhinney, (1966), p.23. Also see L. Lee, (1965), p. 1304.
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1. No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, 
for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other 
State; nor interfere in the right of any State to choose and develop its own 
political, economic and social order in a manner most suited to the genius of 
its people.
2. Accordingly, no State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures 
of an economic or political character to force the sovereign will of another 
State and obtain from it advantages of any kind. In particular. States shall not:
(a) organize, assist, foment, incite or tolerate subversive or terrorist 
activities against another State or interfere in the civil strife in another 
State;
(b) interfere with or hinder, in any form or manner, the promulgation 
or execution of laws in regard to matters essentially within the 
competence of any State;
(c) use duress to obtain or maintain territorial agreements or special 
advantages of any kind; and
(d) recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained 
by duress of any kind by another State.^^
This proposal reflected the concern among ‘new’ states of Africa that in the world 
of 1964, subversion was perhaps the most common and dangerous form of intervention, 
whether it consisted of hostile propaganda, or incitement to revolt or the violent overthrow 
of the established order. While subversion was an ancient act, ‘new’ states argued that its 
usage was more frequent and had come to characterise the ideological struggle that divided 
the world into East versus West or Capitalism versus Communism.
Representatives from the ‘new’ states also noted when intervention was permissible. 
Intervention was permissible in response to the problem of apartheid in South Africa, the 
denial of the right to self-determination, and other colonialist and neo-colonialist practices. 
The argument was that there were some exceptions to the rule of non-intervention, and that 
they should take precedence over the sovereignty rights of a state. In situations of self- 
defence, intervention was also considered permissible.^*
Not all states were satisfied with the broad definition of intervention proposed by the
Proposal by Ghana, India and Yugoslavia, A/AC.119/L.27 in the Report o f the Special Committee on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, prepared by 
the Rapporteur, Mr Hans Blix of Sweden, UN Doc. A/5746,16 November 1964, para. 209, p. 117. (Hereafter 
Report o f the Special Committee).
“ Report o f the Special Committee, paras. 247-248, p. 122.
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‘new’ states. Some representatives, in particular from the West, felt that it was not only 
‘unwise’, but impossible ‘to turn every apparently useful political idea into a legal formula.’ 
There was a risk, the United Kingdom (UK) delegation argued, that defining intervention in 
such broad terms could ‘thwart progress by categorizing as intervention what was in fact part 
of normal diplomacy.’ These delegates had in mind ‘normal’ activities like political, economic 
or material pressure.On this basis, the UK delegation concluded that it would ‘be 
impossible to give an exhaustive definition of what constitutes ‘intervention.” It further noted 
that the new forms of intervention, such as ‘the use of clandestine activities to encompass the 
overthrow of the Government of another State,’ illustrate the dangers of trying to elaborate 
a broader definition.
These were some of the contentious issued raised during the life time of the Special 
Committee. They not only illustrated that there was no consensus to be had among states of 
differing political, historical and legal backgrounds, but also reflected the political sensitivities 
that were confronting states in the 1960s. When it came to outlining the central tenets of the 
resolution in 1970, the preamble noted the necessity of states maintaining ‘strict 
observance... of the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any other State’ as this was 
‘an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with one another, since 
the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter, 
but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security.’ 
The preamble also noted that military, political, economic and any other form of pressure 
constituted ‘coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any 
State,’ a clause which was largely welcomed by the Soviet Union and the ‘new’ states of 
Afiica and Asia.
The section of the resolution dealing with ‘non-intervention in matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any States’, read like the 1965 declaration. Member states declared 
that ‘no State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.’ ‘Armed intervention 
and all other forms of interference or attempted threats,’ constituted a ‘violation of
Report of the Special Committee, para 231 and 245, p. 120 and 122.
 ^Proposal by the United Kingdom, A/AC. 119/. 8 in Report of the Special Committee, paras. 204(4) and (5), 
p. 116. Also see para. 205(3).
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international law.’ The resolution included parts of the Ghana-India-Yugoslavia proposal, 
notably on the problem of subversion and other new forms of intervention.^^
To summarise, both the 1965 and 1970 resolutions emerged from a desire on the part 
of the ‘new’ countries of Africa who wanted to review, and where necessary, add to the basic 
instruments that were contained in the UN Charter. The countries of Africa with the support 
of Asia, East European states, Latin America and the Soviet Union, based their arguments 
for a reworking of international law on a number of practices rooted in the relations among 
states. By arguing for a stricter definition of the prohibition on intervention, these states 
hoped that international law would clarify the duties of states in their relations with one 
another. We shall discuss these resolutions again in Part Two of this Chapter. In the end, 
there was no agreement on the meaning of intervention. Instead, the concept reflected the 
deep anxiety felt by the ‘new’ countries and remained relevant in the practice of international 
relations throughout the Cold War period.
The debate on Intervention and Non-Intervention in the Post-Cold War Period
By 1989 and the end of the Cold War, another debate emerged on intervention and 
the principle of non-intervention. The definitions and the issues raised in the 1965 and 1970 
UN declarations were not made redundant because of the collapse of one international 
system. These were principles to guide states in their relation with one another. However, the 
collapse of the Cold War and with it the ideological confrontation between the East and 
West, advanced new opportunities to discuss and find ways to tackle major issues of 
international relations. A pressing concern that was not adequately addressed during the Cold 
War era was the number of civil wars and how to resolve them.
In the post-Cold war era contemporary discussion on intervention began to locate 
itself around mechanisms to resolve internal conflicts. The discussion was not solely based 
on the question of the military use of force as a response to internal conflicts. Instead, 
discussion focussed on a combination of military and non-military options and the 
participation of a broad spectrum of actors beyond the intervening state in resolving internal
General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970. The full text is in The Yearbook of the United 
Nations, (1970), pp. 788-792.
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conflicts. Discussion on these types of intervention can be found in the literature on third- 
party mediation and conflict resolution which, according to Bruce Jones, ‘allow us to 
consider a wide variety of different processes and actions as interventions.’^  ^This approach 
provides an all-embracing and inclusive approach to the resolution of internal conflicts. Put 
another way, as opposed to the traditional method of high-level and power driven diplomatic 
mediation, this process is more multilateral in its approach. As Tom Woodhouse states, it 
involves ‘a range of intervention strategies from peacekeeping to problem-solving 
w orkshops .T he  aim is to tackle the root causes of a particular conflict, and through 
‘problem-solving workshops’, third-party mediators facilitate dialogue and negotiation among 
the warring factions. '^^
As stated above, conflict resolution involves the use of peacekeeping and 
peacemaking, both defined by Lori Fisler Damrosch ‘as forms of intervention.’^  ^
Peacekeeping is a form of third party intervention - a peaceful act that seeks to prevent not 
just an escalation of armed conflict, but also the intrusion of other external forces in a conflict 
situation. In essence, it is the inter-positioning of military personnel between warring parties. 
The aim is to prevent fighting, maintain the cease-fire, and provide stability while negotiations 
are going on. This type of peacekeeping was present during the UN operation in the Congo 
fi"om 1960-1964. Peacekeeping, however, depends on the prior consent of all parties to the 
conflict even if such an act may still consist of the use of armed personnel.^^ It is for this 
reason that a question mark hangs over whether peacekeeping should be defined as a form 
of intervention. What was distinctive about peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era was the
^B. Jones, ‘’Intervention without Borders’: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990-94’, Millennium, 
Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 1995, p. 240. See also M. Hofiman, ‘Third-Party Mediation and Conflict Resolution 
in the Post-Cold War’ in J. Baylis and N. Rengger, (eds.) Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues 
in a Changing World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 261-286.
^ T. Woodhouse, ‘Commentary: Negotiating a New Millennium? Prospects for African Conflict Resolution’, 
Review of African Political Economy, No, 68, 1996, p. 136.
^ On third-party mediation and conflict resolution, see M. Hoffinan, (1992), pp. 261-286 and the ‘Special 
Issue on International Mediation’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 1, February 1991. On third-party 
mediation in Afiica, see 1. W. Zartman, (1995a), pp. 234-249.
L. Fisler Damrosch, ‘Changing Conceptions of Intervention in International Law’ in L. Reed and C. 
Kaysen, (eds ), (1993), p. 92.
 ^E. Haas, ‘Beware the Shppeiy Slope: Notes toward the definition of Justifiable Intervention’ in L. Reed and 
C. Kaysen, (eds ), (1993), p. 81.
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inclusion of the use of armed forces to assist and protect UN humanitarian agencies and other 
international aid agencies in the safe delivery of food and medical treatment to victims and 
refugees of civil wars. This, for example, became a predominant feature of the UNPROFOR 
mandate in Bosnia. Another significant aspect of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period 
was the expansion of its mandate to include the supervision of elections, assistance in drafting 
constitutions, creating a new government and police force, national reconciliation and 
rebuilding civil society through the disarmament of warring factions and the reintegration of 
rebel forces and refugees into ‘normal life.’ These latter activities form what is defined as 
‘peacebuilding’ (or ‘post-conflict reconstruction’), and the UN operations in El Salvador 
(ONUSAL, 1991-1995), Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992-1993) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ, 
1992-1994) serve as examples.^^
One of the more interesting aspects of the post-Cold War debate on intervention and 
non-intervention had been the idea of preventive intervention or measures taken to detect the 
possible outbreak of conflict and to avert its escalation into armed conflict. This form of 
intervention is largely dependent on an early warning regime which informs states of 
impending conflicts in other regions, and in turn encourages the intervening agents to take 
preventive action before conflicts descend into full-scale civil wars. The deployment of troops 
in Macedonia in 1995 serves as an example of preventive intervention. A more relevant 
example of preventive intervention was the OAU’s attempts to forestall the outbreak of a 
full-blown conflict in Rwanda when it took part in the Arusha Peace Process (1991-1994). 
Action there involved the use of various third parties, ranging from political leaders, 
diplomats and international organisations placing themselves between the parties to the 
conflicts ‘in order to produce a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the issues causing the 
conflict.’^ * Although the peace process failed and led to the genocide of April 1994, 
preventive intervention sheds a spotlight on the options and actions available to interveners 
beyond a military solution. Unfortunately, the tragedy of Rwanda undermined the potential 
of preventive intervention as an instrument to create lasting peace.
E. Haas, (1993), p. 67. For an understanding of the language adopted by the UN since the end of the Cold 
War, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, edn. with new supplement and related UN 
documents (New York: United Nations, 1995).
The idea of the Arusha Peace Process representing a case of preventive intervention is discussed by B. 
Jones, (1995), pp. 240-244, esp. p. 241.
25
So far we have concerned ourselves with the definition of intervention and non­
intervention in the Cold War and post-Cold War era. We have noted that there was not a 
break with the Cold War thinking on intervention and non-intervention; rather what was 
noticeable in the post-Cold War period was the range of actors beyond the state that were 
involved in resolving a conflict. Also significant was the nature of intervention in the post- 
Cold War era. Intervention did not stop at interposing troops between warring factions, but 
also involved a range of activities such as election monitoring, rebuilding socio-political 
institutions of a war-torn society and providing humanitarian assistance. We can further 
define intervention by outlining some of the aims or reasons used to justify intervention in 
internal disputes. An examination of the reasons given by states for intervening allows us to 
consider how the practice of intervention has evolved beside the principle of non-intervention 
in the internal affairs of states.
Justifying Intervention
When states intervene, there are often a host of motives or justifications given. The 
threat posed by an internal dispute to international peace and security is often cited as a 
reason for intervening. On occasion, the UN Security Council authorises action under 
Chapter VU of the Charter if it recognises the existence of a threat to international peace and 
security. In Somalia, the ‘threat to international peace and security’ was cited as the primary 
purpose for UN intervention in 1992. The Security Council mandate stated that it was taking 
action to prevent the likely spill over of the conflict or its causes to other neighbouring 
countries."^ ®
^ Article 39 states that ‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression....’
See C. Ero and S. Long who state that the phrase “international peace and security” is now the ‘magic 
formula’ used by the UN Security Council to justify certain acts of intervention by the United Nations. 
‘Humanitarian Intervention: A New Role for the UN?’ International Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 
1995, p. 151 and 153. In a report to the UN Security Council, the former Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros 
Ghali stated that the civil war in Somalia posed a threat to international peace and security under Article 1 
of the Charter since ‘[t]he countries of the region - Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and the Sudan - some more than 
others, are beset by problems that are largely common to all. As a result, the exacerbation of conflict in one 
of the countries of the region could have serious consequences in one or more of the others. ’ Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali, ‘The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General ’, UN Security Council Document S/23693, 
11 March 1992, para. 12.
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According to Fisler Damrosch, some internal conflicts contain ‘transboundary 
elements’, either as contributing factors (for example cross-border arms transfers or ethnic 
affinities) or as effects of the crisis (for example, refugee flows) which can pose a threat to 
the surrounding region/^ Some internal conflicts may also generate friction and instability, 
either political or economic, in neighbouring countries. There are vivid examples of how an 
internal crisis in one country can affect another country or an entire region and consequently 
spark off regional insecurities. For example, the Afiican continent has witnessed the problem 
of refugee overflows in neighbouring countries coupled with regional insecurity and 
economic instability. The conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda in the 1990s not only affected 
both countries, but also had devastating effects on Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, DRC), and to a lesser extent, Uganda and Tanzania. The Liberian civil war not only 
had a negative impact on the countries that maintained troops there for seven years, but was 
said to have contributed to causing a deadly civil war in Sierra Leone. These transboundary 
elements have been used by states to justify intervention in certain internal disputes, claiming 
that civil wars are a threat to regional and international peace and security. Furthermore, the 
phrase ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ state, where no central authority is present, added to the 
plethora of justifications available to the intervening agent(s).
Two other inter-related motives that are often cited are national interest and self- 
defence. Self-defence is given added weight because it is enshrined in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.'^^ In the official statements provided by the Indian and Tanzanian governments in 
their interventions in East Pakistan and Uganda respectively, the justification was said to be 
self-defence, although some commentators regard both as humanitarian action. '^* Counter­
intervention is said to be another justification for intervening, where the decision of one state 
to enter an internal dispute in favour of one side may provoke the entry of another to support
L. Fisler Damrosch, Tntroduction’ in L. Fisler Damrosch, (ed.), (1993), p. 5.
F. Mosha, ‘Relations between the OAU and Sub-regional organizations in the Prevention, Management 
and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa’, (African Dialogue Centre for Prevention, Management and Resolution 
of Conflicts in Africa, Arusha, Tanzania - Unpublished Manuscript, 1996), p. 2.
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that ‘nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the 
United Nations.’
^ On India, see M. Walzer, (1992), pp. 105-108. On Tanzania, see C. Thomas, (1983 and 1985), Chapter 
Four.
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the other side to a conflict. Richard Little suggests that the purpose of this type of 
intervention is not to undermine the principle of non-intervention, but rather to reinforce it. 
The aim is to forestall the likelihood of intervention by outside states interested in helping 
either the government in power or other warring faction(s) in an internal conflict. States may 
also wish to counter intervention that is undertaken by their rival(s). As Northedge and 
Donelan remark, counter-intervention occurs when State A believes that the initial 
intervention by State B poses a threat not only to ‘world security’ but to its own security.^  ^
In this context, we can refer to Nigeria’s decision to intervene in the Chadian civil war in 
1978 to counter French and Libyan intervention, which will be discussed in Chapter Four.
States sometimes argue that intervention is also justified when the purpose is to 
rescue one’s own nationals or protect humanity and redress violations of human rights.'^  ^
Intervention could be permissible in the internal affairs of a state where there is widespread 
human suffering that so ‘shocks the conscience of mankind.’ It is often designated 
humanitarian intervention - intervention for the sake of humanity. This type of intervention 
gained prominence in the early years of the post-Cold War period. There is no agreed 
definition of what constitutes humanitarian intervention, but in essence it has traditionally 
been defined as action directed at preventing or halting serious violations of fundamental 
human rights with the threat or use of force. The nineteenth and early twentieth century 
definition of humanitarian intervention was frequently attached to the idea of rescuing one’s 
own nationals who were caught in an internal conflict, beyond the provision of helping those 
in distress in general. The protection of one’s own nationals was also cited by the US when 
it intervened in Grenada in 1983.
Increasingly however, and more so in the mid-1990s, human rights was used by some 
academics and practitioners as a tool for justifying many acts of intervention.'^  ^It is important 
to note however that there is as yet no overall consensus as to whether humanitarian 
intervention is permissible or recognised by all within the international society of states. UN
F. Northedge and M. Donelan, (1971), p. 120.
^ See N. Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention on the Grounds 
of Humanity (X>oiàiQchV. Martinus Hijhoff Publishers, 1985).
For example, see O. Ramsbotham and T. Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary 
Conflict: A Reconceptualization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) and N. Rodley, (ed.) To Loose the Bands 
of Wickedness: Intervention in Defence of Human Rights (London: Brassey’s (UK), 1992).
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Security Council Resolution 794 (1992) illustrated the lack of consensus among member 
states over the meaning of humanitarian intervention. The Resolution authorised ‘all 
necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief 
operations in Somalia.’ However, the preamble to Resolution 794 stressed the ‘unique 
character of the present situation in Somalia’ and the ‘complex and extraordinary nature’ 
which ‘requir[ed] an immediate and exceptional response.While recognising the gravity 
of human suffering in Somalia, member states were reluctant to establish a precedent on 
intervening for humanitarian reasons.
Finally, there is another area of motives or justifications for intervention that is 
relevant to this study. In explaining motives for intervening, Northedge and Donelan suggest 
that some states either intervene to help a government that faces internal overthrow or to 
support an internal rebellion. Let us take the first situation. The intervening state may have 
involved itself in an internal dispute because it supports the government or leadership in 
power. More important, if that leadership is an ally or promotes a policy line that is 
favourable to the intervening state, then the latter may see intervention as a ‘right’ or duty. 
A ‘right’ in the sense that the overthrow of a particular leadership with an unknown quantity 
may prove troublesome not only to the world, but to the security of another state if it chooses 
not to intervene. In this context, Northedge and Donelan mention American and British 
attempts to resist the spread of communism, ‘because the victory of the [communist] uprising 
would represent the extension of an alien social philosophy in the world. ’ Hence, the US 
acted in South Korea (and later Vietnam) in response to its fear of spread of the communism, 
although this was justified as resistance to Soviet aggression.'^®
On the other hand, the intervening state may give support to an opposition group 
which may be promoting a ‘social philosophy’ that is in line with its own thinking. Such 
support is linked to a sense o f‘brotherly solidarity’ with similar social philosophies that exist 
in other countries. In this context, Northedge and Donelan mention revolutionary states like 
the former Soviet Union and Egypt who supported movements in other states that promoted 
communism and Arab nationalism, respectively. According to Northedge and Donelan, these 
revolutionary states felt that they had a right or an ‘over-riding legitimacy’ to interfere in the
UN Security Council Resolution 794, UN Doc. S/Res/794, 3 December 1992. 
F. Northedge and M. Donelan, (1971), pp. 119-123, esp. p. 122.
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internal dispute of another state. This had nothing to do with maintaining the status quo or 
state sovereignty’ but instead was concerned with promoting justice against the Western 
capitalist system which they believed was a threat to their advancement. Certainly, as we 
will discuss in Chapter Four, the policy of the Soviet Union towards some African liberation 
movements was not only to promote Maixist-Leninist ideology, but to prevent the expansion 
of Western ideology. Indeed, research indicates that there were certain instances of 
intervention by African states who were seen as supporting ideological or revolutionary 
movements that corresponded to their particular world view.^^
Conclusion
The aim of this first part of the Chapter has been to provide a definition of 
intervention. We focussed on the definitions contained in the two UN declarations of 1965 
and 1970, because the definitions given then were largely influenced by the views and 
expressions of the newly independent states of Afiica and Asia. In both declarations, 
intervention meant not only armed intervention, but it included what these states called new 
forms of intervention: subversion, terrorist acts, propaganda, infiltration, supplying of arms 
or war material for aiding rebellions in another state, and financing, training or supporting 
movements aimed at overthrowing a regime. This is rather a broad definition, but one that 
is important for understanding how intervention has existed alongside non-intervention 
among African states in the conduct of their relations with one another. These declarations 
are not technically binding upon states as the UN General Assembly cannot make binding 
decisions upon member states. However, it was felt by the states who participated in the 
discussions that member states should abide with the ‘spirit’ contained within international 
law and the UN Charter: that is to maintain international peace and security and ensure 
friendly relations among states. We also touched upon the discussion on intervention and 
non-intervention in the post-Cold era and noted how a range of military and non-military 
options and actors were used to tackle internal conflicts. We ended by paying particular
F. Northedge and M. Donelan, (1971), p. 123.
The claim that some African states intervened to support other groups or regimes that shared similar world 
views is discussed throughout this thesis. Existing work has also shown that this motive was widespread in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. See A. Hughes and R. May, (1986) and I. W. Zartman, (1968), pp. 188-197.
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attention to the various motives and justifications often cited by states when intervening. 
These are some of the points that will be useful to us in our study of how the practice of 
intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa.
n. The evolution of the Principle of Non-Intervention in African International 
Relations
The aim of this next section is to review African diplomatic thought on the subject 
of intervention and non-intervention in internal disputes. We use resolutions and documents 
that were drawn up in the early days of post-colonialism to explain the traditional attitude 
towards intervention and non-intervention. This section also considers several cases to 
illustrate how the principle of non-intervention has evolved, largely unopposed, in African 
international relations. The discussion on African views on intervention and in turn, the 
continent’s lack of response in dealing with its internal disputes, usually takes place in the 
context of the OAU as it is seen as the symbol of African diplomacy.
As we noted in the previous section, the ‘new’ states of the African continent that 
emerged to take their place within the international system of states held onto and 
safeguarded the norms of state sovereignty, non-intervention and territorial integrity. The 
desire to adhere to these existing norms of the international system was largely reflected 
within the context of the Charter of the OAU when it was established in 1963. The first five 
of the seven principles of Article 3 sought to ensure the sanctity of the state:
1. the sovereign equality of all Member States;
2. non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
3. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its
inalienable right to independent existence;
4. peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or
arbitration; (and)
5. unreserved condemnation, in all its forms of political assassination as well
as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other
State.
The full text of the Charter of the OAU can be found in B. Andemicael, The OA U and the UN: Relations 
between The Organization of African Unity and the United Nations (New York and London: Africana 
Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 291-298, esp. p. 292.
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Each of these principles will be discussed within this section/^
The experience of great power colonialism ensured that these principles became 
necessary tools in maintaining the effectiveness of the state-system within the African 
continent. Rather than develop principles that were indigenous to them, African leaders 
aligned themselves to what already existed, by making the modem European state-system 
applicable to Africa. Furthermore, as we have already discussed, they also ensured that the 
principle of non-intervention was rigorously adhered to by all. The attempts taken by the 
African leaders to adhere to existing norms are striking. As Mohammed Ayoob confirms:
The globalization of European power and of its attendant norm of 
international intercourse introduced colonized territories...to the notion of 
state sovereignty, which is the fundamental defining characteristic of the 
modem system of states. Along with the notion of state sovereignty came its 
corollaries: rigidly demarcated and sacrosanct boundaries, mutual recognition 
of sovereign political entities, nonintervention in the intemal affairs of other 
states. Third world state elites have internalized these values to an astonishing 
degree.
The principle of non-intervention is not something specific and unique to Afiica and 
other developing countries; the principle is a comerstone of the UN Charter and guides the 
relations of states. The strict observance displayed by developing or weaker states towards 
the principle of non-intervention was a reflection of the order which prevailed in the 
international system prior to the emergence of newly independent states in the late 1950s. 
Through the OAU Charter, African leaders were merely supporting what was seen as an 
essential mling to preserve the dominance of the sovereign state and the associated principle 
of the right and equality of states within the intemational system. As James Mayall states.
The signing of the Afiican Charter in 1963, with its implicit endorsement of 
the territorial status quo, and its explicit denunciation of subversion and 
political assassination and intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, 
was more...a reassertion of traditional principles evolved outside Afiica than 
a major attempt to establish a new and specifically African order of
The principles contained in Article 3 of the OAU Charter reflect the primary purpose and principles set 
out in the UN Charter. In fact, African leaders were influenced by the UN Charter in drawing up their own 
principles concerning the obligation of member states to maintaining peace and security.
^M. Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International 
System (Boulder: Lyime Rieimer Pubhshers, 1995), p. 71.
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intemational relations.
The extent to which African states, and also other states from the developing world, 
had adopted the norms and principles of the modem European state-system can be seen in 
the UN declarations of 1965 and 1970. Although we noted that they were not technically 
binding, they nonetheless illustrate the normative inclination of its signatories and the 
negative connotations that intervention carried within the countries of the developing world. 
These declarations were not only symbols of the ending of colonialism, although the 
‘psychological imprint’ of colonialism remained ‘fresh in the minds of the developing 
wor ld .They  also served as examples of the determination of the developing countries to 
prevent outside intervention in their region. They sought to link the problem of intervention 
with colonialism and to this end held that a reversal of colonial policies would inevitably lead 
to a principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states. The link between intervention 
and colonialism was again made apparent in a statement given by the spokesman of the 
Group of 77 in 1991 when he cautioned ‘against broadening the definition of humanitarian 
intervention’ in relation to the rise of intemal conflicts since the end of the Cold War. In a 
debate on the Strengthening o f the Coordination o f humanitarian emergency o f the United 
Nations, Mr Awoonor stated that:
[T]he Group of 77 is slightly worried that some...may not be sensitive to 
certain pleas for an abiding respect for the sovereignty of nations. Our 
concem stems from our historical past, when many of us, as colonial subjects, 
had no rights. The respect for sovereignty which the United Nations system 
enjoins is not an idle stipulation that can be rejected outright in the name of 
even the noblest gestures. . . And an essential attribute of the sovereignty is the 
principle of consent, one of the comerstones in the democratic ideal itself.
African countries gave little support to the idea that intervention in the intemal affairs 
of states could be permissible, whatever the moral or legal justifications for such an act. 
Thus, intervention must be regarded as ‘suspect’ as it still evokes memories of great power
J. Mayall, Africa: The Cold War and After (London: Elek Books, 1971), p. 30.
^ D. Dallmeyer, (1995), p. 25.
^ General Assembly A/46/PV.41,11 November 1991, (statement of Mr Awoonor, representative of Ghana 
speaking on behalf of the Group of 77), pp. 34-6. Also see D. Dallmeyer,(1995), p. 26.
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imperial dominance, ‘racism and national humiliation.’^ * It is partly for this reason that 
developing countries uphold the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. It is also 
because a majority of these states are economically and politically vulnerable, thus making 
them easy targets for intervention, that Africa and developing countries in general give strong 
support to these norms and principles. Directly related to this latter point is the belief of some 
African states that intervention generates a culture of dependency and consequentially 
undermines national sovereignty. In an article written in 1983, S. Neil MacFarlane made the 
following point on intervention in Africa:
The view that intervention compromises national sovereignty...rests on the 
argument that intrusion on behalf of a party to a civil war creates a 
relationship of dependency such that the local client is incapable of 
independent action in intemal and intemational affairs where his interests or 
preferences diverge fr'om those of his patron. In other words, intervention 
constitutes a new kind of colonialism.^^
Certainly, as MacFarlane states, the history of assistance received by Francophone states 
fr'om their French colonial masters was an indication of this culture of dependency, but even 
here, ‘it is probable that political and economic ties are far more important in accounting for 
dependency in much of Francophone Africa than is French military activity.
The principle of sovereignty and non-intervention was not only directed towards 
North-South relations, but was also applicable in intra-African affairs. In fact, the frrst three 
principles of Article 3 of the OAU Charter signified African states’ determination to ensure 
that the norm of non-intervention was upheld throughout the continent. The doctrines of 
independence, territorial integrity and non-intervention were frequently asserted and 
confirmed within the context of declarations issued by numerous conferences, from the First 
Conference of Independent African States in Accra, Ghana (1958) to the Summit Conference
*M. Trachtenberg, ‘Intervention in Historical Perspective’ in L. Reed and C. Kaysen, (eds.), (1993), p. 32. 
See also D. Dallmeyer, (1995), p. 26.
59 S. N. MacFarlane, (1983/4), pp. 58-59.
® S. N. MacFarlane, (1983/4), p. 59. Even after the end of colonisation, France maintained an interest with 
its former colonies, providing both military and economic assistance which were designed to ensure French 
interests on the Afiican continent. Chapter four of this study focuses on French intervention in Afiican affairs 
in the 1970s. On French interventionist policies, see A. Clayton, ‘Foreign Intervention in Afiica’, in S. 
Baynham, (ed ), (1986), pp.205-215.
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of Independent African States in Addis Ababa (1963)/^ As a consequence, ‘there has been 
a tendency to consider the use of violence to force one state’s will on another as “un- 
African.”’®^ Three areas of intra-African affairs throw a spotlight on the OAU’s position on 
the question of intervention: a) the problem of boundary disputes, b) the problem of 
subversion, and c) intemal conflicts within member-states.
The problem o f boundary disputes
Instead of renouncing the structures stemming from colonialism, African leaders 
wanted to preserve existing territorial entities and thus secure the integrity of the state 
system. This in essence meant developing policy to maintain the existing status quo. Border 
disputes were engulfing regions of Africa before the creation of the OAU.®^  For example, 
conflict emerged between both Somalia and Ethiopia, and Somalia and Kenya. Somalia made 
claims over the validity of the borders it had with both countries on the grounds of ethnic 
nationality, suggesting that certain regions belonged to it. So for example, it contested a part 
of the Ethiopian territory known as the Ogaden, claiming that the region was ethnically 
Somali on the basis that Somalis were inhabitants in the area. The argument then for 
maintaining the existing colonial borders was to avert potential conflicts and instability that 
would erupt on the continent if boundaries were redrawn or reclaimed. Moreover, African 
leaders feared that any boundary changes would undermine the political power they had 
amassed within their own countries. The legality of existing boundaries were upheld in a 
resolution at the OAU Cairo Summit Conference in 1964 which adopted the intemational law 
principle of uti possidetis, a concept that asserts that all member states were committed to
I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 92. The full text of these various conferences and summits can be found in C. 
Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd, rev. edn., 1965), pp. 157-166 
and pp. 294-302.
“ I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 93.
C. Thomas, (1985), p. 68. On the problems of boundary disputes in Africa, see I. Brownlie, African 
Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (with the assistance of I. Bums), (London: C. Hurst and 
Company for the Royal Institute of Intemational Affairs, 1979); S. Touval, ‘The Organisation of African 
Unity and African Borders’, International Organization, Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 1967, pp. 102-127; A. 
Cukwurah, ‘The Organisation of African Unity and African Territorial and Boundary Problems: 1963-1973 ’, 
Indian Journal of Intemational Law Vol. 13, No. 2, April-June 1973, pp. 176-206; and C. Widstrand, (ed.) 
African Boundary Problems (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969).
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respecting the frontiers existing at the time of their independence. The resolution of the Cairo 
Summit stated that the borders from the colonial era constituted ‘a tangible reality’ and to 
this end, member states ‘pledge[d] themselves to respect the borders existing on their 
achievement of national independence.’^ '^
The problem o f subversion
As with boundary disputes, the problem of subversive activities predated the creation 
of the OAU. The constant claims and counter claims of subversive activities by individual 
African states heightened the OAU’s anti-interventionist standing, but also its desire to 
promote a policy o f ‘good neighbourliness.The problem of subversion was particularly 
intense in West Africa. Ghana had been accused of subversive activities in Côte d’Ivoire as 
early as 1959 and later in January 1963 when she was accused of taking part in the 
assassination of Sylvanus Olympio of Togo. However, Ghana was not alone in pursuing 
subversive activities. Togo and Nigeria were also said to be harbouring political exiles and 
opposition groups, mainly from Ghana, within their borders.^ However, rather than openly 
criticise individual member-states, the founding fathers of the OAU entrenched the problem 
of subversion and political assassination in the context of Article 3 of the Charter. Its 
position, which was further reflected in the 1965 ‘Declaration on the Problem of Subversion’ 
at the Second Session of the Assembly of Heads of State, also dealt explicitly with non­
intervention when members ‘solemnly’ declared:
1. Not to tolerate in conformity with article 3, paragraph 5, of the OAU
Charter any subversion originating in our countries against another Member
^ The fiill text on the ‘Border Disputes Among African States’ can be found in the ‘Resolutions of the First 
Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity’ in C. Legum, (1965), 
pp. 303-308, esp. p. 303.
® O. Ojo, D. Orwa and C. African Intemational Relations, (London: Longman, 1985), p. 85. The full 
text on ‘Good Neighbourliness’ can be found in the ‘Resolutions of the First Assembly of the Heads of State 
and Government of the Organization of African Unity’ in C. Legum, (1965), pp. 304-305.
“ I. W. Zartman, (1987), pp. 89, 97-100.
^ See T. 'EVi2&, Africa and the Development of Intemational Law, edn. revised by R. Akinjide (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), p. 128.
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State of the Organization of African Unity;®*
2. Not to tolerate the use of our territory for any kind of subversive activity 
directed from outside Africa against any Member States of the Organization 
of African Unity;
3. To oppose collectively and firmly by every means at their disposal every 
form of subversion conceived, organised or financed by foreign powers 
against Afiica, the OAU or its member states individually;
4. (a) To resort to bilateral or multilateral consultation to settle all disputes 
between two or more member states of the Organization of Afiican Unity;
(b) To refrain from conducting press or radio campaigns against any 
Member States of the Organization of Afiican Unity; and to resort instead to 
the procedure laid down in the Charter and the Protocol of Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration of the Organization of Afiican Unity.
5. (a) Not to create dissension within or among member states by fomenting 
or aggravating racial, religious, linguistic, ethnic or other differences.
(b) To combat all forms of activity of this kind.®^
We shall discuss the problem of subversion Chapter Two
Intemal conflicts in a member state
This area deals directly with the question of intervention and non-intervention within 
the continent. Since the beginning of the post-colonial era, many of the conflicts that emerged 
on the Afiican continent have been intemal. Throughout the OAU’s thirty-five year history, 
member states were reluctant to sanction intervention in the intemal dispute of other 
member-states. The only occasion that could warrant some form of intervention was the 
stmggle for liberation. As Zartman remarked, ‘[t]he only justification for warfare so far has 
been anticolonialism.Apart from this, the OAU is widely seen as placing the resolution of 
intemal conflict in a secondary position, preferring instead to give primacy to the practice of
® Article in, paragraph 5 stated that member states declared, ‘unreserved condemnation, in all its forms of 
poUtical assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other state. ’
The full text of the Declaration can be found in I. Brownlie, (ed.), (1971), pp. 16-17. Also cited in C. 
Thomas, (1985), pp. 70-71.
1. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 92.
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‘maintaining a reasonable level of harmony among the majority of member s t a te s .S o  for 
example, in cases such as the secessionist movements in Biafra, Eritrea and Southern Sudan, 
the OAU remained silent, preferring to be bound by the principle of non-intervention.^^ Two 
reasons exist as to why ‘new’ states of Afiica subscribe to the principle of non-intervention, 
especially in their response to intemal conflicts or civil wars that occur on the continent. First, 
intervention is seen as having a negative impact (especially) on security. The argument 
usually provided is that to intervene is to prolong the conflict. Hence, rather than being a 
solution, intervention becomes a problem. This view was expressed by critics of the 
ECOWAS peacekeeping force - ECOMOG - intervention in Liberia.MacFarlane gives an 
accurate account of how intervention is depicted by Afiican leaders in the following 
statement:
This conclusion is apparently based upon several implicit or explicit 
judgements with respect to the effect of external military interference on 
African core values: that intervention both prolongs and intensifies the 
conflict which provoked it, increasing the number of casualties and refugees 
and the level of physical destruction in the target environment; that it thereby 
jeopardizes economic development; that it erodes national sovereignty; and 
that it is politically destabilizing.^^
In other words, the intensity of a conflict can also undermine socio-economic development 
in terms of agricultural or industrial exports. It can also disrupt physical infrastructures such 
as roads, rail power lines and factories. Furthermore, the intensification could also have 
adverse effect on social infrastructures such as school, medical facilities, and health care 
provision. An intensification of a conflict can also lead to the displacement of thousands of 
peoples.
W. Foltz, ‘The Organisation of African Unity and the Resolution of Africa’s Conflicts’ in F. Deng and I. 
W. Zartman, (eds.) Conflict Resolution inAJHca (Washington, DC.: The Brookings Institute, 1991), p. 354.
Eritrea finally gained independence in 1991 after many years of fighting with Ethiopia over its right to 
secede. Yet, it was only in April 1993, following a referendum on independence that one could say that it 
achieved ‘de jure’ sovereignty. 1 thank Dominique Jacquin-Berdal for this point of clarification.
^ At the early stages of the conflict in Liberia, Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic and Liberation 
Front (NPLF) and the main opposition to the regime of Samuel Doe criticised ECOMOG and in particular 
Nigeria for its perceived lack of impartiality. The Liberian civil war will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Five.
S. N. MacFarlane, (1983/4), pp. 56-57.
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Second, it is important to note that most African leaders are reluctant to intervene in 
the intemal affairs of other states especially on questions related to the political legitimacy 
of a state or its human rights record. A policy of intervention would not only open the 
intervening states up to scrutiny from other states, but many African leaders also lack the 
moral standing to intervene in a crisis which concerns political legitimacy or human rights, 
because they too are ‘mired’ with these problems.^^
The three areas mentioned above explain the emergence of the key principles within 
the OAU Charter: non-interference in the intemal affairs of states; respect for the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of member states; and condemnation of subversive activities. As 
Amadu Sesay, Olusola Ojo and Orobola Fasehun state, all three ‘are interrelated and are 
meant to reinforce each o t h e r . I n  addition, all three principles reflect the legitimacy of the 
African state system that had been erected by the various leaders within the continent during 
the period of decolonisation. However, the decision to establish such principles within the 
OAU Charter needs to be understood within the context of the OAU’s inception. By 1963, 
there were already accusations that certain African states were conducting subversive 
activities and supporting attempts at political assassination. Such problems were to define the 
position to be adopted by African states who came together in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to 
create an institution for intra-Afncan affairs.
Conclusion
On gaining independence from their colonial masters, African states incorporated the 
principles of intemational law that were enshrined in the UN Charter within the OAU 
Charter. However, despite the declared assertion of non-intervention, a history of normative 
thinking about when intervention is justified, combined with the actual practice of state 
intervention, exists beside the principle of non-intervention.
The final part of this Chapter, provides a short review of existing research on 
intervention by Afiican states in intemal conflicts in Afiica. These various works have opened
S. Amoo, (1993), p. 254.
A. Sesay, O. Ojo and O. Fasehun, The OAU After Twenty Years (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 
1984), p. 5.
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the door for further research on how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the 
principle of non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Afiica.
m . Research on African intervention in internal disputes
The research being conducted here fits in with existing work, especially that done by 
Caroline Thomas, Arnold Hughes and Roy May, S. Neil MacFarlane, and I. William Zartman. 
The aim is to briefly explain each author’s contribution to the debate on the practice of 
intervention among Afiican states, although reference will be made to each work throughout 
this study. With the exception of Zartman, all make specific reference to the use of military 
force and/or situations which involve a military dimension without the necessary use of armed 
force.^ What follows is a brief analysis of Caroline Thomas’ work, as what she has to say on 
Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda is relevant to Chapter Four.
Caroline Thomas’ work questioned whether the principle of non-intervention had 
been challenged, extended or modified by ‘new’ states as they entered the European system 
of intemational relations.^* The purpose of her study was ‘to examine the practice of 
intervention in contemporary intemational politics, in order to see whether the traditional 
legitimate justifications offered for breeching the non-intervention norm have been 
extended.In relation to Afiica, she outlines how intervention is perceived by Afiican states. 
Thomas provides a history, not only of how the core principles of the OAU Charter evolved, 
but also of how they were defended on several occasions by Afiican leaders. The main 
example was the condemnation of Tanzania’s intervention against Uganda in 1978. With the 
exception of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, Thomas argues that Afiican states 
did not undermine the principle of non-intervention, even in situations of human rights 
atrocities and the massacre of civilians as was seen in Uganda in the 1970s.
Even in the case of Tanzania, Thomas argues that while Julius Nyerere could have 
justified his actions in terms of humanitarian intervention, official statements declared the
^ I. W. Zartman, (1968)and (1987). Since Zartman’s work is particularly relevant to Chapters Two and Three 
which deal with the early years of intra-African af&irs in the post-colonial era, I will not discuss it until then.
^ C. Thomas, (1983) and (1985).
C. Thomas, (1985), p. viii.
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situation to be a case of self-defence. To this end, Thomas argues that Tanzania’s actions fell 
‘within the categories of the traditional debate’ on non-intervention.However, as will be 
discussed in Chapter Four, Tanzania’s actions did open up a debate within the continent, 
(though it was somewhat limited and done to prevent accusations of a double standard by 
supporters of Nyerere) about the shortcomings within the OAU and the whole question of 
human rights on the continent.
Of all the authors mentioned, the work done by S. Neil MacFarlane and Arnold 
Hughes and Roy May seeks to explore the practice of intervention in intra-Afiican affairs. 
MacFarlane’s main interest is with interventions initiated from outside the continent." In two 
articles, MacFarlane is concerned with the impact of intervention on regional security in 
Afiica: ‘the regional causes of intervention and, from the perspective of African states, what 
its implications are for regional security.’"  This aspect of his argument is not entirely relevant 
to this study. What is relevant, is what MacFarlane says about Afiican attitudes, perceptions 
and policies towards intervention.
MacFarlane suggests that some Afiican leaders may see intervention as permissible 
if it is aimed at preserving and enhancing state sovereignty as when Soviet and Cuban troops 
defended Ethiopia’s territorial integrity against Somali aggression between 1977 and 1978. 
Intervention is also seen by some Afiican states as justifiable if directed at the ‘struggle for 
liberation,’ a point which Caroline Thomas also noted." Both these incidents are discussed 
in further detail in Chapters Three and Four. MacFarlane argues that both incidents 
demonstrate ‘mutually incompatible positions’ among African leaders on the question of 
intervention and non-intervention in African conflict, and then concludes that the increase in 
the number of intervention in the late 1970s and early 1980s ‘not only reflects but fosters 
[the] erosion of previously accepted norms.’"  Unfortunately, MacFarlane stops short in both 
articles of explaining what these ‘mutually incompatible positions on intervention’ are.
“ C. Thomas, (1985),, p. 118.
S. N. MacFarlane, (1983/4), pp. 53-73 and (1984), pp. 127-151. 
S. N. MacFarlane, (1984), p. 129.
“ S. N. MacFarlane, (1983/4), p. 59 and 60.
^ S. N. MacFarlane, (1983/4), p. 60 and 63.
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beyond his observation that support was given by some African states to foreign intervention.
MacFarlane’s work does not have much to say about the involvement of African 
states in various internal conflicts. When he does mention it, it is set in the traditional 
discussion of how the OAU responded: resolutions and declarations which condemned 
intervention. Furthermore, he defines the involvement of regional powers (e.g. Algeria, 
Ethiopia, Libya and Nigeria) in the internal affairs of other states in the traditional terms of 
military capabilities or national interest: ‘[t]he growing disparity of military power in the 
region gives some regional actors a capacity which they did not previously possess to 
respond to or take advantage of these conditions or to pursue their interests through the 
projection of force .MacFarlane does not, however, consider whether there are other 
contributing factors beyond military capability and hegemonic power to explain the 
interventions that were occurring on the continent by Afiican states. On this point, the work 
of Hughes and May not only adds to that done by MacFarlane, but it is notable for its 
research in explaining the use of Afiican armies in particular conflicts, between and within 
states on the continent.
Of all the works discussed here, that of Arnold Hughes and Roy May’s is not only 
relevant, but represents the most serious systematic research on African military involvement 
in the internal affairs of other Afiican states.*® Over a period of 25 years (1960-1985) they 
discuss cases of military intervention by Afiican states in the affairs of their neighbours. In 
their own words Hughes and May are concerned with ‘the deployment of elements of the 
armed forces in open support of foreign policy objectives on the territory of other countries 
in the [African] region.’*^ Their focus is on the ‘loaning’ of military resources: troops, 
training, funding, and equipments.**
Between 1960 and 1985, Hughes and May categorize at least thirty cases of military 
intervention by Afiican states as regime supportive, regime opposing, or state supportive. 
Regime supportive refers to situations where some states intervened in support of the
“ S. N. MacFarlane, (1984), p. 135.
“ A. Hughes and R. May, (1986), pp. 177-202. 
^ A. Hughes and R  May, (1986), p. 178.
“ A. Hughes and R  May, (1986), pp. 191-192.
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leadership within a particular country. The leadership may have shared a similar foreign 
policy outlook to the intervening state, but the aim was to provide ‘mihtary assistance...to 
a threatened regime or government.’ In situations where the intervention was regime 
opposing, Hughes and May argue that states sought to assist in the overthrow of a particular 
regime. Finally, in situations where the intervening agent’s motives were state supportive, 
intervention was aimed at ensuring the survival of state sovereignty as opposed to preserving 
the ‘authority-structure’ (i.e. the regime).Hughes and May argue that intervention aimed 
at supporting another regime accounts for the majority of the thirty cases they examined, 
while those seeking to overthrow the regime or government were less frequent. Such an 
argument is no different from that reached by Christopher Clapham who, writing a year 
earlier, spoke about ‘The Foreign Policy of State Preservation’;
In the context of the state-centred politics of [Africa], external intervention 
on behalf of regimes established in power at the centre acquires legitimacy 
which similar intervention on behalf of their opponents lacks. This is logical 
enough: in an area of potentially very high stability, one is stabilising, the 
other destabilising; governments which themselves are heavily dependent on 
external assistance, are quick to denounce any such assistance to their 
opponents, and to claim that essentially domestic opposition...is externally 
directed.^
Hughes and May outline a number of reasons for the interventions that they consider. 
These include: ideological solidarity among states that are said to be radical; threats from a 
common enemy; racial solidarity against the white colonial regimes of Southern Africa; 
‘personal friendships between national leaders’ and ‘personal or national aggrandisement.’^  ^
Such justifications are similar to those outlined by Northedge and Donelan when they suggest 
that states tended to intervene because they have some shared affinities or social philosophy 
with other states. States everywhere have particular world views and ambitions that they 
want to promote, and in turn want to support those who share similar views. What makes the 
interventions by African states distinctive for Hughes and May, is that a majority were
89 A. Hughes and R. May, (1986), pp. 178-180.
C. Clapham, The Third World: An Introduction (London and Sydney: Groom and Helm, 1985), pp. 115- 
116.
A. Hughes and R. May, (1986), pp. 193-194.
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conducted by economically weak states such as Tanzania and Guinea: ‘Compared with this 
somewhat ostentatious resort to external intervention by these poorer countries, the richer 
states of the sub-continent (such as the Ivory Coast and Kenya) have a pallid record.
All the works mentioned above are beneficial in that they do not characterise intra- 
Afncan affairs in the traditional sense of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member 
states. What, however, distinguishes this present study from these works, especially those 
done by MacFarlane and Hughes and May? One of the concerns of this study is to ask if it 
is possible to detect a ‘pattern of ideas’ or ‘persistent and recurrent’ thinking by Afiican 
leaders about whether or not to intervene in the internal affairs of states. To this end, there 
are similarities with the research already conducted by Hughes and May. In fact, while they 
do not promote these categories as somehow representing normative thinking by Afiican 
leaders, they do open the door for further research on the act of intervention by Afiican 
states. However, while their categories are useful, this study shifts the focus and develops 
other areas which will perhaps serve to reinforce or to refine the analyses developed in the 
work of writers like Hughes and May.
We have already argued that this study presents a broader definition of intervention 
beyond the use of military force, but this itself is not an immediate and distinguishing feature. 
What distinguishes this present study is the starting point it chooses to examine how the 
practice of intervention evolved alongside non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. For this 
study, the starting point is Pan-Africanism and the two themes contained within it: African 
exclusivity mdi African unity. Both, it will be argued, shed light not only on how intervention 
evolved, but also on the general practice of intra-African affairs.
Without anticipating too much. Chapter Two of this study argues that the underlying 
philosophy of Pan-Afncanism - the quest for freedom and independence on the one hand, 
and the desire to protect and defend the continent against the outside world on the other hand 
- had implications for intra-African affairs. The ideas and expressions on the principles 
governing state relations as articulated in the various versions of Pan-Africanism allow us to 
say something about African views on intervention. To this end, this study argues that to 
understand how Afiican views on intervention evolved, research should trace its development 
and other rules governing intra-African affairs to the debates that took place between the
A. Hughes and R  May, (1986), p. 195.
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‘new’ African governments in the various pan-Afiican conferences and meetings from the 
1960s. In this way, we might be able to say something about African views on intervention, 
just as Martin Wight did on Western thought on intervention. We might also be able to say 
something about the wider context of the Afiican normative order and interventions that have 
sometimes challenged that order which is based on the system of statehood. However, at the 
end, a crucial question needs to be asked: how far can African exclusivity and African unity 
enable us to understand the evolution of intervention on the Afiican continent? Are they 
‘persistent and recurrent themes’?
Conclusion
The purpose of this Chapter has been to define what is meant by intervention in this 
study and from here to provide a review of Afiican thought on intervention and the principle 
of non-intervention. We began by defining intervention through two UN declarations - 
General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) on the Declaration on Inadmissibility o f 
Intervention in Domestic Affairs o f States and Protection o f their Independence and 
Sovereignty (1965) and General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) on the Declaration on 
Principle o f International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter o f the United Nations (1970). This was because the 
‘new’ countries of Sub-Saharan Afiica advocated the main tenets of both resolutions with 
the support of Asia, Eastern European and Latin American countries and the Soviet Union. 
More important for this study, several key principles within both resolutions are relevant to 
our understanding of how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non­
intervention on the African continent.
The definition on intervention in this thesis is therefore broad to reflect the thinking 
of the states who participated in the UN debate. Intervention not only means armed 
intervention, but it also means subversion, terrorist acts, propaganda, infiltration, supplying 
of arms or war material for aiding rebellions in another state, and financing, training or 
supporting movements aimed at overthrowing a regime. We further defined intervention by 
outlining some aims or reasons used to justify intervention in internal disputes.
The aim now is to explore how the practice of intervention has evolved on the Afiican 
continent, and in turn, consider whether there are ‘persistent and recurrent themes’ that will
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allow us to note a ‘pattern of ideas’ about the thinking of intervention in Afiica. Put another 
way, the aim is to consider whether it is possible to notice if there are any close and 
interconnecting factors involved in the particular interventions that we analyse. This is a task 
that Northedge and Donelan set for themselves in their analysis of external intervention in 
international disputes during the 1950s and 1960s.^ More important, and here Northedge and 
Donelan prove instructive again, the purpose is to address the following question: do the 
motives for intervening work at every stage and belong to some continuous thinking about 
intervention by Afiican states?
” F. Northedge and M. Donelan, (1971), p. 130.
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CHAPTER TWO
PAN-AFRICANISM: A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING AFRICAN 
THOUGHTS ON INTERVENTION?
Introduction
The purpose of this Chapter is to explain how African leaders understood intervention 
and non-intervention through various Pan-African meetings in the early 1960s. This Chapter 
argues that the ideas and expressions on the principles governing state relations as articulated 
in the various versions of Pan-Africanism and its central themes, are useful in understanding 
how the practice of intervention evolved on the African continent. Two central themes of 
Pan-Africanism dUQ African autonomy or exclusivity (better known as “African solutions for 
African problems”) and African Unity (often called “solidarity”).
Part One of this Chapter begins by briefly examining two key determinants of foreign 
policy in African states in the early 1960s. These are national interest and ideology. Both are 
crucial not only for understanding the foreign policy outcome of African states, but also for 
discerning the norms and principles that guided intra-African affairs in the early post-colonial 
period. In Part Two of this Chapter, we examine Pan-Africanism, asking what it is, what it 
represents and arguing that it is about both unity and exclusivity. In Part Three, we examine 
closely the notion of African exclusivity. The notion of African exclusivity is tied to the 
creation of the OAU, and we ask if this organisation represents a useful starting point in 
understanding the debate on intervention and non-intervention. Part Four and Five focus on 
the notion of African unity because there are various versions of it that are significant for 
understanding how the norms and principles that guided intra-African affairs developed. Two 
distinct schools of thought emerged in the post-colonial era that held different views on the 
notion of African unity. These schools were often labelled the ‘radical’ and the ‘moderate- 
conservative’ school.^ Their various interpretations contributed to an understanding of 
African foreign policy and norms and principles that guided intra-African affairs. We discuss 
the views of both schools in Part Four. In Part Five, we consider how the notion African 
unity as expounded by both schools serves as a source in which to place African thoughts on
 ^ Appendix II sets out the various associations and blocs that developed in post-colonial Africa.
47
intervention and non-intervention. The aim is to conclude that the various meanings attached 
to the notion of Afiican unity shed light on the co-evolution of the non-interventionist norms 
as set out in the OAU Charter and the interventionist practice among Afiican states.
I. The nature of Foreign Policy in early Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.
Before explaining Pan-Afiicanism and the position of the various groups that formed 
in the early stages of post-colonial Afiican politics, it is important to briefly say something 
about the nature of the foreign policy of Afiican states in general during this time. It is 
difficult to state that one factor determines the foreign policy of any particular country. There 
are series of factors that work alongside one another or against each other in explaining the 
outcome of any foreign policy decision. It is the task of the student of foreign policy analysis 
to observe what factors are predominant over time and exert the most influence on the 
decision-making process. This study is not however an examination of the foreign policy of 
Afiican states, but the subject matter is such that a few general words are necessary on the 
nature of the foreign policy of Afiican states.^
What makes understanding the foreign policy of Afiican states so difficult is defining 
the national interest of a particular state. The term ‘national interest’ is however a misnomer 
in understanding the foreign policy outlook of Afiican states. When the early post-colonial 
leaders spoke about national interest, it usually inferred policies which were directed against 
colonialism. However, we can best understand the term as the interest and vision of the 
particular leader, although the idea that the national interest represents the vision of a leader 
is not something specific to Afiica.
Ideology also played an important role in the foreign policy of Afiican states in the 
early post-colonial years.^ The particular ideology or political philosophy of a leader often 
has an important place within the context of foreign and domestic policy making. As Zartman 
notes, ‘every state nurtures a number of dreams and hopes about the world in which it would
 ^On Afiican foreign policy, see O. Aluko, (ed) The Foreign Policies o f African States (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1977) and D. Thiam, The Foreign Policy of African States: Ideological Bases, Present Realities, 
Future Prospects (London: Phoenix House, 1965).
 ^ See M. Radu ‘Ideology, Parties, and Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in R. Bissell and M. Radu, 
(ed ), (1984a), pp. 15-40.
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like to live.’'^  In explaining the place of ideology in the West Afiican region between 1957 and 
1964, Zartman notes that ‘[i]n one group of West African states, however, these aspirations 
[i.e. ideologies] are dominant over other considerations...in determining foreign-policy 
actions. In other states, these aspirations are more distant matters.' Sometimes, these 
ideological aspirations are used by states to justify certain foreign policy decisions. Zartman 
argues that ideological considerations are likely to be more distant to the ‘reahst’ who feels 
that it should remain in the background while it is ‘making discrete choices for immediate 
needs.’ For the ‘idealist’ however, ideological criteria are not only necessary, but should 
remain ‘high on the list of policy criteria and must be kept untainted.’^
There is a limit to how far one can argue that ideologically based criteria determines 
all foreign policy in Afiica. Certainly, as we noted above, other factors exist to determine a 
state’s foreign policy: various internal forces in a country can affect foreign policy making; 
the structure of a country’s internal security; the military power of a particular state; its 
relations with its neighbours and its regional alliances, the influence of former colonial 
masters and the desire for territorial expansion. These factors intertwine in countless ways 
and, over time, reveal not only a state’s behaviour, but also the interests of that particular 
state. Again Zartman proves instructive when he cautions against the use of ideology as a 
point from which to understand and locate African foreign policy.*
While no single factor exists to explain the nature of the foreign policy of African 
states, to a certain extent, it is possible to suggest that Pan-Afiicanism became a significant 
vehicle in the foreign policy of some Afiican states. Pan-Africanism was a strong 
ideologically force in the struggle for independence in the 1950s and was often referred to 
by Afiican leaders who came together at various Pan-Afiican meetings in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Pan-Afiicanism is just one way of understanding aspects of Afiican foreign 
policy, especially the debate of intervention and non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Afiica. 
However, our concern is not to explain individual state foreign policy from the point of view 
of Pan-Africanism, but to analyse how it has been used by some Afiican leaders to justify
 ^I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 55. 
 ^I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 55.
* I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 56. Also see M. Radu, (1984a), pp. 15-40.
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their foreign policy activities, such as intervention in the internal affairs of other countries/ 
n. Pan-Africanism
The ideas and opinions on intra-African affairs that emerged in Sub-Saharan Africa 
during the decolonialization process in the late 1950s largely came from those leaders who 
established their thoughts within the context of various Pan-African movements. What we 
intend here is not a detailed examination of the contents of Pan-Africanism, as there are many 
variants of this movement. Instead, we are primarily concerned with those aspects that enable 
us to understand how the practice of intervention evolved on the African continent.
Pan-Africanism, at least that which existed before Ghana’s independence in 1957, 
began as a ideological movement led by black Americans against slavery and racial 
discrimination. We can trace the movement back to at least 1900 when the first Pan-Afiican 
Congress was held in London. Its main concern was with achieving freedom and 
emancipation for all negroes. Pan-Afncanism evolved into a cultural, political and racial 
ideological movement of black consciousness. The main advocates of this movement from 
outside the continent - W.E.B du Bois, Marcus Garvey and Jean Price-Mars - came to 
represent these various aspects of Pan-Afiicanism.* Within Afiica, the main proponents of 
Pan-Africanism - namely President Leopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, President Felix 
Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, President Sékou Touré of Guinea and President Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana - embraced the various strands of Pan-Afiicanism, seeing them as 
necessary components for establishing an African continent free from great power
 ^For a position which questions the relevance of Pan-Afiicanism as a reliable guide for analysing African 
foreign policy, see L. Jinadu, ‘The Philosophy of Pan-Africanism and its Relevance to Afiican International 
Relations’ in Nigeria and the World. Papers on Nigerian Foreign Pohcy. Vol. 1 (Prepared under the auspices 
of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, January 27-30,1976), pp. 1-26.
® While Marcus Garvey placed more emphasis on racial issues, W.E.B du Bois and Jean Price-Mars 
concentrated on the cultural aspects of Pan-Afiicanism. For an analysis of their contribution to the Pan- 
Afiricanist movement, see Chapter 1 of D. Thiam, (1965) and Chapter 3 of V. Thompson, Africa and Unity: 
The Evolution of Pan-Africanism (London: Longmans, 1969). Rupert Emerson also states E.W. Blyden and 
George Padmore as figures who contributed to the main tenets of Pan-Africanism. See ‘Pan-Africanism’ in 
N. Padelford and Rupert Emerson, (eds.) Africa and World Order (New York and London: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1962), p. 14. Padmore key a key adviser to Kwame Nkrumah on African affairs between 1957-1959.
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domination/ For this study, the main focus is on the political aspects of Pan-Africanism, 
although as Doudou Thiam notes, it is difficult to distinguish between the political and 
cultural aspects of the movement/® In fact, the division is a matter of convenience for those 
analysing an extensive ideology which was seen as symbolising Afiican thought in the early 
days of decolonialization.
The main elements of this political strand of Pan-Africanism may be described in the 
following terms: a) a quest for autonomy in solving Afiican problems (i.e. Afiican 
exclusivity); b) liberation of all of Afiica from alien rule and racial discrimination and c) the 
knitting together of independent states into a form of association to build Afiican unity. 
These three elements sum up the aspirations among Afiican politicians at the early stage of 
decolonialization; and as we shall see in this study, they had implications for how the idea of 
intervention evolved within the continent.
A brief summary of the political strand of Pan-Afiicanism suggests that the main 
driving force were the notion of unity and exclusivity. It was widely agreed by Afiican leaders 
that unity and exclusivity were to be guiding principles in the struggle to liberate the 
continent from colonialism and racial discrimination. Afiican states believed that they should 
work towards political, social and economic development so that the continent had the means 
to take its place on the international stage. In addition, Afiican leaders argued that they had 
to unite and guard their independence against future colonialism. More important, it meant 
ensuring unity and solidarity among Afiican leaders in solving Afiican problems. Ensuring 
unity was paramount not only if Afiican leaders wanted to avoid ‘negative foreign influence,’ 
but also if they wanted to ensure autonomy in solving Afiican problems.
Most states agreed on the notion of Afiican autonomy or an exclusive right to tackle
 ^ Other key Pan-Africanists from the continent included Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Dr Nmandi Azikiwe 
(Nigeria) and Modibo Keita (Mali). It is also worth mentioning here that the Pan-Arabism of President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, found solid links with the Pan-Africanism of figures like Nkrumah. As with 
Pan-Afiicanism, the main problem was with imperialism and the danger that it posed. Liberation, power and 
unity were also key words in President Nasser’s philosophy. More important, Cairo became a base of several 
Afro-Asian Conference, and a refuge for nationalist and radical opposition movements. See Nasser’s The 
Philosophy of Revolution (Buffalo: Economica Books, 1959).
^°D. Thiam, (1965), p. 11.
For a similar list of the central tenets of the Pan-Africanist movement, see B. Andemicael, (1976), p.9.
B. Andemicael, (1976), p. 10.
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the continent’s problems. However, as we shall see in Part Four, not all states agreed on what 
form African unity should take. While African states worked for the same goal of freedom, 
independence, and African exclusivity over its affairs, the notion of unity became 
controversial and divided Africa leaders among themselves as they developed norms and 
principles to guide intra-African affairs.
Of all the three elements in the political strand of Pan-Africanism, the notion of 
African exclusivity was a major concern for the ‘new’ states of Africa as they entered the 
international system in the late 1950s. A major problem for them was how were they going 
to prevent new forms of great power colonialism entering the continent? It was because of 
this desire to protect the continent that the idea of African exclusivity emerged out of the 
Pan-Africanist movement. Other writers call this exclusivity ‘continental jurisdiction’, 
meaning that states within the continent had ultimate jurisdiction over their own affairs. 
African leaders did not express the idea, but leaders like Nkrumah and Touré frequently 
spoke about the ‘right’ African states had to freely conduct their affairs without outside 
interference.
In Chapter One, we discussed how African states advocated the signing of several 
international declarations at the UN to prevent outside interference. Closer inspection of the 
structures surrounding African diplomacy will show that the idea of African exclusivity, 
which was an expression of anti-colonialism, emerged in response to the fear of great power 
intervention. As Yolamu Barongo states, it became a mechanism or a ‘device for keeping 
African affairs free from foreign interference.’ "^^ Put another way, having attained political 
independence, African states gave ultimate expression to the rights of sovereign states to 
conduct their own relations.
See Y. Barongo, Neocolonialism and African Politics: A Survey o f the Impact of Neocolonialism on 
Afiican Political Behavior (New York: Vantage Press, 1980), p. 70 and A. Mazrui, (1967), Chapter Three 
and (1969), Chapter Seven.
Y. Barongo, (1980), p. 70. See also C. Thomas, (1985), p. 64.
Some writers linked the idea of Afiican exclusivity or continental jurisdiction to the US Monroe Doctrine. 
For example, Ali Mazrui defined the ‘closest analogue’ of African exclusivity as the ‘diplomatic system of 
the American states’, that is the Organization of American States (OAU), which was founded upon the 
nineteenth century Monroe Doctrine. See A. Mazrui, (1969), p. 118-122 and D. Thiam, (1965), p. 17. The 
Doctrine guided regional politics in the Americas from the nineteenth century. The Moiu-oe Doctrine was 
based on the US’ aspiration to conceive of an apparatus that would preserve its independence and the rest of 
the American continent fix)m European dominatioa It is however worth noting that there are problems with
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In the following part of this Chapter, we focus on the Pan-African notion of African 
autonomy (i.e. exclusivity) and consider whether it serves as a framework in which to place 
African thoughts on intervention and non-intervention. Since African states argued that the 
continent had an exclusive ‘right’ or autonomy over its affairs, what implications did it have 
for African affairs, especially in situations where conflicts arose within states? Does African 
exclusivity represent other norms and principles that evolved alongside the traditional norms 
of sovereignty, non-intervention and territorial integrity? What does it tell us about the 
practice of intervention by African states?
m . African exclusivity and the * right* to intervene
It seems reasonable to think that the notion of ‘African exclusivity’ would be helpful 
for understanding how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent. On the one hand 
the notion of exclusivity meant limiting or where possible, preventing outside interference, 
while on the other hand, and because of the former, it referred to the establishment of a 
system of self-help and self-regulation to address conflicts on the continent. However, as we 
argue below, its significance in understanding the practice of intervention by African states 
is not readily apparent in the early years of post-colonial intra-African affairs. This is because 
the whole notion of exclusivity was tied to the creation of the OAU, an organisation that was 
supposed to represent a system of self-regulation. This third part of the Chapter is about why 
such a seemingly obvious starting point does not work, and why we have to look elsewhere 
to understand how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent. Nevertheless, we 
discuss it now because it partly explains how African states came to establish the OAU. More 
important, as we shall see when we discuss the radical states in Part Four, the notion of 
exclusivity and unity was interrelated: African unity was only possible if African states had
asscxiating the idea of African exclusivity with the Monroe Doctrine. The Doctrine became a symbol of US’ 
hegemonic power within the region of Central America. The idea that this doctrine was to prevent outside 
interference was gradually extended to give the US sole jurisdiction over inter-American affairs and a right 
or duty to protect other American states. And while American leaders never defined this ‘right’, it 
nonetheless signified America’s power within that region. As Martin Wight notes, the Monroe Doctrine went 
beyond protecting Latin America. It also protected American commercial and financial interests, ‘the policy 
which became known as ‘dollar diplomacy.’ Furthermore, it also reflected the US’ paternalistic attitude when 
it intervened against other political systems to that it objected. M. Wight, Power Politics, edited by H. Bull 
and C. Holbraad (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), p. 195. Also see C. Thomas, (1985), who refers 
to the paternalism of America towards Latin America, pp. 22- 33, esp. pp. 23-24.
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an exclusive right to direct their affairs, and to achieve this, a system of self-regulation was 
necessary.
In Part Two of this Chapter, we stated that one major area of Pan-Afiicanism was the 
desire to protect the continent from future outside interference. The wish by Africans to have 
control over their own destiny was very much in line with the idea of acquiring self- 
governance over their internal affairs, including the maintenance of law, order and security. 
In one sense, African states were advocating self-sufficiency, although it is not clear whether 
this translated into a desire to isolate the continent from the rest of the world. As a 
consequence of wanting control over their own affairs, the following question was often 
asked in the early years of the decolonialization movement: ‘Now that the Imperial Order is 
coming to an end, who is going to keep the peace in Africa?’ The thinking among Africa’s 
leaders was to build a system of self-regulation to oversee African affairs and ensure African 
exclusivity. In a sense, the African’s ambition was to be his own policeman and govern 
himself. The history of Africa’s colonial experience at the hand of the European powers 
legitimised the position of those forces who favoured Africans taking the lead in confronting 
the continent’s problems without recourse to outside help.^  ^Hence African exclusivity was 
usually referred to as “African solutions for African problems.” The OAU was created in 
1963 to be a symbol of African exclusivity, not only to protect the continent from outside 
intervention, but to regulate African affairs and develop home-grown solutions. The question 
we need to ask is how far can the OAU contribute to our understanding of African attitudes 
to intervention, especially when addressing the internal conflicts of other African states?
The OA U and African Exclusivity
Africa’s colonial experience made it inevitable that the OAU would make it a priority 
to try to solve conflicts without involving outsiders. The founding fathers of the OAU
A. Mazrui, (1969), p. 21. 
A. Mazrui, (1969), p. x.
A. Mazrui, (1969), p. x
J. Heihst, ‘African Armies and Regional Peacekeeping: Are there African Solutions to African Problems?’ 
Paper presented at the South African Institute of International Affairs, 4-6 August 1996, p. 2.
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ensured that their objectives were explicitly stated in the preamble of the Charter: Africans 
had an ‘inalienable right...to control their own destiny.’ This ‘inalienable right’ had 
implications for how Africa would deal with of conflicts on the continent, especially those 
within states. Underlying this ‘inalienable right’ was the OAU’s determination to ensure that 
it had ‘the prerogative of subjecting Afiican problems to Afiican solutions.The phrase 
“Afiican solution for Afiican problems” is a well-established principle on the continent and 
asserts that only Afiicans had an exclusive right to deal with their own problems.^  ^Mazrui 
argues that the founding fathers of the OAU wanted to create a ‘unit of exclusiveness’ by 
which only those within the continent had some form of ‘“family” right to interfere’ in the 
affairs of other Afiican states.This notion of exclusiveness was necessary to ensure and 
maintain the ‘keep out’ clause that the OAU had created as a mechanism against former 
colonial powers. Yet, as we will come to see in Chapter Four, the phrase “Afiican solutions 
for Afiican problems” became a mechanism not only for preventing outside interference, but 
also for justifying collective intervention by Afiican states within the continent. It championed 
the idea of a collective self-defence which was the preferred option instead of intervention 
which was frowned upon within the OAU.^^
The reason for wanting to develop “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” was 
because African leaders wanted to develop a diplomatic system that would not only enable 
the continent to deal with conflicts initially before allowing outside forces to influence the 
outcome of particular conflicts, but ensure that the continent did not become entangled in the 
superpower struggle.^ '* The need for a forum that would allow the continent to deal with its 
problems and prevent outside interference was expressed in a speech at the UN General 
Assembly in 1961 by the Ethiopian representative, Mr Yifhi, when he called upon his ‘sister 
States in Africa’ :
N. Pelcovits, ‘Peacekeeping: The African E:q)eiience’ in H. Wiseman, (ed.) Peacekeeping: Appraisals and 
Proposals (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), p. 258.
A. Mazrui, (1967), p. 40.
A. Mazrui, (1967), p. 40 and 41.
See also I. W. Zartman, (1968), p. 195 (in his footnote).
It is however worth noting that although Africans wanted to ensure they had an exclusive right in dealing 
with their own problems, they all signed the UN Charter and therefore gave up some of their right to the 
Security Council.
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to join in the creation, under Article 52 of the United Nations Charter, of a 
regional organization of African States, the basic fundamental task of which 
will be to furnish the mechanism whereby problems which arise on the 
continent and which are of primary interest to the region could, in the first 
instance, be dealt by Africans, in an Afiican forum, free from outside 
influence and pressure.^^
In response to Mr Yifru’s speech, when the OAU was created it dealt with two types of 
conflicts.
First, there were territorial, boundary or other disputes between neighbouring states, 
for example, the disputes between Morocco-Algeria and Somalia versus Ethiopia and Kenya 
which broke out in the same year that the OAU was created.^^ Both cases were dealt with in 
the OAU Commission on Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration whose remit was to settle 
disputes involving member-states. The Commission was not established by the OAU Charter 
but in Cairo in July 1964 at a meeting of heads of state.
The second type of conflict was what Berhanykun Andemicael calls ‘certain 
exceptional situations within individual African states brought about by ethnic, religious, 
political, or ideological differences which might create inter-state tensions or give rise to such 
problems as charges of foreign intervention and the overflow of refugees.These types of 
conflicts were frequent because ethnic groups cut across boundaries and one state may lay 
claim to the territories that these ethnic groups were in. Furthermore, refugees based in a 
neighbouring country could use that country as a base from which to launch an attack against 
their state. Andemicael cites the fiction between Rwanda and Burundi in 1963 and 1972 as 
examples of this second type of conflict.^* The OAU took a lead role in these disputes to 
signify that it had ‘undisputed jurisdiction as a forum for the initial consideration of African 
disputes,’ although it is worth noting that the OAU did not successfully intervene to stop the
Speech by Mr. Yifhi, General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, 10201^  Plenary Meeting, 2 October 1961, 
GAOR., para. 136. Also see B. Andemicael, (1976), p. 10. Article 52(2) of the UN Charter allows for the 
resolution of conflicts by a regional organisation before states refer to the Security Council, although Article 
54 states that regional arrangements and agencies must inform the Security Council about actions taken in 
the context of international peace and security.
B. Andemicael, (1976), pp. 17, 49-53 and 53-56.
B. Andemicael, (1976), p. 17.
B. Andemicael, (1976), pp. 17, 62-65.
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conflict between and within both countries. In the end, the OAU positioned itself ‘as a body 
of first instance’, but was unable to resolve the actual conflict.^ ® Similarly, the OAU did not 
succeed in resolving the dispute over the Ogaden or as we shall discuss in Chapter Four, 
conflicts like the Angolan civil war. As William Foltz remarks, the OAU initially ‘kept crises 
like Angola and the Ogaden out of the United Nations’, even though it had no institutional 
capacity to undertake the management of these conflicts.^ ®
According to Foltz, there are five ‘concerns’ that underlie this ‘principle of African 
exclusivity’ of which two are relevant here. The first relates to the general uneasiness 
surrounding outside intervention, even if the motive is well intended. While individual African 
states may seek the support of outside help,
Afiican judgement invariably emphasizes the negative externalities
of intervention. “We cannot afford to bring bulls into our china shop,” as an 
OAU official assigned to the United Nations once put it.^ ^
The second relates to the fear o f‘setting a precedent’ or making non-Afiican intervention an 
acceptable policy. As Foltz states, ‘once Afiica officially and collectively invites outsiders in, 
ambitious great powers will find it that much easier to return when their intervention may be 
less w e lco m e .O f course, this did not prevent some Afiican states calling upon former 
colonial powers to help them in resolving some of their conflicts as when Côte d’Ivoire, Chad 
and Gabon sought assistance from France or when Great Britain helped to put down mutinies 
in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya in 1964.^  ^In such a situation, it is worth noting some of 
the reasons why states either call for or support outside assistance in resolving their conflicts, 
and among these cases, Gabon is particularly interesting in this regard. Instead of condemning 
the French action, some states praised the intervention at the OAU meeting held in Lagos,
B. Andemicael and D. Nicol, ‘The OAU: Primacy in Seeking Africa Solutions within the Charter’ in Y. 
El-Ayouty and I. W. Zartman, (eds.) The OAU After Twenty Years (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 
p. 103. See also B. Andemicael, (1976), pp. 47, 91-97.
N. Pelcovits, (1983), p. 258.
W. Foltz, (1991), p. 355.
W. Foltz, (1991), p. 355.
W. Foltz, (1991), p. 355 and 359.
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Nigeria between February 24 to 29 1964. This should seem surprising, especially to those 
who considered that membership of the OAU meant strict observance of its core principle 
on non-intervention, especially from non-African forces. However as Immanuel Wallerstein 
explains, support for the French intervention flowed from several logical reasons:
what seemed to be most important was the consideration that the Gabon coup 
was getting to be one too many and there might now be a quick series 
throughout the UAM states, all moving their governments toward 
a...revolutionary position in African affairs and cumulatively creating a 
powerful reinforcement for the revolutionary [radical] core of the 
movement. '^^
Wallerstein’s observations will become more apparent when we discuss the various African 
groupings in Part Four and Five. While some states gave suppojt to the French intervention, 
the President of Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere, called an emergency session of the OAU Council 
of Ministers in Dar-es-Salaam on February 14* 1964, to have the British troops he initially 
requested replaced by an African force.^^
Conclusion
To sum up, the OAU was established to solve local problems locally, and to keep 
foreign powers from meddling in African affairs. Although the notion of African exclusivity 
(or the phrase “African solutions for African problems”) was expressed in the OAU, we 
argued at the outset of this section that it is difficult to suggest it as an immediate source for 
understanding how intervention evolved alongside non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
One reason exists. Primarily because of its Charter, the OAU ruled itself out of dealing with 
internal conflicts. In the end, as Pelcovits notes, the idea of ‘first instance’ or ‘try OAU first’ 
was a failure: ‘In Africa,...regional [or continental] primacy came to mean that intra-African
I. Wallerstein, 4/ /^ca.- The Politics of Unity: An Analysis of a Contemporary Social Movement (New York: 
Random House, 1967), 78. France defended her actions by claiming that it had an accord with Gabon to 
provide such an intervention in the event of the government being overthrown. See C. Crocker, ‘France’s 
Changing Military ItAqtqsI', Africa Report, Vol. 13, No. 6, June 1968, p. 24.
A communiqué was issued by the Council of Ministers to reflect the request made by President Julius 
Nyerere. See African Research Bulletin (Pohtical, Social and Cultural), February 1964, p. 21 A. (Hereafter 
ARB).
58
disputes that might have been contained or managed by the UN were in eflfect left untreated’ 
by the OAU.^  ^This is not to dismiss the notion of African exclusivity. Its usefulness is more 
apparent when we focus in later Chapters on how Africa states, working outside the 
framework of the OAU, used it to justify their interventions in internal conflicts.
In Part Four and Five of this Chapter, we consider how the other strand of Pan- 
Africanism, that is Afiican unity, serves as a framework in which to understand how the 
practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention. We begin by 
arguing that there is no single definition of Afiican unity, rather it has to be understood in the 
context of two distinct schools of thought that formed within the political strand of Pan- 
Afiicanism.
IV. Pan-African Unity
In Part Two of this Chapter, we discussed how Pan-Afiicansim came about. We also 
noted that while Afiican states worked for the goal of freedom, independence and autonomy, 
the notion of unity became controversial and divided Afiica leaders among themselves as they 
developed norms and principles to guide intra-Afiican affairs. Two schools formed on the 
notion of Afiican unity: the ‘radical’ and the ‘moderate-conservative’ school.
In analysing both groups, Wallerstein argues that the differences ‘were not differences 
over the stated common objective of unity. They were differences over the meaning of unity, 
its rationale, and its import. These differences were not formal but ideological.’^  ^Robert 
Good, however, argues that these groupings can be seen as an attempt by Western scholars 
to conveniently develop categories to explain the various Afiican voices and perspectives that 
were emerging, especially in relation to foreign policy. As Robert Good, who uses such 
categories, explains, we can criticise the use of such categories for being ‘inadequate because 
they derived more from Western than from African political experience.’^ * However, Good 
points out that in the early days of post-colonial politics in Afiica, researchers had ‘yet to
N. Pelcovits, (1983), p. 258.
I. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 108.
R Good, ‘Changing Patterns of Afiican International Relations’, American Political Science Review, 
Vol. LVIII, No. 3, September 1964, p. 632.
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develop a vocabulary fully descriptive of Afiican orientation.’ To this end, Good states that 
such categories gave a simplified view of assessing the position of various Afiican issues in 
foreign policy:
In fact, the use of any label or category suggests a certain hardness and 
permanence of the point of view it is meant to describe, and so tends to 
obscure the fluidity of the phenomena we are trying to understand and to belie 
the pragmatism that often dominates the approach of Afiican leaders to the 
enormous problems they face.^^
There is however some usefulness in drawing up categories and labels to explain the 
position of Afiican states in relation to the various issues concerning foreign policy. Except 
for the Pan-Afiicanist desire for liberation and independence for all states on the continent, 
it was impossible to claim that a single voice represented the foreign policy position of 
Afiican states. The number of events that occurred in the early years of independence on the 
continent contributed to the nature and complexity of the Afiican position on international 
relations, and to this end, researchers needed to establish methods to understand what was 
taking place. Good notes the usefulness in using such categories when he remarked that 
‘during the latter half of 1960, there was ample justification for attempting to differentiate 
among several views of the newly independent states of Africa, at least insofar as their 
foreign policies were concerned.’'*® One such justification for using these categories was 
because analysts needed to discern the various views on the norms and principles that guided 
intra-African affairs. The different views generated by the radicals and moderate- 
conservatives on principles to govern intra-Afiican affairs were significant in understanding 
the idea and practice of intervention on the continent in the early years of post-colonial 
Afiica.
The differences on how Afiican states should conduct their relations did not however 
cause any immediate or serious rift among the independent states. In fact, as we shall see in 
Part Five and also in Chapter Three, it was a series of events in the latter half of 1960 that 
intensified the ideological differences among the competing blocs: the differences over the 
meaning of Afiican unity, Ghana’s support for radical dissident organisations undermining
R. Good, (1964), p. 632. 
R. Good, (1964), p. 632.
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governments in the West Afiican region, and the civil war in the Congo.
Prior to this period, the independent states of Afiica came together at Accra, Ghana 
for the first Conference of Independent Afiican states between April 15-22, 1958 and later 
at the second conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on June 14 1960.'^  ^Liberia, together 
with the newly independent states of Ghana and Guinea upheld the principle of ‘non­
interference’ in a joint declaration in Sanniquelle, Liberia on 19 July 1959.'^ ^
The 'Radical'States
The main proponent of Pan-Afiican unity was the ‘radical’ group. This group is 
sometimes defined as the ‘radical-nationalists’ or the ‘revolutionary movement’. I t  was later 
called the Casablanca Group after it held a conference in Casablanca, Morocco fi'om January 
4 to 7,1961 to deal mainly with issues arising from the Congo crisis. In this Chapter, we will 
call this group the radical group. The radical group fits into Zartman’s definition of those 
groups of states, particularly in West Afiica, who were not only ‘idealists’ but also held onto 
an ideological position or a socio-political philosophy that determined their foreign policy 
outlook. This group advocated the idea of sovereign statehood, the maintenance of security 
and autonomy in solving Afiican problems. However, it could be said that its radicalism 
stemmed from its ‘extreme militancy in the struggle to eradicate remnants of colonialism, 
neo-colonialism, and white supremacy from the Afiican continent.For radical leaders, Pan- 
Africanism served as a strong ideological base for domestic and foreign policy objectives. 
Internally, radical leaders preached national unity to fight against colonialism and drew on 
historical sentiments of white oppression against black people. Externally, these leaders called
For a summaiy of the debate among the African states, see, Richard Pankhurst, ‘Independent African State 
in Addis Ababa: I’, West Africa, No. 2248, Saturday 2"^  July, 1960, p. 731 and ‘Independent African States 
in Addis Ababa: 2’, West Africa, No. 2249, Saturday 9* July, 1960, p. 769.
The full text of the Joint Declaration of the Government of Ghana, Guinea and Liberia issued at
Sanniquelle, Liberia, 19 July 1959, can be found in V. Thompson, (1969), pp. 361-363. See also ‘West
African ‘Summit” , West Africa, No. 2202, Saturday August 15*, 1959, p. 600.
See I. Wallerstein, (1967), pp. 20, 21,42, 226-7.
Wild, ‘Radicals and Moderates in the OAU: origins of conflict and bases for coexistence’ in P. Tharp 
Jr., (ed.) Regional International Organisations/Structures and Functions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1971), p. 37.
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for African unity and the creation of a formal political union and an African government. 
These leaders took as their starting point the common history and the long struggle for 
independence for African unity. This justification, they claimed, was to prevent and guard 
against those outside forces who aimed at dominating Africa's affairs.
Kwame Nkrumah headed this group in the first half of the 1960s. There were three 
central themes within the radical movement: 1) the removal of colonial structures and its 
newer version, neo-colonialism; 2) Afiican autonomy in solving Afiican problems; and 3) 
Afiican unity defined as political unification or a Pan-African political federation.'^  ^For the 
radicals, this vision of political unification and the possibility of Afiican autonomy was 
threatened by neo-colonialism, defined as an expression of the old colonial structure dressed 
up in a new guise. Leaders of radical states did not coin the term neocolonialism, what they 
did was to give the term greater significance in African politics. The All-African peoples’ 
Conference defined neocolonialism as ‘the survival of the colonial system in spite of formal 
recognition of political independence in emerging coun tries.F or the radicals, the survival 
of the colonial system was apparent in those states that sought to maintain strong links with 
their former colonial masters. Radicals saw these states as preventing the development of an 
autonomous and self-governing Afiican continent. As a consequence of their perceived fear 
of neo-colonialism, these radical states saw their ‘foreign policy as an extension of their 
domestic commitment to the creation of a “new order”’ that preached national unity at home, 
and continental unity among Afiican states.
This new order was bound by Nkrumah’s idea of a closer form of association with 
those Afiica states who had achieved independence. For Nkrumah, such an association was 
important if Afiican states were to achieve self-governance. In an address to the National 
Assembly of Ghana, Nkrumah stated that there were three alternatives open to African states 
in respect of their future: ‘Firstly, to unite and save our continent. Secondly, to disunite and
M. Zacher, International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-77: The United Nations, Organization 
of American States, Organization of African Unity and Arab League (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 
p. 123.
The fiill text of the resolution is in I. Wallerstein, (1967), pp. 260-263. For a comprehensive analysis of 
the concept of neocolonialism in the African continent, see K. Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage 
of Imperialism (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1965) and Y. Barongo, (1980).
P. Wild, (1971), p. 37.
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disintegrate. Or thirdly, to sell out. In other words: either to unite, or to stand separately and 
disintegrate or to sell ourselves to foreign powers.’'^ * The formation of a tight-knit association 
would be an expression of the union that Nkrumah called for in his famous phrase and book, 
‘Africa Must U n ite .T h is  expression of unity stemmed from a realisation among leaders 
like Nkrumah that they needed collective guarantees to preserve and strengthen the liberated 
countries of Africa.
Nkrumah was not the only leader who argued that the presence of some independent 
African states was meaningless unless the rest of Africa was free and African unity became 
a reality. Apart from Nkrumah, President Sékou Touré of Guinea was the most vocal Pan- 
Afiicanist.^ ® He too equated independence with unity when he stated that the move towards 
liberation was not to be an end in itself, but was to serve as a necessary basis for progress 
towards a ‘United States of Afiica.’ In a statement made in Accra, Ghana on 4 July 1960, 
President Touré argued that:
The United States of Afiica, which a few years ago was only a vague fancy, 
an aim that then appeared over-ambitious or hardly credible, is now a 
possibility that seems capable of fulfilment. It is already inscribed in the hearts 
and minds of our people. It is chronicled in song in our villages and schools. 
Our peasants, workers, the housewives, old men, and above all the younger 
generation, dwell upon the idea with unrelenting zest...
Has there ever existed anywhere else but in Ghana and Guinea a 
people who have endowed themselves with a constitution explicitly providing 
for the partial or total surrender of sovereignty in the interests of a wider 
Union of States? In this connection we must affirm quite definitely that our 
people are ready here and now to carry this out in practice.
K. Nkrumah, ‘African Affairs’, address delivered to the National Assembly on August 8th, 1960 in D. 
Marvin (ed.). Emerging Africa in World Ajfairs (San Francisco, California: Chandler Publishing Company, 
1965), p. 89.
'iAkmraah, Africa Must Unite ( London: Panaf Books Limited, 1963) in which he explicitly stated that 
Africa must unite or perish, (p. xvii and p. 189). On the need for African unity, also see Nkrumah’s speech 
‘United We Stand’, dehvered at the Conference of the African Heads of State and Government at the Addis 
Ababa Conference which led to the formation of the OAU in May 1963: Summit CIAS/GEN/INF/36, 
Proceedings of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, Vol. 1. Section, 2 (Addis Ababa, May 
1963).
See S. Tomé, Africa on the Move (London: Panaf Books, 1979).
President Sékou Touré cited in V. Thompson, (1969), p. 269.
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In fact, movement towards formal union was slow, and when union was achieved between 
Ghana, Guinea and Mali it did not amount to anything concrete/^
In explaining the main driving force of this radical movement, Rupert Emerson states 
that for this group, ‘the case for Afiican unity rests not only on such utilitarian grounds as 
the need to collaborate and to establish a common fi^ ont against Afiica’s enemies but also on 
the...conviction that Afiicans are bom to share a common destiny.Certainly, one key 
aspect of Pan-Afiicanism, at least that promoted by Nkrumah and Touré, placed emphasis 
on establishing a greater sense of oneness, solidarity and political integration.
The determination to seek formal unity among Afiican states was bound by a belief 
that there existed some kind of continental identity or fellow feeling, a feeling linked entirely 
to the shared experience of colonialism and of having the same racial distinction. Underlying 
this continental identity was a sense that Afiicans in some way symbolised a form of 
‘brotherhood.’ So when leaders like Nkrumah used phrases like ‘ Afiica Must Unite’, it not 
only symbolised a sense of brotherhood, but a kind of fi-atemal solidarity across the continent. 
Radical states hoped that this idea of brotherhood would help to generate the realisation in 
different regions that their interests were in many respects the same.
It is possible that this sense of fellow-feeling or brotherhood was only an ideal that 
lasted until individual regions obtained independence fi'om their colonial masters. That is to 
say that it was only relevant during the struggle for liberation. Once they had acquired 
independence, some leaders were more concerned with ensuring the security of their position 
at a domestic level than with the wider concern of enhancing the notion of Afiican 
brotherhood with their neighbours. More important, the concept of the state which radicals 
like Nkmmah wanted to downplay and to replace with the idea of a greater Afiican 
‘commonwealth’ or union, did not transform itself into an effective policy.
To a certain extent, the Pan-Afiicanism that the radicals expounded was an expression 
of African nationalism. On one level, it was a nationalism that saw Afiican interests as 
paramount and which sought to create an alliance with black peoples throughout Afiica on
Ghana and Guinea signed a joint declaration on 1 May 1959 and were later joined by Mali in April 1961 
to form a Charter of the Union of African States. Guy De Lusignan defined it as nothing more than an 
‘administrative fiction’ in French-Speaking Africa Since Independence (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), p. 
273.
R  Emerson, (1963), p. 7.
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the basis of a shared history of oppression at the hands of white Europeans. On another level, 
it spoke of creating a high order which would replace the nation-state and territorial 
affiliation with a United States of Africa.^ '* The ‘moderate-conservative’ school of Pan- 
Africanism upheld the first part of this view as a necessary principle for the future political 
independence of the African continent, but there the similarities ended.
The 'Moderate-Conservative ’ States
The ‘moderate-conservative’ group was formed in 1961 at the Monrovia Conference 
and from then on it became known as the Monrovia Group. Before this merger there were 
two separate schools known as the ‘moderate’ school and the ‘conservative’ school. What 
brought the moderates and conservatives together in 1961 was the Congo crisis and an 
attempt to act as a counter-balancing force to the radical bloc’s policy over that crisis.
Both the moderates and conservative school shared a belief in maintaining African 
independence, and upholding the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non­
intervention in the internal affairs of another state and ensuring autonomy in solving African 
problems. What distinguished both schools from the radicals was their rejection of the 
continental approach, or ‘the ideal of a wholly unified continent through a series of inter­
linking regional federations within which there would be a limitation on national 
sovereignty.’^  ^Both groups paid lip-service to the idea of Afiican unity. The main difference 
between the moderates and conservatives, lies mainly in the colonial heritage of the camps.
Except Guinea, Mali and Togo, the conservative group was made up mainly of states 
that had been ruled by France. Many were in West and Equatorial Afiica. The conservatives 
were also known as the Brazzaville Group after a meeting of heads of state in Congo 
(Brazzaville) from December 15 to 19, 1960, although they were formally known as the
On African nationalism, see George Shepherd, who states that Pan Africanism or African nationalism, 
as it is often referred to, took on various forms and ‘posed many enigmas, making it difficult to generalize’ 
about the pohtical expressions and actions of African leaders. Aside from the position advocated by Nkrumah, 
Shepherd notes the following forms of African nationalism: ‘the resurgent tribalism of the Ashanti, the 
fanaticism of the Man Man in Kenya, the bhnd bigotry of the Afrikaners in South Africa..., and the self- 
sacrificing determination of the fellagu of Algeria to win independence at any price are all manifestations 
of the varied faces of African nationahsm.’ The Politics of African Nationalism: Challenge to American 
Policy (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1962), p. 5. (Emphasis in original).
C. Legum, (1965), p. 38.
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Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM) and later the Organization Commune Africaine et 
Malagche (OCAM)/^ The conservative states were Cameroun, the Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d’Ivoire, Dahomey, Gabon, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal and Upper Volta. We will continue to call this group the ‘conservatives’ in this 
Chapter. Briefly stated, this group emphasised: (1) strong links with their former colonial 
masters, notably France and close ties with other European countries; (2) the maintenance 
of structures and boundaries inherited from their colonial masters. To this end, they were 
seeking to preserve the status quo. For most of the French-speaking states that formed this 
group, the unity expressed within the Pan-Africanist movement was not about developing an 
African government or political unification, but was about cooperation, especially economic, 
with other Afiican states.
The moderate camp was not far removed from some positions expressed by the 
conservatives. Good calls them the ‘in-between group’ for they were not as extreme as the 
conservatives or the radical group, but instead positioned themselves as neutral states. Their 
aim was to ‘establish an all-inclusive organization’ that would transcend the ‘existing 
divisions within Af i i ca .Such  a body would seek to build cooperation and not an Afiican 
‘super-state.’ Again like the conservatives, they wanted to maintain links with the West, 
although they emphasised that this link was not to make them reliant on Western assistance. 
Finally, they upheld the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention. The 
main states within the moderate camp in the early years of independence were Ethiopia and 
Liberia, later joined by Nigeria when it gained independence in October 1960. Somalia, 
Sudan and Togo also joined this group. Finally, like the conservatives, the moderates defined 
unity to mean nothing more than an alliance of states coming together to cooperate on 
economic or social issues.
Conclusion
The OCAM was established in May 1965 as a subregional economic group. On the estabhshment of the 
UAM see A. Tévoédjrè, Pan-Africanism in Action: An Account o f the UAM , Occasional Papers in 
International Afiairs, Number 11 (Harvard University Center for International Affairs, November 1965), esp. 
Chapter Two. Tévoédjrè was the first Secretary-General of the UAM.
R. Good, (1964), p. 633.
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Those who were labelled radical states sought to promote unity to ensure the future 
of African independence. They were labelled radical in the sense that the impulse for such a 
policy was far stronger from this group than from the moderate-conservative group who only 
sought cooperation. We should note that the pattern of alliances was not only based on those 
who had a strong emotional commitment to unity versus those who were only concerned with 
remaining unchanged. There were, as Catherine Hoskyns notes, other ‘marked regional and 
cultural differences (and embryonic ideological ones)’ between these groups.However, 
despite these other differences, in Part Five of this Chapter, we use the divergent views of 
unity as a way of understanding how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent.
We should however note that membership within the radical or moderate- 
conservative group was not static, and changed according to the ruling elite within a 
particular state, geographical developments, international politics and ideological situations. 
Leaders aligned themselves with other states holding the same foreign pohcy perspective, 
common views or ‘social philosophy’ as themselves. We should therefore see these 
associations as fluid and constantly changing. More important, being in the same group did 
not mean that there was a consensus on all issues. As we shall see in Chapter Three, the 
Ghanian and Guinean split over the Congo crisis made it difficult and confusing to make 
sense of the relevance of these groupings for understanding intra-African affairs. Rupert 
Emerson notes the fluidity of the groups especially in the early days of post-colonial politics 
when he states that:
although it is tempting to read a deep and long-lasting ideological conflict into 
the split between these two major groups, many observers are inclined to be 
sceptical of the solidarity of each of the groups within itself and of the depth 
and sticking power of the ideological divergence. Certainly it is premature to 
assume that any political situation in Afiica has as yet had time to achieve real 
stability. Both within each of the states and in the relations between them 
forces are at work which sharply challenge the existing order and may end by 
overthrowing it.^ ®
58 C. Hoskyns, ‘Trends and Developments in the Organisation of African Unity’, The Yearbook of World
Affairs (London: Stevens and Sons, Vol. 21,1967), p. 165.
R. Emerson, (1963), p. 1 
Zacher, (1979), pp. 134-136.
9. Also see P. Wild, (1971), pp. 36-37; I. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 21 and M.
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In sum, the raison d’être of Pan-Africanism is the attainment of freedom and 
independence on the one hand plus unity, peace and security, economic and social 
development on the other hand. As an ideology. Pan-Africanism was used by African leaders 
in the development of norms and principles that were to guide African international relations. 
While Africans on the continent took up the Pan-Africanist struggle of ensuring exclusivity, 
autonomy and independence for all states, not all of Africa’s leadership supported the 
radicals’ idea of unity. Rather, some leaders saw it as an ideal or as Albert Tévoédjrè states, 
a ‘glorious myth. However, despite this, the idea of African unity that was promoted by 
the ‘radical’ states of Africa had implications in the immediate period of the post-colonial era 
for how intervention and non-intervention were understood in intra-African affairs.
V. Intervention for the sake of Pan-African Unity
The main advocate of Pan-African unity within the radical group was Ghana. To 
understand the core of the radical position, this section will draw heavily on the role of 
Ghana. President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana can be seen ‘[a]s the primary architect of Pan- 
Africanism,... [believing] that Ghana had a special mission in Africa’s emancipation from 
colonialism and its political unification.’®^ The emotional commitment that Ghana and its 
supporters had for political unity was sufficiently strong in the first six years after 
independence for us to note its significance in intra-African affairs. In addition, the notion 
of unity serves to explain the particular view and action of certain states on the African 
continent especially in relation to problems of intervention in the internal affairs of another 
state. Finally, leaders used it as a ‘justifying slogan’ to sell their policies either to their 
domestic audiences or other African leaders.®^
®° A. Tévoédjrè, (1965), p. 2.
G. Shepherd, (1962), p. 95. We also focus on Nkrumah’s own thinking on Pan-Africanism because there 
is a lack of available material written in English on other radical states, notably Guinea and Mali.
See I. W. Zartman who outlines the usefulness of the idea of African unity in ‘Characteristics of 
Developing Foreign PoUcies’ in W. Lewis, (ed.) French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity (New York: 
Walker and Company, 1965), pp. 186-187. To this end, Africanists like James Mayall have used African 
unity to explain the general field of African international relations. See ‘African Unity and the OAU: The 
Place of a Pohtical Myth in African Diplomacy’, The Yearbook of World Affairs (London: Stevens and Sons, 
Vol. 27,1973), pp. 110-133. Also see, L. Adele Jinadu, (1976), p. 22 who despite raising doubts about the 
relevance of Pan-Africanism in African politics, states that ‘[wjhether we like it or not, Pan-Africanism has
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There were implications attached to the radical states’ notion of unity and the related 
theme of brotherhood. To a certain extent, it is possible to state that this sense of 
brotherhood led to an interventionist policy in order to achieve the goal of a formal political 
union. While trying to pursue political union, advocates of the radical school extended the 
meaning of brotherhood and unity to incorporate some notion of a right to influence the 
politics of another state, or more explicitly stated, to intervene in the affairs of other states. 
More important, it is possible to suggest that this sense of brotherhood, or more specifically, 
the slogan “We are all Afiicans” led to a policy of influencing the politics of various regions, 
especially where dissident movements who supported the ideology of unity were prominent. 
In addition, radical states supported those dissident movements in their attempts to 
overthrow their governments who they argued were neocolonialist or not “Afiican” 
enough.
If a state was criticised for not being “African”, it meant that the leadership of that 
state still had strong finks with its former colonial master. This, according to radical states 
undermined any possibility of ensuring unity and more important, Afiica’s exclusivity over 
its affairs. Indeed, when Guinea, a radical state, gained its independence from France, Sékou 
Touré ensured that all finks with France were severed. In the same way, Touré, along with 
Nkrumah, argued that Afiican states, upon achieving independence should relinquish their 
finks with their former colonial masters. Where states were still reliant on their former 
colonial masters, radical states supported dissident groups that were critical of their 
government’s policy claiming that their support to these groups was a ‘“continuation” of their 
efforts at Afncan liberation.Radical states did not see their actions as interference in the 
internal affairs of another state. Instead, they argued that the appeal to solidarity, unity or 
brotherhood, cut across state territory and consequently there was no notion of interference. 
Zartman accurately pinpoints what this sense of brotherhood, or “We are all Afiicans” means 
in the following sentence: ‘an African bom in Guinea, can take part in Camerounian politics
become and has come to stay as part of the language of Afncan politics. Policy-makers and statesmen who 
may not believe...it cannot resist the temptation of littering their foreign policy statements with references 
to Pan-Africanism, if only because such references make their positions respectable.’
I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 96.
I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 96.
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with no...presumption of illegitimacy....There is likely to be some...criticism for 
caipetbagging, but not enough feeling of illegitimate interference in sovereign states politics 
to cause rejection.The assistance given to dissident movements was an indication of how 
states were prepared to interpret principles of inter-states relations, especially the principle 
of non-intervention that had been agreed upon in Sanniquelle, Liberia on 19 July 1959 and 
at the Conference of Independent Afiican states in Accra, Ghana between April 15-22, 1958 
and later in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on June 14 1960.
It is not however surprising that radical states did not see their actions as intervention 
in the internal affairs of another state. Indeed, such thinking was logically arrived at. 
According to what Nkrumah preached, the idea of the state was a relic of colonialism, and 
in this new Afiican order, there were no boundaries separating brothers from each another. 
Hence, there could be no sense of interference since radical states were transgressing no 
territory. Yet, it was a form of interference, at least from the perspective of those states who 
did not share Nkrumah’s brand of Afiican unity.
States who were critical of Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism argued that his activities were 
subversive. In fact, subversion, which Afiican states (including Ghana and Guinea) described 
as a new form of intervention in the 1965 and 1970 UN declarations, became an important 
issue in the early days of post-colonialism, especially as it soon became intertwined with the 
idea of a supranational government in Africa.^ During the first conference of Independent 
African States in Accra (April 15-22, 1958), the Liberian Ambassador, Mr Simpson, 
described subversion as ‘undemocratic actions in overthrowing governments. He equated 
undemocratic actions with subversive acts.’®^ Simpson referred to the anxiety Liberia had 
expressed in relation to what she saw as Ghana’s ‘subversive and destructive ideologies’ of 
political union. Liberia, being a moderate-conservative state, advocated cooperation rather 
than the integration of states into a formal association of the kind advanced by Nkrumah. 
When a resolution was put forward on issues of intra-African affairs, the moderate-
I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 189. 
I. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 92.
^^ ‘DraftMemorandum-Conference of Independent Afiican States,’ cited in W. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign 
Policy 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology and the New State (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University 
Press, 1969), p. 33.
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conservative states made implicit references to subversion when leaders affirmed their respect 
for territorial integrity and ‘abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs 
of another country.’^ *
Those who were critical of Nkrumah felt that there was enough evidence to justify 
their attacks against him. They focussed on the various institutions and agencies set up by 
Nkrumah for fulfilling the goal of unity. In fact, the aim of these agencies was to build up an 
alliance with other groups who supported the idea of Pan-African unity. At best, non-radical 
states throughout the West Afncan region claimed that these institutions advocated 
subversive activities in other states, with the intent of weakening the target government. The 
most prominent institution set up in Accra, Ghana in 1958 was the Bureau of Afiican Affairs 
(BAA) which was described as a ‘half-govemment, half-party organism.Alongside the 
BAA was the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute and the African Affairs Centre which 
Nkrumah established in 1961. According to Dr. Michael Dei-Anang who was Principal 
Secretary at the Ghanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs fi’om 1959-1961 and Head of the Afiica 
Affairs Secretariat fi’om 1961 until the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, the BAA was to be 
the ‘sole instrument’ for Nkrumah’s strategy against colonialism. Its main function was to 
provide assistance in terms of financial aid and training to fi*eedom fighters who were under 
colonial rule in other Afiican states. However, in addition to this fiinction, the BAA also 
provided asylum to opposition politicians from other independent African states, including 
the Kingdom of Sanwi (in Côte d’Ivoire), Cameroon and Nige r . I t  was this latter function 
of the BAA that led many states and opponents of the radical group to conclude that 
Nkrumah’s action amounted to interference in the internal affairs of other states.^^
In their own research on Ghana’s external activity under Nkrumah, Arnold Hughes
The full text of the conference can be seen in C. Legum, (1965), pp. 157-166, esp. p. 158 and 161.
I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 97. See also W. Thompson, (1969), pp. 222-227.
M. Dei-Anang, The Administration of Ghana’s Foreign Relations, 1957-1965: A personal Memoir 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1975), p. 27.
In this context, it is however worth noting that the radical states were not alone in pursuing subversive 
activities or providing asylum and assistance to opposition groups. Conservative states like Côte d’Ivoire 
harboured anti-Nkrumah movement groups who had fled from persecution in Ghana. However in an 
interview with the Ivorian Ambassador to Ghana, Zartman was informed that the Ivorian President, Felix 
Houphouët-Boigny, denied supporting attempts to overthrow Nkrumah, suggesting instead that the aim was 
to grant the exiles asylum, with the proviso that they support themselves. 1. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 98.
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and Roy May conclude that while his ‘conservative neighbours’ accused him of ‘plotting their 
overthrow by providing clandestine military training and support to dissidents,’ no concrete 
evidence existed to suggest that Nkrumah sent his troops to other countries, except for when 
troops fought for the United Nations in the Congo as we shall discuss in Chapter Three. 
Although no evidence was forthcoming, a report written by the military government that 
overthrew Nkrumah in 1966 gave details of supposed subversive activities by the BAA In 
a section entitled ‘Subversion against Independent African States’, the report highlighted the 
use of the BAA to overthrow independent African governments with the hope of replacing 
them ‘with regimes that would be subservient to the policies of Nkrumah.The  report went 
on to provide what it defined as evidence to support its claim that Nkrumah had established 
an elaborate organisational structure not only to support opposition groups living in exile, 
but also to infiltrate regional territories like Côte d’Ivoire, Togo and Upper Volta in the 
pursuit of his objective of African unity. Of all these, the most serious allegation was that 
Ghana participated in the assassination of the President of Togo, Sylvanus Olympio on 13 
January 1963, although no adequate evidence was provided to prove this allegation. '^  ^
Although there was no concrete evidence supplied in this report to suggest that Nkrumah did 
sent troops to support dissidents groups, it was largely Nkrumah’s militant brand of Pan- 
Africanism and his vocal support for a radical ideology that led many to believe that he 
pursued subversive activities.
In addition to Ghana, other radical states such as Algeria, Guinea and Mali were said 
to give aid to local opposition groups in neighbouring states as part of their foreign policy 
agenda. As Vernon McKay states, ‘[mjilitant [i.e. radical] states..., which seek to convert 
other states to their views, [found] subversion a useful tool for achieving certain foreign- 
policy objectives.However, we need to understand two important points about the nature 
of the interventionist policies that the radical states advocated in the early stages of post-
A. Hughes and R. May, (1986), p. 185.
Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa: Documentary Evidence ofNkrumah’s interference in the affairs o f other 
States (Accra: Ministry of Iirformation, n.d ), p. 37. Also see J. Mayall, (1971), p. 112.
I. W. Zartman, (1987), pp. 96-97 and 99. Also see A. Tévoédjrè, (1965), pp. 44-50.
V. McKay, Tntemational Conflict Patterns,’ in V. McKay, {çû.) African Diplomacy: Studies in the 
Determinants of Foreign Policy (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), p. 10.
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colonial African politics. First, although intervention as a policy was a significant tool that 
was available to Nkrumah in the pursuit of his objective of political union, according to W. 
Scott Thompson, ‘he never decided specifically to adopt it as his policy.’ Rather, intervention 
came largely ‘by accident and in response to specific challenges’ notably over the Congo, as 
we shall see in the following Chapter.^® Second, although ‘[t]he broader goal of Pan- 
Africanism, referring either to political unification or to political alignment, constitutes a 
temptation to use military fo r c e , t he  method applied and supported by radicals, but in 
particular Nkrumah, was not the threat or use of military force, but the alternative method 
of subversion for intervening in the policy-making process of other neighbouring states. 
This method was employed not because it was better, but because it was cheaper, easier to 
deny and, more important from the radicals’ perspective, they maintained that it never 
explicitly contravened Article 3 of the OAU Charter.
In addition to subversion, another form of intervention in Afiica during this time was 
propaganda. Zartman states that propaganda is typical of the type of intervention pursued by 
Afiican states.*® Propaganda a became useful tool for radical states to question the policies 
adopted by other governments whose policies were somehow deemed ‘wrong’.According 
to Zartman, ‘[pjropagandistic support finds its way into the target country through 
opposition (often clandestine) press and tracts, and through radio broadcasts. ’ Under the 
presidency of Nkrumah, Ghana was said to have helped various groups and movements by 
supplying them with ideological material and information to use against to their governments. 
For example, Ghana was accused of helping groups like the Sawaba in Niger, the Action 
Group in Nigeria, the Sanwi movement in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Togolese opposition
W. Thompson, (1969), p. 221. 
I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 91.
Zartman states that the use of military force was excluded from intra-African affairs ‘for essentially 
negative reasons; the means for such a venture [were] lacking, and Africa’s ideological values and Cold War 
positions inhibit[ed] the use of military force,’ (1987), p. 9.
V. McKay, (1966), p. 10.
I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 87. In addition to subversion and propaganda, other activities regard as 
intervention in Africa were conspiracy, terrorism and guerilla warfare, (p. 94).
I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 87.
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groups.®^
Many states belonging to the moderate-conservative group became suspicious of the 
interventionist tendencies contained in the foreign policies of the radical states. It is mainly 
because they suspected the radical states’ foreign pohcy that as early as the first conference 
of independent African states and the second held in Addis Ababa in 1960, the principle of 
non-interference was asserted by those already moderate independent states. The radical 
states also supported these principles, however, their desire to create a formal association of 
states and the pooling of sovereign states into a political union, implicitly estabhshed them 
as favouring or supporting a policy of intervention to meet their objective. Vincent 
Thompson notes the reasoning behind the inclusion of non-intervention in the early stages of 
intra-Afiican affairs when he states that.
The interesting point is that underlying these declarations of ‘non­
interference’ was the fear that the then ‘radicals’ in the Pan-Afncan 
movement as represented by Ghana-Guinea-Mali, Algeria and the United 
Arab Republic...might attempt to influence, through organisations or by other 
means, the citizens of the less radical African states. A formality of this kind 
as stated in ‘non-interference’ could make political unification more difficult 
to achieve.*^
Wallerstein also comes to a similar conclusion when he analysed what the principle of non­
intervention meant for the moderate-conservative school:
the second principle of the OAU Charter, “noninterference in the internal 
affairs of States”, which all signatories were bound to uphold, was clear and 
straightforward. It required that independent Afiican states refrain from active 
support for opposition movements in other states, aside fi'om [bare] asylum, 
and even the right to asylum was occasionally questioned.*'*
However, those who advocated the need for a formal political union regarded their activity 
in a different manner. Again, as Wallerstein observes:
I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 96. 
V. Thompson, (1969), p. 134.
1. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 98. The idea of African unity was placed in the OAU Charter, although the term 
was never properly defined. Article II (i) of the Charter states that one of the purposes of the organisation is 
to '(a) promote unity and solidarity of African states.’
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The proponents of unity as movement (i.e the radicals) were equally indignant 
about interference by outsiders. But for them the significant unit was Afiica 
as a whole. Within Afiica, all were brothers and one could aid brothers.
Outside interference was action by non-Afiican powers in Afiican 
independent States - or the continuation of colonial rule.*^
Judging by Wallerstein’s interpretation of the views of both groups, it seems that 
there was certainly a moral strain about what was perceived as legitimate and illegitimate 
interference. What Wallerstein’s interpretation of the radical view meant was that the act of 
supporting parties to an internal dispute, either by indirect (e.g. the provision of aid) or direct 
means (i.e. military participation), was justifiable if Afiicans pursued the action. Radicals only 
labelled it intervention if the actors involved were fi’om outside the continent. Therefore, 
radical states like Ghana viewed their actions differently: when Ghana intervened in a 
neighbouring state’s affairs, that action was not to be attacked as Ghanian subversion or 
intervention, rather it was defended as Afncan solidarity and unity. Interestingly enough, 
intervention was not justified in the traditional notions of self-defence, rather as Zartman 
observes,
[r] evolutionary or ideological universalism [became] important as an 
additional justification for interference because it authorizes far more intense 
types of intervention than mere regional identification...
...the need to explain state intervention in terms stronger than the 
mere confusion of geographic identities leads to the use of ideological 
justifications. The state becomes a base for a broader political movement of 
extended national dimensions; the ideological movement takes over territorial 
units of the extended nation and comes to the aid of its believers in other such 
units for the supposed good of the believers, units, and the entire expanded 
nation.*®
This corresponds to Northedge and Donelan’s claim that we noted in Chapter One that 
leaders who shared the same social philosophy with other leaders felt that they had some 
‘right to intervene’ to protect and defend that view. While they do not go on to examine in 
depth the supposed ideological positions that existed among the various groupings on the
I. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 98.
I. W. Zartman, (1968), pp. 190-191.
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continent, Hughes and May suggest this as one way of explaining transnational military 
intervention among black African states.
We can see a further sign of the seriousness that states were giving to the problem 
of subversive activities in the decision taken by some to boycott the OAU Heads of State 
Summit meeting held in Accra, Ghana in 1965. We can quote a number of speeches and 
statements given by many OCAM states (i.e. the conservatives), and an outline of the charges 
levelled against Ghana at a special Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos, Nigeria on June 
10-13 1965 to illustrate how some states were taking the issue of subversion seriously. These 
states discussed the allegations against Ghana within the context of the wider issue on the 
‘Prohibition of Intervention as a Norm.’ In a communiqué from the Afro-Malagasy 
Organisation Conference held at Nouakchott, Mauritania, President Quid Daddah of 
Mauritania summed up the feeling of some member-states:
They strongly condemn the action of certain States, notably Ghana, which 
offer a welcome to agents of subversion and organize training camps on their 
territory. They have consequently decided to bring the matter to the O.A U’s 
attention, and to appeal to the...feelings of all continental Heads of State so 
that a climate of co-operation in equality may replace...the present climate of 
mistrust and of leadership by intervention in the internal affairs of other 
States.*^
During the session. Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria (a moderate state) argued that;
It was in the month of February that I learned with grave concern that 
fourteen of our member states had decided to boycott the second ordinary 
session of the Heads of State and Government scheduled to be held next 
September in Accra. Subsequently on 22 April, a delegation of six 
members...came to Lagos and expostulated with me along the same line....
In subscribing to the principles of the Charter, as Ghana and other 
member states did, every single one of them pledged not to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of one another. They also pledged that they would not allow 
their capitals to become headquarters of subversion against one another.
But contrary to the undertaking, the fourteen states had found that 
Ghana had become the headquarters of subversion against several African 
states; that Ghana had established training camps for subversive elements 
from African states; and that Ghana provided very generously every possible 
facility to dissident elements from African states to overthrow the legitimate 
governments of their home countries. Opposition elements from African
87 CiXod in Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 20893, August 7-14, 1965.
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States were being sent to train abroad and they were returning to training 
camps in Ghana, to further their subversive interests. In realization of this, the 
fourteen heads of state resolved at Nouakchott that, as long as Ghana 
continued to harbor these dissidents and subversive elements and promote in 
concrete terms their subversive intentions, they would not go to Accra.**
In response to these allegations, Ghana defended itself by stating that:
There has been a string of attacks, of abuses, of calumnies, and 
insinuations all against Ghana, and in particular against our President, 
Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah because it is said that we are harbouring 
people engaged in subversive activities against our neighbours. ..
No country can, on very serious ground, refuse to accept people who 
for one reason or other disagree with their governments and therefore decide 
to leave their countries...
Therefore, far from charging Ghana as being a haven, a harbour for 
refugees, one should rather compliment and congratulate Ghana for its 
humanitarian decision to open its doors to people who say they have fears for 
their lives and are fleeing from their countries....*^
While members of the OCAM cited subversion as their main reason for wanting to 
boycott the heads of state summit meeting, Zdenek Cervenka noted that ‘the roots of the 
hostility of the OCAM states towards Ghana went deeper than’ the accusations of 
subversion. ‘The [FJrancophone States had always resented Ghana’s militant posture in 
African politics...in particular Kwame Nkrumah’s criticism of OCAM’s support for Moise 
Tshombe, the secessionist leader of Katanga who later became the Prime Minster of the 
Congo.’ Hence their aim was ‘to use the OAU Summit in Accra to drive Ghana into political
‘Prohibition of Intervention as a Norm’, Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the 
Organization of African Unity, Lagos, 10-13 June 1965. Full text in W. Thompson and 1. W. Zartman, ‘The 
development of Norms in the African System’ in Y. El-Ayouty, (ed.) The Organization of African Unity After 
Ten Years: Comparative Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 24-31, esp. pp. 24-25. 
Niger’s accusations against Nkrumah can also be seen in the same text, pp. 28. Niger provided evidence to 
substantiate its claims that Ghana was training exiles from Côte d’ Ivoire, Dahomey and Nigeria and assisting 
them on infiltrating their respective territories. Niger issued a communiqué on October 14* which accusing 
Ghana of subversion, details of which can be found in the^ÆS, October 1-31, 1964, p. 166BC. Also see the 
statement of allegation made by Niger against Ghana’s subversive activities on January 12* when Ghana was 
said to be part of the subversive activity that the exiled Sawaba leader, Djibo Bakary, is alleged to have been 
conducting in Ghanian territory, ARB, January 1-31, 1965, p. 220C and February 1-28,1965, p. 244C. The 
charges of subversion were made by the members of the OCAM in particular by Côte d’ Ivoire, Dahomey and 
Upper Volta.
Prohibition of Intervention as a Norm’, in W. Thompson and 1. W. Zartman, (1975), p. 29.
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isolation.’^ ® Despite this, the accusations made against Ghana, fuelled the decision to 
reinforce Article 3 of the OAU Charter on subversion. As stated in Chapter One, member- 
states established the ‘Declaration on the Problem of Subversion’ at the Second Session of 
the Assembly of Heads of State, in Accra Ghana in October 1965. Ironically, three months 
after he had also signed this declaration, Nkrumah’s government was overthrown in a coup. 
The inclusion of subversion as one of the norms that guided intra-African affairs was in 
response to the particular nature of relations between African states. Many states in Africa 
were weak and politically unstable, thus making them susceptible to outside intervention. 
Certainly, the norm did not exist in the UN Charter before the OAU declaration and was 
instructive in the UN declaration on the ‘Inadmissibility of Intervention’ in December of the 
same year.
Conclusion
The purpose of this Chapter has been to consider whether Pan-Africanism and its 
central tenets of exclusivity and unity serve as a source of the evolution of intervention 
alongside the principle of non-intervention in intra-African affairs. Although the notion of 
exclusivity is relevant for understanding intervention, we argued in Part Three that its 
usefulness was not apparent for understanding how the practice of intervention evolved in 
the immediate years of post-colonial Afnca. However, we focussed on the notion of 
exclusivity because it partly explained why the OAU was created. More important, as we 
have argued, the notion of exclusivity and unity was interrelated. African unity was only 
possible if African states had an exclusive right to solve their problems, and to achieve this, 
a system of self-regulation was necessary. The OAU became that system of self-regulation. 
Furthermore, as we shall note in more detail in Chapter Three, the OAU was a symbol of 
Afncan exclusivity and unity over its affairs.
We said that a more useful source to begin our investigation on how the practice of 
intervention has evolved is the notion of African unity. This is because the diverging 
groupings that developed on the form of unity had implications for how norms and principles
Z. Cervenka, The Unfinished Questfor Unity: Africa and the OA U (London: Julian Freidmann Publishers, 
Ltd., 1977), pp. 74-75. The support given to Tshombe by the OCAM will be discussed in further detail in the 
following Chapter.
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of intra-African affairs developed. Although the notion of unity was only an aspiration that 
a few leaders shared, it has been worth analysing because it became divisive in the early days 
of post-colonialism, especially in the various foreign policy approaches and methods radical 
states pursued in ensuring this unity. Certainly, as we argued, the notion of African unity 
became a ‘justifying slogan’ among a group of states who, in the end, objected to the identity 
or political philosophy of regimes in neighbouring states. The fact that leaders hke Nkrumah 
and Touré alluded to it to justify their support for dissident movements raised suspicion 
among the moderate-conservative states that unity was synonymous with intervention. 
Therefore, the moderate-conservative states passed a series of resolutions in the early days 
of post-colonialism on the rules governing intra-Afiican affairs, most notably on the problem 
of subversion.
In sum, we had tried to address the question we posed at the start of this study; is it 
possible to find sources from which to understand the practice of intervention in Africa by 
African states? We have argued that Pan-Africanism and its central themes (especially African 
unity) serve as a useful starting point and useful framework in which to place African 
thoughts on intervention and non-intervention. By focussing on cases of African involvement 
in internal disputes in the next Chapters, we consider in specific detail how the central themes 
of Pan-Africanism are useful in understanding the practice of intervention in Sub-Saharan 
African.
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CHAPTER THREE
1957-1970: THE EARLY POST-COLONIAL ERA AND INTRA-AFRICAN
CONFLICTS
Introduction
Having suggested in the previous Chapter that there are two themes within Pan- 
Africanism that can help us understand how the practice of intervention evolved, the purpose 
of this Chapter is to consider their usefulness in the context of internal conflicts on the 
continent. More specifically, the aim is to consider how far individual African states used 
them to justify or support intervention in the internal affairs of other states. If most states did 
accept the idea of unity and exclusivity, they would have been impelled to intervene against 
those states who threatened the possibility of both. An underlying theme of this Chapter is 
to consider whether the particular interpretation of Pan-Afiicanism adopted by individual 
states led them to be either pro or anti-interventionist in their foreign policies.
This Chapter is divided into three parts. Part One introduces the Congo civil war 
(1960-1965) and asks if the idea of unity and exclusivity are useful for understanding why 
some states intervened in this internal conflict. The Congo crisis is a pivotal case study in this 
Chapter as it was the first serious conflict that showed how Afncan leaders developed norms 
and principles to govern intra-Afncan affairs.  ^Many issues raised in the previous Chapter 
reassert themselves again, most notably the divisions between the radical and the moderate- 
conservative states and the creation of the OAU in 1963. Indeed, both events, (in particularly 
the division into various groups) were largely influenced by the Congo crisis.
While the main focus of this Chapter is on the Congo, other events within the 
historical range of this Chapter are considered for what they might tell us about how the 
practice of intervention evolved on the continent. In Part Two of this Chapter, we look brief 
at the response of Afiican states towards the Nigerian civil war that broke out in 1967.
' Although the Congo represented an instance of Cold War politics played out on the African continent we 
try to isolate its impact on the conflict so that we can understand the position of African states towards the 
subject of intervention and non-intervention in internal disputes. Certainly, both superpowers (US and the 
Soviet Union) became active participants in African politics in the post-colonial era. Their presence along 
with other non-Africans and the UN ensured that the Congo crisis became an international conflict. For a 
comprehensive analysis of non-African participation in the Congo and other African conflicts see in K. 
Somerville, (1990), esp. pp. 11-21.
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Finally in Part Three, we consider the position adopted by African leaders over the Union of 
South Africa and the particular question of apartheid. We stated in Chapter One that internal 
disputes can arise in situations where individuals or groups felt that they were not being 
treated equally or where they felt that their interests or honour was being challenged. Using 
the definition provided by Northedge and Donelan, we also stated that internal disputes arise 
in situations where ‘groups within the society are in conflict over how activities or 
possessions shall be allotted to them.’ These types of disputes ‘take the form of a struggle 
to make or change a rule delimiting the scope of the group . I t  is based on this definition that 
we consider South Afiica in this study. Both the Nigerian civil war and South Africa illustrate 
how other factors beyond the notion of unity and exclusivity impinge on the thinking on 
intervention and non-intervention by African states.
I. The Congolese civil war and African states: Defining the rules of intra-African 
affairs
The year 1960 not only marked the emergence of eighteen new African states in the 
international system, of which thirteen were former French colonies, but it also highlighted 
the difiScult transition that faced newly independent states as they left the colonial fold.  ^The 
Congo was the first complex civil war to emerge in post-colonial Afiica, and more important, 
it clearly illustrates the role played and the policies adopted by various African states. It 
became a symbol of the problems facing newly independent states who were trying to adjust 
to life after gaining independence from their colonial masters.^ As Robert Good states, ‘...the 
Congo crisis permits a relatively undistorted examination of the competing positions of the
 ^ F. Northedge and M. Donelan, (1971), p. 38.
 ^ As we shall see later in this Chapter, these newly independent states from the French colonies became 
prominent players in the pohcy adopted by African states over the Congo crisis. The states were closely linked 
to Paris and were to take decisions over the Congo and later the Algerian question that would cause bitterness 
and division among the various alhances in Africa.
 ^R. Good, (1962), pp.34-35. In this part of the Chapter, we draw heavily on Good’s work in analysing the 
Congo crisis and the role played by African leaders. These include: Good, (1964), pp. 632-641 and ‘Four 
African Views of the Congo CJrisis’, in D. Marvin, (ed.) Emerging Africa in World Affairs (San Francisco: 
Chandler Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 146-159.
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new statesmen on some of the basic issues of postcolonial politics.’  ^ Similarly, Francis 
Singleton points out that the crisis in the Congo serves as ‘an excellent prism’ through which 
to examine the development of Afiican attitudes towards the ‘rules of the game for relations 
between Afiican states.’^  The ‘rules of the game’ were issues concerning the legitimacy of 
secession and rebellion, intervention by foreign powers, the criteria for legitimacy of an 
Afiican government, the legitimacy of an Afncan state aiding an opposition movement, 
Afiican intervention in the internal affairs of another state, and the role of the OAU in intra- 
Afncan affairs. The notion of Afiican unity and exclusivity cuts across all these areas. The 
Congo is a significant case study, for not only did it force Afiicans to consider the pattern of 
relations among themselves, but it vividly drew out the differences of opinion that existed 
among Afiican states on how to respond to internal conflicts. The various views, as stated 
in the previous Chapter were bound by the politics of alliance and cooperation (i.e. the 
moderate-conservative view) versus the politics of unity and union (i.e. the radical view). 
This Chapter uses these divergent views as a source through which to reveal how the idea 
and practice of intervention evolved on the continent.
It is not the purpose of this section to provide an account of the conflict in the Congo, 
although it does provide a brief and simplified version of the central characters and the main 
problems.  ^Neither does it concentrate solely on the specific role of each state, but rather on 
the broad positions and manoeuvres of the competing groups. Having said this, we shall, on 
occasion, draw out the specific policies of those states that took a prominent lead in trying 
to solve the Congo crisis. To this end, we will pay particular attention to Ghana’s role. Ghana
 ^R. Good, (1962), pp. 48-49.
®F. Singleton, States and the Congo Affair: 1960-65 (Yale University: Unpublished Thesis, 1968).
In this part of the Chapter, we also draw heavily on Singleton’s analysis of the (Tongo crisis and African 
attitudes.
 ^For a full and comprehensive analysis of the Congolese civil war and the main players involved, see C. 
Hosl^ Tis, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1965) and (ed.). Case Studies in African Diplomacy Number 1: The Organization o f African Unity and the 
Congo Crisis, 1964-65 (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1969); T. Kanza, Conflict in the Congo 
(Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1972); C. Legum, Congo Disaster (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin 
Books, 1961); K. Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo (London: Thomas Nelson and Son Ltd, 1967); R. Good, 
(1962), and (1965); C. Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonialization and Independence (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1965) and Congo: A Report of the "Current Affairs Bulletin ” pubhshed by the 
Department of Tutorial Classes in the University of Sydn^ (Australia), Memo From Belgium, No. 8 
(Brussels: Ministry For Foreign Affairs and External Trade, Information Service, August 1961), pp. 1-20.
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was among the first Afncan states to provide military and technical aid in support of the 
leader of the central government of the Congo, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.®
Our discussion of the various views that existed concerning the Congo and which 
revealed the interventionist language of some African leaders can be found in the first phase 
of the crisis: 1960-1962. By the end of the first phase, the divisions were still apparent, but 
African states were promoting a more unified voice within the OAU. When the civil war 
broke out again between 1964-1965, the unity that Afiicans had found in the OAU was 
shattered and some states developed a strong interventionist line in resolving the crisis in the 
Congo.
Phase one o f the civil war, 1960-1962: The diverging views o f the parties to the conflict
The Congo was granted independence on 30 June 1960, thus signalling a successful 
beginning to the liberation movement, with Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister and Joseph 
Kasavubu as President. However, the rejoicing at the birth of another new African state was 
halted when conflict broke out in July of the same year. We can define the main parties to the 
conflict and the dividing line between them according to the following categories developed 
by Robert Good:®
a) The ‘nationalists’, led by Premier Patrice Lumumba, leader of the Mouvement National 
Congolais (MNC) and Vice Premier Antoine Gizenga sought a unified Congolese state under 
the leadership of a strong central government. The emphasis was upon unity as opposed to 
the break up of the Congolese state. For the nationalists, the presence of Belgium, their 
previous colonial master, was a major impediment to the creation of a centrahsed system of 
government that would no longer be dependent upon external powers for its survival. The 
aim was to remove the Belgians from the region as they represented the politics of 
neocolonialism. Lumumba was however deposed by President Kasavubu in September 1960
* For an outline of the aid provided by Nkrumah to Lumumba see pp. 123-125 of Thompson’s book. See also 
K. 'i^ !\siyaTaS[i,l Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology (Westport, Coimecticut: Greenwood Press 
Publishers, 1961), Chapter 31, esp. pp. 246-247 ztadiKeesmg’s Contemporary Archives, September 17-24, 
1960, p. 17642.
® R. Good, (1962), pp. 46-47.
83
and arrested by Colonel Joseph Mobutu in December of the same year. He was subsequently 
murdered in January 1961. However, some of Lumumba’s supporters led by Gizenga, 
established de facto  control in the northeastern region, with Stanleyville as their “capital.”
b) The ‘secessionists’ were led by Moise Tshombe. The secessionist argued that the present 
structure of the Congo was a hallmark of colonialism; instead the political order of the state 
should be reconstructed along tribal lines as opposed to a single unified state which the 
Belgian colonialists artificially constructed. On 11 July 1960, Tshombe declared Katanga, 
said to be the richest province, independent and ruled as president.
c) The ‘moderates’ included several prominent figures: President Joseph Kasavubu, leader 
of the Association des Bakongo pour l’Unification, l’Expansion et la Défense de la langue 
Kikongo (ABAKO), Colonel Joseph Mobutu and Cyrille Adoula. Like the nationalists, this 
group advocated the idea of a unified Congo, but there the similarities ended. The moderates 
emphasised the politics of federalism in opposition to Lumumba’s centralism. Their criticisms 
of the Belgium presence were mere denunciations, preferring instead to accept Belgian 
assistance. The removal of Lumumba and the creation of de facto rule by his supporters 
meant that two leaders were controlling the Congo: Kasavubu and his supporters were mainly 
based in Leopoldville, while Lumumba’s supporters were in Stanleyville.
Intervention and the Radical States ’ Appeal fo r Unity and Exclusivity over the Congolese 
civil war
What was significant about the differences among the conflicting parties to the crisis 
in the Congo was that they were the same as the differences among the independent states 
of Afiica, although the divisions among Afncan states were not visible until the Lumumba- 
Kasavubu split and the dissolution of the central government. Afiican states then began to 
take sides with the various parties to the conflict. Before the split, Afncan states had been
The fact that Katanga was an area rich in mineral resources could also explain Tshombé motives for 
wanting to secede.
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working together at the level of the UN to ensure that it properly dealt with the civil war.“ 
For example, in a debate concerning the civil war at the UN General Assembly, many African 
states had voted together to remove the presence ‘of all Belgian and other foreign military 
and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations C o m m a nd . I n  
fact, during the early stages of the conflict African leaders were anxious to uphold the 
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Yet as Vincent Thompson 
argues, some ‘were also aware...that the factional fighting in the Congo was not conducive 
to [Afncan] u n i t y . A n  apparent contradiction existed between both goals of non­
intervention and political unity; if Congo were to secede, it would undermine the progress 
of political unity that radical states sought in Africa. The aim was to prevent the breakup of 
the Congo, but would this not undermine the principle of non-intervention?
The desire to build a unified Afiica with no disintegration of former colonial states 
made the objective of non-intervention not only impossible, but incompatible with such a 
goal. In other words, radical states could not support the principle of non-intervention while 
seeking the political unification of Afiican states. Radicals defined Afiican states who did not 
see political unification as the only way forward for the continent as ‘un-African’, and raised 
doubts about their independence and legitimacy. Where there existed groups or African 
leaders that supported these radical Pan-Africanist ideals (e.g. like Lumumba’s nationalist 
movement), the aim was to give them support, although the support given was never properly 
defined.
For the radicals, Lumumba’s call for a strong centralised government in the Congo 
conformed with the goals for Afiican unity. When Lumumba died, the radical states of Afiica 
did not recognise Kasavubu as Head of State, but instead gave support to the Vice Premier
" C. Legum, (1965), p. 49.
General Assembly Resolution 1599 (XV), 985* plenary meeting, 15 April 1961, GAOR, Fifteenth Session, 
Agenda Item 85, Annexes: The Situation in the Republic o f the Congo. See also R. Good, (1962), p. 61 and 
C. Hoskyns, ‘The Part Played by the Independent African States in the Congo Crisis: July 1960-December 
1961’ in D. Austin and H. Weiler, (eds.) Inter-State Relations in Africa, Part I (Freiberg in Breisgau: 
Gutenbergdruckerei Robert Oberkirch, oHG, 1965), p. 35.
V. Thompson, (1969), pp. 142-143.
‘“I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 58.
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and Lumumba loyalist, Antoine Gizenga. Tshombé gained support from the Francophone 
conservative states, while Kasavubu, Mobutu and Adoula had support from states within the 
moderate African bloc.^  ^As we discuss below, it is the position taken by these various 
African groupings that provides a framework for discussion about intervention in African 
affairs.
Of the three groups, the radical group is immediately relevant to our task of 
understanding how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent. It has been 
suggested that the support given to the nationalist-Lumumba cause by the radicals could be 
characterised as promoting interventionist policies, at least of a political nature. While our 
stated objective is to see how far the radicals used the idea of unity and exclusivity to justify 
intervention, Francis Singleton argues that neocolonialism serves as a useful starting point 
in understanding the actions of the radical states. Certainly, as suggested in Chapter Two, it 
served as a convenient slogan, not only to support the radical states’ appeal for a formal 
political union among African states, but also for justifying their direct action in particular 
conflicts.
The radicals were critical of the fact that some African states seemed pseudo 
independent in nature because these states were still reliant on their former colonial masters. 
From the radical perspective, such reliance meant that these states could not be ‘truly’ 
sovereign or independent. Furthermore, this rehance fostered neocolonialism. The threat of 
neocolonialism was enough justification for supporting Lumumba’s fight against Belgium 
who Lumumba argued wanted to undermine the Congo’s progress towards independence. 
The key word for the radicals and the Congo nationalists was ‘balkanization’ or the threat 
of it. That is, the carving up of African states into smaller and inevitably, from the radical 
perspective, dependent states. According to the radicals, Afiican states (or leaders) that 
encouraged neocolonialism were ‘stooges’ of the West and they were mainly the conservative
V. Thompson, (1969), p. 154.
R. Good, (1962), p. 47. For an outline of the African groupings that emerged over the Congo, see C. 
Hoslqms, (1965), pp. 256-259.
R. Good, (1962), p. 52 and (1965), p. 149.
F. Singleton, (1968), pp. 27-29 and 35.
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Francophone states or secessionist leaders like Tshombé. In a speech to the National 
Assembly in Accra, Ghana on 8 August 1960, Nkrumah warned about the dangers of 
balkanization in Africa stating that he ‘had in mind Katanga’s claim to independence when 
I said, “The new colonialism creates client states, independent in name but in point of fact 
pawns of the colonial power that is supposed to have given them independence.’” ®^
While neocolonialism may serve as a useful starting point in understanding the 
position adopted by the radical states over the Congo, this study argues that alongside this 
ideological justification, the Pan-Afiicanist ideas on unity and exclusivity are also powerful 
tools. In many ways, all three bear remarkable similarities. If, as the radical states argued, the 
greatest threat to Afncan independence was outside interference from the neocolonialist in 
the West, then the only way of ensuring Africa’s independence was by creating a Union of 
African states that would be strong enough to maintain Afiica’s autonomy over its own 
affairs. If we accept this view, why then did leaders like Nkrumah request the presence of the 
UN in the Congo, when its involvement meant that the politics of the Cold War and the 
neocolonialists in the West could exacerbate the conflict? Surely the presence of the UN 
meant the involvement of non-Afiican states in Afiican affairs? Was this not a direct 
challenge to the notion of Afiican exclusivity and the desire to achieve “Afncan solutions for 
African problems”?
Not all the radicals supported the involvement of the UN, seeing the organisation as 
an accomplice of the neo-colonialists. Some radicals voiced their criticisms against the UN 
when they met for the Casablanca Conference in January 1961. As Margaret Roberts states:
By the end of 1960 every one of the [radical] States represented which had 
troops in the Congo had threatened to withdraw them, and Guinea had 
already started to do so. They had taken this step in protest against the failure 
of the [UN operation], as they saw it, to fulfill the Mandate under which it
R Good, (1962), p. 50. Radicals also referred to these states as the ‘enemy within...the unwitting puppet, 
the victim of a colonially cormpted mind, unable to distinguish between national and colonial interests. ’ See 
V. Thompson, (1969), p. 158 who also hsts the various names attached to the conservatives as a consequence 
of their policy. For example, the conservatives (and to a certain extent, the moderates) were seen as 
‘sluggards’, ‘traditionalists’ and ‘agents of imperialism’ while radicals were seen as ‘progressives’ and 
‘mihtants’.
K. Nkrumah, The Challenge of the Congo, p. 29. Also see ‘An Address to the National Assembly’, 
Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, August 8 1960, pp. 8-9. It is worth noting that in all his works, Nkrumah 
never e?q)lained why splitting up states into smaller states encouraged colonialism.
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had been established.^^
Guinea, Mali and the UAR pressed the radicals (which began calling itself the Casablanca 
Group after the conference) to withdraw from the UN. In a communiqué detailing the 
conference measures, the states present asserted that they ‘reserve[d] the right “to take 
appropriate action”’ if the nature of the UN operation did not accord with its original 
mandate. Guinea, Mali and the UAR later withdrew their troops from Opération des Nations 
Unies au Congo (ONUC).^^ In so doing. President Sékou Touré of Guinea wondered why 
Lumumba had allowed the UN to enter the Congo. President Touré argued that the UN 
operation had produced negative action because, as he saw it, the organization had 
encouraged the secessionist movement and the ‘chaos sought by the Belgian aggressors.
In a speech delivered on 1 July 1961 Touré remarked that.
Today, one may wonder why President Lumumba appealed to the [UN], that 
organization which, in the Congolese issue, has disclosed itself as a tool of 
colonialism, specialized in diversion, corruption, and treason. ..
Confidence in the [UN], respect for colonial legality, have been too 
expensive for the Congo and Afiica.
However, despite Toure’s criticism of the UN, Ghana had supported the idea of a 
strong UN force in the Congo from the start. In this way, Nkrumah was able to contribute 
Ghanian troops to ONUC rather than the unilateral provision of military aid.^  ^Nkrumah had 
convinced Lumumba of the need to invite the UN to provide peacekeeping troops. According 
to Jitendra Mohan, two reasons existed. First, Ghana saw the UN as the best means of 
removing Belgian troops from the Congo. The second reason is however more fundamental
M. Roberts, ‘Summitry at Casablanca' South in Exile, Vol. 5, No. 3, Apiil-June 1961, p. 68. For a 
analysis of the debate on the Congo and the UN at Casablanca see pp. 68-71. See also K. Nkrumah, (1967), 
Chapter 9.
“ M. Roberts, (1961), p. 70.
S. Touré, The International Policy and Diplomatic Action o f the Democratic Party o f Guinea, Vol. Ill 
(Conakry: Société Orientale de Publicité, n.d ), pp. 60-69, esp. p. 61.
S. Touré, (n.d ), p. 160 and 161.
J. Mohan, ‘Ghana, The Congo, and the United Nations’, The Journal o f Modem African Studies Vol. 7, 
No. 3, 1969, p. 374.
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and is in keeping with the desire of ensuring African exclusivity over its own affairs. As 
Mohan states,
by its prompt and effective intervention the U.N. should bar the way to all 
unilateral ‘foreign intervention’. Ghana’s main concern was to ‘localise’ or, 
rather. Africanisé the crisis, by forestalling all «ow-African, and in particular 
imperialist and neo-colonial, intervention. This the Ghana Government sought 
to ensure not only by claiming for the U.N. a virtual monopoly of all outside 
intervention in the Congo, but even more by its demand that O N U C should 
predominantly be an African affair composed mainly of African troops and by 
its related emphasis that the independent states, which bore a ‘special 
responsibility’ for developments in Africa, should maintain ‘a positive 
solidarity’ and a complete unity of outlook and policy over the Congo.
Thus, Nkrumah wanted to use the UN to propel the nationalist cause within the 
Congo. We should therefore see the UN as instrumental in Nkrumah’s idea of wanting to 
ensure that the Pan-African idea of unity was reinforced in the Congo. Thus, ONUC was to 
be the ‘arm’ of the radical-nationalist policy and a means of guaranteeing that the ‘African 
revolution’ became a reality.Seen this way, we should characterise Ghana’s intervention 
in the Congo crisis as political in nature, preferring to mediate within the framework of the 
UN operation.
However, there were suggestions, though not fully substantiated, that Ghana 
conducted subversive activities while displaying support for Lumumba at the early stages of 
the conflict. Apart from the presence of military advisers and the supply of technical aid, the 
only evidence of Ghana’s support for Lumumba was contained within statements, press 
releases and speeches delivered at the National Assembly in Ghana or at the UN General 
Assembly. These statements and pronouncements may allow us to suggest that the support 
and argument provided by the radicals were tantamount to an interventionist policy or at least 
gave credence to the idea that if the UN operation failed to secure peace in the Congo, then 
‘action must be taken outside the world organization.’^ * So for example, in a news
J. Mohan, (1969), p. 375. (Emphasis in original). Francis Singleton also raises the same point when he 
states that the role of the UN was to provide ‘support for whatever policy Africans wished to cany out — the 
“African solution,’” (1968), p. 24.
J. Mohan, (1969), p. 375 and 402.
Good, (1962), p. 52.
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conference on 6 August 1960, Nkrumah stated that:
if no United Nations solution is forthcoming, Ghana would lend such armed 
assistance as the Republic of the Congo might request. Ghana would provide 
this assistance even though it meant Ghana and Congo had to fight alone 
against Belgian troops and other forces maintained and supplied from 
Belgium.
In another speech to the National Assembly on 8 August in which he requested a mandate 
for the complete mobilisation of all Ghanaian armed force if no UN solution was 
forthcoming, Nkrumah argued that:
The struggle of the Congo is therefore our struggle. It is incumbent on us to 
take our stand by our brothers in the Congo in the full knowledge that only 
Africa can fight for its destiny. In this struggle we shall not reject the 
assistance and support of our fiiends, but we will yield to no enemy, however 
strong.^ ®
Despite accusations of intervention by Ghana, Singleton argues that the methods 
employed by Nkrumah were ‘diplomacy and persuasion’ and not ‘bribery, military aid, or 
conspiracy’ as had been suggested by Nkrumah’s opponents.^^ Nkrumah rejected criticisms 
that his policy over the Congo amounted to intervention. In an address to the UN General 
Assembly in which he outlined Ghana’s support for Lumumba before his assassination, 
Nkrumah justified his actions in terms of Pan-Afiican unity and called for an Afiican High 
Command to take charge of the conflict:
It is because of this viewpoint that I am being charged with ofiRcious 
intervention, and meddling with affairs, in the Congo. How can Ghana pursue 
an isolationist policy in Afiican affairs, when she is committed to a policy of 
Afiican unity ...
 ^Cited in C. Hoskyns, The Congo: A Chronology of Events: January, 1960-December 21, 1961 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 10. Earlier in the conflict, Lumumba asked for military assistance from 
Ghana, Guinea and other members of the radical-Casablanca group as a consequence of what he saw as UN 
failure to remove the threat posed by Tshombé over the secession of Katanga Province. Elsewhere Hoskyns 
argues that Nkrumah’s threat towards the UN and also that of states like Guinea was aimed at bringing 
‘pressure’ upon the UN. In fact, despite the pressure applied towards the UN, Nkrumah had expressed 
confidence in its operation and encouraged Lumumba to cooperate with the UN. See Hoskyns, (1965), pp. 
36-38.
^ K. Nkrumah, (1961), pp. 245-257, esp. p. 255.
F. Singleton, (1968), p. 100.
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In the event of the United Nations failure to comply with these 
proposals in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, 
it will be my bounden duty to secure, with the assistance of the other African 
States, the establishment of an Afncan High Command to take immediate 
action to restore law and order so that the legal Government, headed by 
Premier Lumumba, can operate.^^
In another speech at the opening of the Africa Unity House in London in March 1961, 
Nkrumah replied his critics by stating:
When I am accused by stooges of interfering in the internal affairs of other 
African countries, my answer is that every true Afncan nationalist has a duty 
to concern himself with the present-day problems facing Africa.
Such action could not be defined as intervention from the radical perspective. Rather, 
Ghana’s actions towards the Congo fitted into the wider strategy of ridding Afiica of 
colonialism and the culture of dependency from former masters. Until all traces of 
neocolonialism were removed, ‘tactics that less radical minds might condemn as intervention 
or subversion remain perfectly fair game.’^ '* Providing assistance to the nationalist cause was 
a logical step and did not, in Nkrumah’s eyes, constitute interference or subversion. Rather, 
Nkrumah defined it as one Afiican country coming to the aid of another in distress. More 
important, solving a crisis like the Congo was imperative for those who held onto the belief
Note verbale dated 16 December 1960 from the representative of Ghana to the President of the General 
Assembly, transmitting the text of an address by the President of the Republic of Ghana, UN Document 
A/4661, 16 December 1960 in GAOR, Fifteenth Session, Agenda item 85: The Situation in the Republic of 
the Congo. Nkrumah advocated an African High Command to prevent external forces from participating in 
that conflict. Since the creation of the OAU, its member states have studied the idea at the level of Council 
of Ministers and Heads of State Summit meetings with no consensus on whether to develop such a 
mechanism on the continent. For analysis of the initial discussions surrounding the idea of an OAU defence 
mechanism, see D. Meyers, ‘An Analysis of OAU’s Effectiveness at Regional Collective Defense’ in Y. El- 
Ayouty, (ed.), (1975), pp. 118-132 and J. Woronoff, ‘The Case for an African Defense Organization’, Africa 
Report, Vol. 16, No. 6, June 1971, pp. 23-25. It was stated that if an African force was to be established, it 
would not be used for intervention in the internal affairs of state. Instead its actions would be directed 
towards two objectives: ‘to protect the OAU Members against aggression [South Africa and Portugal being 
regarded as potential aggressors], and to support liberation movements engaged in armed struggle.’ See Z. 
Cervenka, (1977), pp. 38-44, esp. p. 38. We will discussed the idea of an African High Command in Chapter 
Six.
^ ‘African Unity. ’ Speech made by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana, at 
the opening of Africa Unity House in London, 18 March 1961, p. 1.
R. Good, (1962), p. 53 and (1965), p. 150.
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of creating a Union of African states. A strong central and unifred system of government as 
opposed to the creation of smaller, weaker states, was a necessary condition for African unity 
and fed into radical states’ perception of the new order that needed to prevail on the 
continent. As Patricia Wild observes, ‘for these states, ideological considerations 
overshadowed the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of states’ and inevitably the 
rule of non-intervention.^  ^More important, these states saw their position as justifrable within 
their interpretation of Pan-African unity. Indeed, as we argued in Chapter Two, it was not 
surprising that radical leaders like Nkrumah saw their position as justifrable. If, as the radical 
states saw it, Africa was a single country with no boundaries separating brothers from each 
other, then the question of intervention did not arise. Intervention was only an issue when it 
came from ‘the neocolonialists and imperialists outside the continent.
The Francophone conservative states and the moderates, however, rejected this view. 
They held the radicals, especially ‘Ghana responsible for some of the most fragrant 
interference that the Congo [had] experienced.’^  ^For the conservative and moderate states, 
the Congo was a territorial entity, and therefore, its national sovereignty was to be respected. 
Their criticism of the radical states’ policy over the Congo was largely refrected within the 
report of the UN Conciliation Committee written mainly by moderate states. In examining 
the causes of the continuation of the crisis, they cited the problem of interference, not just by 
the Belgians, but by other states:
Foreign interference by certain States in the internal affairs of the Republic of 
the Congo compounded the complexity and the gravity of the crisis. This 
interference largely counteracted the efforts of the United Nations to assist 
the Congolese to resolve their difficulties.^*
""P. Wild, (1971), p. 39.
^ I. W. Zartman, (1968), p. 192.
W. Thompson, (1969), p. 158.
^ Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo, A/4711 and Add. 1 and 2, 20 March 
1961, para. 112(a), GAOR, Fifteenth Session, Agenda Item 85: The Situation in the Republic of the Congo. 
See also R. Good, (1962), p. 58 and 240. The Commission consisted of representatives from Ethiopia, The 
Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, 
Sudan, Tunisia and the UAR. Guinea, Indonesia, Mali, and the UAR pulled out early in 1961 after the death 
of Lumumba and what they saw as UN failure to halt the conflict. It should also be noted that the 
representative of Ghana, Alex (^uaison-Sackey, did not sign the Conciliation Commission most notably 
because, ‘[t]he Authorities in the Congo dealt with the Commission in bad faith, especially in the formation
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Although radical states, and in particular Ghana, were accused of interventionist 
actions, there is some suggestion that some conservative states were also open to the charge 
of intervention. Certainly the assistance given by some to aid Tshombé’s secessionist 
movement in Katanga and to support Kasavubu over Lumumba could be characterised as 
intervention.^  ^Their rejection of Lumumba as the legitimate leader of Congo was tantamount 
to interference in the political makeup of another country. For the Francophone 
conservatives, Lumumba represented that slow movement to the creation of a militant and 
revolutionary African continent which they rejected. Consequently, they directed their 
support at helping Tshombé and Kasavubu in deposing Lumumba.
To accommodate the extreme views of the radical and conservative group, the 
moderate states, mainly led by Nigeria and Liberia, attempted to strike a balance over the 
policy to be taken over the Congo. The moderates called a meeting in Monrovia, Liberia 
which was meant to bring all sides together to resolve the conflict. In the end, only the 
conservative states attended the meeting in 1961 at Monrovia to formulate a policy that 
would counter any form of intervention. The aim of Monrovia was to create ‘a pan-African 
structure that would build very firmly on the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of sovereign states.’'*® ‘More importantly’, it was a place ‘where all participants would 
accept the principle of noninterference’ and the ‘unqualified condemnation of outside 
subversive action by neighbouring States.’'*^ In fact, the resolution from the conference was 
explicit on the question of subversion. It affirmed that all
African and Malagasy States shall refrain from encouraging, directly or 
indirectly, dissident groups or individuals of other States in subversive 
activities by permitting their own States to be used as bases from which such
of a possible Government of National Unity.’ See ‘Observations by the Representative of Ghana regarding 
the Report of the Conciliation Commission’, 16 March 1961, Aimex XX, Report of the United Nations 
Conciliation Commission for the Congo, A/4711 and Add. 1 and 2, 20 March 1961, GAOR, Fifteenth 
Session, Agenda Item 85: The Situation in the Republic of the Congo.
See Singleton (1968) who suggests throughout his research that some of the conservative Francophone 
states were open to the charge of intervention. Their support for Tshombé raised questions about the aid given 
to a secessionist movement.
^ I. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 54.
I. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 54.
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dissidents may operate or by financing dissidents in other countries or 
otherwise.
The Monrovia conference, which was set up to remove the divisions between African states, 
exacerbated the divisions among African states. We can see the extent of these divisions in 
the speech made in January 1962 at the Lagos Conference, by the Nigerian Governor- 
General, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe:
There is one basic difference of an ideological nature between the two 
groups, which should attract the serious attention of all who sincerely 
advocate African unity. It is the conspicuous absence of specific declarations 
on the part of the Casablanca states of their inflexible belief in the 
fundamental principles enunciated at Monrovia regarding the inalienable right 
of Afncan states, as presently constituted, to legal equality, irrespective of 
their area or population; the right of African states to self-determination; the 
right of African states to safety from interference in their internal affairs 
through subversive activities engineered by supposed friendly states; the right 
of African states to be secure in the inviolability of their territories from 
external aggression.
Whilst the Charter of the United Nations provides for these 
safeguards, in general terms, it is very material to the subject of African unity 
that it votaries should declare publicly and recapitulate their faith and firm 
belief by adhering specifically to the principles made famous at the Monrovia 
Conference. Otherwise, it can be a matter for speculation whether these 
principles are capable of becoming speeches to haunt the conscience of those 
who would rather pay lip service to the Charter of the United Nations, whilst 
secretly they nurse expansionist ambitions against their smaller and perhaps 
weaker neighbours.'*^
The resolutions adopted by the moderate and conservatives at Monrovia and Lagos 
were crucial. Two years later, the GAU Charter reasserted the same basic thesis when it was 
established in May 1963. The principle of non-intervention ranked higher than the radical 
appeal for political unity. Although Article 2(1 a) of the GAU Charter stated that one purpose 
of the organisation was to ‘promote unity and solidarity of African states,’ the term was
^ The ‘Resolution on the Means of Promoting Better Understanding and Co-operation Towards Achieving 
Unity in Africa and Malagasy’ fiom the Monrovia Conference, May 8-12 1961. The full text is in C. Legum, 
(1965), p. 216.
Cited in C. Phillips, Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (?: Northwestern University Press, 
1964), p. 93; also partly quoted in I. W. Zartman, (1968), p. 195. The Lagos Conference was a continuation 
of the Monrovia Conference which was held a year earlier.
94
never properly defined. However, as we argue below, a series of events between 1962 and 
1963 made the creation of the OAU possible, and ensured that the Monrovia thesis on non­
intervention gained primacy in the organisation.
The Congo and the creation o f the OAU: unity and exclusivity versus non-intervention
The charters signed at the Monrovia and Lagos conferences ‘became in essence the 
model of a new Charter signed at the Afiica summit conference in Addis Ababa on May 25 
1 9 6 3  ’44 Seygj-^ events, however, between 1962 and 1963 led to the creation of the OAU. 
Notable during this period was the election of one of the parties to the Congolese civil war, 
the ‘moderate’ figure, Cyrille Adoula, as the new Prime Minister of the Congo. The 
nationalist figure and supporter of Lumumba, Antoine Gizenga was re-elected to his former 
position of Vice Premier. This not only reunited the Congolese parliament in August 1961, 
but ended the dual leadership control of Joseph Kasavubu (in Leopoldville) and Gizenga (in 
Stanleyville). This brought the first stage of the civil war to an end. Adoula and Gizenga’s 
election had created a space for better cooperation among the radical and the moderate- 
conservative states of Afiica. More important, it led to the break up of the radical-Casablanca 
group on the eve of the all-Afncan summit at Addis Ababa in 1963 thus allowing the 
Monrovia-Lagos thesis of the moderate-conservatives to dominate the OAU and the gradual 
dissolution of ideological alliances.
In his reflections on intra-continental politics during this period, James Mayall notes 
that 1963 was a ‘year of reconciliation’ for Afiican states. ‘While the causes of friction had 
not been removed by 1963, the Summit of Afiican leaders in Addis Ababa may at least 
succeed in healing the breach between the rival b l o c s . B y  the time of the Addis Ababa 
meeting in May 1963, ‘a number of ground rules for keeping intra-Afncan disputes on a 
manageable level’ had been agreed to, most notably a declaration denouncing subversive
‘ C. Phillips, Jr., (1964), p. 96.
J. Mayall, ‘The Pursuit of African Unity’ Survey of International Affairs, 1963 (by D.C. Watt) (Oxford 
University Press, 1977), p. 265. See also pp. 277-281 on the break up of the Casablanca group. For an 
analysis of the events that led to closer cooperation during the period of 1962 until the creation of the OAU, 
see I. W. Zartman, (1987), pp. 33-34,1. Wallerstein, (1967), pp. 60-65 andM. Zacher, (1979), p. 125. The 
Monrovia group also dissolved, but only after the creation of the OAU.
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activities, political assassination and interference in the affairs of other states/^ States that 
were previously accused of undermming the legitimacy of other states and of harbouring and 
supporting the activities of political refugees from neighbouring states (e.g. Ghana and 
Guinea), were now giving assurances that they opposed intervention in the internal affairs of 
other states.'^  ^As Mark Zacher observes,‘the Casablanca [radical] states had come to feel 
somewhat isolated from the prevailing trends of African politics, and hence they were willing 
to compromise their radical positions to some extent - particularly regarding the issue of 
Africans’ intervening in the affairs of another African state to promote “progressive” 
regimes.’'^ * In return for the support they gave to the moderate-conservative thesis, the 
radicals were given assurance of the new organisation’s commitment towards assisting the 
liberation movements in Southern Africa and establishing a policy of non-alignment over the 
Cold War.'^ ® For the radical states, non-alignment meant that African states would aim their 
foreign policies at influencing the major powers of the West without taking sides in the 
politics of the Cold War. More important, it meant keeping the continent free from outside 
interference and allowing the continent to solve its problems without being caught in the 
East-West confrontation. In a sense, the policy of non-alignment was an expression of 
African exclusivity.
The creation of the OAU can be seen as a symbol of African unity, at least from the 
perspective of those radical states who believed that it was the first step towards establishing 
a ‘supranational’ entity.“ However, as Mayall observes, creating the OAU was partly due to 
the realisation of Afncan leaders that they could only deal with many problems of post-
^ I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 34. 
""R. Good, (1964), p. 632.
^M. Zacher, (1979), p. 125.
For the statements and speeches made by individual leaders, see Proceedings of the Summit Conference 
of Independent African State, Vol. 1, Section I and II (Addis Ababa, May 1963). Also see Keesing’s 
Contemporary Archives, June 15-22, 1963, pp. 19463-19468. See also J. Mayall, (1977), pp. 285-291.
^ Christopher Clapham however argues that ‘[t]hough often described as a compromise between ‘radical’ 
and moderate’ states, the [OAU] Charter actually represented the most clear cut...victory for the principle of 
[state] sovereignty, over any pretensions to supranational continental union. ’ Sqq Africa and the International 
System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 110.
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colonial Africa ‘within the framework of an exclusively African diplomatic system .Despite 
this realisation, there were several contradictions within the Charter. These contradictions 
could be found in the core principles: respect for sovereignty, condemnation of subversion 
and non-interference in internal affairs on the one hand, and the demand for nonalignment and 
promoting unity on the other hand. In addition, there were some lingering differences on 
intra-continental politics, most notably on the Congo, that were papered over in the early 
years of the OAU. These lingering differences re-awakened the divisions between the 
moderate-conservative states and those states with radical commitments on how to conduct 
African affairs.
What re-awakened this division was the re-emergence of the former secessionist 
leader of Katanga, Moise Tshombé in the Congo in June 1964.^  ^Unresolved political and 
social tension in the Congo, plus the re-entry of Tshombé in the Congo largely sparked off 
the second phase of the civil war in 1964. Tshombé’s presence, combined with the division 
among African states on how to conduct intra-African affairs, rekindled questions about 
intervention and non-intervention. The question of how to deal with Tshombé’s arrival in the 
Congo worsened the division between African leaders as they clashed over the notion of the 
right to intervene for the sake of African and Congolese unity and the principle of non­
intervention in the internal affairs of another state.
Phase two o f the Civil War, 1964-1965: The ‘right to intervene ‘for the sake o f African unity 
versus the principle o f non-intervention
On his arrival back in the Congo Tshombé was invited by the ‘moderate’ frgure in the 
Congolese civil war, Joseph Kasavubu, to form a caretaker government after Adoula’s
J. Mayall, (1971), p. 30.
There were reports that Tshombé had re-entered the Congo with mercenary forces from Angola and former 
Katangan gendarmes in June 1964. Since 1962, Tshombé had been in exile in Europe where he had been 
regrouping his forces for a planned return to power. At the time that Tshombé re-entered the Congo, Adoula’s 
govermnent had also been challenged by a military revolt in the Kwilu province in June 1964 by members 
of the Conseil Naüonlale de Libération (CNL) and Pierre Mulele, a former minister in Gizenga’s government 
in Stanleyville back in 1961. (The CNL was made up of former Lumumbist and Gizenga supporters who were 
mainly nationalists.) For discussion of Tshombé’s return to the Congo, see ‘The Build-up of Tshombe’s 
Forces’ Extract from Courrier Africain (Brussels), 4 December 1964 in C. Hoskyns, (ed), (1969), pp. 10-11. 
See dXso Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, August 8-15, 1964, p. 20217.
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resignation and completion of his first term in ofiBce. Tshombé was later sworn into the office 
of Prime Minister on 10 July 1964. The decision by Kasavubu to install Tshombé as Prime 
Minister of the Congo once again divided Afiican states into various groupings and counter­
groupings. As Zartman remarks,
[t]he issue at stake...was a clash between two basic ideological concepts. One 
claimed the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another state in the name 
of a higher value, “Afiicanity”, and saw in Congo an overt colonial threat 
against the entire continent; the other rejected subversion and interference in 
the affairs of a sovereign state and viewed the African system as a concert of 
state designed to defend the new independence from any threat.
Afiican leaders on all sides expressed their objection to Tshombé’s presence at the 
OAU Council of Ministers meeting at Cairo in 1964, but the criticism came from mainly 
radical states. Two statements sum up the position adopted by Afiican leaders over the re- 
emergence of Tshombé in the Congo. The first, coming from the radical states, objects to 
Tshombé’s use of mercenaries from Southern Africa. '^* In his speech to the third 
extraordinaiy session of the OAU Council of Mnisters in September 1964, the delegate from 
Mali, Mr. Boucoumto stated that.
One of the guiding principles of Mali’s foreign policy is the non-interference 
in the domestic affairs of other countries. As a function of this principle, if the 
Congo problem...were limited to a simple conflict, or even a factional struggle 
among the various political leaders of the country, the Government of the 
Mali Republic would have refrained from initiations related to the regime or 
what is happening in this country. But as soon as powerful, extra-military 
forces intervene in a conflict among Africans, and moreover mercenaries, 
coming from a country which has been condemned by our organization 
because of its policy of apartheid towards Afncans, have been recruited to 
slaughter patriots and to bum Afncan villages, we believe that it is our duty 
not to be a passive bystander to such events. If we were to remain silent 
towards such a grievous situation which is not only a blow to the interests of 
Africa, but also to our African dignity, we would be guilty before future 
generations and our guilt would not be pardoned. What is more, such an 
attitude would also be contrary to the pledges we made when in May 1963
I. W. Zartman, (1987), pp. 39-40.
On Tshombé’s use of white mercenaries from Southern Africa, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 
November 21-28,1964, p. 20424.
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we subscribed to the Charter of the OAU. 55
In response to the problem of using mercenaries and the related question of the legality of 
Tshombé’s presence at the OAU, the second speech from the moderates drew an anti­
interventionist line when the Nigerian delegate, Mr Bamali stated at the same meeting that:
President Kasabuvu appointed Mr. Tshombe to head the Provisional 
Government and elections were scheduled to take place within six to nine 
months after the promulgation of the constitution. Although we shall all be 
happy to see an elected government in the Congo, yet we cannot but admit 
the fact that under the present situation it will be impossible for the Congolese 
to elect their own government. The present Central Government is the legal 
government of the Democratic Repubhc of the Congo and this is a fact that 
we must all accept. I am sure that no African government will wish to treat 
with any other Organization outside the legally constituted authority in the 
Congo. In those circumstances it would therefore be wrong and contrary to 
the Charter of the Organization to go beyond the sovereign authority of that 
country. To treat with any Organization other than the proper government of 
a country is to interfere in the internal affairs of that country. Distinguished 
delegates, we all have our own internal problems and we all would not like 
external interference. My delegation considers it the primary duty of this 
Council to assist the Congolese in bringing about the conditions under which 
a freely elected government can emerge. This condition is the restoration of 
law and order. In a previous situation this Council, in recognition of the 
sovereignty of a member state, accepted the principle that such a government 
being responsible for the security of its country, is free to call for military 
assistance from any African state that it so desires. My delegation will wish 
to see that these principles should apply to the Congo problem.
The hostility (especially from the radical states) towards Tshombé led the Congolese 
government to withdraw from the OAU meeting. According to Herbert Weiss, the objection 
shown by some African states towards Tshombé raised ‘a thorny question’ which had
Organization of African Unity Third Extraordinary Session of Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, 5-10 
September, 1964, Extracts from Speeches, in C. Hoskyns, (ed.), (1969), p. 14.
Organization of African Unity Third Extraordinary Session of Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, 5-10 
September, 1964, Extracts from Speeches, in C. Hoskyns, (ed ), (1969), pp. 16-17. President Tsiranana of 
the Malaga:  ^Republic also protested against interference in the internal affairs of another member state of 
the OAU when he argued that ‘We all deplored the death of Patrice Lumumba, but that doesn’t give us the 
right to interfere in Congolese affairs. While we are about it, search your hearts. Have we not all signed an 
execution warrant against one of our compatriots? We are not all angels and if Mr. Tshombé goes to hell, 
there shall be others among us who shall go with him.’ (Rioted in I. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 84.
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consequences for the principle of non-intervention: ‘On what basis could certain statesmen 
refiise to deal with official representatives of another state?’^  ^Tshombé’s presence also raised 
another question on the legitimate standing of the Congolese state on the international stage. 
As Ali Mazrui also points out.
Many African states...seem to postulate a kind of ‘diplomatic republic of 
Africa’ - for admission into which a regime like that of Tshombé in the first 
ten months of his Premiership in the Congo did not have adequate 
credentials.^*
Yet, there were implications for Tshombé other than those raised about his legitimacy as 
leader within Congo. Again as Mazrui states, the problem was not how Tshombé achieved 
power, but ‘how he maintained\ùmsQ\ï'm power.’ This was directly linked to the "external 
help he got’ in suppressing his opponents.Pan-Africanism dictated that any form of 
collaboration with imperialist forces from outside the continent or from the white redoubtist 
government of South Afiica was illegal and contrary to the OAU Charter and the principle 
of autonomy that Afiicans sought.
Here then was the key to understanding the debate surrounding non-intervention and 
intervention within the continent. The OAU Charter, or as Mazrui defines it, ‘Pan-African 
Law’ had however proved an inadequate guide in providing an answer to the use of 
mercenaries or foreign assistance. When was it permissible to seek outside assistance? Could 
a state ask for an outside force to protect itself against internal unrest?^ ® We shall discuss the
^H. Weiss, ‘The Congo and Inter-African Politics’ Extract from the introduction to Congo 1964, pp. xxxi- 
xxxxiv in C. Hoskyns, (ed.), (1969), p. 68.
“ A. Mazrui, (1969), p. 122.
A. Mazrui, (1969), p. 123. (Emphasis in original). See also A. Mazrui, (1967), p. 43.
“ On the question of a state’s right to ask for assistance from other African states or persons, according to 
William Foltz ’[t]he principle is a conservative one, which very much reflects the fact that the indisputable 
point in common among those who attend OAU summits is that they, too, control capital cities . . .Ideally, a 
central government should deal with its internal problems itself, but if it caimot, it has the sovereign right 
to bring in outside help. This help can be ranked in gradations of acceptability. ’ The preferred aim is to seek 
help from within the continent, while the less preferred option is seeking help from non-African states. 
However, on the question of the use of white mercenaries from South Africa, which Tshombé is accused of,‘it 
is’ as Foltz states,‘obvious now...that the use of South African forces and Western mercenaries is not only 
illegitimate but discredits any cause that employs them in the eyes of most OAU members. ’ See W. Foltz, 
(1991), pp. 359-360.
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issues of outside assistance in more detail in Chapter Four. In the end as Wallerstein notes, 
‘[t]he exclusion of Tshombé was... an important event, arguing as it did against the concept 
of unity as alliance (the conservative-moderate stance) and in favour of unity as movement 
(the radical position). For it amounted to...OAU members’ making a judgement on the moral 
worth of a fellow member .The  decision adopted by those African states who rejected 
Tshombé’s presence was significant, for as Vincent Thompson also recognised, such action 
‘emphasised that some African leaders were not prepared to sit idly back and not intervene 
in matters which affected them because of the sacred cow of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of member states.H owever, victory for the radicals was short-lived. The OAU 
seemed unable to affect the Congo situation.
Consequently, the conflict left members split again between the radical states who 
supported the rebels and the moderate-conservatives who retained their support for 
Tshombé, but more important, what they saw as the legal government of the Congo. The 
display of inaction by the OAU may, as V. Thompson suggests, have ‘been because of the 
formality implicit in the principle o f ‘non-interference.” However, ‘[i]t would appear that 
formal attitudes of this kind were likely to make for the connivance by certain African states 
in situations unhealthy to the development of African u n i t y . I n  other words, the inability 
of the OAU to clarify the fundamental issues surrounding when intervention was permissible 
posed a problem for those wanting to create a firm foundation for Afncan unity.
Despite the ability of the radical states to prevent Tshombé’s attendance at the OAU, 
the resolution of the Congo crisis did not prove satisfactory for these states, especially 
Ghana. Instead it intensified Nkrumah’s strategy of Afncan unity and the removal of neo­
colonialism and its ‘stooges’, and this strategy exposed ‘Ghana to further charges of 
‘interference’ and ‘subversion.”^ We can see Ghana’s determination when it, along with the 
leaders of Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Tanzania and the UAR set out
I. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 84. This was not the first time a country had been excluded from the OAU. 
Following the assassination of President Slyvanus Olympio, Togo was excluded not only from the 
preparations leading up to the Addis Ababa Summit of May 1963, but to the OAU itself once it was 
established.
“ V. Thompson, (1969), p. 198.
“ V. Thompson, (1969), pp. 194-195.
J. Mohan, (1969), p. 406. (Emphasis in original).
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to provide bilateral assistance to rebels opposed to Tshombé.
In a secret conference after the OAU Council of Minister’s meeting in September 
1964 and the Conference of Non-aligned States at Cairo in October 1964, leaders from these 
countries noted that Tshombé’s ‘survival...constituted a threat to revolutionary African 
regimes, since a Congo led by [him] would become a base for counter-revolutionary plots 
directed against their governments.’^  ^Partly in response to the Belgo-American intervention 
in Stanleyville on 24 November 1964, these countries launched their own intervention in 
December in support of the rebel leader and President of the CNL, Christopher Gbenye. 
‘Egyptian, Algerian, Malian, Guinean, Ghanaian and Sudanese officers’ were sent to the 
Congo with ‘large shipments of arms’ to assist rebel guerilla forces. At the same time, 
Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, Tanzania and the Sudan had used their countries as a base from 
which military planning could take place to aid the rebels.“  For these radical states, there 
existed a right to assist militarily or financially other Afiican brothers who were fighting 
against neocolonialism. The decision to provide aid to the rebels was in response to the 
support Tshombé received from the US and Belgians. As Mazrui states, ‘the reasoning’ 
logically fits into the belief that some felt they had a right to interfere in support of other 
Afiicans: ‘If Tshombé was getting aid from non-Afiicans, Tshombe’s opponents were entitled 
to some help from fellow Afncans .But  more than some notion of supporting a ‘fellow 
Afiican’ or a brother, the action taken by some Afncans, in particular Ghana, was linked to 
the wider goal of making Afiica free from outside interference and ensuring unity on the 
continent.
65 P. Wild, (1971), p. 42.
P. Wild, (1971), p. 42. Also see F. Singleton, (1968), p. 67 and ARB which covers the allegations of 
pohtical interference by Afiican states, notably Algeria, Sudan and the UAR: December 1-13, 1964, pp. 201c- 
202b, p. 207bc and 211c. A full analysis of the secret conference and the military planning can be seen in 
Jeune Afrique  ^ 13 December 1964 in C. Hoskyns, (ed ), (1969), pp. 45-47. Hoskyns however provides a 
warning about the information surrounding the secret conference stating that, ‘[t]he information contained 
in this document should be treated with some caution since it is now known, for example, that neither 
President Kenyatta pCenya] nor President Nyerere [Tanzania] was in Cairo at [the] time.’ However she goes 
on to suggest that ‘it [was] certainly true that some such meeting did take place and that fiom [that] point 
on the countries named did begin to give more active help to the rebel groups’ (p. 47).
A. Mazrui, (1969), p. 124.
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Conclusion
In sum, two grounds existed for intervention, at least from the perspective of radical 
states. In phase one of the Congo crisis (1960-1962), the reason behind their intervention was 
to prevent external intervention by those perceived to be perpetuating imperialist and neo­
colonialist standards. They directed their actions at supporting the UN operation, and actively 
promoted the policy of limiting troop participation to the UN force to Africans only. This was 
to ensure that the politics of the Cold War was kept out of the Congo crisis, thus providing 
testimony to the principle of exclusiveness and African jurisdiction over its own affairs. 
Dictating the actions of the UN in the Congo and determining the outcome of the conflict 
was a means to maintaining the goal of “African solutions for African problems.” As Mazrui 
states,
Africa’s ambition to be its own policeman is seeking a different safeguard. It 
is seeking a capacity to avert external interference even in the event of 
internal conflict. It would like Africa to have military capability great enough 
to enforce a domestic continental jurisdiction over Afiica’s own quarrels.^*
In this sense, radical states employed the UN to give it that military capability. The UN force 
never came under Afiican control as Nkrumah would have liked. It was when the UN 
operation was deemed a failure that the strategy of the radical states changed from one of 
indirect to direct intervention.
In the second phase of the conflict (1964-1965), radicals attached their justification 
for intervening to the illegality of Tshombé’s presence within the Congo, but more important, 
to his use of white mercenaries, particularly from Southern Afiica, to put down internal 
opposition. Article 3(6) of the OAU Charter on ‘absolute dedication to the total emancipation 
of the Afiican territories which are still dependent’ provided a legitimate haven for radicals 
to justify their actions. For them, the people of the Congo where not experiencing ‘total 
emancipation’, and the presence of neocolonialism and the use of external forces was a threat 
to African unity and the exclusiveness Africans sought in dealing with their own problems. 
But did the Congo crisis open the door for legitimising intervention by African states as
A. Mazrui, (1969), p. 213.
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opposed to when non-African states practised it? It certainly raised the question of whether 
African forces were preferable to the use of other non-African forces.^  ^As Howard Weisberg 
points out, from the start of the conflict the Ghanian representative at the UN had advocated 
‘an active role, including the presence of African forces on Congolese soil, for African states 
in the Congo crisis.’ This, suggests Weisberg, ‘leads to the inference that Ghana would 
reject...intervention when undertaken by former colonial powers, but would accept it when 
the interveners were of the same region or perhaps, race.’^ °
It is possible to argue that the position adopted by the radicals intensified the desire 
by other African states to firmly establish the principle of non-intervention. Thus, in an 
attempt not to lose sight of the sanctity of non-intervention as a principle for ordering 
relations amongst themselves, African states created the ‘Declaration on the problem of 
Subversion’ in October 1965 with a reaffirmation of the principle of non-intervention. 
However, the Congo crisis did raise several questions about the future of unity in Africa, 
especially within the context of intra-African conflicts. While the principle of non-intervention 
was engraved in the OAU Charter, according to Vincent Thompson, its founders failed to 
contemplate ‘the point at which an issue might cease to be a domestic issue and become one 
for Pan-Africanist intervention.’^  ^As W. Scott Thompson and I. Zartman also note,
...behind the problems of interpreting and applying the norm lay the deeper 
question of African unity. Were all African governments to be considered 
equally legitimate (as the conservative states argued) or was there a higher 
standard of “Africanness” with which the sovereignty of brother African 
states could be questioned (as President Nkrumah implicitly argued)? Where 
did the rights of asylum to brother Africans and the duties of support to 
brother African states stop?^^
These questions were left unanswered during the Congolese civil war, but the Nigerian civil 
war and the problem of apartheid in South Africa allowed for another opportunity to discuss
The question of capability was not dealt with, except with the understanding that a UN force was to be 
made up exclusively of African nations.
^H. Weisberg, ‘The Congo Crisis 1964: A Case Study in Humanitarian Intervention’, Virginia Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1972, p. 272.
V. Thompson, (1969), p. 192.
^ W. Thompson and I. Zartman, (1975), p. 5.
104
them. A major question which was left unanswered was the problem of secession which 
caused division among the radicals and moderate-conservative states. Could Afiican states 
intervene to support a secessionist movement? Attempts were made during the Nigerian civil 
war from 1967-1970 to clarify some of the fundamental questions on the rules governing 
intra-African affairs. The ‘rules of the game’ as set out in the OAU Charter were fundamental 
in trying to understand how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of 
non-intervention.
n. The Nigerian Civil War: Secession and the principle of non-intervention
Nigeria’s civil war began when Biafra, a region in south-east region of the country 
indicated its intention to secede from the federal republic.Viewed from the perspective of 
OAU action, an institutional consensus held that the Nigerian civil war was a matter of 
internal affairs for the Federal Government of Nigeria. The OAU Charter attaches great 
importance to the ‘inalienable right to independent existence’ of African states as noted in 
Article 3(3). The Biafrans based their desire to secede on this Charter principle. However, 
this ‘right’ by the OAU Charter is only applicable to colonial territories and not to those 
territories wanting to secede from existing independent African states.^^
During the fourth ordinary meeting of OAU Heads of State on 11 September 1967 
in Kinshasa, the OAU held that the territorial integrity of Nigeria was not to be undermined. 
The Organisation set up a Consultative Committee consisting of six heads of state which in 
the end supported the Federal Government of Major-General Yakubu Gowon.^^ More 
important however, the OAU found itself unable to intervene, because to do so would have
^ A full analysis, with the relevant documents on the Nigerian civil war, can be found in A.H.M Kirk-Greene, 
Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, January 1966 - July 1967, Vol. I and July 1967- 
January 1970, Vol. II (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) and J. Stremlau, The International Politics 
of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).
For an analysis of the OAU’s position see, Z. Cervenka, The Organisation o f African Unity and Its Charter, 
(London: C. Hurst and Company, 2"** edn., 1969), Chapter 9, ‘The OAU and the Nigerian Civil War’ in Y. 
El-Ayouty, (ed.), (1975), pp. 152-173; and (1977), Chapter 7.
Z. Ùervenka, (1969), p. 82. (My emphasis).
The six states in this committee were Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Niger, and Zaire (formerly the 
Congo).
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been contrary to its Charter, Article 2(2) on ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of States.’ 
At the Kinshasa summit, Nigeria effectively dictated that the Committee was only to hold 
consultation if it supported Gowon’s own initiatives on how the crisis was to be resolved. 
Nigeria was able to prevent any intervention to which it did not consent. The principle of 
non-intervention reinforced another principle of intra-African affairs, that of the principle of 
self-determination which protected state sovereignty and territorial integrity.^*
The Nigerian civil war was to be the first case in which the doctrine of self- 
determination, along with traditional rules of international law relating to intervention, 
‘produced a presumption in favour of the established government’ in post-independence 
situations.^  ^More important was the policy of ‘non-recognition’ which the OAU adhered to 
over Biafra. According to Zdenek Cervenka, this policy ‘implies a refusal to admit the vaUdity 
of any change.’ ‘The significance of the policy of non-recognition of Biafra’ which was 
endorsed by the OAU Summit at Algiers in September 1968, called upon ‘all Member States 
of the United Nations and the OAU to refrain from any action detrimental to the peace, unity 
and territorial integrity of Nigeria.’*® This set a precedent against future support for 
secessionist movements within the continent. In the end, the OAU argued that those basic 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention become ‘relevant’ once the struggle of peoples 
within colonial territories was over.*^
There were however variations among Afiican states on the line adopted by the OAU. 
While the Charter was seen as a restraining order on the Organisation, it did not stop 
individual states from commenting. As Obi Okongwu points out.
It seems that in such a situation the duty of non-intervention is a matter tacitly
ARB, Vol. 4, No. 9, September 1-30, 1967, p. 856b. Also see, N. Pelcovits, (1983), p. 264.
^ See J. Mayall, ‘The Hopes and Fears of Independence: Africa and the World 1960-1990’in D. Rimmer, 
{çàL) Africa 30 Years On (London: James Currey and Porthsmouth (N.H.): Heinemann, 1991), p. 27 and M. 
Shaw, ‘International Law and Intervention in Africa’, International Relations, Vol. VUI, No. 4, November 
1985, p. 356.
Shaw, (1985), p. 356.
Z. Cervenka, (1969), p. 219 and 220.
M. Shaw, (1985), p. 350. The Assembly of OAU Heads of States had passed a resolution at the fourth 
ordinary secession at Kinshasa in 1967 against any form of secession in independent Africa and external 
support given for such movements. For full text, see I. Brownlie, (ed.), (1971), p. 364.
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left to the discretion of the individual member States. Individual members, it 
seems, could take measures contrary to that taken by the Organization 
without forfeiting their membership of the Organization.*^
To this end, four Afiican states (Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Zambia) recognised 
Biafra as an independent state. This was a strange mixture: Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire were 
conservative states, while Tanzania and Zambia were radical. President Nyerere of Tanzania 
provided an explicit statement of why his country supported the Biafian secession. In 
adopting a moral attitude, he concluded that.
The O A U was established by Heads of Afiican States. But it is intended to 
serve the peoples of Afiica. The O AU is not a trade union of Afiican Heads 
of States ...We must not just concern ourselves with our own survival as 
Heads of State; we must be even more concerned about peace and justice in 
Afiica than we are about the sanctity of the boundaries we inherited...
We must not be like the French monarch (who) said ‘L’état c’est Moi’
- ‘I am the State.’ The O A U must sometimes raise a voice against those 
regimes in Afiica, including independent Afiica, who oppress the people of 
Africa.*^
Such a statement not only contradicted the OAU Charter, but also the view of early radicals 
like Nkrumah on the dangers o f‘balkanization.’*^ Interestingly enough, Nyerere and later the 
Tanzanian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. C. Y. Mgonja, used Afiican unity to 
justify Tanzania’s decision to recognise Biafra. This again was quite different from Nkrumah 
who rejected Katanga’s secession from the Congo because it would undermine the movement 
towards Afiican unity.*  ^Tanzania’s attempts to recognise Biafra were to prove ineffective.
O. Okongwu, ‘The O.A.U Charter and the Principle of Domestic Jurisdiction in Intra-African Affairs’, 
Indian Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 4, October-December 1973, p. 591.
President Julius Nyerere, ‘Tanzania’s Memorandum on Biafra’s Case’ in A.H.M Kirk-Greene, (ed.), 
(1971), p. 438. This document was circulated privately to the OAU Summit Meeting held at Addis Ababa, 
4 September 1969. For Nigeria’s response, see the Statement made by Chief Enahoro at a press conference 
held in Addis Ababa, September 1969, ‘Nigerian Refutes Tanzania’s Charges before the O.A.U’ in the same 
volume, pp. 439-445.
^ See ‘Nigeria’, Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, Vol. 1, 1968-1969, p. 566.
(Hereafter vlCR).
“ For the full text of the speech see, Julius Nyerere, ‘Why we recognised Biafra’, ACR, 1968-1969, pp. 651- 
652 and Mr. C. Y. Mgonja, ‘Tanzania Recognises Biafra’, Tanzania's Foreign Affairs Bulletin: An Official 
Record of Foreign Policy at the United Republic o f Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: No. 1, Vol. IV, May 1969), 
pp. 41-45.
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We should note that the usual discernible ideological position in Pan-Afiican politics 
did not dictate Africa's response to the Nigerian civil war. So while some sections of the 
radical group supported Biafra (i.e. Tanzania and Zambia), others did not (i.e. Algeria, 
Guinea and Mali). This was due in part to various domestic factors. A majority of the radical 
states were Muslim who, out of solidarity, supported the large Muslim leadership and 
population in northern Nigeria.*® These states supported the vote of conservative states hke 
Malagasy, Cameroon and Ethiopia to maintain the strategy o f‘keep Nigeria ONE.’ Yet while 
these conservatives held to this view, others from their group - Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire - 
supported Biafra’s plea for secession.*^
What was significant about the Nigerian civil war was that it was an African 
crisis from the beginning to the end. As Mayall states, ‘ [i]t was clear that this question would 
be settled by Afncans themselves, albeit with powerful outside support.’** The aim of the 
OAU was to avert the possibility of non-African interference so as to display Africa’s ability 
and jurisdiction to solve its own problem. Africa’s ofiBcial position to the international 
community, via the OAU, was that the war was an ‘African affair’ thus confirming the 
principle of ensuring that the continent had autonomy over its affairs. However, in essence, 
it indicated the opposite; under intra-OAU relations, it was Nigeria’s ‘internal war’ and 
Africans were also prohibited from intervening.*®
Conclusion
The Nigerian civil war illustrated that the principle of non-intervention was paramount
“ H. Ewke-Ewke, (1990), p. 53. 
H. Ewke-Ewke, (1990), p. 54.
“ J. Mayall, (1991), p. 26. In reference to the Congo, Mayall states that what ‘had been at stake was the role 
that the outside world would play in reshaping the political map’ of that country, p. 26. However, Andemicael 
states that ‘the Congo had such an ideologically divisive character that it induced serious interference by 
certain African states and non-Africans and other foreign interests,’ (1976), p. 84. The main outside support 
for the Biafrans came from France who provided military aid via Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon. The Federal 
Government of Nigeria also received militaiy assistance from the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union 
although it is worth adding that overall the international community did not intervene in the civil war. See 
J. Stremlau, (1977), who discusses the external support received by both sides throughout his book, esp. pp. 
79-80, 148, 224-237, 263-268 and 297-308.
H. Ewke-Ewke, (1990), p. 58.
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in cases of internal conflicts. In addition, it also indicated that the ‘rules of the game’ 
governing intra-continental politics held that no policy should aim at undermining state 
boundaries inherited from the colonial era. The general pattern of thought found within 
African diplomatic behaviour was geared towards ensuring that the colonial boundaries and 
the leadership instituted within these boundaries were not to be challenged. As a result, the 
principle of self-determination was effectively subordinated to the quest for territorial 
integrity, thus preserving ‘the territorial status quo.’^ °
However, in the final part of this Chapter, we show how African leaders applied a 
different set of rules to the problem of apartheid in Southern Africa. The actions taken by 
African leaders over Southern African was another indication of how the idea and practice 
of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention. African leaders argued 
that the rules applicable in post-independent situations differed from those during the struggle 
for liberation.
ni: Intervention to remove colonialism: An exception to the rule of non-intervention?
As far as the ideology underpinning Afiican unity was concerned, the view of African 
leaders was that their freedom and security were incomplete while colonialism was present 
in Southern Afiica. All necessary means, although never properly defined, were to be enlisted 
to end the colonial and racial struggle.^  ^The action of Afncan leaders towards South Africa 
showed how they loosely interpreted the principle of non-intervention in dealing with the 
cause of freeing peoples from illegitimate racist regimes.^  ^Afncan leaders sought to attach 
the right of intervention to human rights and the principle of self-determination of peoples.
While there was no direct military intervention in South Africa, the speeches and 
resolutions passed, along with the position adopted by African leaders, in particular those 
from the radical bloc, represented a view indicating that intervention was preferred not only
^ C. Thomas, (1985), and N. Pelcovits, (1983), p. 263.
The aim here is not to consider the success or Mure of Afiican states or the OAU in ensuring the liberation 
of Southern Afiica. The aim instead is to use the early struggles against South Afiica as a means from which 
to discuss the evolution of intervention as a poUcy advocated by Afiican states. For a full analysis of the OAU 
and the liberation struggle see, Z. Cervenka, (1977), Chapter Four.
C. Thomas, (1985), p. 64.
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to achieve freedom, but also to promote the rights of an oppressed group/^ In the pursuit of 
ending colonialism and apartheid, African leaders established what James Mayall defined as 
a ‘two-track policy’:
The first was diplomatic. Afiican governments would continue to press for 
an accelerated pace of decolonisation and for the isolation and/or withdrawal 
of South Afiica from multilateral organisations. ..
The second track consisted of both diplomatic and financial support 
for the liberation movements. Continental support for the legitimacy of armed 
struggle, in those cases where the colonial power refused to go quietly, raised 
the anti-colonial struggle to new levels of militancy....[T]he Afiican 
Liberation Committee [ALC] was set up to coordinate African assistance to 
the liberation movements.^ *^
Thus, at the diplomatic level, the aim was to apply moral pressure upon the South African 
government through the UN.
Afiican states, along with other developing countries, sought an ‘exception to the rule 
- a higher imperative’ to the principle of non-intervention and domestic jurisdiction. They 
affirmed a right of intervention for ‘the case of peoples struggling for their independence 
against the persistence of the old order .Afncan states derived their claim from several 
sources such as the Non-Aligned Summits in Belgrade (1961), Cairo (1964) and Lusaka 
(1970) which dealt with the issues of apartheid, racialism, human rights, self-determination 
and colonialism. However, the most important source was the UN Charter which African 
states argued gave the UN ‘right... as representative of international society, to overrule the 
plea of domestic jurisdiction if standards of conduct within states fell below standards 
asserted to have been agreed between them.’^ ® By taking their cue from the principles in 
Article 55 and 56 of UN Charter on human rights, African leaders demanded active UN
It should be noted that in accordance with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, ‘no armed forces of OAU 
Members [were] being used “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.’” As we 
shall discuss later in section, ‘it [was] the national liberation movements that [were] using force in their own 
Territories with moral and material assistance from OAU Members and other States. ’ B. Andemicael, (1985), 
p. 105.
Mayall, (1991), p. 30.
R. J. Vincent, (1974), p. 261 and 274.
J. Vincent, (1974), p. 261.
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intervention on behalf of the black population of South Afr ica.The moral argument 
introduced by African states led to a confrontation between the white regime of South Africa 
who asserted the right of state sovereignty, and Africans who linked their argument to human 
rights and the associated questions of self-determination and racial equality. Whether it 
legitimated human rights intervention for the future is doubtful. It is possible to suggest that 
African states limited this policy to the white redoubtist regimes of Southern Africa. We shall 
come back to this point towards the end of this part of the Chapter.
At the level of ‘diplomatic and financial support for the liberation movements’, the 
newly independent states of Africa, notably the Congo (Kinshasa - formerly Leopoldville), 
Guinea, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia provided training and assistance to the freedom 
fighters in Southern Africa, although their actions stopped short of direct military 
intervention.^* African states saw the provision of aid as legitimate, corresponding as it did 
to UN General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) of 1965 which noted that ‘all States shall 
contribute to the complete elimination or racial discrimination and colonialism in all forms 
and manifestations. ’ However, the resolution never delineated the nature of this contribution, 
and some states interpreted it as they saw fit. Although this declaration, along with the 
Declaration on the Granting o f Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was not 
binding, they nonetheless, as Richard Falk states, ‘disclose[d] an altered normative 
environment which became established in the late 1950s...In effect, support for anti-colonial, 
anti-racist...action was legitimated as an exception to the rule on non-intervention.
Afncan leaders argued that the situation in Southern Africa constituted a ‘threat to 
international peace and security.’ Representatives of Guinea, Somalia and Sudan argued, that
Article 55(c) authorised the UN to promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’, and Article 56 states 
that, ‘All Members shall pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the 
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55. ’
Y. El-Ayouty, The United Nations and Decolonization: The Role o f Afro-Asia (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1971), p. 235 and M. Shaw, (1985), p. 347. Emphasis was placed on giving aid and assistance to the 
hberation movements as opposed to direct military intervention for mainly one reason. African armies were 
too weak mihtaiily to take on the regimes of Southern Africa. More important, the independent states of black 
Africa ‘lacked the institutional and economic base to contemplate any support in military confrontation with 
either the colonial powers or the regimes of the white redoubt.’ A. Sesay, O. Ojo, and O. Fasehun, (1984), 
p. 15.
^  R  Falk, ‘Intervention and National Liberation’ in H. Bull, (ed ), (1984), p. 129 and 130.
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this being the case, the UN Security Council should take measures under Chapter Seven of 
the UN Charter to end apartheid. These states aimed at three possible outcomes. First, to 
convince the UN that it should resort to actions ranging from economic sanctions to military 
intervention. Second ‘to push South Africa into isolation from the international community.’ 
Finally, to work for South Africa’s ‘expulsion from the United Nations and all other 
international organizations.Despite the efforts of African leaders to define the problem 
of apartheid as one of a threat to peace and security, ‘the Security Council never went 
beyond mere description of the situation in South Afiica as ‘seriously disturbing international 
peace in southern Afiica. Nevertheless, Afiican states appeared to have widened the 
intervention debate:
The Afncan states contend that the perpetuation of colonialism and the 
continuation of apartheid constitute a threat to international peace and 
security. The major powers ha[d] resisted such a conclusion (with the notable 
exception in regard to Southern Rhodesia) though, through their silence, they 
seem to have implicitly recognized the right of African states to intervene 
directly in the affairs of southern Afiica.
African representatives, including Asian and Middle Eastern representatives at the 
UN, fiirther based their call for intervention on ‘a moral duty above the law’ by stating that 
‘[i]n the context of apartheid, the principle of nonintervention had become a totally
Yearbook of the United Nations (1972), p. 70. Article 39 of Chapter Seven determines whether a situation 
is a threat or a breach of international peace and security. Articles 41 to 43 consider what measure are to be 
taken to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security.’ Also see R  J. Vincent, (1974), p. 267.
Z. Cervenka, (1977), p. 112.
Z. Cervenka, (1977), p. 112.
Matthews, ‘Interstate Conflicts in Africa: A Review’, International Organization, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, 
Spring, 1970, p. 337. The link between apartheid and the clause on maintaining peace and security was 
brought about by a series of events within the African continent: the Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa 
(March 1960), where many Africans lost their lives to white police forces; the outbreak of various wars of 
hberation, beginning with Angola in 1961; the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the white minority 
Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia in November 1965 and; the declaration of a ‘Republic’ of Southern Rhodesia 
(March 1970). See Y. El-Ayouty, (1971), pp. 234-235. As early as April 1960, the UN Security Council met 
at the request of the Afro-Asian group at the UN and adopted resolution 134 (1960) which declared that in 
light of Sharpeville, the situation in South Afiica, was ‘one that has led to international friction and if 
continued might endanger international peace and security.’
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discredited d o c tr in e .I t  is important to note that the call for intervention against South 
Africa was justified because the governmental system advocated institutionalised racism. As 
Mazrui states, ‘it is not simply the governmental institutions of South Africa that African 
States object to; it is more the government personnel and its racial arrogance.W itness the 
declaration made in the Lusaka Manifesto, which fourteen east and central African states 
signed in April 1969, that effectively called for intervention over the racist regime of South 
Africa:
The Republic o f South Africa is itself an independent Sovereign state and a 
member of the United Nations. It is more highly developed and richer than 
any other nation in Africa. On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter 
exclusively for the people of South Africa. Yet the purpose of law is people 
and we assert that the actions of the South African government are such that 
the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defense of 
humanity, self-determination and non-racialism.
African states recognised the legal entity of South Africa, but not its leadership or 
governmental system. The purpose of action was to change the structure and make-up of the 
governmental system, which they deemed illegitimate under Pan-Africanism and unacceptable 
to the international community. African states sought justification for their actions through 
the OAU Charter.
The position adopted over South Africa was also reflected in the overall policy taken 
towards the states that made up the Southern African region (i.e. Angola, Mozambique and 
Rhodesia). Again the Lusaka Manifesto, which the Assembly of Heads of States and 
Government of the OAU and the UN General Assembly later adopted, openly stated the 
position of many African states. It noted that African states were to use all means at their
R. J. Vincent, (1974), p. 269. (Emphasis in original). For an analysis of the debate at the UN and a full 
list of UN documents, see pp. 261-275 of R  J. Vincent’s book. See also B. Andemicael, (1976), pp. 18,19, 
101-147 and Y. El-Ayouty, (1971).
A. Mazrui, (1967), p. 43. (Emphasis in original). See also A. Sesay, O. Ojo, and O. Fasehun, (1984), p. 
28.
‘The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, 1969’ in I. Brownlie, (ed.), (1971), p. 532. (Emphasis in 
original). See also C. Thomas, (1985), p. 66. The Lusaka Manifesto was a joint statement by representatives 
of Burundi, the Central Africa Repubhc, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia at the Conference of East and Central African States at Lusaka in April 1967.
See Z. Cervenka, (1969), p. 37. See also C. Thomas, (1985), p. 66.
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disposal to cause change, including the provision of aid to the liberation movements in 
Southern Africa:
On the objective of the liberation..., we can neither surrender nor 
compromise. We have always preferred and we still prefer, to achieve it 
without physical violence. We prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk 
rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to violence 
against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of 
Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed 
circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our 
brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle 
even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while 
peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the 
States of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of 
those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle 
against their oppressors. This is why the signatory states participate in the 
movement for the liberation of Afiica, under the aegis of the Organisation of 
Afiican Unity.
The Lusaka Manifesto was essentially a ‘dual strategy of “talk and fight.’” ®^^ As an indication 
of the necessary means at their disposal, during 1960-1970, Afiican states, with the support 
of other developing countries, called for UN sanctions against the colonial and apartheid 
regimes of Southern Afiica. Among the resolutions passed were the sanctions against 
Southern Rhodesia in resolution 217 (1965) resolution 232 (1965) and resolution 277 (1970). 
The UN also passed an arms embargo against South Afiica in Resolution 181 and 182 
(1963), 282 (1970), and 311 (1972). This latter resolution was the more effective of the four 
as it gained support from the UK and the US (France abstained) and recognition of ‘the 
legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Afiica in the pursuance of their 
human and political rights, as set forth in the [UN] Charter and the Declaration of Human 
Rights.'""
‘The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa’, 1969 in I. Brownlie, (ed.), (1971), p. 529.
A. Sesay, O. Ojo, and O. Fasehun, (1984), p. 30.
Security Council Resolution 311, 4 February 1972 The full text can be seen in Yearbook of the United 
Nations, (1972), p. 88. Also see B. Andemicael, (1976), p. 138. S. Neil MacFarlane points out that while 
African leaders castigated the regime of South Africa over its apartheid poUcy, ‘many black African 
states...maintain[ed] wide-ranging and lucrative economic ties with South Africa,’ (1983/4), p.55. For 
example, the President of Malawi, Dr. Kamuzu Banda, established diplomatic relations between his country 
and South Africa. Trading links were also established with South Africa by the following countries: 
Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Swaziland, Zambia, Central Africa Republic, Gabon, Ivory Coast
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Conclusion
Did the actions against South Afiica fit into the wider question of Afiican unity? Yes, 
insofar as the ideology underpinning Pan-Afiicanism maintains that the states of Afiica will 
not be completely fi*ee and independent until all regions had been liberated fi*om colonialism. 
African leaders saw colonialism as an illegitimate system, and where it was present, 
intervention was permissible to end its reign. Afiican leaders asserted a right to intervene in 
South Afiica, an independent Afiican state, since its political system and its racial constitution 
were detrimental to Afiican unity. The lack of racial representation in South Afiica and the 
problem of what to do not only raised interesting questions, but had several policy 
implications for those who called for intervention. If Afiican states granted themselves the 
light to interfere on such grounds, what of a situation where members of the same race were 
suppressed? What did Afiica’s leadership say about this, especially when colonialism was not 
at the heart of the debate? Was there an ‘exception to the rule’, ‘a higher imperative’ that 
outlawed the principle of non-intervention when blacks were oppressing blacks? Certainly, 
Nyerere’s statement in support of Biafi'a’s secession fi'om Nigeria did partially confi’ont the 
question of the principle of non-intervention when atrocities were being committed by fellow 
Africans. However, as we shall see in the following Chapter, it was Nyerere’s intervention 
in Uganda that explicitly raised this question and added another dimension to the debate on 
intervention and non-intervention in intra-Afiican affairs.
Conclusion
The purpose of this Chapter has been to explore how the idea and practice of 
intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention in intra-Afiican affairs. More 
specifically, the aim has been to consider whether the two central themes of Pan-Afiican - 
unity and exclusivity - are usefiil in understanding how the practice of intervention evolved 
on the continent. The three cases studied in this Chapter tell us how the practice of 
intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention in post-colonial Afiica.
and Zaire. Also see C. Hoskyns, (1967), pp. 170-171.
A. Mazrui also considers this point, (1967), pp. 43-44.
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The Congo was the first intra-state conflict on the continent where African leaders 
were confi’onted with the question of intervention and non-intervention. The main question 
was whether African intervention in the internal affairs of another state was permissible? In 
addition, could Afiican states intervene to aid a secessionist or an opposition movement? 
Afiican leaders were unable to answer these questions effectively in the context of the Congo 
crisis, instead, diverging views emerged.
Although the moderate-conservatives criticised what they perceived as intervention 
in the internal affairs of the Congo, radicals used the underlying principle of Pan-Afiicanism 
and the OAU’s call for ‘emancipation of the Afiican territories that are still dependent’ 
(Article 3(6)), to legitimise and fulfill a dual strategy: unity and autonomy. In fact, both were 
persistent and recurrent themes in statements issued to defend their actions in the Congo. The 
radicals argued that although the Congo had gained its independence, it was only nominal; 
the Congo was not completely free fi*om colonial domination. For Pan-Afncan unity to be 
a reality, aU states had to be fi*ee fi’om colonial domination, but more important, once fi*eed, 
all states must relinquish links with their former colonial masters. Not to do this would 
undermine the progress towards the political unification of Afiican states. In addition, failure 
to achieve political unification undermined the possibility of Africa’s exclusive right to deal 
with its affairs. For the radical states, the Congolese nationalist leader, Patrice Lumumba 
directed his policy at freeing the Congo from its former colonial master, hence why they 
supported his struggle.
When radical states were accused of supporting the nationalist Lumumba cause, they 
defended their actions by claiming that they wanted to preserve the Congolese state from 
disintegration. Nkrumah argued that the breakup of the Congolese would undermine the 
possibility of Afiican unity and autonomy. Factional fighting between fellow brothers was not 
conducive to the goal of unity. More important, as Nkrumah argued, factional fighting or 
disputes encouraged extra-Afiican influences if Afncan states could not resolve their 
problems. Nkrumah advocated the idea of a Pan-Afncan High Command not only to replace 
the UN in the Congo, but to fulfill his strategy of continental exclusiveness. In the end, 
Afiican intervention in the Congo became synonymous with the liberation struggle and the 
radical goal of unity and autonomy in Afncan affairs.
However, not all states supported the radical cause. The conservatives supported 
Tshombé attempts to secede, but there was no agreement among African states on the
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controversial question of foreign assistance, especially the use of mercenaries to put down 
internal unrest. The difference of opinion among African leaders over the Congolese civil war 
and the failure of Africa states to strictly define when intervention was permissible largely 
explained why the anti-interventionist norm gained primacy within the OAU. Combined with 
the accusations of Ghana’s subversive activities in the West African region that we discussed 
in Chapter Two, the principle of non-intervention was gradually becoming the rule by which 
African states conducted their affairs. More important, when Kwame Nkrumah was deposed 
in a coup in 1966, the notion of unity which he promoted and along with it, the contentious 
policy of intervention to ensure political union among African states seem to come to an end.
The extent to which the non-interventionist thesis was fast becoming the dominant 
thesis of African affairs could be seen in the Nigerian civil war. A commitment to the 
principle of non-intervention dictated the OAU’s position over the Nigerian civil war. As with 
the Congo, African states defended the principle of non-intervention to secure African unity 
as opposed to the break up of Nigeria. With the exception of Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania 
and Zambia’s support to the Biafrans, the involvement of African states was limited to 
supporting the cause of the Federal Government of Nigeria. The OAU claimed that Africa 
had autonomy over the crisis to avoid widespread non-African intervention on a scale as that 
witnessed over the Congo. But that autonomy was not Africa’s, it was Nigeria’s and Africans 
were also prohibited from intervening.
The Congolese and Nigerian civil war showed how African states were slowly 
developing rules to govern intra-African affairs especially in situations of civil wars. When 
it came to the question of apartheid in Southern African, African leaders sought to redefine 
intervention and the principle of non-intervention. For African leaders, intervention was 
permissible to free those regions that were still under colonial rule. What African states were 
arguing was that the principle of non-intervention did not extend to the white redoubtist 
regimes of Southern Africa until they had changed the nature of their political system.
In sum, African leaders claimed a right to intervene to liberate regions of Southern 
Africa that were still under colonial rule. In situations of civil wars, as the Congo civil war 
illustrated, the lack of solidarity among Africa’s leaders made it impossible to obtain a clear 
decision on the right of intervention despite the fact that non-intervention became the guiding 
principle of intra-African affairs in the OAU. An unresolved question in the Congolese civil 
war was on the issue of mercenaries and foreign assistance. Could an African leader, as
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Tshombé did, use mercenaries or seek outside assistance to resolve an internal crisis? Did this 
not contradict the notion of African exclusivity? Similarly in the Nigerian civil war, although 
most states observed the principle of non-intervention. President Julius Nyerere statement in 
support of Biafra’s secession opened the door on the problem of what to do when blacks 
were being oppressing by blacks. Was there a right to intervene when atrocities were 
committed by black African states? As we shall discuss in Chapter Four, these unresolved 
questions not only challenged the non-interventionist movement that had built up in the OAU, 
but also shed further light on how the practice of intervention evolved in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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CHAPTER FOUR
1970-1983: POST-INDEPENDENCE AND INTRA-AFRICAN CONFLICTS 
Introduction
By the start of Africa’s second decade of independence, several events occurred on 
the continent that shed light on how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the 
principle of non-intervention. These included the Shaba (formerly Katanga) I and II crises in 
Zaire (1976 and 1977-1978); the Angolan civil war which started in 1976; the Chadian civil 
war which was paramount throughout the 1970s and 80s, and the Tanzanian intervention in 
Uganda (1978-1979). With the exception of the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, what tied 
all these cases together was the issue of mercenaries and foreign assistance or put another 
way, the use of extra-continental forces (i.e. non-African forces) to solve African problems. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to argue that the action of African states in these events 
challenged the principle of non-intervention as set out in the OAU Charter.
In this Chapter, we focus primarily on the Pan-Africanist theme o f ‘exclusivity.’ We 
stated in Chapter Two that one way of understanding the notion of African exclusivity was 
to explore how it was used by some African leaders outside of the OAU framework to justify 
interventions in the internal affairs of other African states. Can we understand the actions of 
African states through the Pan-Africanist theme of ‘exclusivity’? Does it serve as a useful 
source for understanding intervention by African states during the 1970s and 1980s? Another 
aim of this Chapter is suggest that other factors ranked higher than notions of exclusivity in 
understanding how the practice of intervention evolved in Sub-Saharan African. These 
factors included arguments to protect national security and to ensure self-defence and 
territorial integrity.
This Chapter is divided into three parts. In Part One, we argue that the issue of 
mercenaries and extra-continental forces shed a spotlight on understanding when intervention 
was justified alongside the principle of non-intervention. The Angolan civil war and the 
Shaba I and II crises are useful cases in addressing the issues of foreign assistance, 
intervention and non-intervention. More important, we note how the notion of African 
exclusivity was extending from its original meaning of developing a mechanism that would 
keep the continent free from outside influences and pressure.
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In Part Two, we focus again on the issue of foreign assistance and the presence of 
non-African forces. We argue that some states, notably Nigeria, saw intervention by African 
states as a legitimate way of preventing or limiting the presence of non-African forces in 
African conflicts. To argue this point, we focus on the involvement of Nigeria and the OAU 
in the Chadian civil war between 1975 and 1981. However, we also ask what other norms 
and principles guided Nigeria’s actions in the Chad. Can they be understood in terms of Pan- 
Africanism or were there other consideration such as national security and the threat to 
regional peace and security that directed Nigeria’s actions in Chad?
In Part Three of this Chapter, we consider Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda. Of all 
the cases discussed in this Chapter, Tanzania’s action not only challenged Article 3(2) of the 
OAU Charter, but more important, it directly questioned the political authority of an African 
leader. An unresolved question in the Nigerian civil war was openly discussed when President 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania intervened against the regime of General Idi Amin in Uganda: 
What did the rules governing intra-African affairs have to say about atrocities committed by 
black Afiican states? Was intervention justified to end widespread abuse by an independent 
black African state?
I. The principle of non-intervention and the issue on foreign assistance in Africa.
If there was a period in which the politics of the Cold War came to have a lasting 
impact on the African continent, then the 1970s was surely it.^  This period saw the gradual 
intensification of East-West rivalry and outside interests taking their toll on the continent. 
The main problem facing the continent was the unprecedented number of non-Afncan 
interventions that were taking place in African affairs since the end of colonial rule. From 
Angola to Chad, non-Afiican intervention had become a permanent feature on the continent. 
The politics of the Cold War, the ‘continuing historical obligations and economic 
considerations’ combined to heighten the presence of extra-African forces.^ As Colin Legum
* For an analysis of the impact the Cold War had upon Afiica, see J. Mayall, (1971), especially Chapter 4 and 
Z. Laïda, The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints o f a Rivalry, 1960-1990 (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1990).
 ^O. Aluko, ‘African Response to External Intervention in Africa since Angola’, African Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 
319, April 1981, p. 163. See also K. Somerville, (1990) and A. Clayton, (1986), pp. 203-258. Intervention
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stated when assessing the year 1977:
Looking back to the Berlin Treaty of 1884 and the carving out of separate 
spheres of influence by the colonial powers, Africans began to speak uneasily 
about ‘a new scramble’ for the continent. Although the historical analogy is 
false, the colonial memory persists, reinforcing the association of foreign 
power rivalries in Africa with subjugation of the continent.^
Legum goes on to suggest that a ‘new phenomenon’ for this period ‘was the extemalization 
of inter-African conflicts, brought about by militarily and economically weaker forces 
engaging the support of foreign pow ers.The presence of foreign powers was significantly 
felt in inter-African conflicts such as that between Morocco and Mauritania against Algeria 
over the Western Sahara in 1977. Here France was said to have been ‘invited by Afiican 
leaders themselves to play a greater military role in the dispute.’  ^However, most notably for 
our immediate concern, foreign interventions by Cuba, France and the Soviet Union were a 
prominent feature in several civil wars on the continent, for example, the Shaba I and II crises 
and the Angolan civil war. Yet this was hardly a new phenomenon; the Congolese civil war 
had shown how an Afiican conflict could become internationalized. The main problem was 
not only that outside powers were participants in some Afiican conflicts, but that some 
African states were, as Legum observes, seen to be encouraging their presence.
The presence of non-Afiican intervention was contrary to that aspect of Afiican 
diplomacy which agreed at the Addis Ababa conference of May 1963 that extra-continental 
forces would be kept out of African affairs. If strictly interpreted to mean that no outside 
intervention in Afiican affairs was acceptable, then ‘invitations’ to foreign forces went against 
the intention of the founding fathers of the OAU who sought to establish Afiica’s autonomy 
over its affairs. The participation of non-Afiican forces in Afiican conflicts since the end of
by non-Afiican states also includes that performed by the regime of South Afiica. See C. Legum’s discussion 
of South Afiica’s role in the Angolan civil war in ‘Foreign Intervention in Angola’, ACR, Vol. Yin, 1975- 
1976/b, pp. A29-A32 and R. Hallet, ‘The South African Intervention in Angola 1975-76’ African Affairs, 
Vol. 77, No. 308, July 1978, pp. 346-386.
 ^C. Legum, ‘A Year in Perspective’, Vol. X, 1977-1978, p. xx.
 ^C. Legum, (1977-1978), p. xx
 ^C. Legum, (1977-1978), p. xxi. See also C. Wauther, ‘France’s Year in Afiica’, pp. A89-A90; ‘Algeria’, 
pp. B9-B12; ‘Morocco’, pp. B98-B100 and; ‘Western Sahara’, pp. B157-169, esp. pp. B163-166 iwACR, Vol. 
X, 1977-1978.
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colonial rule was a direct challenge to the notion of exclusivity - a principle objective of Pan- 
Africanism - that Africans felt they had over their affairs. However, as was the case in the 
Congo, the principle of African exclusivity was left open to the various interpretations of 
some Afiican leaders in the 1970s. A major problem facing the continent in post-independent 
Afiica and which challenged the assumption of African exclusivity over its affairs, was the 
continuing attachment some states had towards their former colonial masters. Many states 
embraced the idea of what Sam Nolutshungu defined as ‘sovereignty under surveillance’ 
where former colonialists like France appeared to provide ‘protection for otherwise insecure 
regimes.’^
There was one area in which Afiican leaders gave tacit approval to the presence of 
non-African forces. This was in averting the spectre of secession. We discussed the extent 
of the OAU’s opposition to secession in Chapter Three when we noted the OAU’s rejection 
of Biafra’s attempt to secede from Nigeria in 1967. Again in the 1970s, the Organisation’s 
stand against secession was being challenged, this time by the Eritreans in Ethiopia.^ It was 
the threat posed by various secessionist movements that led some OAU member-states to 
suggest that if they enlisted foreign help to prevent the breakup of the state system, such 
action was not to be ‘regarded as interference,...but rather as brotherly help.’* So, when the 
Soviet Union stepped in during the latter part of the 1970s to help Ethiopia prevent ‘the 
greatest of all evils,’ secession, Ethiopia’s President, Mengistu Haile Mariam, did not see this 
as foreign intervention, but as supporting and preserving the African state system.
Both constitutionally and practically, the OAU could not give unconditional support 
to the use of foreign intervention. To this end, it passed a resolution during the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government Summit meeting in Libreville, Gabon in July 1977 that was 
critical of foreign military assistance. However, the OAU never condemned the Cuban and 
Soviet presence on the continent. The resolution urgently called
on all African states so that, without prejudice to their right to conclude
S. Nolutshungu, (1996), p. 6.
’ The Eritreans fought for independence from Ethiopia from 1962. For an analysis of their struggle to 1977, 
see various issues of ACR, esp. ‘Ethiopia’, 1976-1977, Vol. IX, pp. B196-B201 and ‘Ethiopia’, 1977-1978, 
pp. B216-B217.
®Z. Cervenka, ‘OAU’s Years of Disunity’, 1977-1978, p. A63.
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defence agreements of their choice intended especially to forestall outside 
aggression, they refrain from having recourse to foreign intervention in the 
settlement of conflicts between Afncan states/
In an appeal to the Soviet and Cuban presence on the continent, but also the French, the 
resolution called ‘on all extra-African powers, particularly the big ones, to refrain from 
interfering in the internal affairs of African states ' Both the Soviet Union and Cuba had 
pursued an active role on the African continent, most notably in the Angolan civil war (from 
1975) and the liberation movements in Southern Africa/^
Angola andforeign military intervention: a threat to African exclusivity?
Angola gained independence from its Portuguese colonial master on 11 November 
1975. Even before then, fighting had begun among the three nationalist movements and the 
civil war continued to plague the continent. Although fighting continued into the nineties, our 
immediate concern is with the initial years of the conflict and the support the nationalist 
movements received from extra-continental forces. Furthermore, we want to illustrate how 
the attitudes of Afiican leaders to the use of extra-continental forces sheds light on how the 
practice of intervention evolved on the continent.
Briefly, there were three main nationalist movements who were ideologically divided 
and contending for power in Angola: 1) the Movimento Popular de Libertaçâo de Angola 
(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA) led by the strong Marxist 
leadership of Dr. Agostinho Neto had been mainly based in the far east region of Angola. The 
MPLA’s strong socialist credentials under Neto attracted support from the Soviet Union and 
Cuba. 2) The Frente Nacional de Libertçâo de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of 
Angola, FNLA) led by President Dr. Holden Roberto. The FNLA had bases in northern 
Angola, but its main base was in southern Zaire were it had been receiving support from
® Resolution AHG/Res.85 (XIV), ‘On Interference in Internal Affairs of African States’ at the Fourteenth 
Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Libreville, Gabon in 2-5, July 1977. 
The full is mACR, 1977-1978, p. C4.
A comprehensive outline of the role of Soviet and Cuba in Africa is given in various volumes of ACR. See 
especially Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, ‘Cuba: The New Communist Power in Africa’, ACR, 1977-1978, pp. 
A103-A116 and D. Morison, ‘Soviet and Chinese Policies in Afiica’, 1977-1978, pp. A94-A102.
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President Mobutu, but also had ‘connections’ with the US, China and North K o re a ,3) The 
Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for Total 
Independence of Angola, UNIT A) led by Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi. Of all the three 
movements, UNITA was the smallest with its base in central and south-east Angola. UNITA 
was created after a split between Roberto and the former Foreign Affairs spokesman and 
Secretary-General of the FNLA, Jonas Savimbi, who had accused Roberto of tribal-based 
politics. UNITA had not fully established a network of external allies as the MPLA or 
FNLA had, although its early allies seemed to include the US and China. It also 
controversially sought support from South Africa.
Some member-states of the OAU had been critical of the use of extra-continental 
forces in the Angolan civil war.^ '^  As an example of the extra-African Powers, we consider 
the role of the Soviet Union and Cuba primarily in helping Dr. Agostinho Neto and the 
MPLA gain power. The position of both countries is significant, for as Legum states, ‘[f]or 
the first time since the onset of Afiica’s modem independence, an African Government was 
actually helped to establish its power through open foreign intervention.’ *^ The Soviets and 
Cubans claimed that their position in Angola was directly related to their links with liberation 
movements in Southern Afiica. In justifying its presence in Angola, the Soviet Union outlined 
its policy objective in as one o f ‘assisting “Angola’s legitimate government based on
the internationalist principle of supporting the nations’ stmggle for freedom and 
independence.’”^^ It later claimed, along with the Cubans, that the South African intervention
' * It is possible that Mobutu’s support for Holden was tied to the fact that the both men were related by 
marriage. See K. Somerville, (1990), p. 86.
K. Somerville, (1990), p. 86 and ‘Decolonialization’, Strategic Survey 1975 (The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 29.
For an analysis of the civil war in Angola, see ‘Decolonialization’, (1976), pp. 27-38.
For an analysis for the role of extra-Africa Powers in the Angolan civil war, see K. Somerville, (1990), pp. 
94-101.
C. Legum, (1975-1976a), p. xviii and (1975-1976b), pp. A3-A6.
Pravda, 3 January 1976. Cited in C. Legum, (1975-1976/b), p. A12. There were other foreign policy 
objectives beyond providing assistance for the struggle for liberation that explain the presence of both 
countries on the African continent. Certainly, if one looks at the Soviet Union, its objectives ranged from 
wanting to extend the Soviet sphere of influence in the continent to one of undermining Western interest in 
the region. For an analysis of the Soviet Union’s role beyond that of assisting the liberation struggle, see, D. 
Albright, ‘Overview of Communist Arms Transfer to Sub-Saharan Africa’ in B. Arlinghaus, {ed.)Arms for
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in 1975 and US military aid primarily fixelled its decision to enter Angola on the side of 
MPLA.^  ^What is of main interest to us here is not the exact role or real intentions of the 
Russians and Cubans, but the reaction of various African states towards their participation 
in Angola’s civil war.
Much of Africa’s response to the Russian and Cuban intervention, and also to the 
South African intervention, was aired at the OAU Assembly of Heads of State Summit 
meeting at Kampala, Uganda between 28 July-1 August 1975.^* There was, as Legum 
suggests, a broad ‘consensus’ within the OAU that all three main movements in Angola be 
treated equally and that no support was to be given to external intervention. However, this 
‘consensus’ broke down when South Africa intervened in support of UNITA. What was 
however significant about this breakdown was that it shed light on the inconsistencies that 
surrounded a major principle of African diplomacy - the prohibition of external intervention 
in the internal affairs of African states. Member-states had agreed on condemning South 
Africa who was not yet regarded as an independent black African state because of its white 
redoubtist regime. However, there was division between those who rejected outside 
intervention and those who supported the Soviets and Cubans. This latter group (i.e. the pro- 
MPLA group) supported Cuban and Soviet intervention because they believed that both 
countries were protecting the legitimate MPLA government and the rest of Angola from 
South Africa’s intervention, but more important supporting the liberation struggles in 
Southern Africa. This group mainly included left-wing radical states, Algeria, Congo, Guinea, 
Somalia, and the former colonies of Portugal, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and
Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in the Developing World (Lexington, Massachusetts: 
Lexington Books, 1983), pp. 21-37; A. Klinghoffer, ‘The Soviet Union and Superpower Rivalry in Africa’ 
in B. Arlinghaus, {oA.) African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1984), pp. 19-38; andE. Laurance, ‘Soviet Arms Tranrfer in the 1980s: Dechning Influence 
in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in B. Arlinghaus, (ed.) Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in 
the Developing World, pp. 39-77; and D. Morison, (1977-1978), pp. A94-96. On Cuba’s own activities in 
relations with Angola and the liberation movements of Southern Africa, see Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, 
(1977-1978), p. A106 and pp. A109-110 andpp. A113-114.
C. Legum, (1975-1976b), pp. A12-A13. The Cuban leader, Fidel Castro stated that it intervened in Angola 
not only to remove the South Africans, but as a moral duty to counter what he perceived to be imperialist 
aggression. See p. A14.
This section on the reaction of African states to the Angolan civil war is derived from Colin Legum’s 
analysis of the debate that took place at the OAU Kampala Summit in C. Legum, (1975-1976b), pp. A22- 
A26.
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Sâo Tomé and Principe.
Nigeria also staunchly defended the position of the pro-MPLA group. Nigeria had 
initially rejected the MPLA’s claim to be the legitimate government of Angola, when she 
agreed with the OAU that a national government be composed of the three nationalist 
movements. More important, Nigeria’s new leadership under General Murtala Muhammed 
had followed the policy of his predecessor Yakubu Gowon in condemning the support MPLA 
was receiving from the Soviet Union, because it undermined the potential for reconciliation 
among the nationalist movements. A shift in policy however occurred under General 
Muhammed when Nigeria discovered that South Africa had been helping UNITA. In a 
statement to the OAU Summit meeting in Kampala in 1975, General Muhammed criticised 
the neo-colonialist actions of Western governments, particularly the US, for not condemning 
and preventing the South African intervention. In relation to the Soviet Union’s support for 
the MPLA, Muhammed not only praised this action, but the Soviet Union’s overall policy of 
helping the liberation movements in Southern Africa:
We are all aware of the heroic role which the Soviet Union and other Socialist 
countries have played in the struggle of the African peoples for liberation. The 
Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have been our traditional suppliers 
of arms to resist oppression, and to fight for national liberation and human 
dignity. On the other hand the US, which now sheds crocodile tears on 
Angola, has not only completely ignored the freedom fighters whom 
successive US administrations branded as terrorists, it even openly supported 
morally and materially the fascist Portuguese Government. And we have no 
cause to doubt that the same successive American Administrations continue 
to support the apartheid regime of SA whom they see as defender of Western 
interest on the African continent.^®
In response to Nigeria’s approval of Soviet presence in Angola, President Kenneth Kaunda 
of Zambia remarked that support given by the Soviet Union for liberation should ‘not be an 
excuse for establishing hegemony in Afiica.
Those who were critical of MPLA and as consequence, the participation of Russian and Cuban forces in 
the civil war, included Uganda and Zaire.
Cited in C. Legum, (1975-1976b), p. A25.
C. Legum, (1975-1976b), p. A25. Kaunda was referring to the possibility of Soviet and Cuban hegemony 
in Africa.
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We can also see the extent of the division among African leaders over the question 
of allowing non-African intervention in two draft resolutions that were put forward at an 
emergency summit held in Addis Ababa on 16 January 1976 to deal specifically with the 
Angolan civil war. Two groups emerged within the summit because of this division. The first 
group included mainly moderate and conservative Francophone states: Botswana,
Cameroon, Central Afiican Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gambia, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, 
Upper Volta, Zaire and Zambia. This group rejected foreign assistance claiming that it had 
jeopardized and internationalised the conflict. In its resolution, it called for the ‘immediate 
withdrawal of all African and non-Afiican States and cessation of the arms supply.’ The 
second group was a mixture of radical, moderate states and former Portugese colonies: 
Algeria, Benin (Dahomey), Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, the Comoros Island, Congo, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sâo Tomé and Principe, Sudan and Tanzania. This 
group supported a resolution which laid the blame for the civil war squarely at the door of 
the South Afiicans and ‘its active collaborators,’ but refrained from condemning Russia and 
Cuba. Rather, its resolution allowed for ‘Material and military assistance to the People’s 
Republic of Angola both through bilateral arrangements and collectively by the OAU.’Where 
a consensus existed, it was limited to both groups’ condemnation of South Africa’s role in 
the civil war.^^
In his speech to the OAU Summit in Khartoum, Sudan in July 1978, the new Nigerian 
head of state, Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo, held the Soviet and Cuban position 
as legitimate, but added: ‘having been invited to Afiica in order to assist in the liberation 
struggle and the consolidation of national independence, they should not overstay their 
w elcom e.W hile  we suggested earlier that a policy of outward support for foreign
For a full analyse of the competing views between these two groups, Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, ‘The 
Organization of African Unity', vtCR, 1975-1976, pp. A72-A74.
" Lieutenant-General Obasanjo gained power after General Muhammed was assassinated on Friday 13, 
February 1976. The full text of the Khartoum address can be seen in A March of Progress: Collected 
Speeches of his Excellency Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, n.d.), 
pp. 300-304, esp. 303. Also see Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo, ‘External Intervention in Africa: The View 
from Africa’, Survival, Vol. XX, No. 6, November/December 1978, pp. 268-269 and Africa Currents, No. 
12/13, Autumn/Winter 1978/9, pp. 8-12.
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intervention showed a degree of inconsistency with the pohcy of African exclusivity, the 
position of some Afncan states over Angola showed that there was nothing entirely 
inconsistent about this policy. We need to be quite clear about what foreign intervention 
meant to African states.
African states were in two minds about the use of external military assistance on the 
continent. Those who expected the OAU to condemn the Soviet and Cuban presence in 
Angola failed to understand how ‘foreign intervention’ was interpreted by the OAU. Outside 
intervention was deemed legitimate when aimed at supporting the struggle against the white 
regimes of Southern Africa, and to this end, some African leaders invited outside forces to 
support this struggle, although there was no established policy on what type of intervention 
was preferable to remove the white regimes.Some leaders recognised the need to seek 
outside help for the liberation struggle, not only because they lacked indigenous capacity to 
fight the white regimes in Southern Africa, but also to ensure an international dimension to 
their struggle. At the same time, these leaders were aware of the dangers of allowing the 
continent to become dependent on foreign assistance, especially during a period of 
heightened superpower rivalry. It was largely because many perceived the Soviets and 
Cubans to be supporters of the liberation struggle that the OAU Liberation committee 
apparently ‘legitimised’ (if only by default) the supply of arms given to MPLA by these 
countries.
Yet, this was not just a struggle for liberation; Angola had already gained 
independence from its Portuguese colonial master. The struggle now was over who would 
control the country’s political landscape, therefore Angola’s conflict was internal and no 
outside interference according to Article 3(2) of the OAU should have occurred. 
Furthermore, African exclusivity dictated that problems arising on the continent should be 
dealt with, in the first instance, by Africans. The idea behind African exclusivity was to keep 
the continent free from outside influence and pressure, and if defined this way, then the 
support given to the Soviet and Cuban intervention contradicted this policy. However, the 
radical left-wing states that supported President Agostinho Neto and the MPLA, interpreted 
this struggle for power in Angola as a continuation of the fight for independence and saw
C. Legum, (1975-1976b), p. A3.
” Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, (1975-1976), p. A68.
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intervention as a necessary means to fulfill the struggle. In one sense, the radical states and 
the MPLA could define the struggle in Angola as a fight for “second independence”, this time 
against those forces in the country whom they believed to be ‘un-Afiican’ because of their 
pro-Western outlook and influence.^® They saw these forces as breeding neo-colonialism 
within the continent, for they allowed Western interest to get in the way of the liberation 
struggle and the creation of a ‘true’ Afncan identity. Such a view was similar to that 
promulgated by Nkrumah during the Congo civil war who favoured Lumumba’s radical- 
nationalist credentials to the apparently Western influenced views of Tshombé and 
Kasavubu.^^ Seeking outside assistance to achieve this goal of “second independence” was 
not contrary to the principle of Afncan exclusivity, because Afncan states were deciding for 
themselves how to solve a problem even if they had to call outside powers (e.g. the Soviets 
or Cubans) to fulfill their policy. As Nigeria’s Head of State, Lieutenant-General Obasanjo 
stated;
In the struggle for independence and fi’eedom, the only source of effective 
support was the Eastern Bloc countries. The Soviets were therefore invited 
into Afiica for a purpose, and that purpose was to liberate the countries to 
which they were invited....[W]e should not be over-concerned by the presence 
of those we invited to fight for specific causes.. .We have no right to 
condemn the Cubans nor the countries which felt they needed Cuban
“ According to George Nzowgola-Ntalaya, the term “second independence” was coined by the people in the 
Kwilu region of Western Zaire. For these people, the first independence from their Belgian colonial masters 
had failed. ‘Independence was meaningless without a better standard of living.’ The promise of a better life 
had been squandered by those African ‘politicians who inherited state power,...lived in much greater luxury 
than most of their European predecessors and used violence and arbitrary force against the people.’ 
Consequently, people attempted to fight for another independence, this time against their own leaders. See 
Revolution and Counter-revolution in Africa, (London; Zed Books, 1987), p. 92.
The same ideological split that developed between the Casablanca and Mom-ovia group during the 
Congolese civil war re-emerged over Angola in 1976, with the radicals supporting the MPLA and the 
moderate-conservatives backing UNITA and the FNLA. The membership and character of the various 
ideological groupings had rapidly changed in the 1970s. Significant among the groupings was the radical 
bloc. Two kinds of radicals emerged: those who held on firmly to Marxist-Leninist thinking (“Marxist- 
Radicals”) and the radical or “mihtant nationalist” of which Nigeria was one. However, this latter group was 
different from the days of Nkrumah in that it never strove for a United States of Africa. For a full analysis 
of the various groupings, see Z. Ùervenka and C. Legum, ‘The Organization of African Unity in 1978: The 
Challenge of Foreign Intervention’, ACR, Vol. XI, 1978-1979, pp. A27-A28.. On the différences and 
similarities between the radicals of the 1960s and the 1970s (the “new wave”) see M. Radu, (1984a), pp. 15- 
40, esp. 16-21 and 31.
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assistance to consolidate their sovereignty or territorial integrity 28
Here lies the second meaning of the notion of African exclusivity. It became synonymous 
with outside intervention in the struggle for independence and not just as mechanism to keep 
the continent free from outside interference. Indeed, it did not undermine the notion of Africa 
exclusivity; states who supported the MPLA recognised the use of non-African forces, but 
only as a last resort, to remove the foreign meddling of Western states in African states.
The support given to Neto and the MPLA was not surprising. More than seeing it as 
a continuation for the struggle of national liberation, some of the states supported Neto 
because he shared the same Marxist-socialist ideology that they believed in. While the 
struggle for liberation was widely used to justify outside intervention, there was another form 
of justification that some African leaders frequently cited. As we have pointed out in this 
study, support for states who share the same radical or revolutionary view of another country 
was often a reason why some states intervened in certain conflicts. During the 1970s radical 
African states held a seemingly congruous record when it came to interventions aimed at 
supporting a regime that shared the same ideology or overthrowing a regime that held 
opposing views.^  ^ A pattern was emerging within the continent by which radical states 
extended support to other states who fell within the Marxist-Leninist mould or who were 
ideologically friendly regimes, and the support given to Neto and the MPLA was an 
example.^®
“ A March of Progress: Collected Speeches of his Excellency Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo, (n.d.), p. 302. 
President Agostinho Neto of Angola also defended his country’s decision to call for Soviet and Cuban 
assistance. See Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo, (November/December 1978), pp. 270-271 and Africa 
Currents, No. 12/13, Autumn/Winter 1978/9, pp. 4-6.
A. Hughes and R. May, (1986), p. 195.
 ^The radical or left-leaning states during the 1970s were Eduardo dos Santos (Angola), Mathieu Kerekou 
(Benin), Samora Machel (Mozambique), Mengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopia), Agostinho Neto (Angola), 
Didier Ratsiraka (Madagascar), Jerry Rawlings (Ghana) and Albert Rene (Seychelles). See M. Radu,‘Africa 
in the 1980s: The End of Iimocence’ in R Bissell and M. Radu, (eds ), (1984b), p. 233. Angola and Guinea- 
Bissau were active participants in averting the coup d’état in Sâo Tomé and Principe in 1977, while Guinea 
extended military support to Benin in the same year to help President Kerekou’s Government in diverting 
the mercenary invasion. Many of these interventions took place by virtue of bilateral or defence agreements 
that individual states had with one another. Such agreements allowed a state (e.g. Guinea) to lend support 
to another state (e.g. Benin) when it faced internal umest. As an example of bilateral defence agreements, 
see that signed by Guinea and Sierra Leone in March 1971 in ARB, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 1-31, 1971, p. 
2045a. Other defence agreements were that signed between Nigeria and Benin, (29 April 1979) and Senegal 
and The Gambia (July 1981). Alse see M. Radu, (1984a), pp. 35-36.
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However, in supporting states with the same ideological persuasion, several radical 
states became reliant on external military assistance. Did this not contradict the Pan-Africanist 
notion of exclusivity that they identified themselves with? The answer was no; these radical 
states wanted to support those who shared similar political views, but they lacked indigenous 
military capacity available to help neighbouring or 'friendly' states. As Radu states, ‘unlike 
the more naive or unrealistic Pan-Afiicanists or Afiican socialists [e.g. Nkrumah and Touré],’ 
the leaders of the radical states in the 1970s ‘realize[d] that their goals [could] not be reached 
with indigenous resources,’ hence they had ‘no objections to the introduction of non-Afiican 
forces on the continent.
The notion of Afiican exclusivity was again extended in the Shaba I and II crises by 
African leaders this time to either support or reject foreign intervention. Again, we notice 
how Afiican leaders, but more significantly the OAU, claimed that the notion of exclusivity 
had not been undermined, rather supplemented or reinforced.
The Shaba I  and II Crises
The conflict that provoked intense debate on the question of foreign military 
assistance was the Shaba crises of 1976 and 1977-1978 in Zaire. Briefly, the crises that 
engulfed Zaire in the latter half of the 1970s was a spillover of the unresolved political 
problems from its civil war when it was called the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Members from the Congolese National Liberation Front (FNLC) had apparently launched 
their attack from their military base in Angola with the aim of overthrowing President Joseph 
Mobutu and creating a government of national unity. The FNLC were partly made up of 
Katanga gendarmes loyal to the former secessionist leader Moise Tshombé. These gendarmes 
had been in exile in northern Angola after two failed attempts in 1966 and 1967 to restore 
Tshombé’s leadership which he had lost to President Joseph Mobutu. The FNLC had been 
led by a former police commissioner who was appointed by Tshombé, General Nathanael 
Mbumba. President Neto allowed the FNLC to use Angola as a base to launch its attack 
largely because the FNLC had fought alongside Neto’s MPLA during Angola’s civil war 
against the FNLA who were receiving support from President Mobutu. The FNLC were also
M. Radu. (1984b), p. 233.
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helped by Soviet Union and Cuba/^
In response to the FNLC invasion, President Mobutu sought the help of Western 
allies. The US and France responded, the former providing limited support through $15 
million of non-military aid.^  ^ In keeping with its policy of maintaining and expanding its 
sphere of influence in Africa, France sent in a small number of military advisers and military 
equipment to the province of Shaba.^ '^  Some Francophone ‘conservative’ Afiican states such 
as the Central Afncan Empire, Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco and Senegal had ‘played an active 
behind-the-scenes role by encouraging French intervention’ while King Hassan II of Morocco 
dispatched 1,500 troops in a French military aircrafi.^  ^King Hassan’s support for the Zairean 
leader was not surprising. According to Keith Somerville, Hassan was repaying Mobutu 
back for supporting his claim for Western Sahara and the removal of ‘socialist-inclined 
movements like the Polisario.’^ ^
What provoked criticism from some African leaders was a Western-sponsored 
initiative to create a Pan-Afncan Intervention Force to help Mobutu put down the rebel 
incursion. During the Shaba conflicts, France, with the support of the UK, Belgium and the 
US, had recommended the establishment of a Pan-African Intervention Force to replace non- 
African forces. Troops from the Central African Empire, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, 
Senegal, and Togo took part in the African force with the support of US and French military 
assistance in mid-1978 to protect Mobutu. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was notable 
among the critics of this intervention force. He accused France of ‘neo-colonialism for 
economic purposes’ and America of wanting to use the African continent as a pawn in the 
East-West conflict.^  ^In a statement on 8 June 1978, Nyerere gave support to the idea of a
For an analysis of the Shaba I and II crises, see ‘Zaire’, ACR, 1977-1978, pp. B589-B598 and H. Ewke- 
Ewke, (1990), pp. 112-130.
See ‘Zaire’, (1976-1977), p. B527.
See ‘Zaire’, (1976-1977), p. B527.
See ‘Zaire’, (1977-1978), p. B594 and ‘Zaire’, (1976-1977), p. B527. Egypt, Sudan and Uganda also 
supported Zaire’s use of non-African troops to protect his leadership.
^ Keith Somerville, (1990), p. 170.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, August 11, 1978, p. 29130. It should be noted that King Hassan of 
Morocco did not support the French initiative of an African force, ‘on the grounds that it would split Africa 
into moderate and progressive factions. ’ (p. 29130).
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Pan-African security force, but was critical of outside intervention:
It might be a good thing if the OAU was sufficiently united to establish an 
African High Command and a Pan-African Security Force. If, having done so, 
the OAU then decided to ask for external support for this force, no-one could 
legitimately object....
Yet until Africa at the OAU has made such a decision, there can be 
no Pan-African Security Force which will uphold the freedom of Africa. It is 
the height of arrogance for anyone else to talk of establishing a Pan-Afiican 
Force to defend Afiica. It is quite obvious, moreover, that those who have 
put forward this idea and those who seek to initiate such a force are not 
interested in the freedom of Afiica. They are interested in the domination of 
Afiica.^*
For its part, the OAU never openly criticised Mobutu’s decision to seek extra-Afiican 
support. This was not because it supported such a policy; rather, the OAU recognised that 
it was unable to dictate outright how members were to conduct their foreign policies. In the 
end, as Cervenka and Legum note, ‘[t]he essence of the consensus reached at the OAU... was 
an appeal to member-states to avoid resorting to foreign military assistance as far as possible 
and to refrain from using force against one another.’ This was however a point familiar to 
OAU members as the civil war in Angola had shown. The OAU ‘had always claimed that an 
invitation to foreign troops was made only as a last resort and adopted only with reluctance 
by the urgent necessity [of states] to defend their territorial integrity.’ The Organisation was 
also simply acknowledging that the demands of its Charter could not prevent members from 
pursuing their own course of action.
The OAU’s position introduced an interesting aspect to the continent’s understanding 
of the principle of non-intervention, but it was also an indication of the fallacy that lay behind
^ Extracts horn a statement by the President of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, 8 June 1978, Africa 
Currents, No. 12/13, Autunui/Winter 1978/9, pp. 22-23. Also see Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, ‘The 
Organisation of Afiican Unity in 1978’, 1978-1979, pp. A33-A34. It is worth remembering, as we discussed 
in Chapter Two that Nyerere called for an African force to replace British troops who he had requested to 
help him put down the mutiny in Tanganyika in 1964.
^Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, (1978-1979), p. A37. (Emphasis in original). Two resolutions were passed at 
the 31^  session of the OAU Council of Ministers meeting held in Khartoum from 7-18 July, 1978 prior to the 
Heads of State Summit of 18-22 July which were critical of the use of outside militaiy intervention, but 
nevertheless, did not condemn the decision of states to seek outside assistance. See, ‘On an Inter-African 
Military Force of Intervention’, CM/Res. 635 (XXXI) and On Military Interventions in Afiica and on 
Measures to be taken against Neo-Colonialist Manoeuvres and Interventions in Africa’, CM/Res. 64 (XXXI). 
The full text of both resolutions can be seen in ACR, 1978-1979, p. C16 and C19, respectively.
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the principle. As stated above, external intervention seemed justifiable, on the one hand, to 
prevent secession and maintain internal order and movements of national liberation. On the 
other hand, external intervention was also justified if it is aimed at supporting the existing 
status quo and the integrity of the state system. As S. Neil MacFarlane states, ‘there is little 
basis for a sweeping condemnation of intervention when the purpose of such action was to 
preserve sovereignty and ensure political stability.’'^® Research has shown that those African 
leaders seeking to maintain their position in power often sought external aid, and such a 
policy largely went unchecked among African states who argued that the African state system 
needed to be preserved.'^  ^Asking outside powers to prop up the African state was necessary, 
especially as many states did not have indigenous military capacity to either maintain internal 
order or ensure their survival in power. More important, many African leaders feared that the 
overthrow of a regime by rebel forces in one state could have wider implications for the 
continent. It is therefore possible to suggest that underlying Afncan diplomacy was the idea 
of intervention to preserve the African state-system. Most, if not all African states were 
weak and it became an interest for other African states to ensure the survival of ‘brother’ 
states or at least support outside co-operation that was aimed at maintaining the African state 
along with the incumbent regime.
Conclusion
To summarise Part One of our discussion, so far we have argued how the principle 
of African exclusivity was used to justify the intervention of individual African states in some 
internal disputes, or to justify the support given by some to intervention performed by extra­
continental forces. While Western observers might therefore conclude that there appeared 
to be some contradiction in the meaning some Afncan states attach to the principle of non­
intervention, this was not so. African leaders not only attached a special meaning to the 
principle of non-intervention, but they approached the principle in a pragmatic fashion, giving 
it a wide ranging meaning within the context of African affairs.
S. N. MacFarlane, (1983/4), p. 60.
In their study of military involvement of African states with each other, Hughes and May state that 
intervention to support the regimes of particular African states was a common feature on the continent. See 
‘Armies on Loan’, pp. 180-184. Also see C. Clapham, (1996), pp. 80-85.
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In Chapter Two and Three we pointed out that involvement in the internal disputes 
of another state was defined, at least by radical states, as intervention when conducted by 
non-African forces. However, when conducted by an African state, particularly when the aim 
was to ensure the ‘right’ kind of regime was in power, radical states did not define this as 
intervention, but as either lending support to a ‘brother’, maintaining and preserving African 
‘solidarity’ against neo-colonial forces or supporting the cause of ‘national liberation’. 
However, what of when Afiican states supported or as Obasanjo stated ‘invited’ non-African 
forces to resolve intra-Afiican conflicts? Again, radical states were able to extend the 
meaning of exclusivity by stating, as they did in Angola, that they wanted to prevent foreign 
meddling by the neo-colonialist powers of the West, although an underlying motive was to 
seek outside help for those African regimes that they supported.
For conservative or moderate states, or states that maintained strong links with 
Western powers, intervention by non-African forces, when called upon, was justified as 
support for the status quo or for the Afiican state system as in the case of Mobutu’s request 
for help in the Shaba conflicts. For these states the main concern was stability and the survival 
of the state and assistance from allies whether Afiican or non-Afiican was welcome. 
Furthermore, seeking helping from mainly Western powers was also a way of countering the 
influence of Soviet and Cuban presence on the continent who supported radical and 
revolutionary states on the continent.
Despite Article 3(2) of its Charter, the OAU also attached various meaning to the 
principle of non-intervention. While it deplored the use of foreign forces on the continent, the 
OAU recognised the right of any country to invite any state, African or extra-continental, to 
help that country with its internal or external affairs. Yet at the same time, such a position 
allowed for increased reliance on external military assistance.
However, there are several reasons which account for the increased reliance on 
external military assistance in the 1970s: 1) The OAU displayed an inability to resolve 
Africa’s disputes. The OAU was supposed to serve as a body o f ‘first instance’, yet it was 
impotent in effectively dealing with the continent’s internal conflicts. 2) A lack of unity 
among its member-states over how to respond to conflicts on the continent had allowed or 
encouraged outside intervention by major extra-continental powers.'*  ^Put another way, the
Also see ARB, Vol. 13, No. 5, 1-31 May, 1976, p. 4015c.
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failure to harmonise their policies or develop concrete policies on how to tackle conflicts on 
the continent meant greater outside involvement in African affairs. 3) An inability by African 
leaders to maintain law and order in their countries forced them to seek outside assistance. 
Many states were economically weak and politically bankrupt and consequently signed 
defence agreements with Western or Socialist allies to protect their regime from internal and 
external aggression. Instead of concerning themselves with keeping the continent free from 
the politics of the Cold War as the notion of African exclusivity dictated, these states argued 
that exclusivity gave them an ‘inalienable right’ to direct their own foreign policy. 4) Another 
factor, though not discussed in this study, was the ability of the major powers of the North 
to on the one hand, exploit weak African states that could not shield themselves from foreign 
machinations and on the other hand, take advantage of the divisions among African states in 
resolving their conflicts. In the end, these factors contributed to the increased presence of 
foreign intervention and as Nigeria’s Head of State, Lieutenant Obasanjo argued, it is the 
actions of African leaders ‘which provide [outside powers] with the excuse to interfere with 
[Africa’s] affairs.
To a certain degree, in the next part of this Chapter, we should see Nigeria’s decision 
to involve itself in the Chadian civil war in the context of some African states wanting to limit 
external military involvement on the continent. The belief among Nigeria’s diplomatic circle 
was that enhancing Africa’s indigenous capacity through the OAU would replace individual 
state reliance on external military assistance. To this end, the next part of this Chapter 
examines another aspect of how the debate on intervention evolved alongside that of non­
intervention in the continent. We can understand how the practice of intervention evolved in 
the second half of the 1970s in the following statement: ‘Getting the Organisation of African 
Unity strengthened by actually being involved in solving Afncan problems like Chad, is one 
way of ensuring that superpowers do not unduly penetrate the continent.’'^ However, there 
are other reasons that lay behind Nigeria’s intervention in Chad.
n . Regional Intervention in the name of non-intervention: The civil war in Chad
A March of Progress: Collected Speeches of his Excellency Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo  ^ (n.d.), p. 303. 
See K. Somerville,(1990), who argues that there are ‘long-term structural factors and shorter term political, 
social and economic fectors’ which account for foreign military intervention in Afiican states, (pp. 183-188).
^ ARB, Vol. 18, No. 3, March 1-31, 1981, p. 5986c.
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In the introduction to this Chapter, we suggested that some African states saw 
intervention by Afiican states as a legitimate way of preventing or limiting the presence of 
non-Afiican forces in Afiican conflicts. To argue this point, we focus on the involvement of 
Nigeria and the OAU in the Chadian civil war between 1975 and 1981 to further illustrate 
how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent.
The civil war in Chad had gone almost unbroken since the republic’s independence 
in 1960, and engulfed the country right into the 1980s.'*^  We are not questioning whether the 
various African attempts at mediation in Chad did much good to resolve the conflict. This 
is another question altogether and for another study. Rather, we are concerned with why 
there were attempts by Africans to intervene at all in what was essentially an intra-state 
conflict, an area which the OAU traditionally refrains from involving itself. The civil war 
challenged the system of intra-Afiican affairs on three levels. First was over the question of 
to whom to grant recognition at the level of the OAU. Put another way, which leader had 
legitimate control in Chad? Second was the territorial dispute between Chad and Libya over 
the Aouzou Strip, thus challenging the principle of uti possidetis^ a concept that asserts that 
all member states were committed to respecting the frontiers existing at the time of their 
independence. The third level, and one which is of immediate concern here, is the problem 
of dealing with an internal affair while holding on to the principle of non-intervention in 
member-states. The presence of non-Afiican forces, but also of other powerful Afiican states 
(i.e. Libya) in the Chadian civil war, helped some Afiican states side-step the issue of non­
intervention. There were two main Afiican actors that intervened in the Chadian civil war. 
First Nigeria in 1979, then the OAU in 1981. Let us begin with the former.
Nigeria's intervention in Chad
This Chapter does not provide an analysis of the civil war in Chad. Apart from the occasional article in an 
African journal, very little has been written on the civil war in English. For a background into the conflict, 
see the various volumes from 1968-1969 of ACR\ S. Decalo, ‘Regionalism, Political Decay, and Civil Strife 
in Chad’, Journal of Modem African Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1,1980, p. 23-56; J. Hollicks, ‘Civil War in Chad, 
1978-82’, The World Today, Vol. 38, Nos. 7-8, July-August, 1982, pp. 297-304; M. Kelley, A State in 
Disarray: Conditions of Chad’s Survival (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986), (hereafter yf State 
in Disarray)', R  Lemarchand, ‘Chad: The Roots of Chaos’ in Current History, Vol. 80, No. 470, December 
1981, pp. 414-417 and pp. 436-438; A. Lycett, ‘Chad’s Disastrous Civil ’Wax’, Africa Report, Vol. 23, No. 
5, September-October 1978, pp. 4-9; S. Nolutshungu, (1996), and V. Thompson and R  Adloff, Conflict in 
C/raif (Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981).
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Of the Afncan states to participate in the civil war, the position of Nigeria’s federal 
military government is worthy of analysis/® Nigeria played the role of mediator when it first 
involved itself in the Chadian conflict. In brief, Nigeria held four conferences to resolve the 
difficulties surrounding the conflict: Kano I, 12-16 March 1979; Kano II, 3-11 April 1979; 
Lagos I, 26-27 May 1979, and Lagos II, 18 August 1979.'^  ^Nigeria sent in peacekeeping 
troops on 10 March 1979 in the hope of fostering a peaceful outcome to the civil war. 
Nigeria abandoned the operation in June 1979, partly in response to the difficulties of 
maintaining a viable cease-fire, but also in response to its opposition to the constitution of 
the Transitional Government of National Unity {Gouvernement d'Union Nationale 
Transitoire or GUNT) which was established in April 1979.'** GUNT was to be inclusive of 
all parties to the Chadian conflict, but was instead seen by Nigeria as undermining 
negotiations at Kano I and II which sought to broaden the power-sharing base within Chad.'*^  
Despite its rejection of GUNT, Nigeria however maintained a key role in the crisis through 
OAU initiatives. In response to the failure of all-inclusiveness within GUNT, Nigeria 
resorted to coercive measures such as the placing of an oil embargo on Chad. Nigeria further 
insisted that the composition and constitution of the new government of Chad be acceptable 
and ‘subject to “legitimation”’ by other Afncan states. Nolutshungu argues that although 
such a policy was contrary to the OAU’s principle of non-intervention, the Chadian state was 
however ‘in eclipse’ and on the verge of collapse.®® Nigeria went on to support the formation 
of a new transitional government which was established after the second Lagos peace 
conference.
There are several factors which we can use to explain why Nigeria intervened in the 
Chadian conflict. For the purpose of this section, we discuss them under three headings: 1)
The other states who were involved in the Chadian civil war were Cameroun, Central Africa Repubhc, 
Libya, Niger, and Sudan.
Details of the conferences can be found in M. Kelley, (1986), pp. 68-71 and B. Lanne, ‘Recent History’, 
Africa South of the Sahara, 1980-81, (London: Europa Pubhcations Limited, lO^Edn., 1980), pp. 289-291.
It was also reported that Chad ordered Nigeria to withdraw its troops on 1 June 1979, because the 
peacekeeping troop was viewed as an ‘army of occupation.’ ^qqARB, Vol. 16, No. 6, June 1-30, 1979, p. 
5305A.
See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, February 1, 1980, p. 30066.
S. Nolutshungu, (1996), p. 131.
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Nigeria’s internal politics, 2) Nigeria’s regional security, and 3) African diplomacy.
1) Nigeria's internal politics
On the question of internal politics, Chad and Nigeria were neighbours. More 
important was that like Nigeria, religious and economic divisions affected Chad. As West 
Africa states, ‘[g]iven the internal make-up of Nigeria and its proximity to Chad, it ha[d] 
more than a passing interest in the settlement of the conflict.’ For Nigeria, a stable Chad 
meant one that allowed a cross-section of society to participate in the economic, 
administrative and political life of the country, all of which Nigeria was concerned with 
because of its own civil war.^  ^ Nigeria’s concern was also due in part to the economic 
linkages and the ‘common body of water’ that both countries shared along with Cameroon 
and Niger.
Of the issues to affect Nigeria’s internal politics, the presence of refugees posed a 
problem for the country’s security. Notable among these were members of the Kanuri tribe. 
At the time of the partitioning of Africa after the Berlin Conference of 1884, the Kanuri tribe 
had found itself divided and governed by two different colonial entities - Britain in Nigeria 
and France in Chad. When independence came nothing had been done to merge both groups; 
rather they remained within two separate independent states. As Ade Adefuye states, ‘the 
Kanuri are one of several African cultural groups who ha[d] been separated from their Kith 
and Kin’ because of colonial partitioning.^^ Consequently, such a policy, as Adefuye notes, 
‘affected internal politics and dictated the pattern’ of Nigeria and Chad’s inter-state relations, 
and other countries who found themselves in similar situations.Nigeria’s intervention was
‘Massacre of Muslims in Chad’, West Africa, No. 3217,12 March 1979, p. 420.
I. James, ‘Nigeria in OAU Peace-keeping in Chad: Historical and Political Analysis’ in M. Vogt and A.
Ekoko, (eds.) Nigeria in International Peace-keeping 1960-1992 (Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd, 1993), p. 137.
As a consequence of this ‘common body of water’, the Lake Chad Basin Commission was established in 1964 
as a system of economic and regional cooperation among the surrounding states. The conflict in Chad was 
seen as having a direct effect on the development of the basin. Also see A. Adefuye, ‘The Kanuri Factor in 
Nigeria - Chad Relations’, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol XU, Nos. 3 & 4, Dec. 1984-June 
1985, p. 129.
A. Adefuye, (Dec. 1984-June 1985), p. 121.
^ A. Adefuye, (Dec. 1984-June 1985), p. 121.
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in part an attempt to stem the flow of refugees in its borders. Adefuye states that this ‘ethnic 
factor’ influenced the nature of Nigeria’s intervention.
Nigeria was said to have intervened to supported Aboubakar Abdelrahmane, ‘a 
Kanuri with a view to making him occupy an important position in Chad so that he could be 
used to aflfect the course of events in the country.Abdelrahmane had been part of Goukoni 
Oueddei’s Frolinat (Front de Liberation Nationale Tchadien (du Tchad)), until May 1977 
when he broke away to form the Frolinat Third Army. Although there is no concrete 
evidence, Nigeria was reported to have given his army financial and training assistance 
because Abdelrahmane supposedly shared Nigeria’s opposition to Libya’s involvement in 
Chad. As Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloflf state, ‘General Obasanjo forthwith became 
his “protector” providing ‘the Third Liberation Army with funds and a training ground for 
its recruits.’^  One could however suggest that Nigeria’s motives were directed at achieving 
a peaceful settlement and ensuring that a stable government could be established in order to 
end the conflict in Chad as opposed to supporting one faction.
2) Nigeria’s regional security
In relation to Nigeria’s regional security, her involvement in Chad stemmed from her 
concern that the presence of foreign military troops not only undermined the independence 
of the Afncan state, but also had implications for Nigeria’s own security. The main foreign 
troops in Chad were French and Libyan. Nigeria’s involvement could be presented as an 
alternative to the Libyan, but in particular, the French intervention which it saw as neo­
colonial.
With regard to France, Nigeria saw French involvement in Chad as a way of 
maintaining a traditional sphere of influence in a region where French economic interest was 
at stake. However, French presence in Chad went beyond economic interest. France had a
A. Adefuye, (Dec. 1984-June 1985), p. 129. See also V. Thompson and R. AdlofF, Conflict in Chad, pp. 
92-93.
56 V. Thompson and R. Adloff, (1981), pp. 112-113
See A. Hughes and R. May, (1986), p. 184 and M. Vogt, ‘Chad in Inter-State African Politics’, Nigerian 
Journal o f International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 and 2, 1981, p. 141. Vogt also argues that there was no 
evidence to suggest that Nigeria had been supporting Abdelrahame, p. 156.
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defence agreement at the time of Chad’s independence in 1960 which entitled her to station 
troops in the country. French military presence had been in the country since 1968 to support 
both the regimes of President Ngarta Tombalbaye and General Felix Malloun and was 
withdrawn in May 1980.^ * Chad had strategic relevance for French policy in Africa. As David 
Yost notes, ‘Chad is a buffer state, partly shielding other French-protected states (most 
immediately Cameroon, Niger, and the Central African Republic) from invasion or subversion 
from territories beyond French influence.Nigeria’s involvement in Chad could therefore 
be seen as an attempt to avert any challenge to its own security. As Margaret Vogt suggests:
Nigeria’s interest in Chad stems from a reluctance to allow complete freedom 
of action to foreign military powers in a country that is so strategically 
located at her border for fear that the conflict may spill over to adversely 
affect Nigerian security. Nigeria [was] suspicious of the intentions of 
countries that maintain[ed] military establishments in Chad for fear that this 
may be turned into a launching pad for subversive activities against her.^°
Although Nigeria’s intervention in Chad has often been described as an attempt to 
counter French presence, France herself was said to have sought Nigeria’s participation in 
resolving the Chadian civil war. In an attempt to prevent itself from becoming further 
‘embroiled’ in the conflict, France promoted the idea of regional participation in the hope of 
shifting the financial and political responsibility away from herself. France was facing 
domestic criticism over its ‘apparently endless commitments’ in Chad and consequently, 
France not only ‘encouraged’ Nigeria’s involvement, but regarded it as timely.
 ^Under the Kano (I) Conference, French troops were to withdraw from Chad. On 20 March 1979, the French 
Government announced that its troops would be leaving Chad, although it would still offer technical 
assistance and other forms of co-operation. France began its withdrawal at the beginning of September 1979. 
See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, February 1, 1980, p. 30065 and 30067.
 ^D. Yost, ‘French policy in Chad and the Libyan Challenge’, Orbis, Vol. 26, No. 4, Winter 1983, p. 966. 
On the subject of neo-coloniahst tendencies from France, see F. Otubanjo and S. Davies, ‘Nigeria and France: 
The Struggle for Regional Hegemony’ in A. Akinyemi, S. Agbi and A. Otubanjo, (eds.) Nigeria since 
Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years, Vol. X, International Relations (Ibadan: Heinemanh Educational 
Books (Nigeria) Limited, 1989), pp. 73-86.
®°M. Vogt, (1981), p. 148.
M. Kelley, (1986), p. 17. Also see M. Vogt, (1981), p. 145 and S. Nolutshungu, (1986), p. 118 and 121.
O. Aluko, ‘Nigerian Foreign policy under the Second Refmblic (1979-1983)’, No. 18 (Institut D’ Études 
Politiques De Bordeaux Domaine Universitaire: Centre D’ Étude D’ Afriques Noire, 1988), p. 13.
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To a lesser extent, Nigeria saw Libya’s intervention in Chad as a threat to its attempts 
at becoming the dominant player within the region. Libya’s involvement in Chad goes back 
to the 1960s when Colonel Muammar Qadhafi gave political support to the Frolinat, whose 
exiled leader, Dr. Abba Siddick had his headquarters in the Libyan capital, Tripoli. Relations 
with Chad began to deteriorate after Libya’s occupation of the Aouzou Strip on the Libya- 
Chad border in 1973 and its intervention in the Chadian conflict in 1980.®^  Nigeria saw 
Libya’s presence in Chad as not only undermining, but tilting the balance of power in the 
region towards Libya, a factor which Nigeria used to justify its involvement in Chad.^ Part 
of Nigeria’s dilemma was that it was unsure of the intentions of Libya’s Head of State, 
Colonel Qadhafi. However, as opposed to seeing Libya as a major threat, Nigeria took 
comfort from the fact that her presence served to counterbalance French influence in Chad 
and the region as a whole. As Vogt states,
Nigeria’s concern over the events in Chad...is further aggravated by the 
absence of a clear perception of Libya’s real intentions. As long as the Libyan 
military presence in Chad has resulted in the withdrawal of French forces and 
in the creation of a peaceful environment necessary for the conduct of 
elections, then their presence may be rationalised as a response to the appeals 
made by the Organisation of African Unity to member states to help find a 
peaceful solution to the crisis.
Nigeria and Libya both had an interest in reducing French and Western presence in the 
region. Thus, they worked together to ‘dislodge’ what they saw as ‘the imperialist 
penetration of Africa .I t  was on this basis that Nigeria decided that it was not ready to start 
a diplomatic war with Libya.
The Aouzou Strip was said to be rich in manganese and uranium, but it was also said that Qadhafi was 
claiming the area by virtue of a Franco-Italian treaty signed in 1935 by King Idris of Libya. For an analysis 
of Libya’s involvement in Chad, see C. Legum, ‘The Crisis in Chad: Colonel Gaddafy’s Sahelian Dream’, 
ACR, Vol. Xm, 1980-1981, pp. A35-A46 and R. Lemarchand, ‘The Case of Chad’ in R. Lemarchand, (ed.) 
The Green and the Black: Qadhafi's Policies in Africa (Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 
1988), pp. 106-124.
^ M. Vogt, (1981), p. 140. Also see O. Aluko, (1988), p. 10.
""M. Vogt, (1981), p. 140.
66 M. Vogt, (1981), p. 141.
It is also interesting to note that the northern part of Nigeria which shares a border with Chad is heavily 
populated with Muslims. Some sections of the Muslims population were said to ‘show some affection’
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We can therefore define the history of Nigeria’s search for peace in Chad as two- 
dimensional. On the one hand, it aimed at preventing the complete collapse of the country, 
while on the other, it sought to reduce French and Libyan presence which it argued posed a 
threat to Nigeria’s security. While one cannot dismiss Nigeria’s internal security fears of a 
civil war being conducted in a neighbouring country, we have paid attention to the second 
reason - Nigeria’s concern over her own security within the region. There is a third area, that 
of Afiican diplomacy, which is not only relevant to this study, but also provides an interesting 
element to our understanding of how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the 
principle of non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Afiica.
S) African diplomacy: ensuring “African solutions for African problems"
Although it is likely that Nigeria’s actions in Chad were aimed at protecting its own 
security by countering French interests in Chad, we could further define Nigeria’s actions as 
promoting a regional initiative or to recite the popular euphemism, “Afiican solutions for 
African problems.” Put another way, Nigeria’s intervention can be described as a case of 
‘African diplomacy’ negotiating peace in an Afiican conflict at the expense of France.^* 
Nigeria saw itself as playing an important role both in international and Afiican politics. As 
Pauline Baker notes, ‘[o]ver the years,...Nigeria has come to see itself as a regional power 
with the duty and obligation to intercede in Afiican issues, particularly those involving...extra 
continental intervention.’^ ^
Nigeria’s participation in the Chadian civil war was reminiscent of the radical foreign 
policy pursued by Nkrumah in the 1960s. As stated in Chapters Two and Three, Nkrumah’s 
aim was to prevent the participation of extra-continental powers in the affairs of Afiican 
states to ensure Afiican autonomy over its own affairs and the formation of a United States 
of Afiica, hence his interventionist policy over the Congo. Minus the goal of an Afiican
towards Qadhafi’s brand of militant Islam. There was a suggestion at the time that this explained Nigeria’s 
initial reluctance to criticise Libya’s actions over Chad. See ‘Nigeria and Gaddafi’s African Ambition’, West 
Africa, No. 3312, 19 January 1981, p. 99.
68 <Peace at Last in Chad?’, West Africa, No. 3219, 26 March 1979, p. 523.
® P. Baker, ‘A Giant Staggers: Nigeria as an Emerging Regional Power’ in B. Arlinghaus, (ed.), (1984), p. 
81.
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government, Nigeria’s policy in Chad was also partly aimed at stopping what it perceived 
were neo-colonial aspirations of major powers like France. Such objectives led Sam 
Nolutshungu to remark that the ‘radical concerns of the earlier period’ (as laid down by 
Nkrumah) were not abandoned altogether.
In an article that analyses the history of peacekeeping in Afiica, Pelcovits states that 
Nigeria developed a ‘novel exegesis on the doctrine of nonintervention’ to justify its call for 
intervention in Chad in 1979.^  ^This policy could be defined as regional intervention in the 
name of non-intervention. What added weight to Nigeria’s justification was that its 
involvement in Chad came at a time when there was increased external intervention in Afiican 
conflicts. For example, outside Chad, there was also the French intervention in the Central 
African Empire in 1979 to remove Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa and reports of Spanish 
involvement in the removal of President Marcias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, also in 1979. 
In response to these activities, the President of Nigeria, Lieutenant-General Olusegun 
Obasanjo, ‘called for engaging Afiican regional peacekeepers in internal conflicts so as to 
deter the weaker, vulnerable states from being driven “into the laps of extra-Afiican powers 
for defense and security. Nigeria hoped that the policy of regional intervention would 
provide an additional degree of legitimacy to Afiican states who sought to restrict the number 
of outside interventions within the continent and ensure Afiican autonomy over its own 
affairs. As Nolutshungu states, ‘African mediation claimed...a function of legitimation, and 
a control and limitation of external armed intervention.’^  ^In other words, Nigeria felt that 
there was more credence to be found in an Afiican state intervening in another Afiican state’s 
internal dispute than there would be if the intervening state came from outside the continent. 
This argument leads one to wonder whether Nigeria was also extending this policy to Libya. 
Was Libya not part of the African continent, and therefore had a family ‘right’ to involve 
itself in African affairs?
In one sense, the claim of regional intervention in the name of non-intervention may
S. Nolutshungu, (1996), p. 120.
N. Pelcovits, (1983), p. 264. Pelcovits adds that ‘regional intervention by Afiican peacekeepers is justified 
as a countervailing force to foreign intervention (and not necessarily because of the consent of the parties). ’
Cited in N. Pelcovits, (1983), p. 265.
^ S. Nolutshungu, (1996), p. 119.
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seem to suggest the compatibility of both regionalism and non-intervention in containing a 
particular conflict and preventing outside intervention. Certainly if one looked at the OAU’s 
own position on Chad before it sent in an Inter-Afiican peacekeeping force in 1981, it had 
been unable to respond to the conflict in Chad partly because of its own principle on non­
intervention, but nevertheless it used the strategy of “Afiican solutions” for limiting, if not 
preventing outside interference. '^  ^As Nolutshugu states, ‘[i]n Chad, regionalism was pushed 
to the point of significantly qualifying the principle of non-interference, a requirement of state 
sovereignty in which the OAU placed much store.However, and again Nolutshugu proves 
instructive, this claim of regionalism was more than a plea for the recognition of non­
intervention. It set up a form of ‘right’ that Africans felt they had concerning the future of 
the state in Chad. This is similar to Ali Mazrui’s argument that we raised in Chapter Two. 
African states claimed a ‘family right’ to interfere in conflicts within the continent, not 
because they could somehow resolve the conflict, but because their presence could act as a 
barrier or a means of preventing unwanted outside intervention. It fitted into the notion of 
exclusivity or what Mazrui labelled ‘continental jurisdiction’ or as Nolutshugu suggests, that 
aspect of Afiican nationalism which inferred that the Afiican continent had some ‘right of 
oversight’ in dealing with its own conflicts.^^
Yet, it would appear that this ‘right of oversight’ seemed limited to Nigeria. Certainly, 
no other Afiican state except Libya played an active role in the Chadian conflict. Neither was 
there any clear understanding of what was inferred by regionalism among Afiican states, save 
that it was directed and used for preventing or deciding the nature of outside intervention. 
The principle of regionalism and “Afiica solutions” appeared vague as it never specified the 
degree of responsibility, expectation or obligation on the parts of African states in situations 
of internal conflicts. In addition, it never properly defined when it was acceptable to call on 
non-Afiican states to intervene in the internal affairs of Afiican states. However, more 
important than this, those states who did concern themselves with the conflict in Chad lacked
The OAU first addressed the crisis in Chad in 1977 at the Libreville Summit meeting when it approved an 
ad hoc committee of six (Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria and Senegal) to negotiate in the 
dispute between the regime of General Felix Malloun and Libya over its support for Frolinat.
S. Nolutshungu, (1996), p. 142.
S. Nolutshungu, (1996), p. 142.
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the military or economic means to take any decisive actions and consequently turned to their 
Western allies for assistance. In the end, the notion of “Afiican solutions” served to legitimise 
the presence of non-Afiican intervention in Afiican affairs because Afiican states were 
exercising ‘their supposed Afiican responsibility’ in dealing with a conflict on the continent.^^ 
Yet, it is because of this dependence on outside military assistance that Nigeria advocated a 
stronger OAU presence in resolving the conflict in Chad.
At the heart of Nigeria’s policy of wanting to involve the OAU in the Chadian civil 
war was the hope that its presence would halt the supply of arms by non-Afiican powers to 
the various warring parties. In a shift from its position in the Congo civil war where it 
supported the role of the UN instead of the OAU, Nigeria now wanted to see the OAU take 
an active role in Afiican conflicts. During the Congo crisis, Nigeria had characterised the 
Organisation’s role as an ‘infiingement of the [Congo’s] sovereignty and thus contrary to the 
organisation’s charter.’ Now Nigeria wanted to see ‘some major problems...resolved by the 
OAU to prevent foreign exploitation of such issues.’^ * It was a strategy to keep Afiican 
affairs and resolutions over the Chadian conflict in ‘black hands. ’ Nigeria did not aim this 
policy at guaranteeing a successful outcome to the conflict; rather success was measured by 
how far the continent could maintain authority over its own affairs. As Thompson and AdlofiF 
states, ‘[t]hus far they have successfully opposed bringing the Chad impasse before the UN, 
even after their own efforts as neighbors and as members of the OAU had proven 
unavai l ing .The  OAU did however appeal later to the UN when it decided to send in a 
peacekeeping force in 1981.
The OAU came in primarily to reduce Libya’s own involvement in the Chadian 
conflict, but also in response to ‘the increasing conflict of interests by external powers in 
Chad.’*® An OAU inter-Afiican force comprising Nigeria, Senegal, Zaire and the other 
Afiican states was suggested to replace Libyan forces. The OAU’s peacekeeping force has 
been criticised for its handling of the Chadian conflict, largely because of its failure to define
^ S. Nolutshungu, (1996), p. 143.
See O. Aluko, Essays on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 31.
79 V. Thompson and R. AdlofiF, (1981), p. 90.
R Kupolati, ‘The Nigerian Contingent in the Organization of African Unity Peace-keeping Operation in 
Chad’ in M. Vogt and A. Ekoko, (eds ), (1993), p. 143.
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its mission or mandate, but also because it lacked the capacity to launch a peacekeeping 
operation." While this study is not concerned with the issues surrounding the OAU’s 
perceived failures, Cervenka and Legum suggest an interesting point on the Organisation’s 
lack of success which is relevant to our present study. They argue that despite the plea to 
limit the presence of the major powers in the conflict, the OAU asked for peacekeeping 
troops and logistical and financial assistance from the UK, France and the US. The decision 
to invite these countries was not only contrary to the idea of exclusivity, a central pillar of 
Pan-Africanism, but it also ‘tarnished’ the OAU’s principle of “African solutions for African 
problems.” Although ‘the original decision was to seek this support through the UN’ (which 
was consistent with the role of regional organisations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter), 
‘in practice the request for logistical support was made only to France, the US and Britain.’"  
Yet, as we have stated occasionally throughout this Chapter, the OAU’s request for outside 
assistance was an illustration of the vagueness surrounding the idea “African solutions.” 
There was no consensus among African leaders on whether non-African states could be 
called upon to intervene in internal conflicts. Despite this, Nolutshungu raises an interesting 
point about non-African intervention in the Chadian civil war which is relevant to our 
understanding of how the thinking on intervention evolved on the continent:
...the OAU, or some states through it, effectively claimed a right of veto in 
the internal politics of Chad (though the distinction between internal and 
international was hard to sustain in Chad) and tried to open or shut doors to 
external influences as it judged proper. . .In this way, OAU members were no
For an analysis of the OAU’s peacekeeping in Chad, see Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, ‘The Organization 
of African Unity in 1981: A Crucial Testing Time for Peacekeeping’, ACR, Vol. XIV, 1981-82, pp. A83-A96, 
esp. A84-A87; Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, September 3, 1982, pp. 31677-31680; R. May and S. 
Massey, ‘The OAU Interventions in Chad: Mission Impossible or Mission Evaded?’, International 
Peacekeeping, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 46-65; V. Ndovi, ‘Chad: Nation-Building, Security and OAU 
Peacekeeping’ in S. Wright and J. Brownfoot, (eds.) Africa in World Politics: Changing Perspectives 
(London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987), pp. 140-154; and S. Nolutshungu, (1996), pp. 157-172.
^ Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, (1981-1982), p. A86. The decision to seek financial assistance from the UN 
was made at the 35*** OAU (Council of Ministers Meeting in Freetown, Sierra Leone, held on June 23-29,1980 
and passed at the 17* aimual Assembly of Heads of State and Govenunent also held in Freetown, between 
1-4 July. The text of the Council of Ministers stated that they, ‘resolved that member states in a position to 
do so should contribute towards a required budget of $60,000,000 to finance an African peacekeeping force, 
and that an appeal would be made to the United Nations Security Council if sufficient fimds had not been 
raised within two months. ’ Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, November 7, 1980, p. 30557. It should be 
noted that the intervention in Chad was appropriately dealt with by the UN Security Council and was 
therefore legitimate.
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longer merely assuming the right to “legitimate” governments in Chad, as they 
had seemed to do in 1979; they were now also being assigned a power to 
“legitimate” foreign armed intervention in Chad, which they had not the 
means themselves to undertake or to control effectively when done by 
others.
In other words, because the Organisation and its member states lacked indigenous capacity 
to resolve the conflict, the OAU invited non-Afiican states to act on its behalf while still 
dictating how the conflict ought to be conducted. Put this way, such a policy did not go 
against the principle of exclusivity; rather, it meant that the conflict (in theory at least) was 
to be handled within the framework of Afiican diplomacy. In reality however, the fund-raiser 
of a peacekeeping force for the OAU would inevitably have a large influence on the 
objectives of the operation and the outcome of the conflict, and to this end, states like France 
and America influenced the nature and pattern of the Chadian civil war, and also the policies 
taken by some Afiican states.
Conclusion
In sum, Nigeria’s intervention and later the OAU’s involvement can be understood 
within the context of the Pan-Afiican desire to maintain jurisdiction over Afiican affairs or 
at least where outside intervention is involved, to decide the nature of this intervention, thus 
preserving the idea of Afiican autonomy. We could however suggest that Nigeria brought 
in the OAU and appealed to the Pan-Afiicanist notion of African exclusivity to legitimise its 
real intentions for intervening. Nigeria’s ‘real’ motives in Chad were to preserve its national 
security, maintain regional peace and security and protect its regional hegemony against its 
rival states, France and Libya than any appeal to Pan-Africanism. However, one cannot 
discount the presence of non-African forces intervening in conflicts on the continent, 
especially in the later half of the 1970s, consequently, Nigeria was able to appel to a higher 
order - the Pan-Afiicanism desire for “Afiican solutions” - to justify its involvement in 
Chad.'"
83 S. Nolutshungu, (1996), p. 157.
^ See C. Clapham, (1996), Chapter Six in which he notes the increasing presence of non-African intervention 
on the African continent in the latter half of the 1970s.
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In the next part of this Chapter we focus on another example of how the practice of 
intervention evolved on the continent. The type of intervention being discussed is not justified 
in terms of seeking “Afncan solutions” to prevent extra-continental intervention, nor is it 
justified within the context of Afncan unity. In fact, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda not 
only challenged the political authority of an African state, but accused the regime of General 
Idi Amin of human rights atrocities: What did the rules governing intra-Afiican affairs have 
to say about atrocities committed by black Afncan states? Was intervention justified to end 
widespread abuse by an independent black Afiican state? Did the rules sanctioning 
intervention against the white redoubtist regimes of Southern Afiica apply to black 
independent Afiican states who commit atrocities?
m . The principle of self-defence: Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda
Of all the cases studied so far, the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1978 is 
particularly significant. Tanzania’s action raises several questions especially in trying to 
understand how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non­
intervention on the continent. Significantly, this was a case that generated a different level of 
justification fi-om the cases we discussed so far in this study. Tanzania’s decision to intervene 
was not spurred on by a desire to prevent major extra-continental forces fi’om entering the 
conflict involving it and Uganda, nor was it to do with the question of Afncan unity or the 
struggle for liberation and independence. How then was the Tanzanian intervention justified? 
What criteria existed fi'om which Tanzania could base its actions? If the ‘rules of the game’ 
did not apply yet to what radical states like Tanzania suggested were not free and 
independent states in their own right, what then of President Julius Nyerere’s decision to 
intervene in Uganda - an independent black Afiican state?
The conflict between Tanzania and Uganda goes back to 1971 when Idi Amin 
deposed President Milton Obote in a military coup. Obote was a personal fiiend of President 
Julius Nyerere and a ‘seeming socialist like the Tanzanian Head of State,’ so Nyerere offered 
Obote and his troops asylum.®^  The former President along with his supporters launched an
A. Sesay, O. Ojo, and O. Fasehun, (1984), p.56. See also P. Okoth, ‘The O.A.U. and the Ugandan- 
Tanzanian War’, \91%-19, Journal of African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 1987, p. 160.
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attack from the Tanzanian territory against Uganda which failed.*  ^The dispute between 
Tanzania and Uganda continued throughout the 1970s with both sides issuing threats or 
counter threats and accusing one another of planned or attempted invasions.*  ^In 1975 the 
Tanzanian government used Amin’s human rights atrocities as grounds for boycotting the 
OAU Heads of State Summit at Kampala because of its location in the Ugandan capital. 
Tanzania saw the decision to hold the Summit meeting in Kampala as the OAU giving tacit 
approval to the regime of Amin. In an official statement issued on 25 July 1975 by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ndugu John Malecela, the Tanzanian government openly 
criticised Amin and began the first of many comparisons between Uganda and South Afiica. 
The criticisms were also directed at the OAU for not condemning Amin’s human rights 
atrocities:
The reason given by African leaders for their silence about [the atrocities 
committed] is the non-interference clause in the OAU Charter. This 
agreement not to interfere in the internal affairs of another State is necessary 
for the existence of the OAU A similar condition is accepted by members of 
the United Nations. But why is it good for States to condemn apartheid and 
bad for them to condemn massacres which are committed by independent 
African Governments? Why is it legitimate to call for the isolation of South 
Afiica because of its oppression, but illegitimate to refuse co-operation with 
a country like Uganda where the government survives because of the 
ruthlessness with which it kills suspected critics?**
Malecela raises some fundamental questions about when intervention is permissible, and we
shall come back to address them when we focus on the question of intervention for
“ Z. 6ervenka, (1977), p. 81. For an analysis of the causes of conflict between Tanzania and Uganda, see C. 
Thomas, (1983), Chapter 4 and (1985), pp. 90-92, and P. Okoth, ‘The O.A.U. and the Uganda-Tanzania 
ySl2Œ\ African Studies Association Papers, 27* mtg. No. 80, October 1984, pp. 2-6.
^ In February 1973, Amin accused Tanzania of plotting against his government and in July 1974 he accused 
Tanzania of plaiming an attack against Uganda, this time with the aid of Zambia. In response, 4000 Ugandan 
troops were placed on the border with Tanzania. Again in 1977, Amin accused Nyerere of plotting to invade 
Uganda. See John Lonsdale, ‘Recent History’, 4/^/ca South o f the Sahara (London; Europa Publications, 10* 
Edn., 1980-1981), p. 1027.
 ^The full ofiicial statement can be found in N. Malecela, ‘Why Tanzania did not attend the OAU Summit 
Africa Currents, No. 3, Auturrm 1975, p. 21 and^CR, Vol. VIII, 1975-1976, p. A66 and p. C22. 
Part of the text can also be found in Z. Cervenka, (1977), p. 82 and C. Thomas, (1985), pp. 73-74 and 
(1983), pp. 133-135. See also OAU: Tanzania’s Official Statement for Staying Away from the Kampala 
Summit - Official statement issued by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Dar es Salaam, 25 July 
1975, ^CR, 1975-1976, pp. C22-24.
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humanitarian reasons in this part of the Chapter.
It was the 1 November 1978 annexation of the Kagera Salient - a Tanzanian territory 
which was north of the River Kagera - that finally provoked Nyerere’s decision ‘to contribute 
directly to [Amin’s] overthrow.’*^  Before this, Nyerere had not advocated intervention or 
military action against Amin, but openly criticised Amin’s leadership in Uganda. Two reasons 
lay behind Nyerere’s condemnation of Amin throughout the 1970s. First was Nyerere’s ‘self- 
interest’ in wanting to weaken ‘the cause of a troublesome and threatening neighbour state’, 
and second, was ‘a humanitarian impulse which found the brutality of the Amin regime 
repugnant.’^  However, with Amin’s attack on the Kagera Salient and his direct challenge on 
the OAU Charter principle of ‘territorial integrity,’ Nyerere was able to turn his open 
criticism into a ‘three-point strategy’ or a plan of action to ensure Amin’s downfall. The 
strategy set out:
(1) to get the OAU to condemn Amin’s aggression, to obtain compensation 
for the damage done as well as a renunciation of all claims to Tanzanian 
territory; (2) to drive Amin’s forces out of Tanzania and to punish the two 
battalions involved in the Kagera operation; and (3) to ensure that there 
would be no repetition of attacks against Tanzania.®^
President Amin was overthrown with the fall of the capital city, Kampala on 10-11 
April 1979. While these plans reflected Nyerere’s intentions, Africa Contemporary Record 
(ACR) states that it was not part of his ‘original plan that Tanzanians should overthrow 
Amin.’ According to ACR, Nyerere had stated in several speeches that this was a task 
‘entrusted to Ugandans themselves.’ Nevertheless, ACR goes on to state that ‘Nyerere did 
commit himself to helping the Ugandans.’^  This not only provided evidence of interventionist 
intention, but challenged Article 3(5) of the OAU Charter which sought to prevent 
subversion, the overthrow of a leader, political assassination or support of these activities by
‘United Republic of Tanzania’, ylCR, 1978-1979, p. B393.
C. Thomas, (1985), p. 91.
‘United Republic of Tanzania,’ (1978-1979), p. B394. Also see the four conditions for a cease-fire laid 
down by Nyerere 'mARB, Vol. 16, No. 2, February 1-28, 1979, p. 5154c.
^ ‘United Repubhc of Tanzania,’ (1978-1979), p. B395. See also pp. B395-397 for an analysis of the conflict.
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an outside force. We can see this in the following remark Nyerere made to justify the 
overthrow of regimes:
Despite my dislike for Amin - and I really do not like him - the government 
of Tanzania has no right to enter Uganda in order to topple Amin...No other 
government in Africa or anywhere else in the world has the right to 
overthrow Amin’s regime.. .But Amin’s regime is a brutal one, and the people 
of Uganda have that right. All people all over the world have the right to 
topple regimes they detest....Recently Iran did likewise...and I congratulate 
them for this....
The question that needed to be asked was whether other states could help the people in the 
overthrow of a regime that they opposed? Nyerere claimed that his military action against 
Amin should be understood separately from that being conducted by the people of Uganda 
who wanted to overthrow him. To this end, Nyerere claimed that there were ‘two wars’ 
being fought in Uganda and his was a fight to ‘maintain national security’ against Amin’s 
aggression.^ However, as Caroline Thomas states, such an analysis was an oversimplication 
of Tanzania’s action: ‘Tanzanian forces...were helping to topple Amin. They made the job 
of Amin’s opponents far easier than it would otherwise have been.’®*
During the conflict with Uganda, Nyerere had been critical of the OAU’s position and 
its refusal to condemn Amin’s regime, especially as Amin had in Nyerere’s mind challenged 
the Charter principle on the ‘inviolability of borders. ’ In a speech to mark Tanzania’s 17th 
Independence anniversary. President Nyerere again drew comparisons with South Africa and 
Ian Smith’s Rhodesia:
Amin is a killer. Since he took over the leadership of Uganda... he has killed 
many more people than [Ian] Smith has done. He has killed many more 
people than [John] Vorster has done in [South Africa]. But there is a strange 
habit in Afiica: an Afiican leader, so long as he is an Afiican, can kill Afiicans 
just as he pleases, and you cannot say anything. If Amin was white, we would 
have passed many resolutions against him. But he is black, and blackness is 
a licence to kill Afiicans. And therefore there is complete silence; no one
” ‘United Republic of Tanzania,’ (1978-1979), p. B431 and C. Thomas, (1985), p. 102. 
Cited in ‘United Republic of Tanzania,’ (1978-1979), p. B433.
C. Thomas, (1985), p. 102 and (1983), p. 242.
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speaks about what he does.^^
In another speech, Nyerere demanded that the OAU Charter, which only defended the rights 
of those living under colonial and racially dominated regimes, be reviewed. Once these states 
were liberated and had achieved statehood, Nyerere claimed that the Charter sought only to 
protect Africa’s Heads of State. In this way, the OAU was nothing short of a trade union. As 
Nyerere stated, ‘It did not matter what a Head of State did; he could kill as many people as 
he liked in his country and he would still be protected by the Charter.
The Tanzanian intervention enables us to consider whether, in a similar line with how 
the debate has evolved in the West, there may exist a special case for intervening on 
humanitarian grounds. Tanzania could have justified its action on humanitarian grounds if it 
chose to.^ * In the section that dealt with South Africa in the previous Chapter, we raised the 
following question; if the right to interfere was to be granted on the grounds that the regimes 
of Southern Africa were colonial and racially oppressive, what of a situation where members 
of the same race were suppressed? What did Africa’s leadership say about this, especially 
when colonialism or the struggle for liberation was not at the heart of the debate?
In defending its actions, Tanzania refrained from providing a humanitarian rationale. 
Instead, official documents from Tanzania said that self-defence was the basis for 
intervention. Certainly, the actions of Idi Amin on the Tanzania-Uganda border were a threat 
to Tanzania’s own security, territorial integrity and sovereignty. As stated earlier, since 1971, 
Amin’s troops had been attacking Tanzania, culminating with the 1978 invasion in which 
troops occupied parts of the Kagera Salient. But why did the documents not mention Amin’s
^ Cited in ‘United Republic of Tanzania,’ (1978-1979), p. B394. Also partly quoted in C. Thomas, (1985), 
p. 98 and (1983), p. 236.
^ Cited in ‘United Republic of Tanzania,’ (1978-1979), pp. B394-B395. Also see ‘Nyerere on need to review 
OAU C\mXQi\ Africa Currents, No. 14, Spring 1979, p. 4.
On the question of whether Tanzania’s action were humanitarian see F. Hassan, ‘Realpolitik in 
International Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict “Humanitarian Intervention” Reexamined’, 
Williamette Law Journal, Vol. 17,1980-1981, pp. 859-912; N. Ronzitti, (1985), pp. 102-106; U. Umozurike, 
‘Tanzania’s Intervention in Uganda’, Archiv des Volkerecht, Vol. 20, 1982, pp. 309-313; and I. Wani, 
‘Humanitarian Intervention and the Tanzania-Uganda War’, Ham of Africa, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1980, pp. 18-27. 
All four authors reject any claim that the Tanzanian intervention constituted humanitarian intervention. Some 
writers do however indicate that Tanzania’s actions constitute some element of humanitarian intervention. 
See C. Greenwood, ‘Is there a right to humanitarian intervention’. The World Today, Vol. 49, no. 2, February 
1993, p. 35 and F. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (Dobbs Ferry, New 
York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1988), pp. 159-174.
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atrocities? Caroline Thomas gives us an answer;
[i]nterestingly, in the many cases of intra-Third World intervention, 
justifications are never couched primarily in humanitarian terms, but always 
within the logic of the state system, that is, in terms of self defence. It is easy 
to understand why. State interest takes precedence over human concerns.
States outlaw intervention as an insurance policy for their own futures.®^
Other reasons exist to show that humanitarianism was not the prime concern for the 
Tanzanian intervention. As noted earlier, part of Nyerere’s aim was to re-install his fiiend 
Milton Obote back as leader in Uganda. Nyerere had refused to recognise Amin as the 
legitimate leader in Uganda. It is worth noting that Nyerere did back the new government of 
Mr. Godfi’ey Lukongwa Binaisa which followed the overthrow of the Amin regime.
It is difficult to state whether member-states of the OAU supported Tanzania’s action. 
Although Tanzania defended its right to intervene, there was general criticism levelled against 
her for undermining the main principles of the organisation. Rather than provide institutional 
condemnation for the atrocities committed by Amin, some member-states accused Tanzania 
of trespassing the rule of non-intervention. Morocco, Sudan and Nigeria condemned 
Tanzania, the latter partly because Nyerere had supported Biafra’s plea for secession in the 
Nigerian civil war. Before this, Nigeria had supported Nyerere when Uganda had violated the 
territorial borders of Tanzania on several occasions since Idi Amin’s accession to power.
The OAU seemed reluctant to establish a precedent which gave human rights primacy 
over the principle of state sovereignty. More important, as Thomas states, ‘the OAU had 
never condemned a black Afncan, nor an Arab state, whatever the atrocities that had been 
committed, and [in relation to cases like Uganda] it was not prepared to set a precedent.
^ C. Thomas, ‘The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention’ in I. Forbes and M. Hoffinan, (eds.), (1993), p. 95. 
It is worth noting that eight years before, in 1971, India also defined its intervention in East PaMstan 
(Bangladesh) as self-defence, while in 1978, Vietnam also adopted the same reasoning to defend its actions 
in Kampuchea (Cambodia). Yet, as with Tanzania, both also raised the question of humanitarianism to justify 
intervention.
We should also note that Nigeria had also rejected Vietnam’s claim of intervening in Kampuchea 
(Cambodia) to end the brutal regime of Pol Pot, also in 1978. After international criticism of the Federal 
Government’s treatment of the Ibo tribe who mainly supported the Biaffan secession, Nigeria was sensitive 
to outside criticism of human rights atrocities. Nigeria argued that human rights abuse did not warrant 
outside military intervention.
C. Thomas, (1985), p. 94.
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Instead, during the 16* OAU Heads of State Summit Meeting in Monrovia, Liberia from 17 
to 21 July 1979, President Numeiry of Sudan, the Chairman of the OAU at the time of the 
Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, criticised Nyerere for violating OAU principles, while 
Nigeria’s Head of State, Lt. General Obasanjo stated that Tanzania’s intervention was ‘ill- 
advised’ and had set ‘a dangerous precedent of unimaginable consequences.” Obasanjo went 
on to state that, ‘[sjecurity may be endangered by this act, for the weaker and smaller nations 
of Africa will have to look over their shoulders at their powerful neighbours whenever they 
have to act.’ °^^
Despite these criticisms, there was no consensus about how to respond to Tanzania’s 
intervention, which clearly fell outside the framework of the OAU Charter. Rather, as 
Thomas notes, ‘most African states remained silent’ at the OAU Summit in July 1979, 
‘thereby indicating a tacit approval of Tanzanian action.Similarly, William Zartman notes 
that rather than outwardly condemning Nyerere’s actions,
the African community [i.e. the OAU] was generally content to register 
criticism in principle alone, since Nyerere saved the continent from an 
egregious aberration that the system of collectivity could not handle, bound 
as it was by its own negative norms against any interference in internal 
affairs.
More important, in a joint statement in Luanda, Angola, the frontline states of Mozambique, 
Zambia, and Angola denounced Amin’s past incursions in Tanzanian territory as well as his 
human rights abuses at home. °^  ^ The support of the frontline states was largely due to
Cited in Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, ‘The Organization of African Unity in 1979’, ACR, Vol. XII, 1979- 
1980, pp. A61-A62. Criticisms from other member-states of the OAU can also be seen on pp. A60-62. See 
dXso ARB, Vol. 16, No. 7, July 1-31, 1979, pp. 5328a-5329c for a summary of the 16* Summit Conference 
and C. Thomas, (1985), p. 109. For a full commentary of the wider international community’s reaction 
towards Tansania’s intervention in Uganda, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, June 22, 1979, pp. 
29669-29671.
103 C. Thomas, (1985), p. 108.
I. W. Zartman, ‘Issues of African Diplomacy in the 1980s’ in R. Bissell and M. Radu, (eds ), (1984), p. 
142. Also see A. Sesay, O. Ojo, and O. Fasehun, (1984), p. 52.
O. Aluko, (1981), p. 172. On 3 March 1979, the Times o f Zambia stated that:‘Either the OAU puts Africa 
first now, or it will degenerate into self-seeking power groupings, each intent on its own narrow national 
ambitions. ’ It went on to state that ‘Amin’s Uganda is the aggressor nation. It is in breach of the OAU 
Charter [on territorial integrity]. Amin’s regime should be roundly condemned by the OAU.’ Cited in Z.
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Tanzania’s policy of championing the cause of these states in their struggle for liberation and 
independence and their shared belief in the same radical Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Such 
justification, although not explicitly stated, corresponds to those interventions Northedge and 
Donelan and later Hughes and May defined as ideologically-driven motivations.
Conclusion
Despite these factors or justifications for intervening, Tanzania’s intervention proved 
significant in terms of understanding the debate on intervention and non-intervention among 
African leaders. While official documents from Tanzania cite the motive of intervention as 
self-defence rather than humanitarianism, the statements made by Nyerere did not stop short 
of indicating the number of atrocities that the Amin regime was said to have committed and, 
in one sense, it is possible to note an implicit humanitarian motive behind Tanzania’s action. 
On this point, Cervenka and Legum state that the Tanzanian intervention did at least set ‘one 
positive impact’ in that it ‘compelled’ the OAU to focus on the problem of human rights 
abuses within the continent. For example, one could suggest that the Tanzanian 
intervention ‘enabled’ other Afiican leaders to condemn human rights violation and in several 
instances, some leaders were assassinated because of their domestic behaviour. For example. 
Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central Afncan Empire and President Marcias Nguema 
in Equatorial Guinea in 1979 and President William Tolbert in Liberia in 1980. More 
important, an ‘Afncan Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights’ was adopted by 
African Heads of State at the OAU Summit held in Nairobi, Kenya in June 1981 which 
sought to apply pressure on Afncan leaders to improve their human rights record. Did the 
introduction of the Charter sanction intervention if Afncan leaders violated humans rights 
with impunity?
Certainly, or at least in theory, the Afiican Charter on Human Rights held that Afncan
Cervenka and C. Legum, (1979-1980), p. A60. Also sqqARB, Vol. 16, No. 3, March 1-31, 1979, p. 5186b. 
In a statement on Radio Maputo, the Government of Mozambique also criticised Uganda’s attack on 
Tanzania. See ‘Mozambique’s statement on why Tanzania was attacked: Excerpts from the full text of a 
statement of the People’s Republic of Mozambique. Radio Maputo, 10 November 1978’ in Africa Currents, 
No. 12/13, Autunm/Winter 1978/9, pp. 28-29.
Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, (1979), p. A66.
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States could question the legitimacy and internal conduct of other African states. More 
important, as Christopher Clapham notes, Tanzania’s intervention and the African Charter 
on Human Rights did remove the pretence that African states could operate as fiefdoms, safe 
from external scrutiny. As Clapham notes, the Charter on Human Rights did ‘formally 
[establish] the principle that the domestic conduct of African leaders was subject to generally 
accepted criteria of international morality’ more so when African leaders were prepared to 
criticise the behaviour of the South African regime for what they defined as crimes against 
humanity. Indeed, when Afiican states challenged the apartheid system in South Afiica 
they drew attention to their own human rights record because they were commenting upon 
how a state should threat its people. Nevertheless, the Charter did not prevent subsequent 
human rights atrocities by Afiican leaders; nor did it shift the OAU from its traditional 
orthodox position of non-intervention. Again as Clapham notes,
[t]he Charter was not legally binding, and provisions in the original draft 
placing states under an obligation to ‘guarantee’ rights and ‘ensure’ respect 
for them were taken in order to gain acceptance from member states.^ ®*
In the end, Afiican leaders rejected intervention aimed at overthrowing a regime, even 
if its conduct was contrary to the standards of international society, and Afiican leaders found 
any resolution that promoted intervention of this nature dangerous and detrimental to the 
survival of the Afiican state. President Nyerere too agreed with this despite his condemnation 
of Amin’s atrocities, hence the official statements from Tanzania justifying its intervention 
in terms of norms recognisable to Afiican states and the wider international community: 
territorial integrity and self-defence.
Conclusion
We began this Chapter by suggesting that the 1970s represented a period when there 
was significant willingness by some states to seek military assistance from external actors, in
C. Clapham, (1996), pp. 187-191, esp. p. 190 and ‘Discerning the new Africa’, International Affairs  ^Vol. 
74, No. 2, 1998, p. 264.
C. Clapham, (1996), p. 190.
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particular, assistance from the two main superpowers, and Cuba and France. Such a policy 
showed how intervention was deemed acceptable at one level, because its intended use was 
to support the integrity of the state system and the existing status quo (i.e. the Shaba I and 
n  crises). It is in this context that we can argue that intervention to support and uphold the 
sovereign state is a source from which to understand how intervention evolved alongside that 
of non-intervention within the African continent thus conforming with Hughes and May’s 
analysis that most interventions were either ‘regime’ or ‘state’ supportive. While the OAU 
reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention, member-states widely acknowledged that 
African leaders could call upon outside intervention if its purpose were to protect the 
incumbent regime and the survival of the African state system. At another level, intervention 
was supported if its intended aim were to promote the struggle for liberation and rid the 
country from the neocolonialists from the West (i.e. the Angolan civil war).
The decision of Nigeria to intervene in Chad did not undermine such a policy, 
although it is possible to argue that Nigeria’s, and later the OAU’s intervention, was also 
motivated by the presence of non-Afiican states in this conflict. The intervention in Chad was 
however an example of attempts taken by some leaders to ‘Africanisé’ a particular conflict 
on the continent, although it did not limit or remove the presence of non-African states 
intervening n African conflicts. Rather, Afiican states ‘welcomed’ their participation in terms 
of logistical and financial support partly because they lacked the necessary means to solve the 
Chadian civil war. This policy was in line with what Julius Nyerere defined as a policy of ‘Yes 
to military assistance; no to any foreign intervention.’ Such a policy supported the ‘occasional 
necessity’ of seeking military assistance from non-African states, but rejected direct military 
intervention from outside the continent.
We could sum up the policy of African leaders and the OAU during the 1970s as 
follows: Afiicans may call for assistance, but at the end, they must take the lead in resolving 
a particular crisis. It is within this context that we can understand the Pan-Afiicanist notion 
of exclusivity. The involvement of Nigeria and the OAU in Chad was less a matter of 
resolving the conflict, than one of hoping to reduce the dependence of the continent on non- 
African powers, and where possible, to define the limits of, and direct, the use of outside
See ‘Tanzania Stands: Yes to militaiy assistance; no to any foreign intervention’, Extract from a statement 
by the President of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, 8 June 1978, Africa Currents, No. 12/13, 
Autumn/Winter, 1978/79, pp. 21-23.
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forces. Such a policy explains how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle 
of non-intervention on the continent. However, we should also note that Nigeria’s actions 
were primarily to ensure its own security against countries like Libya and France. It used the 
idea of “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” to ensure that outsiders did not undermine 
its security in the region.
Tanzania’s intervention does not fit into the fi'amework of continental exclusiveness. 
What then does Tanzania’s action tell us about the evolution of the principle of intervention 
on the continent? We can understand the intervention on two levels: a) as a response to 
Amin’s annexation of the Kagera Salient in 1978 and, b) as a response to human rights 
abuses. Both are directly related and cannot be dealt with separately. Nyerere sought to 
justify his actions on the grounds of self-defence. We can therefore interpret Tanzania’s 
actions as belonging to the traditional behaviour of states who find that other states are 
challenging their security and sovereignty. It was the principle of self-defence, one which was 
far more conventional and acceptable to Afiican states and the wider international community 
than any assertion of humanitarian intent, that explains Tanzania’s action.
Yet, while making attempts to avoid setting a precedent for intervention on grounds 
of humanitarianism, Nyerere’s attacks on the brutality of Amin’s regime opened the door for 
such considerations. However, as Caroline Thomas observed, the OAU or African states 
never advocated humanitarianism as a first principle for supporting intervention in the affairs 
of another state. The attitude of the OAU was however significant to the debate on 
intervention on the continent. While the OAU was critical of Nyerere, it did not pronounce 
any devastating remark on his actions, even though he transgressed Article 3(5) of the 
Charter. Rather, its position showed two seemingly contradictory aspects about the 
Organisation. First, it highlighted that the OAU wanted to show that it did not sanction 
intervention by one African state in another, thus preserving the sanctity of the principle on 
non-intervention. Yet, at the same time, the Organisation silently credited Tanzania and 
Nyerere for saving it from having to continually deal with an embarrassing and brutal 
figurehead like Idi Amin because of the principles enshrined in Article 3 of the Charter.
In sum, the cases studied in this Chapter can tell us a good deal. They indicate that 
Afiican leaders developed a pragmatic approach on the question of intervention alongside the 
clause of non-intervention as set out in the OAU Charter. If intervention was directed at the 
survival of a regime or the Afiican state, then it was justified, although its legitimacy was not
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institutionalised within the OAU Charter. If outside assistance was sought to protect the state 
or an incumbent regime, this also received tacit approval despite the occasional criticism from 
some African states.
Seeking outside assistance did not undermine the Pan-Africanist desire of ensuring 
African autonomy over its affairs, for African leaders were taking the responsibility for these 
conflicts and dictated whether or not outside intervention was permissible and in turn, 
legitimate. Tanzania’s case however was different, no appeal was made to notions of 
exclusivity. However, although history shows otherwise, Tanzania’s actions and the OAU’s 
silent approval partly answers a question we raised in Chapter Three about what is to be done 
about African leaders who oppress their people. Although the OAU did not sanction 
intervention to remove leaders who committed atrocities against their citizens, by the latter 
half of the 1970s and with attention focussing on the African continent, African leaders were 
forced to question the behaviour of other African leaders towards their citizens. More 
important, their routine condemnation of the apartheid system in South African required that 
African leaders depart from the diplomatic habit of closing their eyes to atrocities committed 
by a fellow Afncan leader.
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CHAPTER FIVE
POST-COLD WAR INTRA-AFRICAN AFFAIRS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON­
INTERVENTION
Introduction
We said at the outset of this study that while the impact of the Cold War is relevant 
for understanding the development of Afiican international relations, this study would 
attempt to isolate its impact on the continent to examine the practice of intervention by 
Afncan states. However, we have reached a stage in this study where some International 
Relations theorists say that the setting of international politics no longer resemblances that 
of the thirty years period we covered in Chapters Two to Four. For the Afiican continent, 
instability, humanitarian crises, and widespread civil wars were still endemic features, but 
they were occurring within a ‘new’ international environment in the nineties. Any 
significant discussion on how the practice of intervention evolved on the Afiican continent 
in the nineties would need to start with the end of the Cold War and the implications it had 
for the continent in dealing with internal conflicts.
However, as we noted in Chapter One, although relations between states were being 
conducted in a less ideological international environment in the nineties, the language and 
definitions on intervention and non-intervention as set in the UN (and OAU) Charter did not 
change. Certainly as we said, the collapse of the East-West confiontation advanced new 
opportunities and ideas for tackling major issues of intemational relations, but the concerns 
of member-states mainly fiom the developing world on rules governing the relations of 
states did not change. More important, as we stated in the introduction, our main contention 
in this study is that the intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia and the creation of mechanisms 
within the OAU since the end of the Cold War is not ‘new’, but belong to a tradition of 
interventions as practised by Afiican states that can be traced back to the early post-colonial 
era.
The aim of this Chapter is to use the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in 1990 to 
argue that the practice of intervention by Afiican states on the continent is a continuation
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of intra-African affairs developed in the Cold War context. How relevant are the Pan- 
Afiicanist notions o f‘solidarity” “autonomy” (i.e. “African solutions for African problems”) 
for understanding the intervention by the ECOWAS Community? Where these themes still 
invoked by Afiican leaders to justify their intervention? The aim in this Chapter is to 
illustrate how other factors such as the fear of regional and economic instability, widespread 
humanitarian abuse and complex regional dynamics took precedence over these Pan- 
Afiicanist ideals.
In the lead up to the intervention, member states of ECOWAS offered a variety of 
justifications for their actions in Liberia. We can categorise these justifications under five 
headings: i) the apparent ‘right to intervene’ given to ECOWAS through the Protocol on 
Non-Aggression of 22 April 1978 and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence of 29 
May 1981; ii) the role of the OAU, African diplomacy and the UN; iii) the fear of regional 
instability; iv); the humanitarian tragedy in Liberia, and v) the personal motives of heads of 
states and the regional sensitivities and political divisions between the main Francophone 
countries, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and the dominant Anglophone state in the region, 
Nigeria, and those who supported the idea of intervention, Guinea and Sierra Leone. This 
Chapter is divided into six parts with parts two to six examining the above categories of 
justification. As we shall show, the justifications illustrate the way in which ECOWAS 
Heads of State interpreted the principle of non-intervention throughout the West Afiican 
region. In Part One, we offer a brief outline of the Liberian civil war and the debate among 
member states of ECOWAS in the lead up to its intervention on 25 August 1990.
The use of force by ECOWAS was inconsistent with the rules set out in the UN 
Charter, the Charter of the OAU and its own treaty. Was this a break with the principle of 
non-intervention as set out in these institutions? How did the ECOWAS intervention exist 
alongside other important principles such as sovereignty and territorial integrity? Should we 
label this intervention ‘new’ or ‘innovative’ and a break with the past, or should we see it 
as a continuation of attempts by African leaders to help other countries affected by internal 
disputes? What principles, norms or criteria were being invoked by West Afiican leaders to 
support their intervention in Liberia? Although the Liberian civil war ended in 1997 with 
the election of the main rebel leader, Charles Taylor on 19 July, this study concentrates on 
the first three years, when significant justifications abound about West African intervention,
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I. Justifying Intervention: ECOWAS in Liberia, 1990-1993
Liberia’s civil war began on 24 December 1989 when the National Patriotic Front 
of Liberia (NPFL) led by its rebel leader, Charles Taylor, invaded the country from 
neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire. The purpose, according to Taylor, was to end the brutal regime 
of Liberia’s Head of State, Master-Sergeant (Staff Sergeant ) Samuel Doe. The armed 
incursion soon degenerated into carnage and the massacre of civilians as fighting broke out 
between the NPFL and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) who were mainly made up of 
Doe’s ethnic group, the Krahns. The NPFL soon controlled most of the Liberian territory 
and by May 1990, President Doe was constrained to call upon ‘all patriotic citizens’ to join 
forces with the government and fight the rebels with ‘cutlasses and single-barrelled guns.’  ^
Doe’s appeal did not delay Taylor’s advance significantly, although he suffered a setback 
when one of his commanders, ‘Prince’ Yormie Johnson, spilt from the main NPFL and 
began fighting both the forces of Taylor and Doe’s AFL as the Independent National 
Patriotic Front (INPFL).^
The events taking place in Liberia came under the scrutiny of the 13* summit of the 
Heads of States of ECOWAS countries held in Banjul, Gambia on 30 May 1990, under the 
chairmanship of Sir Dawda Jawara of Gambia. Working through the Standing Mediation 
Committee (SMC) of ECOWAS, some member states (Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Nigeria, 
and Sierra Leone) began the initial task of trying to achieve a peace settlement to the
' ‘Doe Calls on Citizens to Join Fight Against Rebels’, BBC Monitoring Report, 21 May 1990, Document 18 
in M. Weller, (ed.) Regional Peace-keeping and Intemational Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis, Cambridge 
Intemational Documents Series, Vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Grotius Pubbcations, 1994), 
p. 38. Weller’s book contains significant documents on the Liberian crisis from 1989-1994.
 ^There were three other warring leaders in the Liberian civil war: Albaji Kromab of the United Liberation 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO-K), Roosevelt Johnson of the ULIMO splinter group (ULIMO- 
J) and George Boley of the Liberia Peace Council (LPC). For an analysis of the civil war see J. Armon and 
A Carl, (eds.) The Liberian Peace Process 1990-1996 ACCORD: An Intemational Review of Peace Initiatives 
(London: Conciliation Resources, Issue 1/1996), S. Ellis, ‘Liberia 1989-1994: a study of ethnic and spiritual 
violence,’ Afncan Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 375, pp. 165-197 and M. Huband, The Liberian Civil War (London: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 1998).
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Liberian civil war/ On 6 July 1990 at a summit meeting in Banjul, Gambia, the five 
members of the SMC took an unprecedented step in the region in deciding to send a 
multinational peacekeeping force - the Economic Community (of West Afiican States’) 
Monitoring Force (ECOMOG) - to the Liberian capital, Monrovia. The mandate for the 
peacekeeping force stated that they were ‘to conduct military operations for the purpose of 
monitoring the cease-fire,’ and to restore ‘law and order to create the necessary conditions 
for free and fair elections to be held in Liberia .On 25 August 1990, 3,000 troops from 
ECOMOG landed in Monrovia with the hope of halting a civil war.^ The ECOWAS 
intervention of 1990 can be seen as the first significant collective action taken by African 
states since the attempt by the OAU Inter-Afiican Force in 1981 in Chad.
This regional peacekeeping merits particular analysis when considering the evolution 
of intervention on the Afiican continent. As with the Tanzanian intervention in 1978, it is
 ^The Standing Mediation Committee consists of five members and rotates every three years. It was set up to 
respond ‘to the disruptive effect that recurrent situations of conflict and dispute’ had on the goal of ‘a 
harmonious and united West Afiican society.’ The SMC was set up in response to President Babangida’s 
campaign for a mechanism to address regional disputes. At the 13* session of the ECOWAS summit meeting, 
he stated that ‘In view of the occasional clashes resulting fi'om political misunderstanding among some of our 
Member States, I propose that this Summit should set up a Standing Mediation Committee of four members 
including the country that holds the Chairmanship of the Authority. Such a committee should intervene in 
timely fashion whenever such disputes arise.’ The full text is in ‘ECOWAS: Rising to the Global Challenges 
of Our Times.’ Address by President Ibrahim Badamsi Babangida at the 13* Session of the Authority of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Heads of States and Government, Banjul, The 
Repubhc of The Gambia, May 28-30, 1990 in General I. Nwachukwu, (ed.) Nigeria and the ECOWAS Since 
1985: Towards a Dynamic Regional Integration (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd., 
1991a), pp. 96-102, esp. p. 102. At the time that a decision was being made over what to do in Liberia, the 
five members of the committee were Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Togo. See Decision A/DEC.9/5/90 
of the Authority of Heads of State and Government relating to the Establishment of the Conununity Standing 
Mediation Committee, Banjul, The Gambia, 30 May 1990 in the OfficialJoumal of the Economic Community 
of West African States, Vol. 21, 1992, p. 5.
 ^ Economic Community of West African States First Session of the Community Standing Mediation 
Committee, Decision A/Dec. 1/8/90 on the Ceasefire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring 
Group for Liberia, Banjul, The Gambia, 6-7 August 1990, Article 2 (2), p. 3.
 ^ECOMOG was initially made up of troops from four Anglophone countries - Ghana, Nigeria, The Gambia 
and Sierra plus Guinea. For an analysis of the peacekeeping operation by ECOMOG, see K. Magyar and E. 
Conteh-Morgan, (eds.) Peacekeeping in Afiica: ECOMOG in Liberia (London; Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998); 
R. Mortimer,’ECOMOG, Liberia, and Regional Security in West Afiica’ in E. Keller and D. Rothchild, (eds.) 
Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 149-164; W. Ofiiatey-Kodjoe, (1994), pp. 261-302; M. Sesay, ‘Civil War 
and Collective Intervention in Liberia,’ Review of African Political Economy, No. 67, March 1996, pp. 35-52; 
M. Vogt, (ed.), (1992) and M. Vogt, ‘The Involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia’s Peacekeeping’ in E. Keller 
and D. Rothchild, (eds.) (1996), pp. 165-183.
164
not easy to place the central motive or justification within the context of “Afiican solutions 
for Afiican problems,” nor it is possible to understand it through the Pan-Afiican notion of 
unity. The traditional justification in the 1970s - that intervention was pursued to counter the 
presence of extra-continental forces - could not be used to explain the actions of the West 
Afiican states. Having said this, in Part Six we shall consider Nigeria’s initial claim that it 
intervened to counter French and Libyan interference in the Liberian civil war and the West 
African region to ensure regionally derived solutions to the conflict. Our main concern is 
to consider what criteria existed fi'om which the ECOWAS states based their decision to 
intervene. Parts Two to Six of this Chapter consider five areas used by Afiican leaders to 
justify their intervention.
II. The ‘right to intervene’ and the ECOWAS Protocols on regional defence and 
security
Several commentators have raised questions about whether there was a sufficient 
legal basis for the intervention by ECOWAS.^ In establishing a peace-keeping force, some 
member states of ECOWAS tried to address questions of legality under the Protocol on Non- 
Aggression (1978) and the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981). The 
SMC argued that both Protocols gave ECOWAS a ‘right to intervene’ in Liberia’s civil war 
because of the provisions on the peaceful resolutions of intra-regional disputes and 
mechanisms to prevent foreign military interventions. In this way, member states declared 
that they were able to overcome the principle of non-intervention as laid down in the 
ECOWAS Treaty and the UN and OAU Charter.
The decision taken by ECOWAS to intervene can be seen as a novel move. 
ECOWAS was designed in 1975 by a joint initiative of Nigeria and Togo to promote 
economic and social cooperation within the West Afiican region.  ^ Why should a
® See E. Toyo, ‘Questions on Bcomog’, The Guardian (Nigeria), 25 February 1991, p. 19 and K. Sunyaolu, 
‘Aguda on ECOMOG, says intervention is wrong’. The Guardian (Nigeria), 21 November 1990, p. 23. Dr 
Timothy Aguda was Chief Justice of the defunct Western State and former Chief Justice of Botswana.
’ The ECOWAS member-states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea- 
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
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multinational economic organisation with no history of collective military operations 
embark on a peacekeeping mission in a civil war? The aims of the ECOWAS Community 
made no provisions for a collective security or peacekeeping role, although as Osita C. Eze 
notes, there was an assumption that maintaining economic stability as stated in Article 2(1) 
of the ECOWAS Treaty might infer that member-states were also concerned with ensuring 
regional peace and security.^ More important, the West Afiican region was vulnerable to 
coups, civil strife and insurgencies, thus ECOWAS leaders could only guarantee the quest 
of economic integration if there was a viable security fi'amework to tackle these issues. As 
the introduction of the 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression states, the objectives 
on economic development among the West Afiican states cannot be met ‘save in an 
atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among the Member states of the 
Community [i.e. ECOWAS].’®
When it came to justifying the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, this aspect of the 
1978 Protocol guided the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Abass Bundu, when he stated that 
‘the Liberian crisis has demonstrated more than anything else,...that it is futile to talk about 
economic integration unless the environment in which you pursue such integration is 
peaceful and secure.’ Bundu further stated that ‘this is what I believe was the underlying 
factor that motivated the standing mediation committee to take the decision it did to 
establish ECOMOG in August 1990.’ ®^ Similarly, the Nigerian Permanent Representative 
to the UN, Ibrahim Gambari, also used the desire to ensure a continuation in the economic 
development of the region to explain the motive behind the ECOWAS intervention: 
‘member states...acted collectively in the interests of both regional and subregional political 
and economic development.’ '^
While the Protocol noted that the objectives of economic cooperation needed to be
* O. C. Eze, ‘Legal Aspects of Peace-keeping’ in M. Vogt and A. E. Ekoko, (ed.), (1993), pp. 12-17, esp. p. 
13.
® The full text of the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression is in M, Weller, (ed.), (1994), pp. 18-19.
A. Bundu, ‘Convergence of Policies’ Interview with Kate Whiteman, West Africa, No. 3956, 19-25 July 
1993, p. 1247.
" I. Gambari, ‘The Role of Foreign Intervention in Afiican Reconstruction’, in I. W. Zartman, (ed.), (1995/b), 
p. 224.
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conducted ‘in an atmosphere of peace,’ member states also agreed not to transgress Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter that prohibited the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity of a sovereign and independent state. The 1978 Protocol adds that ‘[e]ach member 
state shall refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility 
or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other member 
state’, (Article 2). To this end, member states were ‘to prevent non-resident foreigners from 
using [their] territory as a base for committing [these] acts’, (Article 4). The Protocol also 
outlines the Community’s commitment to settling disputes peacefully among themselves, 
(Article 5(1)). While the 1978 Protocol upholds the principle of non-intervention, it neither 
rules outs the right of individual or collective self-defence, nor the possibility of 
enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, while it was a valuable 
document, the Protocol was limited to only addressing aggression between member states. 
It did not refer to aggression coming from outside the Community or the problem of internal 
conflicts like the Liberian civil war. The Protocol was later supplemented by another 
Protocol on 29 May 1981 relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence.
The 1981 Protocol was drawn up in response to the number of foreign interventions 
in several West African countries, although it did not come into full effect until 1986. For 
example, it sought to prevent situations like the Portuguese invasion of Guinea-Bissau and 
the mercenary attack on Benin in 1977. ECOWAS members also signed this Protocol at a 
time when there were fears, namely from Nigeria, over the activities of Libya’s Head of 
State, Colonel Qadhafi, especially in Chad. In 1981, member states were also concerned 
with the number of foreign military interventions in the region and the African continent and 
thus signalled a determination to ‘resolve regional conflicts by regional means.However, 
like the 1978 Protocol, the 1981 Protocol did not envisage responding to civil wars like that 
in Liberia.
There are two parts to the 1981 Protocol. Part one refers to situations of armed 
conflict between two or more member states. In the preamble to the Protocol, member states 
declared that they would ^firmly resolve to safeguard and consohdate the independence and
The full text of the ECOWAS Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence is in M. Weller, (ed.), 
(1994), pp. 19-24.
D. Wippman, (1993), p. 167.
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sovereignty of member states against foreign intervention.’ Members also declared that any 
‘armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or 
aggression against the entire Community’, (Article 2). To this end, ‘Member States resolve 
to give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression’, 
(Article 3).
The second part which is of immediate concern to us, refers to internal armed 
conflict within any member state of ECOWAS directed from a foreign base. Where ‘internal 
armed conflict within any member state engineered and supported from the outside’ is 
‘likely to endanger the peace and security’ of the region, ‘the Authority [i.e. the Heads of 
State] shall appreciate and decide on this situation in full collaboration with the Authority 
of the Member State or States involved’, (Article 4(b)). Where armed intervention (Article 
9) is to occur, the Protocol empowers the Authority to ‘decide on the expediency of military 
action,’ (Article 6(3)). If necessary, the Authority shall interpose the Allied Armed Force 
of the Community (AAFC) ‘between the troops engaged in the conflict’, (Article 17). 
Article 13 (1 & 2) allows for the creation of a Community army made up of troops 
earmarked from national units. Finally, Article 18(1) of the 1981 Protocol stipulated that ‘in 
the case where an internal conflict in a Member State of the Community is actively 
maintained and sustained from outside’, then the Community can decide on the use of force 
as stated in Article 6.
When it came to deciding how to respond to the conflict in Liberia, the SMC referred 
to the 1981 Protocol to justify its intervention. Similarly, the ECOWAS chairman when 
member states decided to intervene in August 1990, Sir Dawda Jawara, placed the 
ECOWAS intervention within the context of the 1981 Protocol, suggesting that it was 
extended to deal with civil wars like Liberia. The Protocols, he acknowledged, specified that 
member-states were to come to the aid of each other in the face of unrest especially if it was 
generated from outside. Similarly, some states of ECOWAS cited the provisions contained
Economic Community of West African States First Session of the Community Standing Mediation 
Committee, Decision A/Dec. 1/8/90 on the Ceasefire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring 
Group for Liberia, Banjul, The Gambia, 6-7 August 1990, p. 1.
Sir Dawda Jawara, ‘Towards Peace in Liberia’ interview with K. Whiteman, West Africa, No. 3822, 26 
November-2 December 1990, p. 2894.
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in the 1981 Protocol. As we argue in Part Four, Nigeria and Sierra Leone argued that 
Charles Taylor’s war campaign had been maintained and sustained by France, and in 
particular Libya via Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, and therefore intervention to preserve 
the Liberian state against outside aggression was justified. More important, as we argue 
again in Part Four, Nigeria claimed that it intervened to ensure regionally derived solutions 
to the Liberian civil war.'^
Although member states referred to the 1978 and 1981 Protocols in various mandates 
and communiqués, we argue in the next part of this Chapter that it is likely that the position 
of the OAU, African diplomacy and the UN explains in more detail where the ‘right to 
intervene’ derived.
III. The role of the OAU and African diplomacy the UN
Outside the ECOWAS structure, there were other avenues available to member states 
from which to justify their actions. In this regard, it is worth noting the position of the OAU, 
African diplomacy and the UN whose actions not only gave open approval to the ECOWAS 
intervention, but provided ECOWAS with the legal basis to justify its intervention.
The OAU, African diplomacy and the Liberian Civil War
Throughout this study, we have noted that while member states may act contrary to 
the Charter principle of non-intervention, the OAU strictly observed this principle. To this 
end, the Organisation never explicitly extended support to intervention carried out by any 
African state. So to many observers of the OAU, there was some surprise over its position 
in 1990-1991 towards the ECOWAS intervention.
It appeared that the OAU had openly contradicted its own principle of non­
intervention in the internal affairs of member states. It is however important to note the 
wider context of what appeared to be an open endorsement of the ECOWAS intervention
Curiously, member states never invoked the 1978 and 1981 Protocols to response to many crises that the 
Protocols envisaged, namely inter-state conflicts and border clashes such as that between Mali and Burkina 
Faso (1985), Ghana and Togo (1988), and Senegal and Guinea-Bissau (1989-1990). See M. Sesay, (1996), 
p. 43.
169
by the OAU. An open endorsement by the OAU would have been unthinkable several years 
earlier, however, this was a sign of significant change by Africa’s principle international 
political organisation. As we will discuss further in Chapter Six, the OAU, at least at the 
level of the Secretariat and the Office of the Secretary-General, had been seeking ways at 
the start of the post-Cold War period not only to assume more responsibility for Africa’s 
conflicts, but also to develop a flexible approach to the principle on non-intervention. To this 
end, the Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, stated that ‘non-interference should not be 
taken to mean indifference.’ Rather than question the legality of the ECOWAS-ECOMOG 
initiative in Liberia, Salim argued that,
[b]efore ECOWAS undertook its initiative, many, including the African 
media were condemning the indifference demonstrated by Africans. The 
most desirable thing would have been to have [had] an agreement of all 
parties to the conflict and the convergence of views of all the member of 
ECOWAS. But to argue that there was no legal base for any intervention in 
Liberia is surprising. Should the countries in West Africa, should Africa just 
leave the Liberians to fight each other? Will that be more legitimate? Will 
that be more understandable? In my frank opinion the decision of the 
ECOWAS countries to despatch a peacekeeping force or a monitoring group 
was a timely and very bold decision.
The extent of the OAU’s open endorsement of the ECOWAS initiative could be seen when 
its Council of Ministers hailed ‘the laudable efforts deployed by ECOWAS’ and expressed 
"its total support for its initiatives.’ *^ In 1992, the OAU sent an ‘eminent person,’ former 
President of Zimbabwe, Reverend Canaan Banana, to act as its special envoy to the 
ECOWAS headquarters in Liberia, thus confirming its support for the peacekeeping 
operation.
Similarly, the Ugandan President and OAU Chairman in 1991, Yoweri Museveni, 
argued for a reinterpretation of the OAU principle on non-intervention when he stated that 
in regard to Liberia,
S. Ahmed Salim, ‘Africa’s Destiny’. Inaugural London Africa Lecture and talks to West Africa, West Africa, 
No. 3817, 22-28 October 1990, p. 2691.
OAU Council of Ministers, Resolution on the Armed Conflict in Liberia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1 March 
1991, Document 123 inM. Weller, (ed.), (1994), p. 140 (Emphasis in original).
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...there was no state anymore. Sometimes the situation is so bad that there is 
no state. Liberia was no longer there. It was chaos, it was anarchy, so some 
of us were of the view that some supranational force must be available to 
save the population....
I encouraged...ECOWAS very much to do something in Liberia...So 
I think there is need to interpret this principle of non-interference: But to 
clarify the issue, does it mean non-intervention in all circumstances even 
when it turns to anarchy or what? That is why I call it interpreting.^^
Museveni further legitimised ECOWAS’s action when he argued that the anarchic 
conditions in Liberia rendered a Liberian claim to sovereignty inadmissible. However, at 
first glance, Museveni’s position was surprising to those who had observed his elevation to 
power in Uganda. Museveni’s path to power was no different from Charles Taylor’ since he 
achieved power through a similar armed struggle against Tito Okello’s government in 
Uganda in January 1986. To this end, Museveni’s remarks added significance to the 
ECOWAS intervention.^® Here was a man who gained power via the overthrow of a regime 
in Uganda , thus challenging Article 3(5) of the OAU Charter, but four years later 
condemning a similar action by Taylor who also wanted to overthrow a brutal regime.
The Zimbabwean Head of State, President Robert Mugabe, gave similar support to 
the ECOWAS intervention. In a press conference during a visit to Ghana, Mugabe suggested 
that the OAU enshrine a clause in the Charter sanctioning the right of intervention:
In view of this successful effort and demonstration of togetherness to save 
a critical internal situation in the country [Liberia], it is necessary that the 
OAU should examine itself in terms of its efficacy and capabilities to help 
to sustain the sovereignty of states which have been threatened by so much 
internal strife that it is no longer within a particular people’s capability to 
control the strife or to bring it to an end. It is a difficult proposition (to put 
the right of intervention in the OAU Charter), but nevertheless, it’s a 
proposition we should examine.^*
As with Museveni, Mugabe argued that the right to intervene was justified on the ground
Y, Museveni, ‘’’Democracy is a must.’” Interview with K. Whiteman and K. Gyan-Apenteng, fVesi Africa, 
No. 3846, p. 835.
“ See ‘An Ecowas Force for Nigeria?’ The Guardian (Nigeria), 8 August 1990, p. 10.
Cited in Ben Ephson, ‘Right to Intervene’, West Africa, No. 3831,4-10 February 1991, p. 141.
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that there was no effective authority to govern Liberia:
The ‘domestic affairs’ of a country must mean affairs within a peaceful 
environment, but where that peaceful environment is completely gone and 
the people are no longer in a position to exercise their own sovereign 
authority, when there is no government in being and there is just chaos in the 
country, surely the time would have to come for intervention to occur.^^
It is important to explain the background of these various African personalities to 
understand why they extended support to the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. In post-Cold 
War Africa, figures such as President Museveni of Uganda and the OAU Secretary-Genenral 
Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania, were seen as representing a ‘new’ group of leaders 
advocating that the continent should be more self-reliant in resolving its internal conflicts, 
and display readiness to shoulder responsibility for peacekeeping and peacemaking. Leaders 
like Museveni evolved their approach during the long liberation struggles of the 1960s and 
1970s. They point to the failure of African post-colonial leaders who not only undermined 
the progress of the African state, but had in place inadequate economic structures and 
unaccountable systems of governance. Their struggle, essentially for “second independence” 
as discussed in Chapter Four, was aimed at reversing the trend towards dependence on 
outside forces to sustain the African state. In the nineties, these ‘new’ leaders, which also 
included President Isiaias Afewerki in Eritrea and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, 
advocated “African solutions” to provide basic necessities, equality of opportunity and 
transparency within African governments and institutions. Although it is difficult to make 
a general statement about their foreign policy, it is possible to suggest that they thought that 
intervening to resolve domestic conflicts like that in Liberian was permissible. Their policy 
certainly put a dent in the established OAU consensus on non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of member states. We shall say more on these ‘new’ leaders in Chapter Six.
The UN and the Liberian Civil War
Outside Africa’s diplomatic circle, the ‘right to intervene’ or at least ‘to do
Cited in Ben Ephson, ‘Right to Intervene’, (1991), p. 141.
1 7 2
something’ was also granted by the UN, although initially it was not as direct as the OAU’s 
open endorsement. The support given by the UN and its member states needs to be 
understood within the context of other events that were taking place, most notably on the 
Iraq-Kuwait border and in East Europe where significant international attention was 
directed. These reasons are often cited to explain why West Afiican states responded to the 
conflict in Liberia.^  ^ There was an expectation that one permanent member of the UN 
Security Council - the US - would intervene in what was described as its unofficial colony. 
However, the US initially showed little concern for what it considered would be a brief 
disruption. The administration under President George Bush stated that ‘the resolution of 
this civil war is a Liberian responsibility...a solution to Liberia’s current difficulties will be 
viable if it is worked [out] by Liberians themselves and has broad internal support.Senior 
Liberians and interest groups called for the US marines to stop the fighting or at least to 
create a safe haven for civilians, but US troop presence was limited to 200 marines sent to 
evacuate at least 300 US nationals on 5 August 1990.^^
When there was no significant response ft"om the UN and its member states, leaders 
from ECOWAS decided to ‘do something’ to stop the conflict in Liberia. However, 
questions were raised at the start of the ECOWAS intervention about whether its actions 
were consistent with the procedures set out under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, 
specifically, the decision to undertake enforcement action to address threats to international 
peace and security. Chapter VIII does allow for enforcement action if the Security Council 
authorizes it. As we noted in Chapter Two, Article 52 under Chapter VIII expressly 
recognises the right of regional arrangements or agencies to deal with conflicts in their 
region before ‘referring them to the Security Council.’ However, Article 54 further states 
that ‘[t]he Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken 
or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the
"'M. Vogt, (1996), p. 178.
Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State, Herman J, Cohen, US House of Representatives, Subcommittee 
on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 19 June 1991, Document 29 in 
M. Weller, (ed.), (1994), p. 43 and 46.
D. Wippman, (1993), p. 165. Also see ‘Taylor Opposes Foreign Intervention; US Marines to Rescue U.S. 
Nationals’, BBC Monitoring Report, 5 August 1990, Document 45, p. 63 and US President’s Press Secretary 
(Fitzwater), Press Briefing, 5 August 1990 (Extract), Document 46 in M. Weller, (ed.), (1994), pp. 64-65.
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maintenance of international peace and security.’ The principle difficulty for ECOWAS lies 
in the fact that it never informed the Security Council of its intention to intervene, nor did 
the Security Council give it formal authorisation to use force in the internal affairs of 
another state to maintain international peace and security. In addition, the Security Council 
never dealt with the role of ECOWAS until 1992, two years after West Afiican leaders had 
deployed the ECOMOG force in Liberia.
Despite this, Nigeria’s Head of State, President Ibrahim Babangida, used Chapter 
VIII of the UN Charter to counter those who raised questions about the legality of 
ECO W AS.M ore important, there was later support through the UN Security Council for 
several peace initiatives undertaken by ECOWAS, thus giving concrete meaning to Chapter 
VIII of the Charter, which encourages cooperation with regional bodies in the pacific 
settlement of disputes.^^ This support was a logical extension of the UN’s attempt to 
encourage an even division of labour between regional arrangements and itself in resolving 
conflicts. The idea of sharing the burden of maintaining international peace and security was 
paramount in the UN report. An Agenda for Peace, that the former UN Secretary-General, 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote. Although he wrote this report two years after the start of the 
Liberian conflict, it nonetheless reflected the belief among the member states of the Security 
Council that ‘where appropriate’ support should be extended to ‘regional efforts as 
undertaken by regional organizations within their respective areas of competence.’^ * More 
important, as we noted above, it was an indication that member-states of the UN, in 
particular the five permanent members of the Security Council, were reluctant to intervene 
in the Liberian civil war. As we shall discuss in Chapter Seven, the major powers of the UN 
were streamlining their international peacekeeping activities to only respond to conflicts 
they considered an immediate national interest.
Both the ECOWAS Protocols of 1978 and 1981 and the support of the OAU and the 
UN were used by ECOWAS leaders to justify their intervention. This was illustrated in the
President Babangida ‘Impromptu Press Briefing: The Imperative Features of Nigerian Foreign Policy and 
the crisis in Liberia’, 31 October 1990 in General I. Nwachukwu, (ed.), (1991/b), p. 106.
Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Five Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting of the Security 
Council, UN Doc. S/PV.3517, 13 April 1995, p. 3.
Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/25184, 28 January 1993.
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official statements and speeches made by ECOWAS leaders in the lead up to, and after it 
launched its peacekeeping initiative in Liberia. These sources enabled ECOWAS to 
overcome the principle of non-intervention and questions about its legal competence to 
intervene in what was essentially a domestic affair. However, there are other useful sources 
within the West African region that provide a clearer indication of how the practice of 
intervention evolved alongside the ECOWAS Treaty ruling on non-intervention.
IV. Intervention to prevent regional instability
A major reason for the intervention in Liberia was the perceived threat to sub­
regional peace and stability. As noted in Chapter One, there are vivid examples of how an 
internal crisis in one country can affect another country or an entire region and spark off 
regional insecurities. Elements of Charles Taylor’s NPFL were said to have joined the Sierra 
Leone rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), in the overthrow of President 
Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone in March 1991. As a result. President Momoh wanted to 
send the ECOMOG force to the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia in a defensive 
capacity.^  ^The Heads of State of Nigeria and Benin, Presidents Babangida and Nicéphore 
Soglo, expressed concern over the implications the crisis in Liberia had for the rest of the 
West African region: ‘Today it is Liberia, tomorrow it could be any one of the countries 
represented here. Indeed the canker we are fighting against is already showing itself in Sierra 
Leone and in other parts of the sub-region.’^ ®
The immediate threat to regional stability was the overflow and displacement of 
refugees in neighbouring countries, and some ECOWAS leaders cited this fact as one motive 
for intervening. While refugees are a humanitarian problem, they often pose a security 
threat to the host government. Apart from straining the economic or health services of local 
communities who are ill-equipped to cope with an extra population, ‘refugee camps are
‘Sierra Leone Proposes West African Peacekeeping Force’, Reuters News Service, 8 April 1991. 
Cited in G. da Costa, ‘Fresh Impetus for Peace?’ No. 3922, West Africa, 16-22 Nov, 1992, p. 1968.
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potential pools for rebel recruitment,’ as the conflict in Rwanda illustrated in 1994/^ To this 
end, General Emmanuel Erskine of ECOMOG could use the spread of refugee overflows 
partly to justify the ECOWAS intervention: ‘with the crisis in Liberia creating unbearable 
refugee problems for Sierra Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, 
it is obvious that the situation in Liberia has gone beyond the boundaries of the country and 
ceases to be an exclusive Liberian question.Certainly the figures from the UN illustrated 
the unprecedented outflow of refugees into Liberia’s contiguous neighbours. Between 1989 
and 1993, the UN estimated that between 600,000 and 700,00 refugees were mainly in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone.^^
Apart from the problem of refugees, ECOWAS leaders saw the civil war as having 
potential damage on economic development within the region. Certainly as we have 
discussed in Part Two, the 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression noted the necessity 
of peace and stability to ensure economic development in the West African region.
It is therefore possible to suggest that the fear of regional instability and the 
possibility that the conflict would spread and engulf other states in the region partly ensured 
that some ECOWAS leaders would overlook the principle of non-intervention on this 
occasion. Certainly, those West African leaders who initially sent troops to Liberia (i.e. 
Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Guinea) did argue that intervention was 
permissible since Liberia’s war would have spiralling effects on peace and security in the 
region. In addition, member states argued that large scale human suffering among the 
Liberians constituted a major factor in the ECOWAS intervention.
V. Intervention for humanitarian purposes
In the past, African leaders have avoided appealing to humanitarianism to justify 
their actions for fear that their own domestic policies may come under scrutiny. More
S. J. Stedman, ‘Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in M. Brown, (ed.) International 
Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts; The MIT Press, 1996), p. 246.
E. Erskine,‘Peacekeeping’, Africa Forum, Vol. 1, no. 1, 1991, p. 27 cited in W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, (1994),
p. 282.
Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Liberia, UN Doc. S/25402, 12 March 1993, para. 8.
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important, as we noted in Chapter Four, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania preferred to 
justify his actions in Uganda as self-defence, which he saw as more reconcilable with the 
norm of non-intervention, sovereignty and territorial integrity than any appeal to 
humanitarianism. However, in the early nineties, the alleviation of widespread human 
suffering has often been cited as a reason for mihtary intervention in certain conflicts. What 
was significant in the early years of the post-Cold War era was that large-scale denial of 
human rights and widespread human suffering came to be judged a threat to international 
peace and security. From the protection extended to the Kurds in Northern Iraq, to 
intervention aimed at establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations 
in Somalia, UN Security Council resolutions made appeals to humanitarianism to sanction 
action by states under the authority of Chapter VU of the UN Charter. Resolution 688, which 
demanded inter alia that the Iraqi regime cease the repression of its Kurdish population, 
represented a significant precedent in the action to be taken against a government that 
violated the right’s of its people.^ "^
In Liberia, West African leaders used the displacement of peoples and widespread 
human suffering to justify their intervention. In one Communiqué, ECOWAS gave a strong 
humanitarian rationale for its decision, adding that, ‘presently, there is a government in 
Liberia which cannot govern and contending factions which are holding the entire 
population as hostage, depriving them of food, health facilities and other basic necessities 
of hfe.’^  ^A subsequent ECOWAS statement in August 1990 was more explicit in stating the 
humanitarian objective as ‘stopping the senseless killing of innocent civilians, nationals and 
foreigners, and to help the Liberian people to restore their democratic institutions.’^ ^
Individual leaders in the region also repeated this humanitarian justification.
^ See UN Security Council Resolution 688, UN Doc. S/Res/688, 5 April, 1991. As we noted in Chapter One, 
the link between human suffering and international peace and security was explicitly noted in UN Security 
Council Resolution, UN Doc. S/Res/794, 3 December, 1992 which dealt with Somalia. In that resolution, the 
Security Council ‘(a)cting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary- 
General and Member States cooperating...to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia’, (para. 10). (Emphasis in the original). On the 
question of whether these resolutions set a precedent, see C. Ero and S. Long, (1995), pp. 148-151.
ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Banjul, Republic of Gambia, Final Communiqué of the First 
Session, 7 August 1990, Document 54, in M. Weller, (ed.), (1994), p. 73.
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary- 
General, 9 August 1990, UN Doc. S/21485, 10 August 1990.
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President Jawara of Gambia advanced the appeal to humanitarianism when he claimed that 
‘ECOWAS is not sending in an invading force; I think we have made this absolutely clear. 
One aspect of our mission is strictly humanitarian.’^  ^Later, at a press briefing at Dodon 
Barracks in Lagos on 31 October, President Babangida of Nigeria emphasised that his 
country was intervening.
because events in [Liberia] have “led to the massive destruction of property, 
the massacre by all parties of thousands of innocent children some of whom 
had sought sanctuary in the churches, mosques, diplomatic missions, 
hospitals and under the protection of the Red Cross, contrary to all 
recognized standards of civilised behaviour” and international ethics and 
decorum....[I]n Liberia..., we are all, first and foremost reflecting the love we 
have for our respective countries, our sub-region, Africa, the black world and 
mankind.^*
Nigeria’s intervention was also partly motivated by the attacks on foreigners, especially 
Nigerians in Liberia. Nigerians in Liberia were seen as vulnerable to attacks from the NPFL, 
largely because of Charles Taylor’s hostility towards Babangida’s decision to intervene.^^ 
Finally, the Ghanian Foreign Minister, Obed Asamoah, also sought to provide a 
humanitarian motive for the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia when he stated that, ‘the basis 
of ECOMOG is humanitarian, in the sense that it was felt that the slaughter had gone on for 
far too long and had to be stopped.
It is worth noting that in line with the rhetoric of the post-Cold War era, various 
West African leaders claimed that they were acting on behalf of fellow Africans who were 
facing severe disasters. Yet this desire to extend help to fellow African brothers was hardly 
new. As we have shown in this study, African leaders often justified intervention on the
Cited in P. da Costa, ‘Intervention time’, West Africa, No. 3807, 13-19 August 1990, p. 2280.
President Babangida, (1991/b), pp. 103-111, esp. p. 105 and p. 108.
K. Komolafe, ‘ECOMOG Burdened With 7000 Stranded Nigerians’, The Guardian (Nigeria), 10 September. 
1990, pp. 1-2. Margaret Vogt however argues that Nigeria did not intervene to protect its own citizens because 
it remained ‘faithful to the age-long AJfrican confidence in the abihty of her fellow African brothers to protect 
each other.’ See ‘Nigeria’s Participation in the ECOWAS Monitoring Group - ECOMOG’, Nigerian Journal 
of International Affairs, Vol 7, No. 1, 1991, pp. 104-105 and pp. 111-112.
O. Asamoah, ‘A New Role for ECOWAS’. Interview with M. Novioki in Afnca Report, Vol. 35, No. 5, 
Nov/Dec 1990, p. 17.
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grounds of a perceived sense of ‘brotherhood’ or extended solidarity with other African 
states.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that ECOWAS strengthened its overall case by 
increasing the humanitarian justification post facto. Furthermore, the resolution establishing 
ECOMOG did not explicitly refer to a humanitarian rationale, although the communiqué of 
the SMC was 'gravely concerned" with ‘the wanton destruction of human life and property 
and the displacement of persons’; and ‘the massive damage in various forms being caused 
by the armed conflict to the stability and survival of the entire Liberian nation.However, 
there is also no reason to question the moral ground adopted by various ECOWAS leaders 
regarding their decision to intervene. Certainly the reports of large-scale massacres, 
allegations of widespread loss of life, human rights abuse, mass starvation and the 
deterioration of social services by Human Rights Watch/Afiica Watch and the US 
Committee on Refugees in the early stages of the conflict indicate the humanitarian tragedy 
that was facing Liberia. The massacre of 600 people at St. Peter’s Church on 30 July 1990 
by remnants of Samuel Does’s AFL, was also an indication of the atrocities encountered by 
Liberians before the ECOWAS intervention."*^
Taken together, the fears of regional instability and the widespread humanitarian 
tragedy caused by the Liberian civil war were grounds to justify intervention, and as we 
have shown, member states cited these reasons to explain their actions. However, in the final 
part of this Chapter we focus of what are usually defined as ‘real’ motives of states to 
understand why member states of an economic community, with no history of collective 
intervention, would mandate a force to intervene in a complex civil war. The aim is to use 
the diverging views among ECOWAS member-states to understand the intervention. We 
said in the introduction that we would consider how relevant the Pan-Afiricanist notions of 
“solidarity,” “autonomy” are for understanding the intervention by the ECOWAS 
Community? Where these themes still invoked by Afiican leaders to justify their
Economic Community of West African States First Session of the Community Standing Mediation 
Committee, Decision A/Dec. 1/90 on the Ceasefire and Establishment of an Ecowas Ceasefire Monitoring 
Group for Liberia  ^Banjul, The Gambia, 6-7 August 1990. (Emphasis in the original).
See H. Ruiz, ‘Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Bmtal War’, Issue Paper: US Committee of Refugees, 
1992, esp. p. 6 and ‘Liberia: A Fhght from Terror. Testimony of Abuses in Nimba County’, An Africa Watch 
Report, May 1990. The report points to abuse by government soldiers and the rebel force of Charles Taylor.
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intervention? We show on the one hand how complex political divisions, the personal 
motives of Heads of States and regional sensitivities ranked higher than Pan-African ideals, 
but also how Nigeria used Pan-African ideals partly to justify its actions in Liberia.
VI. Regional sensitivities and political divisions: why some states intervened
While some ECOWAS leaders predominantly cited fears of widespread regional 
instability and humanitarian tragedy as justifications for intervening, there are ample 
political and historical justifications to explain why individual member states intervened to 
either assist the various warring parties to the conflict or to end the conflict in the region.
The Francophone States: Burkina Faso and Côte d ’Ivoire
The two main Francophone countries, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, were accused, 
along with Libya, of providing support to the main Liberian rebel leader, Charles Taylor. 
These accusations were heightened when it was discovered that Charles Taylor’s NPFL 
launched its invasion from Côte d’Ivoire. At the beginning of the conflict, supporters of the 
Liberian President, Samuel Doe, alleged that Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso (and Libya) had 
trained NPFL soldiers and that the NPFL had entered the country from Côte d’Ivoire, a 
claim that the states concerned denied."^  ^ The Ivorian Minister of Communications, St. 
Auguste Miremont, rejected the allegations, stating instead that his country’s involvement 
on the Liberian border had been humanitarian, offering help to those fleeing the combat 
areas."*^
There are largely historical reasons as to why these Francophone countries extended 
support to Charles Taylor. For example, relations had deteriorated between the late President
‘Liberia: Doe’s criticism of Côte d’Ivoire; Burkina Faso denies involvement’, BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 6 January 1990, ‘Liberia: Captured rebels describe recmitment, training in Libya’, BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 12 January 1990 and, ‘Côte d'Ivoire: Friend or Foe?’ African Confidential, vol. 13, no, 
18,14 September 1990.
^ ‘Liberia: Monrovia ‘normal’; Côte d’Ivoire denial of alleged support for rebels’, BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 5 January 1990. Also see G. Bourke, ‘View from Abidjan’, West Africa, No. 3778,22-28 January 
1990, p. 93.
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of Côte d’Ivoire, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, and Samuel Doe after the latter’s killing of the 
former Liberian leader. President Tolbert on 22 April 1980 and the arrest and death of his 
eldest son, Adolphus Tolbert, the son-in-law of Houphouët-Boigny in the same year. It is 
partly because of both these events that analysts have so far suggested that the Ivorian leader 
encouraged another son-in-law, Blaise Compaore, to support Charles Taylor’s attempt at 
overthrowing Doe.^^
The relationship between Burkina Faso’s Head of State, Lieutenant Blaise 
Campaore, and Charles Taylor was complex. Compaore was accused of giving the NPFL 
a strategic planning ground at Po military base south of the capital, Ouagadougou, and a 
supply of arms at the start of the conflict."^  ^The allegations seem plausible since Compaore, 
along with the Ivorian leader, was largely critical of Nigeria’s desire for an ECOWAS 
intervention force, especially since Compaore believed that the country was supporting the 
Liberian President, Samuel Doe. Radio Burkina reported that Compaore had sent a message 
to the ECOWAS Chairman, Dawda Jawara, declaring his country’s ‘total disagreement’ with 
the operation, adding that ECOMOG had ‘no competence to interfere in member states’ 
internal conflicts, but only in conflicts breaking out between member countries’ as stated in 
the 1978 and 1981 Protocols on regional defence.'*  ^ Mr. Sanon, the Permanent 
Representative of Burkina Faso, clarified his county’s position during a debate on Liberia 
at the UN Security Council: ‘Our conviction is that the situation in Liberia is first and 
foremost a Liberian matter; that we should not throw oil on the fire; and that no military 
solution could...be contemplated.
A. Alao, ‘Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Liberian Civil War in Brassey’s Defence Yearbook, 
edited by the Centre of Defence Studies, King’s College, London (London: Brassey’s, 1993), p. 341. Also 
see ‘Liberia: Sparking fires in West Africa’, Africa Confidential, vol. 32, no. 10, 17 May 1991, p. 3 and M. 
Huband, (1998), pp. 57 and 107.
^ M. Huband, ‘ Liberian mercenaries train in Burkina Faso’, The Guardian, (London), 19 December 1990,
p. 10.
‘Liberia: Taylor to visit Banjul; Burkinabé leader rejects ECOWAS intervention’, BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 15 August 1990 and ‘Jawara and Compaore disagree on ECOMOG’s mandate in Liberia’, The 
Guardian (Nigeria), 8 September 1990, pp. 1-2.
Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred and Thirty-Eighth Meeting, Security 
Council, UN Docs. S/PV.3138 , 19 November 1992, p. 33. At the time this speech was made, Burkina Faso 
took the decision to participate in the ECOMOG intervention largely because of the reaffirmation by the 
ECOWAS First Summit Meeting Committee of Nine in Abuja, Nigeria on 7 November that the role of
181
Reports, from diplomats and journalists expelled from Liberia suggest that because 
of Burkina Faso’s criticism of the ECOWAS intervention, Compaore had sanctioned the 
supply of arms and troops to help the NPFL."*^  Campaore did not deny the allegations made 
against him; instead he argued that his decision to supply 400 soldiers to fight against Doe 
‘was a moral duty to save Liberians from the wrath of a ruthless dictator.’^ ®
Another factor that may explain Burkina Faso’s support for Taylor is the latter’s own 
support for Compaore when he overthrew the former Burkinabé head of state, Thomas 
Sankara on 17 October 1987. As Byron Tarr states, ‘[s]ome people think that the Liberians 
training in Libya were employed to kill Sankara.Once he became leader, it is believed 
that Compaore introduced Charles Taylor to the Libyans and also provided him with an 
estimated 700 Burkinabés who fought alongside the NPFL in Liberia.^  ^ What is more 
difficult to assess is the suggestion that Compaore could secure the support of Colonel 
Qadhafi of Libya to help Charles Taylor.
The relationship between Compaore and Qadhafi dates from when the former came 
to power in 1987. However, Qadhafi’s history in sub-Sahara Africa dates from the 1960s 
when he extended support to those states that he perceived as radical revolutionists and anti- 
Western, in particular, anti-US foreign policy, in African affairs. As for Charles Taylor, Tarr 
suggests that it was the ‘feeling of betrayal by Doe’ who initially shared the same political 
outlook as the Libyan leader, that drew Qadhafi towards supporting the rebel movement.^^ 
What is more probable is that Qadhafi suspected Doe after 1986 when the latter had allowed 
Liberia to be used as one of the twelve communication and staging posts for the US’ 
bombing of Libya. To this end, one suspects that the Libyans wanted a situation in which 
they could undermine Doe. Supporting Charles Taylor’s attempts to overthrow Doe was
ECOMOG would be that of a neutral disengagement force.
‘Burkina Faso sends arms and men to support Liberian rebel Taylor, Reuters News Service, 27 August 1990.
Cited in B. Gbanabome, ‘"Enfant terrible” Explains’, West Africa , No. 3894, 4-10 May 1992, p. 756.
S. B. Tarr, ‘The ECOMOG Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective’, Issue: Journal of Opinion, Vol. 
XXI/1-2, 1993, p. 80.
""S. B. Tarr, (1993),p. 80.
S. B. Tarr, (1993), p. 80. Also see Y. Gershoni, ‘From ECOWAS to ECOMOG: The Liberian Crisis and the 
Struggle for Political Hegemony in West Africa’, Liberian Studies Journal, XVIII, 1, (1993), p. 31.
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therefore seen as a logical foreign policy option for Qadhafi.^ "^  Although Charles Taylor had 
repeatedly denied reports of Qadhafi’s involvement in the civil war, Nigeria and the US 
nevertheless maintained that support in the form of arm supplies and trained men from Libya 
was a major factor in explaining Taylor’s immediate advances in the initial stages of the 
civil war/^ Certainly, Qadhafi might have considered that there were new opportunities for 
Libya to extend influence over the sub-region and develop new alliances, especially with the 
end of the Cold War and the retreat of the superpowers from the Afiican continent. The 
withdrawal of the superpowers certainly left a pohtical vacuum that Libya felt it could fill.^  ^
To a large extent, Taylor received support from the French-speaking countries of 
West Africa. Much of this support was due to the belief among Francophone states that the 
ECOWAS-ECOMOG venture marked the beginning of ‘Pax Nigeriana.’^^  Francophone 
countries long suspected Nigeria’s desire for hegemonic power in the region and saw the 
dispatch of a Nigerian-controlled ECOMOG force as a vehicle to promote its power in the 
region. In fact, the decision to deploy ECOMOG brought into focus the sharp rivalries and 
political sensitivities between the Francophone countries and Nigeria, the dominant 
Anglophone country in the West Afiican region. Although Côte d’Ivoire was party to the 
decision to set up the SMC, it did not become a member of the committee at the time of the 
ECOMOG intervention. Rather, it supported Taylor, to halt Nigeria’s attempt at regional 
domination. However, Taylor was not the only one receiving external support.
Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia
I am grateful to Emmanuel Kwesi Aning for pointing out this further link between Charles Taylor and 
Colonel Qadhafi. See his article, ‘The International Dimensions of Internal Conflicts: The case of Liberia and 
West Africa’, Working Paper 97.4 (Denmark: Center for Development Research, 1997), esp. pp. 10-14.
ARB, Vol. 27, No. 11, November 1-30 1990, p. 9912a.
^ Y. Gershoni, (1993), p. 31. A detailed analysis of the Libyan-lvorian-Burkinabe connection in Liberia can 
be seen in the article by F. Omowunmi, ‘Liberia; The Libyan, Ivorien and Burkinabé connection’. The 
Guardian (Nigeria), 3 November 1990, pp. 1-2.
Relations between Nigeria and the Francophone states in West Africa had tended to be fraught, partly 
because Nigeria objected to French influence in the region, although there were attempts to fuel cooperation 
through die creation of ECOWAS. The first sign of a strain in relations between Nigeria and Francophone 
countries was seen during the Nigerian civil war in 1967 when Côte d’Ivoire called for the recognition of 
Biaffa.
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Liberia’s Head of State, Samuel Doe, visited countries within the sub-region of West 
Africa, namely Sierra Leone and Nigeria/^ Some saw the Nigerian leader. President Ibrahim 
Babangida, as Doe’s sub-regional god-father. The extent of the Doe-Babangida friendship 
could be seen when the Liberian leader named a Graduate School of International Relations 
and a major road after the Nigerian leader. Much has been said about President Babangida 
wanting to intervene to protect his friend, Samuel Doe, and to prevent a precedent being set 
over a civilian being able to oust a military leader in a similar style to Charles Taylor. 
However, one other area provides another insight into the various motives and justifications 
that lay behind Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia. It is interesting to look at the claim that 
Nigeria’s initial motive for intervening was also to counter the support Charles Taylor and 
the NPFL was receiving firom France and Libya via Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso.
While there is doubt about whether Nigeria intervened solely because of the support 
Taylor was receiving, research has shown this to be a possible dimension in explaining 
Nigeria’s decision to intervene. In their work on the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, W. 
Ofuatey-Kodjoe and Ademola Adeleke noted that Nigeria’s initial motive for intervening 
in the civil war partly stemmed from the perceived support from France via Côte d’Ivoire 
for Charles Taylor.^  ^If the suggestions are true, Nigeria’s motive closely resembles those 
given during its intervention in the Chadian civil war, discussed in Chapter Four.
Nigeria’s role in Liberia needs to be understood within the overall context of its 
policy towards the region and the whole of Africa. The conflict in Liberia gave Nigeria an 
opportunity to establish itself as the most influential mediator in the sub-region. As 
suggested above, its role in the conflict and the perception that it has used Liberia for 
exacting her dominance in the sub-region has been a source of contention among member 
states, in particular. Francophone states. Successive governments in Nigeria have aspired 
to the role of regional hegemonic power primarily because the oil-producing wealth of the 
country imbued a sense of power, status and confidence that other countries in the region
O. Nwolise, ‘The Internationalisation of the Liberian Crisis and the effects on West Africa’, in M. Vogt, 
(ed.), (1992), p. 58.
^ W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, (1994), p. 273 and A. Adeleke, ‘The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West 
Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia’, The Journal of Modem African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1995, 
p. 577.
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lacked. However, as we argue below, Nigeria’s leaders did not interpret their intervention 
in Liberia as an attempt at regional domination. As with his predecessors. President 
Babangida believed that Nigeria had an obligation to first ensure that the region was a 
strategically secure environment for its own foreign policy objectives and second, prevent 
outside interference in the region. A brief history of the principles guiding Nigeria’s foreign 
policy can explain President Babangida’s actions in relation to Liberia.
Since gaining its independence in 1960, Nigeria’s Heads of State have always 
maintained that Afiica should strive to solve its problems thus conforming to the Pan- 
Afncanist desire of keeping the continent free from external intervention and ensuring 
exclusivity over Africa’s affairs. It was against this background that in the 1970s, Presidents 
Murtala Muhammed and Obasanjo of Nigeria introduced a policy of regional intervention 
aimed at countering extensive extra-continental intervention in Afiican conflicts, especially 
in the Chadian civil war. The policy advanced by Presidents Muhammed and Obasanjo has 
remained the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy ever since. From the perspective of 
Nigeria’s foreign policy making, intervention by other Afiican states was seen as a 
legitimate way of preventing or limiting the presence of extra-continental forces in Afiican 
conflicts. Certainly, Nigeria’s leader since the 1970s have held onto the view that a regional 
defence mechanism should be established to avert any extra-continental interference, and 
to this end was prominent in setting up the OAU Inter-African force in Chad. Finding ways 
to prevent outside intervention also led to Nigeria’s determination to create an organisation 
like ECOWAS.^®
Just as it had sought to explain its intervention in Chad on the grounds of 
regionalism or ensuring that the conflict did not become internationalised, Nigeria suggested 
that its intervention in Liberia was aimed at countering the threat posed by extra-continental 
forces, in particular France and Libya. In line with its foreign policy, Nigeria was not ready 
to assign tutelage responsibilities for former Afiican colonies to the former colonizers like 
France.
Historically, the presence of French involvement in the West Afiican region had 
always posed a problem for Nigeria. The fact that nearly all Francophone countries in the
See G. Yoroms, ‘ECOMOG and West Afiican Regional Security: A Nigerian Perspective’, Issue: Journal 
of Opinion, Vol. XXI/1-2, 1993, p. 84.
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region had defence and economic agreements with France under the framework of Accord 
de Non Aggression et d’Assistance en Matiere de Defence (ANAND) and Communauté 
Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO), partly explains why Nigeria has always been 
suspicious of France. In relation to Liberia, Nigeria had suspected that France had been 
Charles Taylor’s main supplier of arms through Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso.^  ^While no 
substantial evidence has been forthcoming, Nigeria’s fears were well placed. Like Nigeria’s 
economic interest, French interest extended to the iron ore sites in the Nimba mountains of 
Guinea, but more important, to the port of Buchanan in Liberia which served as a 
transportation site for any material.^
As for Libya, Nigeria perceived that Taylor served as a vehicle for developing a 
revolutionary wave in the West African region. The fact that Libya’s Colonel Qadhafi had 
a history of supporting radical and revolutionary movements on the continent led Nigeria’s 
leadership to conclude that Qadhafi extended support to Charles Taylor. The fear that France 
and Libya were somehow involved in Liberia accounts for Nigeria’s determination to 
prevent outside interference, but more important, to ensure that they did not undermine its 
own security and economic interest. As Adeleke points out: ‘it can hardly be denied that 
establishing [ECOMOG] conformed with Nigeria’s security and economic interests in the 
subregion. As the core state in ECOWAS and the dominant economic and military power 
in West Afiica, Nigeria could not remain impassive to a crisis, like the one in Liberia, within 
its strategic and geo-political orbit.
Yet despite the fears of French and Libyan presence in the Liberian civil war, it is 
also interesting to note Nigeria’s ‘big brother’ mentality in the West Afiican region handed 
down from previous administrations. Certainly President Babangida saw Nigeria as its 
‘brother’s keeper’ in responding to emergencies like Liberia. In outlining the imperative 
features of Nigeria’s foreign policy, to paraphrase the title of Babangida’s speech, Nigeria 
felt ‘duty-bound to react and respond...to ensure peace, tranquillity and harmony’ in the
J. Okwara, ‘Nigeria Protests France’s Role in Liberian Crisis’, The Guardian, (Nigeria), 9 September 1990, 
p. A1-A2.
W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, (1994), p. 273. Buchanan Port is the second busiest in Liberia as it the hub of the 
economy for Liberians and those wanting to export material from the region.
A. Adeleke, (1995), p. 578.
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region. On 31 October 1990, Babangida stated that,
Nigeria has evolved to the point of acceptance of the fact that the conduct of 
our international relations and foreign policy may at times involve certain 
contractual military and other obligations beyond our borders. This is 
moreso, on issues and areas that can stabilize political, economic, security 
and social facets of our national hfe, and enhance peace and stability in our 
sub-region, Africa and the world.^
The Vice President of Nigeria in 1990, Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, repeated the view that 
Nigeria was acting on behave of peace and stability and a sense of finding an “Afiican 
solution” to the problem in Liberia as opposed to seeking solutions from the international 
community:
Nigeria cannot relent in its traditional vanguard role in the defence of 
fundamental human rights, freedom and dignity of the black man and the 
black race, and in its commitment to, and the promotion of peace and unity 
within, and among...sister African states. This position informed Nigeria’s 
concern over the terrible and self-destructive war in Liberia, and in its 
participation in the formation...of ECOMOG.
The formation of ECOMOG was inspired by the philosophy that the 
Liberian crisis was an Afiican problem which demanded an Afiican solution.
The time has certainly passed for countries to await intervention of extra- 
African forces, no matter how benevolent such forces may appear, to solve 
our conflicts and misunderstandings for us.^ ^
The policy set by Babangida was carried forward by the late President of Nigeria, General 
Sanni Abacha after Babangida’s departure from office in 1993.^  ^ This sense of 
‘brotherhood’ and extending help to fellow Africans was not limited to the leadership, but 
was reinforced within the military framework when Sergeant Leader Riku Morgan stated 
that.
^ President Babangida, (1991/b), p. 104 and p. 111.
Vice President Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, ‘Why we are committed to peace in Liberia’, The Guardian 
(Nigeria), 1 November, 1990, pp. 15-16, esp. 15.
‘Nigeria’s Abacha pledges support for Liberian peace process’, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 
November 1993.
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The concept of an all African force within the sub-region [ECOMOG] in 
itself, has a cultural under-tone. Culturally, it is un-African to see a 
neighbour go hungry and do nothing about it, or a neighbour without shelter.
The extended family system which is a historical factor is what we are 
witnessing in...ECOMOG.^^
To a certain extent, we could state that Nigeria held what Ali Mazrui defined as a ‘family 
right’ (as we discussed in Chapter Two) developed through a sense of solidarity to help 
fellow brothers. It perceived that it had a ‘right’ to tackle the region’s problems and sought 
to justify its act as maintaining solidarity and harmonious relations with its neighbouring 
states.
Sierra Leone and Guinea’s involvement in Liberia’s civil war
Of the countries to have intervened in Liberia, the position of Sierra Leone and 
Guinea is more difficult to assess. The only plausible explanation for Sierra Leone’s 
participation in the civil war was that President Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone and Ibrahim 
Babangida had a close relationship that was first established while they were both attending 
the Nigerian Defence Academy at Kaduna. Sierra Leone also received economic assistance 
from Babangida in the 1980s and Momoh’s support for Babangida’s policy in Liberia was 
seen as a repayment of this assistance.^^ The only other explanation for Momoh’s 
involvement in Liberia was that like Babangida, Momoh felt that military men should not 
be ousted from office by a ‘bloody civil ian.As Max Ahmadu Sesay states, ‘[t]he tendency 
of such regimes is...to resist the forces of change which, in subregional terms, appeared to 
be represented by Charles Taylor’s movement.’ Sesay further suggests that the ‘ECOMOG 
deployment can be seen as a move by corrupt, repressive, undemocratic and self-
Sgn, Ldr R. Morgan, ‘ECOMOG: A Pride to Africa and a Challenge to the United Nations’, The 
Peacemaker: ECOMOG Magazine, Vol. 2, No. 1, September 1992-September 1993, p. 58.
""A. Alao, (1993), p. 341.
Cited in A. Sesay, ‘Humanitarian Intervention in Liberia: Implications for State and Sub-regional security 
and International Society.’ Seminar presentation at the workshop on Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Society, Department of International Relations, London School of Economic, 13 May 1995.
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perpetuating regimes to save the military dictatorship of Doe from collapse.’^ ® Another view 
likely to be shared by Momoh and other leaders was that Taylor had used dissident groups 
from neighbouring countries to mount an attack in Liberia. This led to increased concern 
among regional powers that if Taylor were to become President, he would allow Liberia to 
be used as a base for dissidents to launch attacks against other states.^*
Guinea’s participation was partly explained because it shared common borders with 
Liberia. It was the only Francophone state that initially contributed to the ECOMOG 
military contingent, thus maintaining the dissident stance towards la Francophonie that it 
acquired since the days of President Sékou Touré in the 1960s. However, it is likely that the 
possible spill-over of the conflict because of the overflow of refugees gave Guinea added 
justification to intervene to contain the civil war in Liberia.^^
Conclusion
The ECOWAS intervention is unprecedented, not only in the history of the sub- 
region, but also on the African sub-continent. Not since the OAU Inter-African Force of 
1981 had a peacekeeping force been established for responding to a civil war. More 
important, not since the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1978 had Africa witnessed an 
explicit challenge to the principle of non-intervention. The attempt at collective intervention 
offers an opportunity to examine how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the
M. Sesay, ‘Collective Security or Collective Disaster? Regional Peace-keeping in West Africa’, Security 
Dialogue, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1995, p. 213.
M. Huband, ‘Rebels splits threaten to engulf neighbours in Liberia’s war: West African leaders are 
determined to crush Charles Taylor before the region is set ablaze’. The Guardian, (London), 13 November 
1990, p. 12. At the start of the conflict, Taylor’s forces were reported to include Ghanian and Gambian 
dissidents and soldiers from Burkina Faso.
It is important to note that attempts had been taken to correct the rift that had developed between 
Francophone and Anglophone countries. This was due in part to the fact that Nigeria took a back seat in the 
peace conferences, such as the Yamoussoukro conferences held in Houphouët-Boigny ’ s country retreat on 
three occasions in 1991. The Yamoussoukro conferences were led by a Francophone dominated Committee 
of Five (Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Togo and Ghana, the only Anglophone). This Committee 
replaced the Anglophone dominated Standing Mediation Committee. See W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, (1994), p. 276 
and J. Adisa, ‘Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political Undercurrents and the Burden of Community Spirit’, Small 
Arms and Insurgencies, vol. 5, no. 1, Spring 1994, p. 99. For the full text of the various ECOWAS Final 
Communiqué of the Committee of Five, see Document 138, p. 154, Document 141, pp. 169-172, Document 
147, pp. 175-179 in M. Weller, (ed.) (1994).
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principle of non-intervention on the Afiican continent. The justifications given by ECOWAS 
leaders of a humanitarian tragedy and the possibility of regional destabilisation point to how 
they temporarily overrode the notion of sovereignty and non-intervention. Added to this was 
the absence of any serious global concern with the crisis in Liberia, but important the 
support given by the OAU and UN to the ECOMOG peacekeeping force. This not only gave 
the intervening countries credibility, but it led to the belief among the leaders of West Afiica 
that something had to be done to halt the conflict. By all accounts, as we argued in Part 
Three, the support and declarations by the OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim and 
the Ugandan President and Chairman of OAU in 1991, Yoweri Museveni, that ECOWAS 
had the ‘right to intervene’, were a fimdamental and substantive change to the OAU’s 
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states.
The actions by ECOWAS in Liberia have certainly established a precedent for the 
Community in responding to similar situations. Events since ECOWAS intervened in 
Liberia showed a gradual movement towards establishing structures for regional 
peacekeeping. A one day summit meeting held in Lome, Togo, on 17 December 1997, 
agreed in principle to set up a mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution in the sub­
region.^  ^In Sierra Leone, for example, the late Nigerian President, General Sanni Abacha, 
tried to endorse the use of force to drive out the Armed Forces Council/Peoples Army and 
reinstate the ousted leader. President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah during 1997 and 1998.^ "^  While 
there was no consensus among the ECOWAS leaders on sanctioning a military intervention. 
General Abacha had been the most committed and visible proponent of the use of force to 
restore the democratically-elected government in Sierra Leone. This was seen as an unusual 
position for Abacha who had also come to power via a coup in 1993. Before his death on 
8 June 1998, Abacha had outlined three areas that served to justify Nigeria’s action in Sierra 
Leone. First, he relied on the ECOWAS Treaty and Protocols that prevent cross-border 
insurgencies and subversive activities. More important, Abacha used the revised Treaty of 
ECOWAS in 1993 which made explicit provisions for maintaining ‘regional peace, stability
See F. Harispe, ‘West Africa seeks balanced, autonomous security mechanism’, Agence France presse 
International, 17 December 1997.
The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council is a military faction backed by the Revolutionary United Front 
who are loyal to Foday Sankoh, a former protégé of Charles Taylor.
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and security.Second, the Nigerian leader relied on the apparent support from the 
international community of the removal of the military junta and the restoration of the 
Kabbah government. Finally, Nigeria used the bilateral agreement it signed on 7 March 
1997 to support its intervention. This agreement provided Presidential protection and 
strategic support for the Kabbah government from Nigerian forces and the training of Sierra 
Leone’s military force.
The ECOWAS intervention was the first post-Cold War intervention by African 
states, but as we argued in the introduction, it should not be be seen as ‘new’ or representing 
a break with other interventions by African states during the Cold War period. Rather it was 
a continuation of a policy by African leaders to either help a regime affected by internal 
disorder (i.e. Nigeria’s support for Doe) or to help a movement in the overthrow of a regime 
that had lost favour (i.e. Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso’s support for Charles Taylor and 
the NPFL). Indeed, many of the justifications used by African leaders to explain why they 
intervened are not directly specific to the post-Cold war period, save for the strong 
humanitarian appeal that had become a frequent justification in several post-Cold War 
conflicts, for example in Somalia and Iraq. However, despite accusations of French (and 
Libyan) involvement in the Liberian civil war, what was new and specific to the post-Cold 
War era was that this was the first civil war that did not involve large scale foreign military 
intervention as was evident during African conflicts in the Cold War era.
What of our assertion that Pan-Afiicanism and its central tenets can serve as useful 
sources to examine the evolution of the practice of intervention alongside the principle of 
non-intervention. How relevant are they in understanding the ECOWAS intervention in 
Liberia? Nigeria was the only country to make appeals to the Pan-Afiicanist notion of 
“exclusivity” or the right to be his ‘brother’s keeper.’ It is likely that the interplay of 
political sensitivities, personal motives and regional dynamics were far stronger factors that 
Afiican leaders did not need to appeal to Pan-Afiicanist sentiments to justify their actions. 
The fear that the conflict could spread and have effects on an already vulnerable region was 
a significant justification for several states. Added to this was the political and economic 
instability that this conflict would cause to other vulnerable states. More important was that
‘Highlights of Treaty’, West Africa, No. 3956, 19-25 July 1993, p. 1248.
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Charles Taylor’s invasion against the military regime of Samuel Doe could have had 
implications for other military regimes in West Africa who feared that his actions could 
ignite other opposition movements to overthrow their regimes.
In sum, the aim of this Chapter has been to consider how the ECOWAS intervention 
shed frirther light on how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non­
intervention among African states. We have argued that despite the occasional references 
to Pan-Africanism by Nigeria’s former Head of State, President Babangida, other factors 
such as regional and political sensitivities and economic instability ranked higher in 
understanding when African states intervened in this conflict. However, we have also argued 
that this intervention by African states is not ‘new’ or specific to the post-Cold War period, 
but a continuation of that aspect of Afiican diplomacy that either intervenes to help other 
regimes affected by internal disputes or opposition groups in the overthrow of a regime.
Does this mean that Pan-Africanism was specific to a period where Afiican leaders 
were trying to consolidate their power against the forces of neocolonialism as Kwame 
Nkrumah asserted back in the 1960s? Was it because there was no large scale foreign 
military intervention present that Afiican states, with the exception of Nigeria, did not make 
appeals to “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” to justify their interventions? The 
evidence of justifications used by ECOWAS member states suggest that Pan-Africanism and 
its central tenets do not provide an immediate understanding of this intervention by African 
states. However, the support and declarations by the GAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed 
Salim and other Afiican leaders tended to appeal to the Pan-Afiican notion of exclusivity. 
Certainly as we argued in Part Three, figures such as President Museveni of Uganda argued 
that the continent should be more self-reliant in resolving its internal conflicts and to this 
end advocated “Afiican solutions” to maintain stability and order in Afiican states. In our 
next Chapter, we shall examine the role of the GAU in the post-Cold War period and argue 
that was reasserting the Pan-Afiicanist appeal of “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” 
as a way of encouraging Afiican states to take charge of the continent’s conflicts. Its support 
to the ECGWAS member states was the first indication and in a sense, the ECGWAS 
intervention in Liberia partly paved the way for the GAU to reassert this old Pan-Afiicanist 
theme.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE OAU AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION IN POST-COLD 
WAR AFRICA
Introduction
The main focus in this Chapter is on the OAU and the resolution of internal confhcts 
in the post-Cold War era. In Chapter Two of this study, we argued that the Pan-Afiican 
notion of exclusivity (i.e. “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems”) was tied to the creation 
of the OAU because, the Organisation was supposed to represent a system of self-help and 
self-regulation. When it was established in May 1963, Afiican leaders expected the OAU 
to solve local problems locally, and keep foreign powers from meddling in Africa affairs. 
However, we argued that although the notion of Afiican exclusivity was expressed in the 
OAU, the Organisation was inhibited by its strict adherence to the principle of non­
intervention to solve the continent’s conflicts. Therefore, we said that we would focus on 
how Afiican states, working outside the OAU, used the Pan-Afiicanist notion of exclusivity 
to justify or support interventions in the internal affairs of other states. On the occasions that 
we have mentioned the OAU, we have suggested that it did not necessarily condemn state 
intervention, like Tanzania in Uganda, nor did it abandon the principle of non-intervention.
With the end of the Cold War, the OAU begun discussing ways of overcoming the 
principle of non-intervention to deal with the perennial problem of internal conflicts on the 
continent. In so doing, it reasserted the notion of “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” 
and tabled several options and initiatives that it argued would ensure this objective. These 
options were i) an OAU Early Warning Capacity; ii) a Continental Peacekeeping Force; iii) 
Sub-regional capacity for conflict management, and iv) a Blueprint on Unconstitutional 
Change. These initiatives were generally seen as ‘new’ or innovative, signalling a kind of 
proactiveness by the Organisation to respond to, and take charge of internal conflicts that 
arise on the continent. The idea that these were new was linked to the belief that as the 
foreign powers of the West began withdrawing their military presence from Africa in the 
1990s, the continent would be increasingly marginalised from the international community 
and forced to find ways of solving its problems.
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The aim of this Chapter is to argue that the OAU has longed concerned itself with 
developing mechanisms to resolve internal conflicts on the continent. The options and 
initiatives that emerged in the OAU in the post-Cold War era were a continuation of policies 
established by African leaders to develop “African solutions for African problems” and in 
a sense, it sheds further light on how the thinking on intervention evolved into the post-Cold 
War era. It is true to say that the collapse of the Cold War and the disengagement of foreign 
troops on the continent did influence the thinking within the OAU on how to resolve the 
continent’s internal conflicts. For so long, African leaders were reliant upon extra­
continental forces to resolve many internal conflicts and sometimes, were prepared to justify 
the use of outside force as “African solutions for Afiican problems.” Consequently, the 
OAU was unable to fiilfill its objectives of seeking African solutions to resolve conflicts 
primarily because African leaders did not agree on developing structures for responding to 
conflicts, but instead sought outside assistance. However, the OAU was also aware of the 
disastrous effects that outside intervention had on the continent during the Cold War, thus 
in the 1990s, it argued that rather than leaving it to others to tackle the continent’s problems, 
African themselves would have to address Africa’s problems effectively. Consequently, the 
OAU reasserted the original meaning of “African solutions for African problems” to ensure 
that the Organisation and the continent took initial control of its conflicts, but more 
important, develop a flexible approach to the principle of non-intervention.
A new breed of African leaders were said to have emerged in the 1990s to influence 
the thinking within the OAU in developing structures to resolve conflicts. This group also 
reasserted the Pan-African ideal of “Afiican solutions for African problems” and self- 
reliance in dealing with conflicts on the continent. Significantly, their policies reflected how 
the thinking of intervention has evolved on the continent.
This Chapter is divided into four parts. The aim is not to provide a critical exposition 
of the initiatives proposed by the OAU, rather, the purpose here is to illustrate the 
continuation in the thinking on intervention and the principle of non-intervention among 
African leaders from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. In Chapter Seven we will 
consider whether the notion of “African solutions for Afiican problems” is a realistic goal 
for Afiican leaders in their attempt to address internal conflicts in the post-Cold War. Part 
One of this Chapter begins with a discussion on the changes to have occurred in the
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international political arena in the 1990s, and the immediate consequences this change had 
for Africa and its international relations. In Part Two, we consider the role of the ‘new’ 
breed of African leaders who were said to have reasserted the Pan-Africanist notion of 
“African solutions for African problems, while in Part Three, we focus on the role of the 
OAU in the post-Cold War era, in particular arguments put by its Secretariat for addressing 
the continent’s conflicts. In Part Four, we explore in detail the four initiatives mentioned 
above for ensuring “African solutions” and suggest that not all of Africa’s leadership were 
prepared to institutionalise the notion of “African solutions for African problems”; rather, 
they preferred to engage in ad hoc measures in responding to internal conflicts. Such an 
approach is however not new; in the past African leaders developed a piecemeal approach 
to settling disputes rather than undermine the principle of non-intervention. The aim 
throughout this Chapter is to illustrate how the various proposals suggested by the OAU in 
the 1990s were aimed at developing a system of self-help and ensuring that the continent 
took control of its conflicts, thus suggesting that the thinking of earlier African leaders of 
ensuring African exclusivity were still paramount in the post-Cold War era. More important, 
as this Chapter indicates, the Pan-Africanist ideal still served as a meaningful principle in 
understanding how the thinking on intervention has evolved alongside the principle of non­
intervention.
I. Africa and the end of the Cold War
During the Cold War, the superpowers and Cuba, Britain and France supplied 
weapons and training and military assistance to those African states that they favoured. For 
example, while the US lent support to UNITA in Angola, the Soviets and Cubans provided 
assistance to Ethiopia and the MPLA in Angola. Simultaneously, Britain and France 
extended support to their former colonies. The end of the Cold War brought a reversal of 
policy by these outside powers regarding the African continent.
Before its breakup in 1991, the Soviet Union began to withdraw from the continent, 
thus ending three decades of political commitment and military assistance to support or 
resolve regional conflicts on the African continent. Along with the US, the Soviet Union 
appeared less eager to fight proxy battles in developing countries. The Soviet Union retreat
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from Africa began before the end of the Cold War in 1989. We could see signs of a retreat 
under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and his policy of perestroika in 1985.* 
Perestroika was essentially an ‘economic reform programme’ which, according to Margot 
Light, was ‘aimed at making the Soviet economy more efficient both through domestic 
restructuring and through attracting Western credits and investments.’^  The new leadership 
in Moscow targeted the budget allocation for foreign policy activities as the main area of 
economic reform. The Soviet policy of supporting socialist-orientated states, such as 
Ethiopia and Angola, and its involvement in Afghanistan, imposed a profound strain on the 
Soviet economy, consequently, formed the basis of the ‘new thinking’ on Soviet
foreign policy.  ^The aim was to assess the cost-effectiveness of pursuing not only an Afiica 
policy, but large-scale foreign agendas with other developing countries. The new Soviet 
leadership under Gorbachev began to question the cost of supporting states that did not serve 
an immediate strategic or security interest.
The change towards Afiica was further intensified after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the emergence of independent states with no policy objective towards the African 
continent. In any case, with the end of ideological confrontation with the US by 1990, the 
principle reason for maintaining political and strategic interest on the continent had 
diminished. There seemed, from the policy-maker’s perspective, no real reason, save for 
economic factors, to carry on with an Afiica policy. Since 1991, Russia appeared to be 
promoting trade and investment links with various Afiican states, rather than developing 
military stmctures on the continent.
With the end of the Cold War, the other major powers - Britain, France and the US - 
were also withdrawing from Afiica, but their departure was not as immediate as the Soviet
' Margot Light provides several other reasons to explain Soviet disengagement from the continent. She argues 
that the first signs can be seen as early as 1966 when doubts were raised over the future of socialism on the 
Africa continent following the coup of Nkrumah, one of the founding fathers of African Sociahsm. Soviet 
leaders felt that Nkrumah’s departure signalled the end of socialism on the continent. See ‘Moscow’s Retreat 
from Afiica’, in A. Hughes, (ed.) Marxism’s Retreat from Africa (London: Frank Cass, 1992), p. 21-22.
"M. Light, (1992), p. 33.
 ^ See L. Marte, Political Cycles in International Relations: The Cold War and Africa, 1945-1990 (The 
Netherlands: Vrije Universiteit Press, 1994), pp. 252-269 which analyses the ‘new thinking’ and policy shift 
introduced by Gorbachev between 1986-1990 towards Africa and the developing world in general, and also 
the Soviet stand-off with America.
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Union. European powers, such as France, who traditionally maintained a sizeable military 
presence in Afiica, often to shore up regimes in former colonies, signalled a retreat firom the 
continent. Officials who had been extremely active in carving out a French policy in the 
Elysée Palace began to advocate disengagement both on a political and military level. 
France appeared reluctant to carry on with its traditional role as ‘gendarme of Afiica;’ rather, 
from the mid-1990s its Afiica policy was aimed at economic reform, democracy and ‘good 
governance.’'*
The US also started to reassess its policy over Sub-Saharan Afiica when the 
perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union and its Communist allies diminished. Events 
such as Namibia’s independence, the breakdown of the apartheid system in South Afiica and 
Cuba’s withdrawal firom Southern Afiica, all added to the shift in American policy in the 
continent. However, it was America’s experience in the violent civil war in Somalia, where 
is was unable to curb the powerful warlord, Mohammed Farrah Aideed, that led to a gradual 
policy reversal on how the US responded to conflicts on the continent. The ‘new world 
order’ which President George Bush proclaimed after the Gulf War in 1991 was shattered 
on the Afiican continent (and in the Baltic region). Images of dead US soldiers dragged 
through the streets of the Somali capital by militiamen forced Washington to rethink its 
strategy on the continent.
The failure of American peacekeeping to restore peace and stability in Somalia was 
seen as a turning point in US foreign policy activities on the continent. President Bill 
Clinton announced the withdrawal of US peacekeepers in the UN operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM n) after the deaths of eighteen American troops in October 1993. The first sign 
of retreat came with the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 25) of May 1994 that the 
Clinton administration issued. Not only was there to be a change over the future of 
international peacekeeping, but PDD 25 also illustrated the marginalisation of Afiica in US 
foreign policy. This directive imposed strict guidelines on UN peacekeeping operations and 
effectively meant streamlining or, occasionally, non-participation of US troops in 
international peacekeeping where there was no immediate US interest. This new policy 
orientation towards Afiica was felt in the Great Lakes region of East Afiica, most notably
See C. Wauther, ‘French Policy in Africa: Aid for Countries that progress towards Democracy’, ACR, Vol. 
XXIII, 1990-92, pp. A83-A90.
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in Rwanda where political and ethnic conflict resulted in genocide in April 1994/
The pohtical, security and humanitarian crisis in this region between 1994 and 1996 
was further evidence of the disinterest shown towards the continent. Members of the UN 
Security Council voted to reduce the troop and staff presence in the UN Assistance Mission 
in Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 2500 to 270 at the time of the genocide in that country.^ The 
five permanent members of the Security Council soon reflected the uncertainty surrounding 
international policy towards the countries in the Great Lakes region of East Africa: Burundi, 
Rwanda and Zaire. The inability of the main players within the Security Council to maintain 
a clear position over these unfolding crises made apparent the great sense of ‘Afro- 
exhaustion’ that was emerging within the foreign ministries of the major Western powers. 
Rwanda prompted Western policy-makers to question not only the future direction of 
international peacekeeping, but also the role of the African continent in resolving its own 
conflicts. To this end, the major powers of the West encouraged “African solutions to 
African problems.” The major powers not only advocated this policy over the last few years, 
but some within Africa’s diplomatic circle also reasserted this Pan-Africanist principle in 
response to Western and Soviet retreat from the continent’s conflicts. We shall come back 
to discussing what the major powers mean by this policy of “African solutions to African 
problems” in Chapter Seven.
For now, we consider its usage by African leaders and the OAU in the post-Cold 
War context and what it means in relation to the debate on intervention. How relevant is the 
theme “Afiican solutions for African problems” in understanding how the thinking of 
intervention has evolved since the end of the Cold War on the Afiican continent? Does the 
expression “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” mark a shift or a continuation of policy 
justification that some Afiican states employed when intervening in internal conflicts on the 
continent over the last thirty years?
II. The ‘new’ breed of African leaders: seeking “African solutions” for Africa’s
 ^For an assessment of US policy in the immediate years of the post-Cold War era, see P. Schraeder, ‘The 
United States and Afiica: Increased Marginalization in an Evolving ‘New World Order,” ACR, Vol. XXIII, 
1990-92, pp. A138-149.
® UN Security Council Resolution 912, UN Doc. S/Res/912, 21 April 1994.
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internal conflicts in the post-Cold War Era
The problems raised by the internal conflicts and widespread instability in African 
states in the 1990s propelled the Afiican continent into reconsidering the sacrosanct idea of 
non-intervention and state sovereignty. The urgency and need to do something was partly 
fuelled by a ‘new’ breed of Afiican leaders who were said to be concerned with the problem 
of domestic conflicts and the effects they have on the survival of the Afiican state. This new 
leadership stretched fi-om Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa through Uganda and 
Rwanda in Central Afiica. We referred briefly in Chapter Five to this new group that 
included President Isiaias Afewerki in Eritrea, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, 
Vice-President and Defence Minister (‘and de facto head of government’) Paul Kagame in 
Rwanda, and President Yoweri Museveni in Uganda.^ This group also includesdthe former 
Tanzanian Foreign Minister and OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, who began 
many of the initiatives in the OAU when he was first elected in 1989. We will discuss 
Salim’s role in the context of the debates that were taking place at the OAU in Part Three. 
Western and Afiican commentators earmarked this group as representing a ‘new breed’ of 
African leaders who were transforming the political landscape of the continent. Glynne 
Evans describes this group as forming the ‘inner sanctum’ who began to take more 
responsibility for the political future of Afiica in the mid-1990s.*
Briefly, this group formed itself into a powerful axis in Eastern and Central Afiica, 
but also in the wider regions of Southern Afiica since the late 1980s. As noted in Chapter 
Five, these leaders evolved their approach during the long anti-apartheid and liberation 
struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. Their political philosophy stemmed fi*om that aspect of 
Pan-Afiicanism that preached the politics of ‘solidarity’ and ‘unity’ among fellow Afiican 
states. More important, their ‘common intellectual and personal heritage’ can be traced back 
the 1970s when many of them met under the auspices of the left-wing radical Pan-Afiicanist
’ See M. Ottaway, ‘Africa’s “New Leaders”: African Solution or African Problem?’ Current History, Vol. 97, 
No. 619, May 1998, p. 209.
® G. Evans, Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes, Adelphi Paper 311, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford Urtiversity Press, 1997), p. 33. The view that there was a new breed of 
African leaders was also expressed in several interviews that I conducted at the OAU in February 1997.
199
leader and former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere.^
These leaders all shared a similar route to power: insurgency, subversion and guerilla 
warfare against regimes that they argued were ineffective, corrupt or brutal regimes. The aim 
of these leaders when they came to power was the reconstruction of the style of Afiican 
regimes in power from being militaristic to one that practised an open and accountable 
system of governance. Government, according to this ‘new’ group of leaders, needed to be 
based on an inclusive, representative, participatory and democratic system of governance, 
all of which these leaders saw as necessary for ensuring a peaceful environment. 
Furthermore, this new group of leaders emphasis the need to create economic recovery, 
integration and cooperation through the revitalisation of bodies like the East African 
Community (EAC) and the Inter-Govemmental Agency on Development (IGAD) in the 
hope of improving Africa’s potential for economic regeneration. We shall say more on 
IGAD below.
While this Chapter is not concerned with how the individual leaders have mn their 
countries, Christopher Clapham and Marina Ottaway argue that these states have not fully 
accomplished the progress to démocratisation. For example, Museveni dropped his left-wing 
ideological commitments to Marxism and Pan-Afiicanism, preferring to be guided by the 
politics of free market economy. While their various statements and speeches reiterate the 
appeal for democracy, these leaders have ‘put the requirements of order before participation’ 
and, have been concerned with ‘stability and economic growth than with democracy and 
human rights.'®
The concern for stability and order brought this group of leaders together to pursue 
foreign policy objectives that aimed at tackling widespread instability within their region 
and the African continent. For these leaders, intervening to ensure regional stability and 
order was necessary on the African continent especially because of the adverse effects
® See S. Lautze, B. Jones, and M. Duffield, ‘Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes 1996- 
1997; An Independent Study for the Intern-Agency Standing Committee (Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, March 1998). (Located at: http://www.reliefweb.mt under resources), 
para. 65 and P. Smith, ‘Africa at trigger-point: A shaken continent looks to the new Zaire for strength,’ 
Observer, 18 May 1997. Museveni was partly influenced by the ideology and political philosophy of 
Nyerere’s Pan-Africanism during his student days at the University of Dar-Es-Salaam. See ‘Uganda’ ACR, 
Vol. XIX, 1986-1987, pp. B459-B460.
C. Clapham, (1996), p. 205 and M. Ottaway,(1998), p. 209.
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internal conflicts in one state can have another state. According to these leaders, finding 
"African solutions for African problems” in the post-Cold War era was essential for two 
reasons. First, because of the increasing number of conflicts and the spread of collapsing or 
failing states. Consequently, they intervened in regional conflicts such as that in Burundi and 
Zaire to restore stability and order. The extent of this powerful axis could be seen when 
Museveni lent ‘support’ and the Rwandese government made soldiers available in 1997 to 
the rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his umbrella organisation of militias, the Alliance 
des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Kinshasa (AFDL) in the overthrow 
of President Mobutu in Zaire. However, Hughes and May, the support given to Kabila
by Rwanda and Uganda can also be understood as ‘regime opposing’ where leaders send 
forces into adjacent countries and help topple leaders they oppose. Both countries were 
helping Kabila in his attempt to overthrow the brutal and autocratic regime of President 
Mobutu, but more important, because they believed Kabila’s leadership would provide 
regional security and the political and economic reform necessary for Central and East 
Africa.
The second reason for advocating ‘‘African solutions for African problems” is that 
it appeared that the international community would not respond to the conflicts in the 
African Great Lakes or in Liberia. The lack of a clear direction from outside the continent 
furthered their desire and the determination to take control and participate in various peace 
processes. In the Great Lakes region, sub-regional leaders believed the fate of the region and 
even the continent was in their hands, especially after the Kabila’s overthrow Mobutu. 
Consequently, these leaders created ad hoc Great Lake meetings, such as the Arusha 
Summit, to address the crises in the sub-region." Furthermore, these leaders developed 
‘‘home-grown” or indigenous initiatives aimed at confronting Africa’s political and security 
problems in contrast to peace initiatives from outside the continent. It was clear to these 
leaders that the continent could not rely on external assistance, but more important, that 
African leaders needed to dictate the nature of order that should prevail on the continent. 
The rest of the Chapter focuses on the OAU where many of these ‘‘home-grown” initiatives
** See Improving African and International Capabilities for Preventing and Resolving Violent Conflict, 2"** 
International Berlin Workshop, 3-5 July 1997. Report by W. Kiihne in conjunction with P. Cross and T. 
Schiimer for Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, p. 25 and G. Evans, (1997), p. 85.
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had been appearing since the end of the Cold War. These initiatives shed light on how the 
thinking on intervention had evolved in the post-Cold War era.
The influence of this new leadership was visible in the OAU. These leaders took 
active participation in the attempts to reinstitute “African solutions for African problems” 
at the heart of the OAU in the hope that the Organisation would be an active participant in 
mediating conflicts on the continent. The role of the OAU Secretary-General, who also 
shared an intellectual root with these ‘new’ African leaders, ensured that the movement 
towards reasserting “Afiican solutions” would be fulfilled at a continental level.
III. The OAU and Africa’s internal conflicts: defining the principle of ‘‘African 
solutions for African problems”
The former Tanzanian Foreign Minister and OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed 
Salim, began many of the initiatives in the OAU when he was first elected in 1989. 
According to Colin Legum, Salim’s election ‘breathed new life into the...OAU’ as he 
‘provided the kind of leadership at the top which the OAU lacked since its first Secretary- 
General, Diallo Telli. ’ ^ 2
Prior to Salim’s leadership, most attempts by the OAU at creating collective security 
mechanisms to ensure “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” were aimed at preventing 
intervention by outside powers and mediating border disputes during the Cold War period. 
In 1964, the OAU created the Commission o f Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration to 
settle disputes among member states, but it did not function well. Usually, the OAU resorted 
to ad hoc arrangements including the use of good offices of the OAU Secretary-General, and 
mediation committees to address disputes among states. When it came to responding to 
internal disputes, the OAU held onto the principle norms of international relations while 
turning a blind eye to some potentially damaging conflicts. The fear within the OAU was 
that to undermine the Afiican state system would have disastrous effects on the political and 
economic development of the continent. However, in the 1990s, the destructive effects of 
internal conflicts compelled the OAU to re-examine its mechanisms to limit their spread and
C. Legum, ‘The Organization of African Unity: Reactivating an Almost Moribund Organization’, Vol.
XXIII, 1990-1992, p. A120.
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to redress the edict on the sanctity of sovereignty and non-intervention.
The urgency and need to respond to the conflicts on the continent was made by 
Salim when he encouraged Africa’s leaders to consider the changing nature of international 
politics in 1990. The Secretary-General set the tone in the Declaration on Political and 
Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and Fundamental Changes taking place in the World 
which was signed by Africa’s Heads of State on 11 July 1990. In it, the OAU Heads of State 
and Government renewed their ‘determination to work together towards the peaceful and 
speedy resolution of all conflicts on [the] continent.The Declaration did not just point to 
the fact that the nature of the international system was changing and with it, the policy 
direction of the major international players. It also noted that African leaders needed to 
consider that the conflicts on the continent took place largely within and not between states. 
The ending of the Cold War system brought to the fore previously suppressed ethnic and 
political tensions, and a process of disintegration of some African countries, to the extent 
that the continent was witnessing what can be defined as failing or collapsed states. In the 
face of mounting conflicts, the management of internal conflicts was a key issue contained 
in the 1990 Declaration. The Senior Political Adviser to the Conflict Division of the OAU, 
Sam Ibok, states that the 1990 Declaration
marked a decisive turning point for...Africa because for the first time in its 
history, the OAU recognized the changing nature of conflicts from inter­
state, for which serious if ad-hoc efforts had been deployed in the past to 
resolve, to intra-state which called for a more dynamic approach, given the 
African pre-occupation with concepts such as sovereignty and non­
interference in the internal affairs of Member States, as enshrined in the 
OAUCharter.i^ ^
Largely due to the growing problem of internal conflicts and because of the 
continent’s perceived marginalisation from the international community, several 
fundamental implications emerged as officials at the OAU Secretariat considered how to
The Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes 
taking place in the World, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl.l (XXVI), 11 July 1990, para. 11, p. 4.
S. Ibok, ‘The Dynamics of Confhcts in Afiica: Evaluating OAU’s Past and Present approaches for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution and Future Prospects’, African Journal of Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution, Vol. One, No. 1, January-April 1997, p. 69.
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respond to these internal conflicts. These were:
1. That there is a need for the OAU to redevelop existing capacities, institutions and 
mechanisms that ensure that it can intervene when necessary to settle conflicts 
within member-states.
2. That the OAU and the continent cannot depend on the international community or 
the UN in any substantial measure for resources to resolve the conflicts within the 
continent. The signal being sent to the countries of Africa is that they must shoulder 
an increased burden in the conduct of peace operations on the continent and 
outsiders might only complement Africa’s effort.
In seeking ways to respond to internal conflicts, the OAU Secretariat reasserted the 
popular euphemism of "African solutions for African problems”. In line with its original 
meaning advocated by Pan-Africanist leaders like Kwame Nkrumah in the 1960s, the OAU 
ws trying to generate a sense of African ownership or a sense of taking charge of matters 
that could undermine the future of peace and stability on the continent. At the height of the 
superpower involvement on the African continent in the mid-1970s, the notion of “African 
solutions for African problems” was extended to mean individual states could seek and 
obtain support from extra-continental forces to fight their conflicts or to mediate. The OAU 
never condemned this practice. In the post-Cold War era, according to the OAU, the main 
objective of “African solutions for African problems” was to break Africa’s dependence on 
outside involvement and mediation in conflicts on the continent. The OAU argued higher 
priority should be given to conflict prevention, management and resolution, and the potential 
of the Organisation to help build Africa’s capacity in this area. The Deputy Permanent 
Observer of the OAU mission to the UN, Solomon Gomes explains what “African solutions 
for African problems” means in the post-Cold War era:
Put in the context of today, the notion of African solutions for African 
problems is basically that the OAU should become pro-active in the 
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the continent. It 
should engage in preventive diplomacy including the preventive 
deployments of troops in situations that warrant military fact-finding or
These points were raised during interviews with Dr. Chris Bakwesegha, Head of the OAU Conflict 
Management Division and William Nhara, Coordinator of Conflict Prevention Research at the OAU Conflict 
Management Division.
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military/civilian Observer mission(s). This it should do, in accordance with
the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
The first real attempt taken by the OAU to ensure “Afiican solutions for Afiican 
problems” can be found in the proposal for an OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution that the Secretary-General initiated. Salim may have gained 
inspiration for this Mechanism firom the ECOWAS-ECOMOG initiative in Liberia. 
Furthermore, the 1992 UN report on Agenda for Peace may also have propelled Salim’s 
proposal. This report emphasised the need to devolve the burden of addressing conflicts to 
institutions and regional bodies other than the UN.
In his proposals to the 56* meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in Dakar, 
Senegal firom 22-27 June 1992, Salim suggested that the Organisation should take the lead 
in going beyond the established view of sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of states when internal conflicts cause widespread humanitarian tragedy and political 
instability. Salim argued that Afirican leaders should work to develop Afiican ‘solidarity’ 
and the idea that ‘every Afiican is his brother’s keeper.’** Salim’s policy was no different 
to those outlined by the radical Pan-Afiicanist leaders in the 1960s. Nor was it different fi*om 
the statement made by Nigeria’s Head of State, Ibrahim Babangida at the time of the 
ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. The difference between what was said in the 1960s and 
what was said in the 1990s, was that in the 1960s, radical leaders focussed on developing 
structures to liberate Afiican territories still under colonial rule and to remove 
neocolonialism on the continent. In the post-Cold War era, while the aim was still to remove 
foreign meddling, the main concern was with responding to instability and internecine 
warfare that is not only destroying the lives of thousands of people, but undermining the 
legitimacy of the Afiican state system. To this end, the Secretary-General has argued that 
since ‘our borders are at best artificial, ...we in Afiica need to use our own cultural and
Letter to the author, 16 March, 1997.
See the OAU Secretary-General's comments during a newspaper interview: ‘OAU defence force inevitable, 
says Salim Salim’, The Guardian (Nigeria), 23 August 1990, p. 5.
56* Meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflicts in Africa: 
Proposals for an OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, CM/1710 (L.Vl), Dakar, Senegal, 
22-27 June, 1992, p. 12.
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social relationships to interpret the principle of non-interference in such a way that we are 
[able] to apply it to our own advantage in conflict prevention and resolution.’*^
Afncan Heads of State appeared to give weight to Salim’s proposal when they 
endorsed the idea of a Mechanism at their 28* Ordinary Session in Dakar from 27 June -1 
July 1992. They went on to establish the Mechanism at the 29* Ordinary Session from 28-30 
June 1993, in Cairo, Egypt.This document combined the methods of the UN and the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE since 1994) and the traditional 
African approach of including elders and chiefs for mediation. Picking up on the theme from 
the 1990 Declaration to establish an OAU capacity for resolving conflicts, the Mechanism 
was authorized to concern itself with internal conflicts by anticipating and preventing their 
emergence.^* The document emphasised ‘peace-making and peace-building functions in 
order to facilitate the resolution’ of conflicts that occurred on the continent. However, the 
primary objective of the Mechanism was prevention, preferring to forestall a potential civil 
war, rather than deal with the consequences of launching a large-scale peacekeeping 
operation.^^ The motivation for this was arguably financial, based on what was the most 
cost-effective approach for an Organisation whose member states were experiencing severe 
economic difficulties. The OAU also noted the complexities of launching a large 
peacekeeping exercise where there were limited logistical resources, as reasons for 
preferring preventive action.^^In cases where a conflict deteriorates to the extent that 
international intervention becomes necessary, the OAU states that ‘the assistance or where
56* Meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers, (22-27 June) 1992, p. 12.
^ Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the establishment, within the OAU of 
a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Decision AHG/Dec.I (XXVIII), Cairo, 
Egypt, 28-30 Jun 1993. (Hereafter Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution). The full 
text is in. Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options,{\992>), pp. 59-60. Also see Appendix III of 
this study. For an analysis of the OAU Mechanism, see S. Gutto, ‘The OAU’s New Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution: The controversial concept of Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Law’, CODESRIA Bulletin, Dakar, Senegal, No, 4, 1996, pp. 15-20.
‘Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’, (1993), p. 62.
‘Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’, (1993), p. 63.
^ OAU’s Position Towards the Various Initiatives on Conflict Management: Enhancing OAU’s Capacity in 
Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, Central Organ/MEC/MIN/3 (IV), para. 27, p. 
9. (No date given).
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appropriate the services of the [UN] will be sought under the general terms of its Charter’ 
in full recognition that the UN is tasked with the primary responsibility of maintaining 
international peace and security/'*
At the centre of this Mechanism is the Central Organ - a policy-making body of the 
OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Central Organ is a committee of 
fifteen states charged with finding solutions to conflicts on the continent. The committee 
of fifteen, which is elected annually, consists of countries selected from the Bureau of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the state of the outgoing Chairman and, where 
known, that of the incoming Chairman, with the Secretary-General and the Secretariat acting 
as its operational arm. The Central Organ meets every month at the level of Ambassadors, 
twice a year at a Ministerial level and once a year at the level of Heads of State and 
Government to discuss issues relating to conflict situations. In deciding its 
recommendations, the principle of consensus guides the Organ. The Central Organ has been 
compared with the UN Security Council, but the fundamental difference is that unlike the 
UN Security Council, it lacks both a permanent membership or the use of a veto.^  ^Within 
its first year (1993-1994), the Central Organ dealt with several of Afirica’s internal crises: 
Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Somalia.^^
As part of the Mechanism, the OAU created a Confhct Management Centre (CMC) 
in 1996. Can the CMC enable the OAU to develop “African solutions for Afiican problems” 
in responding to internal conflicts? Although the OAU Secretariat was committed to 
ensuring that Afiican states were equipped to respond to crises as they emerge on the 
continent, doubts were raised about the potential of the CMC to intervene in internal 
conflicts. The OAU lacked two desirable elements for resolving most internal conflicts 
within the continent: an adequate staff fully trained for managing internal conflicts, and the 
financial resources necessary for mounting peacekeeping operations. We shall discuss these 
problems in Chapter Seven. For now, we consider the pohcy options that were placed before
‘Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’ (1993), p. 62.
C. de Coning, ‘The OAU and Peace-keeping’ m Resolving Conflicts: OAU Conflict Management Bulletin, 
Vol. One, No. 4, June-July, 1996, p. 13.
See the Draft Report of the Third Session at die level of the OAU Council of Ministers of the Central Organ, 
Central Organ/MEC/MIN/Comm. 1(111), Rev. I, Tunis, Tunisia, 3-4 August 1994.
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the OAU Conflict Management Centre between 1996-1997.
IV. OAU options for ensuring “African solutions for African problems”
In theoretical terms, the decision to establish the CMC ‘represented an important 
breakthrough’ for the OAU principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member 
states. However, it is worth noting that the 1993 declaration is still firmly based on the 
principle of non-intervention.^^ Again, in theoretical terms, while the decision to establish 
the CMC empowered the ‘Secretary-General to become an activist wherever and whenever 
he [saw] conflicts em erging ,in  reality however, member states remained hesitant about 
allowing the Secretary-General and his Good Offices to enter their country to mediate in 
internal conflicts.
Despite this, officials argued that the CMC would give the OAU a capacity to 
intervene, but also ensures “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems”. To make “Afiican 
solutions for Afiican problems” a functioning reality, officials put forward several options 
that they stated would allow for the continent to take ownership of conflicts that emerge. 
The various options can be summarized under the following headings:
i) An OAU Early Warning Capacity;
ii) A Continental Peacekeeping Force;
iii) Sub-regional capacity for Conflict Management; and
iv) A Blueprint on Unconstitutional Change.
The remainder of this Chapter looks at these four options aimed at ensuring “Afiican
See Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options, (1993), p. 42 and H. Cohen, ‘African 
Capabilities for Managing Conflicts: The Role of the United States’ in D, Smock and C. Crocker, (eds.) 
African Conflict Resolution: The U.S. Role in Peacemaking (Washington, D C.: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1995), p. 78.
H. Cohen, (1995), p. 78.
^ Interview with Ambassador Daniel Antonio, OAU Assistant Secretary-General (for Political Affairs). The 
Ambassador cites Sudan and Nigeria as examples of member states who have traditionally rejected the 
presence of the Secretary-General and his Good Offices in their countries.
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solutions for African problems.”
An OAU Early Warning Capacity
Although we have argued that most of the initiatives to come out of the OAU are not 
‘new’ or specific to the post-Cold War context, the idea of early warning needs to be 
understood within the context of the post-Cold War period. In this sense, it is certainly an 
innovative measure by the OAU in its attempts at responding to internal conflicts on the 
continent.^®
After the creation of the CMC, the OAU Secretariat took steps to set up an Early 
Warning System for collating information on impending violent conflicts and suggesting 
strategies to forestall the outbreak of conflict. The idea of identifying indicators of nascent 
conflicts is crucial for the OAU. Officials at the OAU argued that an early warning system 
should enhance the Organisation’s knowledge and understanding of the underlying patterns, 
causes and consequences of instability in Africa.  ^^ However, the idea of early warning came 
under attack in the 1990s by those examining mechanisms for maintaining international 
peace and security for sounding ‘Pollyannaish and vacuous.’ Yet, as Thomas Weiss asks 
‘what are the alternatives’, especially for a continent that lacks real financial capacity to 
embark on a cost-intensive policy of peacekeeping or peace enforcement?^^
The OAU first discussed the idea of establishing an Early Warning System in its 
review of the OAU Mechanism at the 3P‘ Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of 
State in July 1995. It was generally felt that the lack of such a capacity seriously undermined 
the ‘efficacy’ of the Mechanism and its potential to perform the tasks proscribed to it.
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has also embarked on creating an Early Warning capacity within its 
Secretariat.
C. Bakwesegha, ‘OAU and Early Warning in Conflict Situations in Afiica: Perceptions and Possibilities’ 
in S. Ibok and W. Nhara, (eds.) OA UEarly Warning System and Conflict Situations in Africa (Addis Ababa: 
OAU Conflict Management Division, 1996), p. 32.
T. Weiss,‘The United Nations and Civil Wars at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century,’ in T. Weiss, (ed.) 
The United Nations and Civil Wars, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 204.
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namely to ‘predict and prevent conflict situations in the C on tinen t.In  order to establish 
an effective system, the OAU emphasised the need to create a network with national bodies, 
sub-regional organisations, the UN and its specialized agencies, academic institutions, the 
media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The aim was to generate a ‘multi­
layered solution’ to preventing conflicts,^ *^ by which ‘different actors, intervening at 
appropriate intervals and using relevant tools can be used to construct a cohesive network 
for prevention action and conflict resolution throughout the multi-layered paradigm .T he 
attempt to develop a multi-layered approach with the NGO community was a new effort for 
the OAU as it sought to establish “African solutions for African problems.” Historically, the 
OAU never worked with NGOs, whether indigenous or external, seeing them as an essential 
threat to the state system and the principle of non-intervention.^^ However, Salim Ahmed 
Salim was reported to have been influenced by the NGO community, suggesting that the 
‘twenty-first century [would] be defined as the era of the NGO.’^  ^Some within the CMC 
also felt that NGOs have an intimate knowledge of local conflict situations and an ability 
to identify the actors in a conflict. However officials were also reluctant to seek the 
assistance of Western-based NGOs as some African leaders perceive them as having their 
agendas set by their financial donors, also from the West, thus undermining any neutrality 
that NGOs seem to have.^*
The OAU Secretariat set up a 24-hour watch centre, a Database Unit and an officer 
charged with providing indicators of impending conflicts and strategic advice for preventive
‘The Concept’ in S. Ibok and W. Nhara, (eds.), (1996), p. 10. The desire to institute an Early Warning 
System within Africa led to a four day seminar at the OAU January 1996. The rest of this section is a summary 
of the key elements that were raised during this seminar. The full text of the seminar can be seen in the edited 
book mentioned above. Also see Early Warning in Conflict Prevention: OA U Perception and Possibility, 
(Addis Ababa: OAU, 4 October 1996).
C. Bakwesegha, (1996), p. 32.
K. Rupesinghe,‘Intemational Experiences in Early Warning Networking’, in S. Ibok and W. Nhara, (eds.), 
(1996), p. 60.
Interview with W. Nhara and Medhane Tadesse, Research Coordinator of Environmental Conflict 
Management, (Ethiopian NGO).
Interview with Medhane Tadesse.
Interview with Medhane Tadesse.
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diplomacy with the hope that this mechanism would help it prevent conflicts/^ However, 
the OAU Secretariat found itself constrained at three levels in trying to develop an Early 
Warning System. First, the OAU found it difficult to establish ‘the necessary framework 
for assessing a wide-variety of information from diverse and sometimes even competing or 
distorted sources.’'*® Second, was the problem of obtaining information from member states 
of the OAU. Many states that face impending conflicts are run by regimes that tend to be 
hostile towards press freedom; consequently, information received is largely limited, judged 
suspect and inadequate. Third, and more significant, was what to do with the information 
once the OAU has received it. Put another way, what use is an early warning capacity if 
member states have not matched it by early pohtical action or some form of diplomatic 
initiative to head off a full-fledged conflict? The crisis in Rwanda eloquently demonstrated 
that the problem was not the failure of obtaining information on the conflict situation, but 
in taking the necessary political action to respond to it.'**
Early warning systems are only part of the solution in preventing a conflict and 
ensuring the efficiency of the OAU’s response to confhct resolution. However, for such a 
system to be credible, pohtical leaders need to assess the security implications (e.g. the flow 
of refugees and arms) for acting or not in a region if a potential confhct turns into a full- 
scale civil war and threatens regional peace and security.
A Continental Peacekeeping Force
The idea of a continental peacekeeping force is not new, and was first suggested by
The officer’s principle job is to: develop, test, implement and maintain methods to detect as early as possible 
impending situations of conflict, and formulate strategies and prepare documents for consideration within the 
OAU. This forms part of die ‘Job Description’ of the Senior Political Officer on Preventive Diplomacy, 
Research and Early Warning System.
Opening remarks by Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the OAU, in S. Ibok and W. Nhara, 
(eds.), (1996), p. 16.
The idea of early warning was undermined when it was alleged that the UN Secretariat failed to pass on 
relevant information to the Security Council which could have, it was suggested, prevented the massacre of 
Tutsis by Hutu extremists in Rwanda in spring of 1994. See Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the 
Rwanda Experience - Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management (Copenhagen: Steering Committee, 
1996), p. 37.
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Kwame Nkrumah during the Congolese civil war (1960-1966) to prevent external forces 
from participating in the conflict, but more important to ‘Africanisé’ the solutions to the 
conflict. Since the creation of the OAU, member states have studied the idea of a 
peacekeeping force (or to use its original name, an African High Command) with no 
consensus on whether to develop such a mechanism on the continent. The Shaba I and II 
crises in Zaire (Congo) in 1976 and 1977-1978 also prompted discussions on the potential 
for creating a continental peacekeeping force. Twenty years later, the political upheaval and 
humanitarian tragedy in the same country, again calling itself Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), and the surrounding countries of the Great Lakes (i.e. Rwanda and Burundi), 
reignited an old debate. The idea of a continental peacekeeping force also corresponded with 
the desire by the international community to devolve responsibility for peace operations to 
continental bodies, such as the OAU, or NATO (in Bosnia).
As with previous debates, African leaders appeared reluctant in the 1990s to boost 
the OAU and the continent’s autonomy in handling peacekeeping operations on the 
continent. Instead leaders appeared to share the view that the creation of a standing 
peacekeeping force on the continent was neither desirable nor practically feasible. They 
opted, on the one hand, to set up peacekeeping missions with the limited role of observing 
and monitoring conflicts, and on the other, to engage in ad hoc peace operations as the need 
arises.'*^  The restriction of peacekeeping to observer status was an indication that African 
Heads of State had not realised the need for an OAU peacekeeping force as expeditiously 
as officials in the Secretariat would have wish. More important was the fact that political 
considerations, such as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, were clearly at stake 
once peacekeeping was sanctioned.
However, while member states appeared reluctant to set up a peacekeeping force, the 
recurring problem of internal conflict on the continent and the decline in outside intervention 
showed that member states could not always avoid undertaking activities of a peacekeeping
This view was strongly expressed by South Africa. See Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National 
Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, p. 16. (Located at: 
http:\\www.polity.org,za/govdocs/white_papers/defencewp,html).
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nature/^ This was exemplified in Rwanda and Burundi where OAU missions found 
themselves engaged in some activities related to peacekeeping in 1993 and 1994."*^  The 
massacre of Tutsis by Hutu extremists in Rwanda in April 1994 and Mayor Pierre Buyoya’s 
coup against the government of President Sylvestre Ntibantuganya in Burundi in July 1996, 
further convinced many at the OAU Secretariat of the need to explore how Afiica could 
build a capacity for peacekeeping operations that could be placed at the disposal of the UN, 
and in exceptional circumstances, the OAU."*^
Member states discussed the issue of peacekeeping during the 62"^  Ordinary Session 
of the Council of Ministers firom 21-23 June 1995. At the meeting, the Council felt that the 
OAU should develop and enhance its capacity in the field of peacekeeping. While 
recognising that they should give priority to preventive diplomacy, the Council 
recommended that member states ‘set aside or earmark ready contingents to be given 
specialized training in peace-keeping operations.This policy marked a major step, in 
theory at least, towards enhancing the capacity of the Organisation to act quickly. However, 
on the political level, there are reasons to remain cautious about the OAU’s capacity. These 
reasons were brought to the fore when the OAU deployed an Inter-Afiican Force in Chad 
in 1981, and again when the West Afiican region set up the ECOMOG force to address the 
civil war in Liberia; they include: inadequate planning, confusion over the mandates, 
absence of OAU command and control, perceived partiality of some troop contributing 
countries, inadequate allocations of financial and logistical resources and, above all, lack of 
political will, not just of the parties to the conflict, but also of third party mediators in the 
surrounding region. We will come back to these problems again in Chapter Seven.
As a direct outcome of the 1995 meeting of the Council of Ministers and later the 
Heads of State and Government Summit, the OAU convened the first meeting of Chiefs of
Statement by H E. Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the OAU to the Meeting of Chiefs of Staff 
of State Members of the OAU Central Organ, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3-5 June 1996.
The OAU Neutral Observer Group in Rwanda (NMOG), 1993 and the OAU Observer Mission in 
Burundi (OMIB), April 1994.
Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of State Members of the Central Organ, ‘Concept Paper’, 3-5 June 1996,
p. 1.
Report of the Council of Ministers, Sixty-second Ordinary Session, 21-23 June, 1995, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, CM,Rpt(LXII),p. 16.
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Staffs within the continent in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in June 1996. Although the 1995 
Summit limited the possibility of establishing an African peacekeeping force, the Chiefs of 
Staff meeting encouraged the need for the creation of an African rapid reaction force. The 
Chiefs of Staff argued that the modest achievements and shortcomings of the OAU missions 
in Rwanda and Burundi implied that the time had come for the OAU to develop a common 
understanding that would guide operations that the Organisation may be called upon to 
launch in any given conflict area within the continent."^  ^The clearest indication of the need 
to create a peacekeeping force can be found in two proposals that were put forward during 
the Chiefs of Staff meeting. The first proposal consisted of the establishment of two bodies 
at the OAU General Secretariat: a body for the prevention and management of conflicts and, 
another body to act as an Intervention Force. Such a Force would rely on the establishment 
within each state of a military contingent under the responsibility of the OAU, which, while 
remaining part of its national army, would be ready to carry out missions for the OAU. The 
second proposal was the estabhshment of an integrated African doctrine for peacekeeping, 
comprising political, military, paramilitary and civilian stand-by arrangements in all the 
member States, ready for deployment at any time."** In relation to the second proposal, 
decisions about the necessary organs and their institutionalisation at the continental level 
would have to address some important questions:
i) Should the Organisation have the capacity to use force in an internal confhct?
ii) Should the OAU independently recruit and train a peacekeeping force, or 
should it be drawn from the armed force units of member states?
iii) Whom should the primary responsibihty for deciding to intervene rest with,
i.e. at the level of the OAU, a subregional organisation, or the UN?
iv) How will training, maintenance, and deployment of troops be funded?
Interview with Commodore Mesfine Binega, Military Consultant to the OAU Conflict Management Centre. 
Also see ‘Working Document,’ Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Member States of the Central Organ of 
the OAU, 3-5 June 1996, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p. 8.
Report of the First Meeting of the Chief of Staff of Member States of the Central Organ of the OAU 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3-6 June 1996, 
OAU Doc: OAU/CO/C. Staff/RPT (I).
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These questions are relevant for a continent that has limited experience in launching mihtary 
expeditions for resolving internal conflicts. At the time of writing, the most crucial and 
contentious question was number three, concerning responsibility for decision-making.
Although Africa leaders argued that they needed to develop operational procedures 
for intervening, the idea that the OAU could have the capacity to tackle internal disputes and 
mandate peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations was received with some caution. 
Some member states, for example Kenya and Zimbabwe, not only questioned the legitimacy 
of a force if not sanctioned by the UN, but more important, argued that they would only 
pursue peace enforcement operations under the framework of a clear UN mandate and 
decisive leadership, and not under the auspices of any particular country. Furthermore, while 
they argued that they were not denigrating the efforts of the OAU to manage a peacekeeping 
or peace enforcement operation, they nonetheless raised concerns about the ability of any 
regional peacekeeping initiative to maintain the essential principle of impartiality.'*  ^South 
Africa set out several conditions in its White Paper on National Defence that need to be met 
if it is to become involved in peace support operations. These are that:
1. The operation should have a clear mandate, mission and objectives.
2. There should be realistic criteria for terminating the operation.
3. The operation should be authorized by the United Nations Security Council.^ ®
In addition to the uneasiness shown in South Africa’s White Paper, there is also a certain 
degree of reluctance and suspicion among Africa’s leadership about establishing a proactive 
OAU for intervening in Afiica’s conflict. As Edmond Keller points out, although Afiican 
leaders tend to agree that they need an Afiican peacekeeping force, ‘it is unclear what most 
of them would do if the...OAU were to intervene in their own countries.T he Declaration
This view was expressed in a survey conducted by the OAU, the Institute of Security Studies (South Afiica) 
and The Lester B Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre. See M. Malan (with W. Nhara and 
P. Bergevin), African Capabilities for Training for Peace Operations, (South Africa: Institute of Security 
Studies and the Organisation of African Unity, 1997), p. 38 and 46. Also see J. Chiahemen, ‘Kenya leads 
objection to African Peace Force’, Reuters News Service, 27 June 1995,
^ Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Afiica, (1996), p. 20.
E. Keller, ‘Introduction: Towards a New Afiican Political Order,’ E. Keller and D. Rothchild, (eds.), (1996), 
p. 13.
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that established the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
in 1993 emphasised that the OAU’s activities will be ‘in keeping with the provisions of 
Chapter VIE of the UN Charter on the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of 
international peace and security,’ thus providing a clear indication that the OAU would not 
conduct an operation without seeking the authority, but more important, financial and 
military resources from the UN/^
The idea of a body with a mandate to intervene is no less controversial because it is 
a ‘homemade’ initiative. Indeed, Afiicans are increasingly wary of the potential for 
intrusiveness that a continental force will have. Certainly in Burundi between 1993 and 
1994, there was great doubt over the possibilities of an exclusive Afiican army interfering 
in the domestic affairs of the state. More important, as Burundi again illustrated, there was 
suspicion over the nature of the African force. The Burundi army, which was largely Tutsi, 
rejected the idea of foreign troops, even if they were African, because it perceived that 
outside intervention would change the balance of power in the country. The countries in the 
region - Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania - had all been accused of taking sides in the conflict 
in Burundi. As a result of a history of partisanship, few countries, if any, in the subregion, 
could play the role of a neutral mediator or provide troops for an impartial peacekeeping 
force. As Glynne Evans points out, the perception within the army was that ‘an external 
force’ would not only have ‘changed the local dynamic’, but also it ‘would have heightened 
Tutsi insecurity’ rather than ‘promote secu rity .In  the end, the OAU only sent an observer 
mission that posed no threat to the balance of power in the region. Similarly, as we discussed 
in Chapter Five, in Liberia there were various protests against the ECOMOG force from 
ECOWAS member states and Charles Taylor who saw the force as an extension of Nigeria’s 
attempts at regional hegemony.^^^
Africa does possess some peacekeeping experience inside and outside the continent. 
It also has several states such as Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania who have 
significant experience in UN peace-keeping operations. Africa’s first experience in the field
“ ‘Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’, para. 25, (1993). 
G. Evans, (1997), p. 54.
Also see J. Herbst, (1996), pp. 18-19.
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of peacekeeping came with its participation in the Congo in the 1960s. This was followed 
by an attempt by the OAU in 1981 to dispatch a peacekeeping force (i.e. Inter-African 
Force) in Chad to resolve the civil war. In the 1990s, the oftquoted example of African 
peacekeeping is ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone. African leaders need to look at the 
ECOMOG experience with care, for not only does it illustrate the potential of subregional 
organisations in promoting conflict management alongside the OAU system, but it also 
highlights their shortcomings as they attempt to participate in peacekeeping operations. We 
will come back to the ECOMOG operation in the next section when we focus on the role of 
sub-regional capacity for conflict management. Alongside this recent attempt by ECOMOG 
is the use of African troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon and Mali in the Mission 
InterAfricaine de Surveillance des Accords (Inter-African Monitoring Mission, MISAB) 
which was at the forefront of managing the crisis in the Central African Republic in January 
1997.33
Since the end of the Cold War, several programmes and training initiatives have 
taken place on the continent to enhance Africa’s capacity in participating in peace support 
operations. For example, Zimbabwe held a major Regional Peacekeeping Field Training 
Exercise (Blue Hungwe or ‘Blue Eagle’) between April and May 1997. The initiative 
involved officers from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Afirica, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, and the Zambia. It also involved participants from outside the 
continent (e.g. Britain), including the UN and international observers. The aim of Exercise 
Blue Hungwe, as it became known, was on the one hand to develop a coordinated approach 
to learning military and technical skills for peacekeeping operations, while on the other 
hand, it was intended to enhance inter-operability for multinational operations. Since the 
major powers of the West want to avoid repeating the mistakes of Somalia, they trained a 
force of African soldiers to respond to widespread internal conflicts and humanitarian 
tragedies.3  ^The use of Western resources to train Afiican soldiers is consistent with the idea
MISAB was a French initiative to monitor and implement the Bangui agreement signed by the government 
of the Central African Republic and the rebel soldiers. In April 1998, the UN Security Council established a 
UN peacekeeping operation (UN Mission in the Central African Repubhc - MINURCA) to replace the French- 
sponsored initiative. See S/Res/1159, 27 March 1998.
^ In December 1992, the US led a peacekeeping mission - Operation Restore Hope - in response to the civil 
war in Somaha. This mission compromised the concept of neutrality in peacekeeping operations when US
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of “African solutions for African problems” because the OAU maintains it is not only 
ensuring that African armies are well equipped to respond to African conflicts, but that 
Africans can police themselves and be a partner in creating stability.^^
Sub-regional Capacity for Conflict Management
The idea that sub-regional organisations should have the capacity to intervene is an 
innovative step in the history of attempts by the African continent to device mechanisms to 
resolve internal conflicts. As with the idea of creating an Early Warming Capacity on the 
continent, it should be understood in the context of the post-Cold War, although the idea that 
regions should manage their conflicts is clearly noted in Article 52 of the UN Charter. What 
makes the use of African sub-regional organisations an innovative idea in maintaining peace 
and security, is that these organisations were originally devised to pursuit political and 
economic integration. No sub-regional organisation in Africa had any significant military 
structure from which it could devise plans for intervening in internal conflicts. It was not 
until the intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia that we witnessed an attempt by a sub­
regional organisation to resolve an internal conflict. Furthermore, the growing reluctance of 
the major powers to engage in conflicts that were not an immediate national interest, 
coupled with an UN body that found itself overstretched in addressing conflicts, led to calls
troops fought against the Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aideed in his attempts to take control of Somalia. 
Similarly, the UN missions in Somalia - UNOSOM I and II and the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) - 
contributed to the tension and hostility in the country. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations: 
Lesson Learnt Unit, The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM), April 1992 - March 1995 (Located at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/). This report 
criticised the vagueness of UN Security Council mandates which ‘changed frequently during the process and 
was open to myriad interpretations.’ For example, the mandates changed from protecting the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, to encouraging and assisting in political reconciliation, to establishing and 
maintaining a “secure environmenf’, to capturing a leader of one of the factions at one stage and, later, to 
encouraging negotiations with that same leader. These mandates were, in many respects, contradictory, and 
most often the changes were decided upon with little explanation to Member States, troop-contributing 
countries, the humanitarian community operating in Somalia or the Somali people,’ (para. 10).
Also see ‘Peacekeeping force could free West from African conflicts’. Agence France Presse International, 
4 April 1997 and S. Njanji, ‘Afiican multinational force in conflict resolution exercise’. Agence France Presse 
International, 15 April 1997. In the another training initiative, African and foreign troops took part in Exercise 
Guidimakha 98, a ten-day course held by Senegal from 20 February 1998. The event was again aimed at 
enhancing joint field training of various national armies in peacekeeping techniques so that they will be ready 
to come together when an emergency arises. As with Exercise Blue Hungwe, Britain, France and the US 
supported the event.
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for regional institutions to play an active role in maintaining peace and security in the post- 
Cold War era.
The intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia widened the options available to the 
African continent and the OAU on how to enhance its ability to promote conflict 
management. It also raised the expectations of those who saw this style of peacekeeping as 
‘giving new expression to the cooperation envisaged in Chapter VIII of the United Nations 
Charter between regional organisations and the UN in the maintenance of international 
peace and security.W hile the ECOWAS intervention highlighted the opportunities to be 
had at sub-regional peacekeeping and the capacity of “African solutions for African 
problems”, it also raised several complex issues concerning the ‘competence and 
effectiveness of regional and subregional organisations with no history of collective military 
action for pursuing peacekeeping operations.ECOMOG encountered many problems in 
Liberia, not least over its legitimacy and neutrality. On an operational level, it lacked 
adequate staff, logistics, transport and an overarching structure to command and control the 
operation in Liberia. Despite the criticisms levelled against ECOWAS, one cannot deny that 
its intervention force - ECOMOG - will serve as a possible prototype for future Africa 
peacekeeping force. The ECOMOG intervention preceded many of the changes and 
initiatives that were taking place at the OAU. ECOMOG is likely to continue to serve as a 
peacekeeping force for the West African region, although at the time of writing. West 
Africa’s Heads of State had not defined the nature and scope of future peacekeeping 
operations on which ECOMOG will embark.
Certainly the experience of ECOWAS had opened possibilities in the subregions of 
Afiica in the field of conflict management. To this end. Presidents Afewerki, (Eritrea), 
Zenawi (Ethiopia) and Museveni (Uganda) used IGAD in East Africa as a mediation force 
in Sudan in September 1993 with a mandate of resolving the conflict between the Sudanese 
government and the northern (Umma Party and Democratic Unionist Party) and southern
C. Ero, ‘Subregional Peacekeeping and Conflict Management: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia.’ 
Paper presented at the Second Pan-European Conference in International Relations, Paris, 13-16 September, 
1995, p. 14.
D. Wippman,(1993), p. 191.
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Sudanese opposition movements (the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, SPLA).^® When 
the mediation process failed, Eritrea and Uganda extended support to John Garang and the 
SPLA/M.^i
In Southern Africa, the South African Development Community (SADC) was seen 
as an institution for capacity-building after its efforts in Lesotho in 1994. The peacemaking 
of SADC in Lesotho received attention largely because of the prominent role played by the 
South African and Zimbabwean Presidents, Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe. Regional 
Heads of State from South Afiica, Botswana and Zimbabwe averted the possibility of 
hostility and a royal coup by Lesotho’s King Letsie III against the Prime Minister, Ntsu 
Mokhehle and the elected Parliament.^ However, while some may cite SADC’s intervention 
as an example of the role of sub-regional organisations in conflict management, Jeffrey 
Herbst sounds a note of caution over future operations:
Everyone’s favourite example of Afiican intervention...should not be read 
as an easily transferable example of how Afiicans stop state failure in its 
tracks. That effort was successful because Lesotho is a landlocked country 
unusually vulnerable to outside powers. Indeed Mandela was simply 
continuing an old South African practice of dictating to Lesotho what could 
and could not be done.®^
^  IGAD is comprised of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda. IGAD was previously 
known as the Inter-Govemmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was created in 
1986. In 1994 it expanded its mandate to deal with conflict mediation. For an analysis of IGAD’s mediation 
in Sudan, see F, Deng and K, Medani, ‘Civil War and Identity in Sudan’s Foreign Policy’ in E. Keller and D, 
Rothchild, (eds.), (1996), pp. 116-117, and Sudan: Ending the War, Moving Talks Forward, A Report of 
United States Institute of Peace Seminar, 12 April, 1994. (Located at http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/sudan.html).
The SPLA spht in 1991 after internal divisions. There are now two groups: the SPLA/Mainstream faction, 
led by John Garang, and the SPLA/United faction (known as the Torit faction), led by Riek Machar. Eritrea 
and Uganda decided to help the SPLA because of the support the Islamic Sudanese government was giving 
to Islamic movements in their countries, especially the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. See M. Ottaway, 
(1998), p. 213.
For an analysis of SADC’s role in Lesotho, see L. Evans, ‘Preventive Diplomacy in Lesotho and 
Mozambique’ in J. Cilliers and G. Mills, (eds.) Peacekeeping in Africa, Vol. 2, (South Africa: Institute of 
Defence Policy and the South African Institute of International Affairs), pp. 187-198 and D. Venter, D. 
Venter, ‘Regional Security in Sub-Saharan Afiica: What role for South Afiica?’ in African Journal of Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution, Vol. One, No. 1, January-April 1997, pp. 23-51. At the time of 
writing. South Afiican forces unilaterally intervened in Lesotho to put now a rebel movement.
«J. Herbst, (1996), p. 11.
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The ECOWAS intervention and the prominent role of IGAD and SADC have 
highlighted the potential roles of subregional organisations. There are several reasons for 
focussing on the role of sub-regions in conflict resolution instead of the continent-wide 
approach favoured by the OAU. Not all states are willing to participate in conflicts that are 
far removed from their borders as they are not an immediate security threat, a fact not 
specific to African states. While such a model would ensure continental solidarity, thus 
keeping in line with the ideals of Pan-Africanism, one cannot dismiss the reluctance of states 
to send troops to distant areas. Sub-regional approaches to peacekeeping might therefore 
ensure the participation of states because they have more at stake for the peace and security 
of their own countries and the sub-region. It would therefore follow that along with a 
continental mechanism, there is, frrom the OAU’s perspective, a need for sub-regional 
mechanisms that can effectively act in helping the OAU to resolve conflicts on the 
continent. Such an approach would complement the OAU’s continental structure, and, in a 
sense, remove the burden of resolving all the continent’s conflicts fr"om the OAU. However, 
work still needs to be done to enhance the capacity of the sub-regions in the field of conflict 
management as they are not all geared or fully equipped to participate in peacekeeping 
operations. "^*
It is worth noting here that South Africa is reluctant to play the role of sub-regional 
peacekeeper if the OAU were to concentrate on developing the capacity of institutions like 
SADC to take active participation in peace operations. In the immediate years of its post­
apartheid era. South Africa came under increasing pressure to participate in settling conflicts 
in the continent.Since re-entering the international community. South Afiica’s role in 
African affairs raised new and interesting possibihties for the management of conflict. With 
a new democracy, and with one of the continent’s strongest economies. Western countries 
were asking South Africa to take an ‘aggressive’ role in rebuilding, and in solving African
^See W. Nhara, ‘The OAU and the Potential Role of Regional and Sub-regional organisations’ in J. Cilliers 
and G, Mills, (eds.) Peacekeeping in Africa, p. 102. See also the argument for a sub-regionalist approach to 
peacekeeping on the continent by Celestine Bassey in ‘African State and the Politics of Continental Defence 
in a Changing World; Post Mortem or Preview?’ Nigerian Journal Of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1, 
1993, pp. 56-61.
See S. Pons, ‘South Africa under pressure to intervene in conflicts’. Agence France Presse International, 
5 November 1996.
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problems. According to Herbst, some countries within the international community saw 
South Africa ‘as a kind of “Mr. Fix-It,” able, and because of the sacrifices made by many 
countries during the liberation struggle, obliged to address Africa’s problems.However, 
the Government of National Unity appeared reluctant to involve South Africa’s army in 
extensive peacekeeping operations for two reasons. First, the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF), had to undergo the process of transforming itself into a credible 
defence force after its activities under the apartheid regime tainted it. The military had to 
treading carefully for historical reasons, especially after its overt and covert actions against 
most neighbouring states that opposed the country when it was under white minority rule. 
Second, the political and military dynamics of peace support operations were new to South 
Africa and SANDF.^  ^South Africa did not complete its programme of integrating non- 
statutory forces (e.g. former African National Congress (ANC) soldiers and Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFF) fighters) into a single national defence until 1997. The government has 
argued the SANDF’s first task is to serve the new South African democracy before 
embarking on peacekeeping or peace enforcement activities in internal conflicts.
While South Africa is perceived as having the necessary power and resources to take 
the lead in resolving conflicts on the continent, government ministers have often stated that 
the country’s initiatives needs to ‘be formulated against a background of what South Africa 
can realistically hope to achieve.®* South Africa showed its reluctance to take the lead role 
on the crisis in Burundi (July 1996), and later in Zaire (February 1997). While President 
Nelson Mandela took part in negotiations to end both conflicts, the view from Pretoria was 
that South Africa did not have the capacity or the intention to act unilaterally in addressing 
African conflicts.®’ To this end, the South African government emphasised that peace 
support operations in the Southern African region ‘should be sanctioned by SADC and 
should be undertaken with the SADC states rather than conducted on a unilateral basis.
“ J. Herbst, (1996), p. 4.
See M. Malan (with W. Nhara and P. Bergevin), (1997), p. 92.
South Africa Foreign Policy: Discussion Document, Department of Foreign Affairs, July 1996, p. 14. 
(Located at: http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/discuss/foreign.html).
^ See ‘South Africa will not act alone over Burundi: Mandela’, Agence France Presse International, 30 July 
1996.
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Similarly, operations in Afiica should be sanctioned by the Organisation of Afiican Unity.
Blueprint on Unconstitutional Change
Of all the four options that were proposed by the OAU, the idea of a ‘Blueprint on 
Unconstitutional Change’ was by far the most ambitious, controversial and extensive. Some 
officials at the Secretariat argued that reforms in the Organisation were meaningless if 
nothing was done about failing states and the abuse of the doctrine of sovereignty and non­
intervention. The need to stop the prevalence of failed states and coups in Afiican states led 
to the ‘Blueprint on Unconstitutional Change’. Early in 1996, the Central Organ asked the 
OAU Legal Division to help it set up a Subcommittee to formulate a blueprint on 
unconstitutional change of government in Afiica, so that it might empower the Organisation 
to condemn the illegal removal of a government in power.^  ^ The Central Organ defined 
unconstitutional action to mean.
Military coups against democratically elected governments; refusal by 
incumbent governments to relinquish power to the winning party after fi*ee 
and fair elections; refusal by governments to call general elections at the end 
of their term; Governments by Decree; and Mercenary intervention.^^
Not surprisingly, when the Central Organ presented the proposal, Nigeria and Algeria 
rejected it. According to the Subcommittee, the purpose of this blueprint was to ensure that 
the OAU ‘assist Member States involved to restore constitutional order and prevent 
escalation of violence’ and to stand by ‘the side of legitimacy and the popular will of the 
people.’ In this respect, the Sub-Committee stated that the
OAU should in the future be able to consistently condemn any 
unconstitutional change of government....and be able to apply sanctions such
Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Repubhc of South Africa, (1996), p. 20.
Interview with Ben Kioko, Legal Officer, OAU. See also the Draft Report of the Second Meeting of the 
OAU Central Sub-Committee on the Preparation of a Blue Print for dealing with Unconstitutional Changes 
in Africa, (OAU Doc: Sub-Cttee/Central Organ/RPT., April 1996).
Draft Report of the Second Meeting of the OAU Central Sub-Committee on the Preparation of a Blue Print 
for dealing with Unconstitutional Changes in Africa, (1996), p. 3.
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as temporary suspension of Member States or withhold recognition of any 
government or would-be government that violates its principles/^
While member states had not endorsed this proposal, the OAU Legal Officer, Ben Kioko, 
states that the proposal will not be watered down to the extent that it becomes meaningless. 
Rather, he suggests that it should be seen as a ‘milestone’ in thinking by the OAU 
Secretariat.’^'^
Certainly the initial actions taken over Burundi at the time of the July 1996 coup 
confirmed the possible function of this blueprint. Before the coup, the Central Organ of the 
OAU Mechanism issued a communiqué on the impending situation in Burundi. It warned 
against the overthrow of what it defined as the ‘legitimate’ government of President 
Sylvestre Ntibantuganya: ‘Any attempt to take over power through illegal means will not 
be accepted by Afiica and will be strongly condemned and opposed by the Organisation of 
Afiican U n i t y . T o  this effect,
the Central Organ called upon Member States and the international 
community...to prepare themselves to isolate...any such regime which could 
take over leadership through the use of force or any other pretext.^^
The Heads of State of the OAU supported the recommendation for sanctions proposed by 
the former President of Tanzania and leader of the peace negotiations, Julius Nyerere, and 
the regional body know as the Arusha Summit.^  ^The decision to press for sanctions marked 
a progress in the thinking of OAU; this stance was unusually tough and unprecedented fi-om 
an Organisation that had often turned a blind eye to coups on the continent. Evans noted the 
significance of this decision taken by some Afiican leaders when she stated that
Draft Report of the Second Meeting of the OAU Central Sub-Committee on the Preparation of a Blue Print 
for dealing with Unconstitutional Changes in Africa, (1996), p. 3 and p. 4.
Interview with author.
Statement of the Central Organ of the OAU on the Grave Situation in Burundi, July 25 1996, Press Release, 
(OAU Information Division).
Statement of the Central Organ of the OAU on the Grave Situation in Burundi, (25 July 1996).
Members of the Arusha Summit included Etiiiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia.
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This was the first time a group of Afiican countries, with the political cover 
of the OAU-CRM [Conflict Resolution Mechanism], had taken coercive 
action against one of their own number, on their own initiative, on a matter 
that had traditionally been regarded as the 'internal affairs’ of another stated*
The OAU (through its Council of Ministers or Summit of Heads of State), had never 
condemned any member state except apartheid South Afiica, but according to Kioko, since 
the end of the Cold War, a new trend had developed/^ Before the creation of the blueprint, 
the OAU had condemned the coup d’etat in the Comoros led by French mercenaries on 28 
September 1995, However, to date, the OAU has only concerned itself with condemning 
coup leaders who rule over small or weak states, but it may run into difficulty in 
condemning the coup leaders firom powerful states like Nigeria, However, despite the likely 
challenges to the proposal, the OAU Secretariat maintained that it would work ‘slowly and 
pragmatically’ to modify certain aspects of thinking on this area without laying itself open 
to criticism of interfering in the political structure of a member state,*®
Of all the initiatives taken by the OAU, the attempt to develop a principle that 
challenges leaders who come to power via ‘illegal means’ (e,g, coup d’etat or insurgency) 
goes to the core of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. At the time of writing, 
the blueprint was however still at its draft stage and any significant action is dependent upon 
the signatures of OAU member states. Yet, although did not received full approval, Kioko 
argued that it did prove worthy of examination, if only because it highlighted the new 
thinking that existed among some members of the Secretariat, The idea of challenging 
leaders who come to power via ‘illegal means’ is not entirely new. When the OAU was 
established in 1963, Togo was excluded fi-om attending the first OAU meeting after the 
assassination of President Slyvanus Olympio, The then-Foreign Minister of Nigeria, Jaja 
Wachuku, questioned the legality of the new Togolese leader. President Grunitzky. 
However, the OAU has not been consistent in condemning leaders who came to power via
G. Evans, (1997), p. 36. Also see B. Mseteka, ‘OAU leader takes tough line on Burundi Junta, Reuters News 
Service, 27 July 1996.
Interview with Ben Kioko. As with Western commentators on post-Cold War Afiican affairs, Kioko cites 
Yoweri Museveni, Zenawi Meles and also Gerry Rawlings of Ghana as leaders who instigated this new trend 
within the OAU.
Interview with Ben Kioko.
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‘illegal means,’ preferring not to involve itself ‘in disputes which could otherwise have 
divided Afiican states between the supporters of rival domestic r eg imes .The  document 
on the blueprint for unconstitutional change therefore signals a renewed attempt by the OAU 
in the 1990s to deter the continuation of coups as a means of gaining power.
Conclusion
The aim of this Chapter has been to focus on the ‘new’ breed of Afiican leaders, 
mainly in East Afiica, and the various options proposed by the OAU for responding to 
internal conflicts to illustrate how the thinking on intervention has evolved alongside non­
intervention. The response of the ‘new’ breed of Afiican leaders to the crises in the Great 
Lakes region provided several ways of understanding how the notion of “Afiican solutions 
for Afiican problems” was still relevant in considering how the thinking on intervention has 
evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention in the post-Cold War era. Rather than 
define their actions as intervention, leaders like President Museveni and Vice-President 
Kagame argued that they needed to find regionally based solutions to ensure regional 
stability and order. Finding “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” was necessary, they 
argued, because of the increasing number of conflicts and the spread of collapsing or failing 
states. However, leaders in this region also justified the use of force by arguing that the lack 
of a solution or concrete policy firom the UN and its member states furthered their decision 
to search for “Afiican solutions.” The willingness of Museveni and Kagame to use force in 
support of Kabila in Zaire was defined as “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” where 
international efforts and peace negotiations failed. It was clear to these leaders that the 
continent could not wait for the international community to respond to growing regional 
insecurity, but more important, that Afiican leaders needed to determine the outcome of the 
conflicts in the region without recourse to outside intervention.
The ‘new’ breed of leaders in East Afiica partly encouraged the thinking within the 
OAU that Afiicans should take a lead role in mediating the continent’s conflicts. Since 1989, 
the OAU had been run Salim Ahmed Salim who shared the same desire as these leaders for 
continentally-derived solutions. In the 1990s, the OAU picked up the objective of “Afiican
C, Clapham, (1996), p. 112.
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solutions for African problems” - an objective that it was unable to fulfill in the Cold War 
period. In the spirit of Pan-Afiicanism, the OAU Secretariat sought to find “Afiican 
solutions for Afiican problems” to save the continent from self-destruction. The OAU 
argued that the principle of non-intervention needed to be watered down, not only to respond 
to conflicts that emerge on the continent, but to ensure Afiica’s own self-reliance in 
addressing its crises. In essence, the notion of “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” is 
aimed at putting the “Afiican house in order.” Yet, more than this, we have argued that the 
idea of “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” is a continuation of a policy started by 
Kwame Nkrumah to dispense with Western intervention to resolve its periodic crises. In the 
1990s, “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” held the same expression as it did 30 years 
ago: to establish an Afiican High Command or a continental peacekeeping force to deal with 
Afiica’s internal conflicts.
The OAU justified its call for a more pro-active response to internal conflicts as 
seeking “Afiican solutions” thus avoiding the controversial debate of intervention versus 
non-intervention that hindered its effectiveness in the Cold War period. It further argued that 
the options it put forward were “home-made” indigenous initiative aimed at preserving the 
Afiican state-system and not undermining the principle of non-intervention. Furthermore, 
as we argued, while the CMC reaffirmed the doctrine of non-intervention in strong terms, 
officials suggested that they will continue to act pragmatically outside the framework of the 
OAU Charter to ensure that regional peace and security is not put at risk.*  ^When asked, for 
example, if the OAU would intervene if there was another crisis like Somalia where there 
was a complete collapse of state and society, some officials were prepared to answer ‘yes’ 
to some form of military intervention.^^ They argued that the OAU would be dealing with 
a failed or collapsed state, where intervention would be less of a diplomatic or a legal 
problem.
In sum, the aim of this Chapter has been to consider how the various initiatives 
developed by the OAU, and the response of the ‘new’ breed of African leaders shed light 
on how the thinking and practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-
Interview with Ben Kioko and Sam Ibok,
Interview with Ben Kioko, William Nhara and Sam Ibok.
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intervention in post-Cold War Afiica. The attempt by Afiica’s leaders through the OAU to 
appeal to the Pan-Afiicanist notion of “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” to justify 
intervention in internal conflicts is further evidence that Pan-Afiicanism provides a useful 
source in understanding the thinking and practice of intervention in Sub-Saharan Afiica. 
However, in the concluding Chapter of this study (Seven), we will consider how realistic 
and practical the notion of “Afiican solution for Afiican problems” is for the continent in 
responding to internal conflicts.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN INTERVENTIONS IN INTERNAL 
CONFLICTS
Introduction
This concluding Chapter is divided into two parts. In Part One we argue that the 
cases discussed in this study have been useful in exploring how the thinking and practice on 
intervention evolved on the African continent. In Part Two, we point to future research when 
we consider the question of outside assistance in post-Cold War Africa. While this study has 
not suggested that African interventions in internal conflicts are more likely to succeed than 
Western interventions, this study ends by arguing that attempts to prevent widespread 
internal conflicts are also dependent on help coming from the international community.
I. Justifying Intervention African style?
In the introduction to this study we asked the following questions: How has 
intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention since the end of colonial 
rule in Africa? Is it possible to find sources from which to understand the practice of 
intervention in Africa by African states? In this study, we have argued that one way to 
understand how the practice of intervention has evolved is to focus on Pan-Africanism and 
two themes contained within it: African exclusivity (often defined as “African solutions for 
African problems”) and African unity (often called “solidarity”).
Pan-Afficanism set out to provide a set of political and philosophical ideas on 
independence, the building of political unity on the continent and rules governing intra- 
African affairs. Furthermore, we argued that it served as a useful starting point in 
understanding how norms and principles of African international relations evolved because, 
the philosophy of Pan-Africanism littered the foreign policy statements of African leaders, 
especially those states labelled ‘radical’ states when they were accused of intervening or 
supporting another state’s intervention. The notion of African exclusivity and unity emerged 
from the Pan-Afiican conferences and meetings of the 1960s and served as powerful
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expressions in understanding rules governing intra-Afiican affairs, especially the principle 
of non-intervention.
When Afiican states met at various Pan-Afiican meetings and conferences in the 
early stages of decolonisation, there was general agreement that unity and exclusivity would 
be the principles guiding them in their struggle to liberate the continent firom colonialism 
and racial discrimination. Afiican leaders argued that unity was important to guard their 
independence against future outside intrusion. In addition, they argued that they needed to 
create a diplomatic body that would regulate the affairs of the continent to prevent outsiders 
fi*om interfering in their affairs. That diplomatic body was the OAU. The idea of unity and 
exclusivity became a rallying point for the first leaders of independence: Azikiwe, 
Houphouët-Boigny, Keita, Kenyatta, Nkrumah, Senghor and Touré. These leaders held that 
only black Afiican states of the continent should determine Afiican affairs, and to this end, 
the notions of unity and exclusivity emerged as guiding principles in African diplomacy 
towards the outside world.
Thus, the focus of Afiican foreign policy towards the outside world was clear: the 
struggle for independence against future outside interference. When it came to deciding the 
rules and principles that would guide intra-Afiican affairs, Afiican leaders were divided. 
There was no clear or concrete definition on what unity or exclusivity meant beyond the 
desire to prevent future incursions on the Afiican continent. The notion of unity and 
exclusivity became divisive themes in understanding the ‘rules of the game’ in intra-Afiican 
affairs, most notably on the issue of intervention in the internal affairs of states.
African unity: a source in which to understand how the thinking and practice o f intervention 
evolved among African states?
What does the notion of Afiican unity tell us about how the thinking and practice of 
intervention evolved in Sub-Saharan Afiica? The Congolese civil war was the first 
indication of how useful the notion of unity would be in understanding the thinking and 
practice of intervention among Afiican states. In the Congo, the notion of unity became a 
useful slogan for radical leaders like Nkrumah and Touré when they justified why they 
helped the Congolese nationalist leaders, Patrice Lumumba and Christopher Gbenye.
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Generally, radical states provided assistance because they supported a particular leader or 
movement that shared their own political outlook. In the early 1960s, the political outlook 
for radical Pan-Afiican leaders was ‘Afiican unity’, meaning the political integration of 
Afiican states into a single federation or union of Afiican states. Externally, Afiican unity 
became a significant vehicle in the struggle for continental liberation from the 
neocolonialists in the West. Internally, it became synonymous with the struggle for national 
liberation from those Afiican leaders, like the Congolese secessionist leader, Moise 
Tshombé, who were seen as ‘stooges’ or ‘puppets’ of the West. The call for unity was to 
create a supranational organisation that would not be dependent on outside assistance. 
Afiican leaders, whether in government or in opposition that represented the kind of 
leadership that radical leaders like Nkrumah and Touré wanted in Afiica (i.e. commitment 
to unity), received their help. The help, though never properly defined, was at times 
subversive or involved sending in propaganda materials to destabilise a regime. Nkrumah 
and Touré rejected accusations that their activities amounted to interference in the affairs of 
another state. In the end, subversion was seen as necessary and served as a useful political 
strategy in the struggle for national liberation and Afiican unity.
The belief in Afiican unity lasted as long as Nkrumah was in power. When Nkrumah 
was overthrown in a coup d’etat in 1966, the policy of intervention for the sake of Pan- 
Afiican unity ended. Leaders who appeared to transgress the principle of non-intervention 
did not appeal to Pan-Afiican unity to justify their intervention again. Although the notion 
of unity was significant in understanding why states like Ghana and Guinea intervened in 
the Congo, it was not the only theme at play to justify state intervention. The notion ofPan- 
Afiican exclusivity became a significant tool to justify state intervention.
African exclusivity: a source in which to understand how the thinking and practice o f 
intervention evolved among African states?
Again the Congolese civil war provided the first indication of how useful the notion 
of exclusivity was in understanding the practice of intervention on the continent. Radical 
states referred to the notion of exclusivity to justify their intervention in the Congo. Radical 
states provided two meanings on the notion of exclusivity to further justify their intervention
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in the Congo. Where exclusivity meant creating a system of self-help to prevent extra­
continental intervention (i.e. non-African intervention), radical states claimed that it also 
meant that black independent African states had a ‘right’ which they derived from belonging 
to the family of African states, to intervene to help other African ‘brothers’ that were facing 
internal unrest. These ‘brothers’ were not necessarily other African leaders, but were 
sometimes opposition movements or dissident groups. Nonetheless, exclusivity became 
synonymous with the idea that since “We are all Africans” then there could be no sense of 
intrusion as support was aimed at helping a fellow African brother.
However, and more than just helping a fellow African, intervention was justified as 
wanting to prevent extra-continental intervention or keeping outsiders from intervening in 
Africa’s internal conflicts. Radical states originally sought the assistance of the UN to 
maintain Afiican’s autonomy over the Congolese civil war. But rather than regard this as 
contradicting the notion of African exclusivity, radical states hoped that the UN would serve 
a dual purpose. First, that the UN would liberate the Congo from Moise Tshombé who 
supported secession and Kasavubu who wanted to maintain links with the neocolonialists 
in the West. Second, radicals argued that if ONUC was composed of mainly Afiican troops 
this would not only prevent foreign interference, but ensure that the Congo was an Afiican 
affair, thus giving testimony to the notion of exclusivity. When the UN appeared unable to 
fulfill this dual strategy, Nkrumah advocated the idea of a Pan-Afiican High Command (i.e. 
a continental force) to fulfill his strategy of unity, but also continental exclusiveness.
When Nkrumah was overthrown in a coup d’etat, the notion of exclusivity that he 
appealed to lived on and became a useful slogan for Afiican leaders of all political 
persuasions. Exclusivity became a ‘persistent and recurrent’ theme in justifying why states 
intervened or supported intervention in the affairs of states. The civil war in Angola clearly 
illustrated how the notion of Afiican exclusivity was useful in understanding how the 
practice of intervention evolved on the continent. We also saw a widening of the term of 
exclusivity in this civil war as states sought to use it to defend why they supported extra­
continental intervention.
From the Superpower proxy stmggles that destroyed Angola and tore at the heart of 
the Hom of Afiica, to the near breakdown of Zaire during the Shaba I and II crises, foreign 
powers usually played a prominent role, backing one side or another by intervening directly
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or by supplying arms, advisers or military technicians. On these occasions, African leaders 
justified their intervention as either preventing or supporting foreign involvement. In the 
Angolan civil war, some radical states (e.g. Nigeria, previously a moderate state) supported 
Soviet and Cuban assistance because it was aimed at preventing the emergence of a pro- 
Western ‘puppet’ government. Similar to the Congo, seeking outside assistance was to fulfill 
a wider political strategy, liberation. The Soviet and Cubans were seen by radical states as 
allies in the struggle for liberation in Southern African and using them served the purpose 
of removing the neocolonialist threat on the continent. Here we can notice a close and 
interconnecting factor between these two cases of intervention by African states. Like the 
radicals had argued in the Congolese civil war in the 1960s for the UN to fulfill the strategy 
of liberation, the radical states in the 1970s were also seeking outside assistance to ensure 
liberation. This policy as we argued did not undermine the notion of exclusivity, rather, 
African states argued that were deciding for themselves how to solve a problem even if they 
had to call on outside powers (e.g. the Soviets or Cubans) to fulfill their policy.
The Shaba I and U conflicts in Zaire (formerly the Congo) further raised interesting 
points on how the notion of exclusivity shed light on the practice of intervention on the 
continent. In Zaire, other radical states (e.g. Tanzania), were critical of the support from 
mainly Francophone conservative states to Western intervention to protect the regime of 
President Mobutu. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania argued that this challenged the 
OAU principle of non-intervention and the idea that Africans had an exclusive right to solve 
their problems. But the OAU never condemned the use of outside assistance; instead, it 
accepted the principle that a government, being responsible for its own security, was entitled 
to seek assistance from any state, whether it was African or not. This was defined as an 
African solution to an African problem and not a diminution of the principle on non­
intervention. Furthermore, those states that did support Mobutu claimed that they sought 
outside assistance to preserve the African state system. In the end, African states failed to 
respond to the fundamental question of when foreign assistance did or did not constitute 
intervention. Put another way, leaders were unable distinguish between intervention and the 
right of any state (defined as “African solutions”) to appeal for external assistance in order 
to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
There was further confusion over the meaning attached to intervention when Nigeria
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intervened in the Chadian civil in the later 1970s. Nigeria appealed to the Pan-African 
notion of exclusivity when it stated that it intervened to end outside intervention from 
France and Libya. Nigeria felt that there was more credence to be found in an African state 
intervening in another African state’s internal dispute than there would be if the intervening 
state came from outside the continent, hence its decision to intervene itself, and also to 
involve the OAU in the civil war. The belief among Nigeria’s diplomatic circle was that 
enhancing Africa’s indigenous capacity through the OAU would replace individual state 
reliance on unilateral external military assistance.
The appeal to “African solutions for African problems” was again used by Nigeria 
to justify why it intervened in the Liberian civil war. Liberia was the first post-Cold War 
civil war that involved African intervention, thus signifying a continuation in the thinking 
and practice of intervention among African states. However, the appeal to this Pan- 
Afiicanist theme in the post-Cold War era was forcefully asserted in Zaire in 1997. We 
argued that in the 1990s we could witness the emergence of a so-called ‘new’ breed of 
Afiican leaders who had sought to give the continent ‘home-made’ initiatives for resolving 
conflicts. These ‘new’ leaders were not however shifting the thinking of the continent on the 
principle of non-intervention. Instead, they were reasserting the Pan-Afiicanist themes that 
could be traced back to leaders like Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. The ‘new’ leaders 
in Uganda and Rwanda appealed to the notion of “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” 
to justify their military support for Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s overthrow of President Mobutu. 
Their appeal for developing ‘home-made’ initiatives was reflected in the OAU when the 
Organisation embarked on creating mechanisms to respond to internal conflicts on the 
continent in the post-Cold War era.
One reason why the OAU reasserted the Pan-Afiicanist notion o f‘Afiican solutions 
for Afiican problems”, was either to prevent or control outside intervention. In the post-Cold 
War era, the Organisation used it to explain Afiican involvement in conflicts because 
disinterest from the international community meant that the future of the continent was 
largely in the hands of Afiica’s leaders. Additionally, in the latter part of the nineties, 
outsiders also emphasised “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” because propping up 
corrupt regimes or resolving Afiican conflicts was too costly.
Taken together, the cases of Afiican involvement in internal conflicts show a
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continuation in the thinking of intervention among Afiican leaders. These cases illustrate 
the view that the notions of unity and exclusivity were common themes when Afiican states 
justified intervening in internal conflicts. However, did the notion of unity and exclusivity 
work at every level in understanding why Afiican states intervened in internal conflicts? 
This study has not suggested that these are the only themes that were dominant when states 
sought to justify their actions. On the contrary, Nigeria’s intervention in the Chadian civil 
war, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda and the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, showed 
that other factors ranked higher than the Pan-Afiican notion of unity and exclusivity.
Other sources to understand the practice and thinking on intervention among African states
When we looked at why Nigeria intervened in Chad, we found that in addition to 
wanting to develop “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems,” Nigeria also had a mixture of 
security, territorial and domestic concerns that affected its interpretation of the OAU 
principle on non-intervention. Furthermore, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda did not seem 
to support our primary claim that interventions carried out by other Afiican states can be 
understood within the framework of Pan-Afiican unity or exclusivity. However, what 
Tanzania’s intervention demonstrated, far more explicitly than Nigeria’s intervention in 
Chad, was that considerations other than African unity and exclusivity account for why 
states intervene. Tanzania’s official statements noted the intervention was in response to Idi 
Amin’s territorial aggression along the Tanzanian-Uganda border.
Similarly, the ECOWAS intervention in post-Cold War era showed how other factors 
ranked higher than the notion of unity and exclusivity. Despite Nigeria’s attempts to appeal 
to Pan-Afiicanism, there were wider regional and political sensitivities, coupled with the 
fear of regional and economic instability that provoked intervention by Afiican states in the 
Liberian civil war.
Conclusion
What then can we say about how the thinking and practice of intervention evolved 
in Sub-Saharan Africa? Afiican states intervened in internal conflicts on the continent for
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several reasons: to support those who shared a similar ideological commitment or political 
persuasion, to preserve a regime, to ensure the survival of the Afiican state-system, to ensure 
regional and political stability, or to prevent outside intervention. In analysing the apparent 
contradiction between the non-interventionist principle and the interventionist practice, the 
two can be reconciled in the justifications Afiican leaders provided to explain their 
activities. These justifications were based on an appeal to a sense of Afiicamzejj as stated 
in Pan-Afiicanism: that Afiican states had an inalienable right to determine their destiny and 
that the continent was responsible for deciding its affairs. These justifications appeared to 
work at every stage, especially when questions were raised over the legitimacy of 
intervention (as when Nkrumah intervened in the Congo or when Nigeria supported Soviet 
or Cuban intervention in Angola).
One area where intervention was justified was in addressing the plight of blacks in 
South Afiica. Intervention, as we noted in Chapter Three, was justifiable because the aim 
was to liberate Southern Africa firom the aegis of colonial rule. However, when it came to 
responding to the oppression of black people by Afiican leaders (e.g. Idi Amin’s human 
rights abuse in Uganda), there was no clear line on the question of intervention. While some 
Afiican states condemned the decision of Nyerere to assist in the overthrow of Amin, others 
applauded Tanzania’s decision. The OAU never outwardly condemned Tanzania’s actions, 
thus leaving no indication about whether or not this was a tacit approval on its part and 
whether it held that intervention for humanitarian reasons was legitimate.
What is significant during the period between 1960-1989 is that while Afiican 
leaders pursued intervention in practice, there was no attempt to institutionalise it within the 
OAU Charter. Throughout this period, the OAU was a fervent advocate of the principle of 
non-intervention, although it did not condemn states who overrode the principle. An 
example of its strict interpretation of this principle was in its response to the Nigerian civil 
in 1967. The Organisation told the outside world that this civil war was an Afiican affair 
thus confirming the notion of exclusivity. However, among Afiican states, exclusivity was 
defined as Nigerian exclusivity, and no Afiican state could intervene.
The aim of this thesis has been to sketch out a history about the co-evolution of non­
interventionist norms and interventionist practice among Afiican states in the post-colonial 
era. Although it is difficult to suggest that there is a coherent tradition or a pattern that is
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easily identifiable, we can make two statements about this co-evolution. First, the evidence 
offered demonstrates that in large parts of Afiica the practice of intervention exists, that 
there is nothing new about intervention by Afiican states, but more important, that there are 
various ways for states to justify intervention. However, it is important to note that in the 
areas where we have studied state intervention, we need not assume that these actions 
represent an endorsement of intervention in general. All we can say is that Afiican leaders 
have advocated or opposed intervention less upon clearly formulated principles or law, and 
more upon circumstances, including political interest, but also normative considerations and 
conviction.
Second and directly related, we can state that there was a degree of pragmatism at 
play in how Afiican leaders applied the principle of non-intervention. Put another way, 
Afiican leaders developed a ‘step-by-step approach’ on the question of intervention in the 
internal affairs of states which did not lead to the collapse of the non-interventionist norm. 
In fact, this pragmatic approach showed the elasticity of the non-interventionist norm. 
Afiican leaders and the OAU were able to stretch the meaning of this norm to its maximum 
without overhauling its core features. This had been done despite the incredible pressures 
and forces ranging firom superpower politics, internal tensions and conflicts caused by state- 
building, socio-political cleavages, economic underdevelopment, political struggle, weak 
social and political institutions and complex regional and political realities and sensitivities, 
all of which undermined the transition fi*om being a colonial entity to an independent state. 
What we could say is that individual states and the OAU have managed - at least as well as 
their sometimes-intervening colleagues elsewhere in the world - to maintain the non­
interventionist norm, even though it took a few dents.
However, although the OAU and its member-states have managed not to undermine 
the non-interventionist norm, the main challenge for the continent is how to respond to 
internal conflicts which are going to remain a constant feature as the continent enters the 
twenty-first century. The OAU wants to resolve conflicts on the continent, without 
undermining the non-interventionist norm, but it does not have the capacity to achieve this 
goal. The OAU may however need to seek outside assistance to achieve its goal of resolving 
internal conflicts on the continent. However, the question of foreign assistance poses a 
problem for a continent that seeks “Afiican solutions” to prevent outside intervention. The
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idea of “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” may seem like a desirable policy for a 
continent that seeks to maintain the most sacrosanct principles of Pan-Afiicanism: sohdarity, 
autonomy and sovereignty. It may also be a sensible pohcy for the major powers of the West 
who want to shift responsibility for resolving conflicts to bodies like the OAU, ECOWAS 
and SADC. However, in the final part of this concluding Chapter, we point to future 
research when we argue that “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” needs foreign 
assistance if this policy is to become a functioning reality. Several crises on the continent 
in the post-Cold War - Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi - have exposed the notion of “Afiican 
solutions for Afiican problems” as unrealistic and impractical, thus leaving doubts about the 
future of Afiican attempts to resolve internal conflicts. Therefore, we argue that a degree of 
foreign assistance is necessary to ensure “Afiican solutions” in resolving internal conflicts. 
The OAU has emphasised that for Afiica to fulfill its potential in resolving conflicts, a 
multi-layered solution or a ‘multi-institutional’ approach is necessary.^ It is worth 
remembering that the notion of “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems” does allow for 
foreign assistance. What makes it an “Afiican solution” is that Afiican leaders argue that 
they should decide upon the level and nature of foreign assistance.
II. The future of African Intervention in internal conflicts
"African solutions for African problems”: a realistic goal?
Despite the optimism within the OAU Secretariat about the continent’s potential to 
develop “Afiican solutions for Afiican problems,” there are some serious concerns about the 
OAU’s ability, and that of the continent as a whole, to create an effective mechanism and 
ensure that sufficient action is taken. Unfortunately, many accomplishments of the OAU 
since the end of the Cold War remain in the stage of projects, sometimes highly advanced, 
but rarely matured. Consequently, there are major problems that are going to prove difficult 
for the Organisation.
The OAU created several structures for Afiican peacekeeping on paper, but this is
 ^Letter from the Deputy Permanent Observer of the OAU Mission to tiie United Nations, Solomon Gomes 
to the author, 16 March 1997.
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not enough. Bringing them to life is also necessary, and this requires the political will of its 
members. However, member states are unlikely to empower the CMC with the means to 
intervene in future internal conflicts. As with the UN Secretariat, the CMC is dependent on 
the political will of its member states. It is therefore hard to escape the conclusion that for 
“African solutions for African problems” to have some degree of success, African Heads of 
State will need to redefine when and how the Organisation will become involved in settling 
internal conflicts. This however might prove difficult, for while Africa’s leaders make 
declaratory statements on the need to develop mechanisms for coping with the continent’s 
flashpoints, there are still fundamental reservations about the feasibility of establishing a 
peacekeeping force with the mandate to intervene in the internal affairs of states. 
Furthermore, there are fundamental questions about the continent’s operational and financial 
capacity to ensure that solutions to Africa’s conflicts are ‘home-made’ initiatives.
Despite all the initiatives pursued at the level of the OAU and throughout the 
continent in the nineties, the inability of the OAU to respond effectively to crises like 
Rwanda and Zaire highlighted the glaring disjuncture between expectations and institutional 
capacity with respect to resolving internal conflicts. The OAU Secretary-General was said 
to have described Rwanda as the ‘baby’ of the OAU Conflict Division, suggesting that it 
would take the lead, and initially it did so.^  However, the OAU found itself unable to carry 
out many of the initiatives it proposed in the Arusha Accord of August 1993. Rwanda 
exposed the OAU’s lack of resources and capability to launch a peace process successfully. 
While individual African states may have troops available to mount an operation even for 
a cease-fire, lack of financial resources prevents any meaningful outcome. However, despite 
the scarcity of resources, Rwanda provided the most graphic example of the lack of pohtical 
will, not only in the international community, but also in the OAU at the level of Heads of 
State.
Ever since Kwame Nkrumah advocated an African High Command to carry out 
conflict resolution, the OAU has wrestling with how it could solve the continent’s conflicts 
and ensure that Africans bring a solution to their own problems. The CMC was an 
advancement of Nkrumah’s limited idea of only responding to the liberation of African
 ^Interview with Carla Mucavi, Diplomat of Mozambique and Sam Ibok, Senior Political Adviser, Conflict 
Management Centre.
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States from neo-colonial powers. In the 1990s, the CMC was more ambitious, seeking to 
respond to internal conflicts, an area that the OAU has traditionally shied away. However, 
as the Senior Political Adviser at the Conflict Division, the Deon Van Schoor argues, the 
CMC is likely to underachieve because member-states are reluctant to give it the freedom 
to intervene in internal conflicts.^ As Van Schoor argues, the organisational arm of the OAU 
needs to be empowered by states to be more proactive rather than being driven by the 
traditional mechanisms of high-level diplomacy."* This however requires political 
commitment and effective institutions to mobilise the continent’s own resources, a problem 
Van Schoor recognises.
If we take all the problems that confront the OAU in enhancing the continent’s role 
together, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the goal of “African solutions for African 
problems” may prove difficult for the OAU and its member states to achieve. It is because 
of these fundamental reservations that we argue that “African solutions for African 
problems” need the support of foreign assistance to make it a functional reality. However, 
we also argue that foreign assistance needs ensure effective planning and coordination to 
meet the needs of the continent.
Foreign Assistance and '‘African solutions for African problems ”
Since the African continent is not ready or fully equipped to manage internal 
conflicts, there is no doubt that it needs outside assistance. During the nineties, several 
Western governments produced proposals to help Africa develop mechanisms for 
responding to conflicts on the continent. This section summarizes the proposals produced 
by those powers who actively engaged in African affairs during the Cold War era - the UK, 
France and the US - and considers ways of ensuring effective political response in providing 
assistance to African states in their attempts to resolve internal conflicts on the continent.^
Author interview.
 ^Author interview.
 ^Other countries developed proposals for enhancing Africa’s capacity to resolve conflicts. These included the 
Dutch and Canadian initiatives. Some institutions and research organisations have participated in developing 
mechanisms for resolving Africa’s internal conflicts. For example, Global Coalition, Afncan Leadership
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In 1994, Britain and France launched initiatives for strengthening Africa’s 
capabilities in the field of peacekeeping and conflict management. According to the then- 
British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, the aim was ‘to help give Africa’s regional 
organisations military and humanitarian capacity in responding to internal conflicts.’^  
Between 1994 and 1996, the British Government convened seminars in Camberley, Accra, 
Cairo and Harare with the view of creating ‘regional centres of excellence for UN 
peacekeeping training,’
At the 18* Franco-African Summit in Biarritz on 9-10 November 1994, the French 
proposed an African Intervention Force, The French proposal was largely fuelled by the 
crisis in Rwanda, The basis of the French initiative was similar to that proposed by the 
British Government, but the emphasis was directed at ‘collective self-reliance’ through 
subregional intervention during crises situations,^ The British and French proposals were 
aimed at creating an early warning system; preventive diplomacy; training and pre-stocking 
of material; and the emergency deployment of peacekeeping forces,*
Of the three external initiatives, the US proposal received critical response from the 
OAU Secretariat. As with the French initiative, the US proposal was a reaction to the 
genocide in Rwanda, coupled with the deterioration of security in Burundi and the potential 
for other crises on the continent. In September 1996, the then-US Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher, proposed to set up an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) with the task of 
facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and securing a healthy environment for the
Forum, ACCORD, The Carter Centre and the UN African Regional Centre for Disarmament.
 ^ ‘Africa - Time to Take Another Look’. Speech by the former Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind to the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, Thursday, 28 November 1996. The British 
initiative is outlined in OAU’s Position Towards the Various Initiatives on Conflict Management: Enhancing 
DA U’s Capacity in Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, (n.d.), para. 33-46, pp. 11- 
16.
 ^Interview with Commodore Mesfine Binega, Military Consultant to the OAU Conflict Management Centre. 
Also see OAU’s Position towards the Various Initiatives on Conflict Management: Enhancing OAU’s 
Capacity in Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, (n.d.), para. 51, p. 17.
* See W. Kühne, G. Lenzi and A. Vasconcelos, ‘WEU’s role in Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 22 (Paris: Western European Institute, 
December 1995), p. 67. (Located at: http://www.weu.mt/institute/chaillot/chai22e.htm).
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internally displaced.^ The ACRF was based on the idea of ‘“marrying” resources’, whereby 
concrete steps would be taken towards uniting the contribution of African military forces 
with those from other nations. The main aim was however to establish a force capacity on 
the continent to respond to major crises like Rwanda or Burundi. However, it was not 
envisaged that it would assume a Security Council mandate to carry out UN Chapter VII 
peace enforcement activities. Neither would troops merge into a continental standing army, 
but would instead remain in their countries. The US proposal recommended that the ACRF 
be placed under the authority of the UN Security Council and cooperate in joint operations 
with the OAU and appropriate sub-regions.
The US initiatives received critical response from the OAU and several African 
countries. The main criticism came from South Africa who raised suspicion about US 
motives. South Africa’s position was summed up by Jakkie Potgieter, a senior researcher 
at the Institute of Security Studies in a newspaper interview:
He [Warren Christopher] was dangling a carrot in front of everybody’s nose.
He had a 20 million dollar aid package and a lot of American training to get 
African countries to start to take responsibility for peacekeeping. It pretty 
much looked like a buy off - sorry guys we’re not interested in getting 
involved in your problems but here’s some money, see what you can do 
about them. So it created a lot of negative responses.
The main challenge from South Africa and the OAU was that the US proposal only targeted 
a select group of countries that, the US argued, had the capacity to establish such a force. 
Ironically, South Africa was part of the US strategy. The OAU Secretariat argued that 
initiatives with only ‘favoured’ states or former colonies endangered the possibility of 
creating a Pan-African Force if some countries were left out of the consultative process.’* 
The OAU further argued against unilateral initiative, preferring that Western proposals acted
 ^Report of the Secretary-General on the Consultations he had with the United States Administration on the 
latter’s proposal on the establishment of an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), Central 
Organ/MEC/AMB/3 (XXV), October 24 1996, pp. 2-3.
J. Potgieter, cited in ‘Southern Africa flexes its military muscles’. Agence France Press International, 8 
April 1997.
” Report of the Secretary-General on the Consultations he had with the United States Administration on the 
latter’s proposal on the establishment of an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), (1996), p. 6.
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in collaboration with the OAU and its member states.The OAU Secretariat wanted to see 
the response of the international community as part of the ‘multi-layered solution’ whereby 
partnerships are built in resolving conflicts within Africa. Another concern for the OAU 
Secretariat was the question of ownership of this Force. The OAU feared that African 
soldiers may be used as policemen by the West who preferred not to send in their own 
troops. Furthermore, the OAU consistently stressed the need for all formal procedures 
concerning the deployment of troops and operational matters to be decided within its 
headquarters.
In response to the criticisms from Africa, the Clinton Administration revised its 
initiative, renamed it the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and began discussing 
its plans with the OAU, while maintaining those links it had already established.^^ What 
distinguishes the ACRI from the ACRF is that it is not aimed at creating a Force, but ‘inter­
operable capacity.’ The word ‘Force’ was dropped to avoid contentious questions on ‘who 
controls the force’ or ‘where does the political authority come to mandate a particular 
operation?’ This new initiative held that there was already an international organisation - the 
UN Security Council - who authorised peacekeeping. The US envisaged a ‘two-track 
approach’: bilateral training and international coordination. This latter point was emphasised 
in response to earlier criticism that Western governments were duplicating their programmes 
of peacekeeping initiatives on the continent. There was to be a broader multinational 
initiative with Britain, France, and joint coordination between the UN and OAU.^ "* The 
essence of this redesigned programme was to have US Special Forces, with soldiers from 
Britain and France, teach peacekeeping skills to military units from participating African 
nations. The US envisaged that these units could be quickly combined into a Pan-African
This view was expressed ia an interview with Chris Bakwesegha and William Nhara.
For full details on this initiative see Amb. Marshall McCalhe and Col. David E. McCracken, On-the-Record 
Briefing, Washington, DC, ‘African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI),’ July 28, 1997. (Located at 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/afnca/acri_briefmg_970728.html,)
See Amb. Marshall McCallie’s comments on ‘Building an “African” or an “African-International Crisis 
Response Force”? In Improving African and International Capabilities for Preventing and Resolving Violent 
Conflict, pp. 144- 146.
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peacekeeping force of 10-12 battalions to prevent outbreaks of violence. However, the 
ACRI still conforms with Western political interest in ensuring that African countries take 
care of their own problems.
Despite the reworking of proposals from the major powers, it appeared from 
discussion with various officials at the OAU-CMC, that the Organisation believed that 
Western governments were operating within two policies. First, Western countries seem less 
inclined than ever to commit resources and to risk casualties in military operations. Second, 
because of the human and financial cost behind peace operations, officials at the OAU 
seemed to conclude that Western capitals would only support or promote initiatives and 
increase partnership between Afidca and the international community if the result meant a 
diminished demand for Western forces and no more ‘body-bags’ being carried back home 
to face the media and public opinion. Certainly such thinking became apparent after the 
failure of the US military intervention in Somalia.
While the OAU Secretariat criticised Western initiatives, officials also recognised 
the necessity of Western initiatives, at least in financial and logistical terms, if they are to 
achieve æiy lasting success in the field of peacekeeping and conflict management. Western 
initiatives are directed at helping the OAU and individual states develop mechanisms for 
responding to internal conflicts - a process far removed from placing Western troops at the 
centre of Afirican conflicts. In developing initiatives to meet the objective of strengthening 
Afiican mechanisms for peacekeeping and conflict resolution, the West will need to redirect 
its future strategy at least to limit the suspicions raised by the OAU and some Afiican states.
First, while the West seems likely to continue to direct initiatives at favoured states, 
the main emphasis might also be directed at developing a ‘continental strategy’, thus 
targeting the existing mechanism set up within the CMC. The OAU jealously guards its 
position as the regional political and collective security organ on the Afiican continent. For 
this reason, there should be more sensitivity to Afiican political realities by the West as
Since it started the ACRI, a sixty-man team from the 3^** Special Forces Group from Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina, US has conducted separate, two-month exercises starting in July 1997 with various African 
battalions: Uganda and Senegal (July-September 1997), Malawi (September-November 1997), Mali 
(Febmary-April 1998) and, Ghana (March-May 1998).
This is the impression of the author after speaking to various officials at the OAU Conflict Management 
Centre. This view was also expressed by J. Herbst (1996).
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resources and skills are transferred to the OAU and subregional bodies. In addition to this, 
foreign assistance needs to be based on a more collaborative and well-structured approach 
as opposed to a policy perceived as ad hoc and un-coordinated.^^
Some African states, notably Kenya and South Africa argued that the OAU or 
subregions are unlikely to receive the necessary assistance from the West in responding to 
Africa’s internal crises because of the growing sense of “Afro-exhaustion.”'* Consequently, 
they argued that a multi-institutional approach, directed by the UN, may remove some of the 
their misgivings and improve Africa’s efforts at responding to internal conflicts.
Some African leaders, notably President Nelson Mandela and also the OAU argued 
that the UN was a more credible institution for channelling and promoting international 
assistance to Africa than individual Western states. On 16 April 1998, the UN Secretary- 
General, Kofi Annan produced a document -The causes o f conflict and the promotion o f 
durable peace and sustainable development in Africa - which aimed at improving the 
OAU’s capacity to respond to conflicts and ensuring a coordinated international response. 
This document stated that the objective of the UN was to ‘complement rather than supplant 
African efforts to resolve Afhca’s problems.’ For example, in the area of peacekeeping, the 
UN targeted areas relating to training assistance, joint peacekeeping exercises and greater 
African participation in UN Standby Arrangements as areas to ensure effective contribution 
from Africa.^ ®
The argument for turning to the UN was not limited to the fact that the UN was the 
only credible institution for ensuring that resources were effectively channelled to the 
appropriate areas on the African continent. More important than its ability to coordinate 
resources was the recognition that the OAU or subregional organisations were not ready or
In response to many OAU criticisms, the UK, France and the US developed a joint initiative in October 
1997 known as the T3’ initiative. The initiative is based on long-term peacekeeping training and education 
programmes to ensure that African states have the capacity to conduct peace operations. Under this 
programme is the US initiative, ACRI, the UK initiative, African Peacekeeping Initiative, and the French 
initiative. Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP).
Interview with Deon Van Schoor.
Report of the UN Secretary-General, ‘The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and 
sustainable development in Africa,’ UN Doc. S/1998/318, 13 April 1998.
Report of the UN Secretary-General, ‘The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and 
sustainable development in Africa,’ (1998), paras. 41 and 45.
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fully equipped to launch peacekeeping operations without the assistance of the UN. 
Furthermore, the OAU argued that the UN was primarily responsible for the maintenance 
of international peace and security, and in this respect, Africa should not be left alone to 
solve its own problems. However, the relationship of the UN towards the OAU needs to be 
based on mutual assistance in responding to conflicts aimed at reducing human suffering in 
war-torn societies.
Thus, while the UN may be able to help the OAU in its attempts to strengthen its 
capacity, it is still difficult to suggest that OAU member states will redefine when and how 
the OAU will become involved in the settlement of severe internal conflicts. The objective 
of “African solutions for Afiican problems” will therefore be difficult for the OAU to 
achieve as it enters the twenty-first century. The OAU, at least at the level of the Secretariat, 
will continue to encourage member states to abide by the provisions set out in the Cairo 
Declaration: to ‘anticipate’ and ‘prevent’ conflicts and to undertake ‘peace-making and 
peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution.’ In the area of peacekeeping, 
it is likely that it will continue to rely on the assistance of the UN while making Afiican 
troops available to contribute to international forces. In situations where the UN and its 
member states appear reluctant or unwilling to intervene, the OAU and Afiican states argue 
that will attempt to take matters into their own hands as they did in Liberia and the Great 
Lakes region. This approach to resolving conflicts is at the heart of the continent’s Pan- 
Afiican philosophy of “African solutions for Afiican problems.”
Conclusion
We began this study with the Congolese civil war in 1960 because it was the first 
major internal conflict from which we could examine the co-evolution of non-interventionist 
norms and interventionist practice among Afiican states. We ended with the crisis in Zaire, 
renamed the Congo in 1997, to demonstrate again how events in this country serve as an 
excellent prism through which to understand this co-evolution. We cannot end this thesis 
without acknowledging how events in the same country were again defining the ‘rules of the 
game’ on the continent in the latter half of 1998. A year since it was renamed the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the internal crisis in that country has again become
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the focal point for speculating about the future of non-interventionist norms on the continent.
Between August and October 1998, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe militarily 
intervened at the request of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila not only to counter the internal 
rebellion against Kabila, but also the alleged support the rebellion was receiving from 
Rwanda and Uganda. There was a willingness among those that supported Kabila to openly 
suggest that their intervention was a legitimate “African solution” to counter what was in 
an international law or OAU sense, illegitimate action by Rwanda and Uganda to topple 
Kabila. More important, was the claim that their intervention was aimed at upholding the 
twin pillars of international relations - sovereignty and non-intervention. In fact, one can 
suggest that this was a classic case of counter-intervention at the request of a leader whose 
regime was being undermined not only by an internal rebellion, but also by the support that 
rebellion was receiving from outside. Those states that claimed to defend Kabila were in 
a sense strengthening the non-interventionist norm. However, the intervention of various 
African states on either side of the conflict may have complicated regional politics in an 
already volatile part of Africa. Furthermore, the actions of these states could, in fact, lead 
to the erosion of the non-interventionist norm.
As a consequence of the various intervening force, the DRC found itself encircled 
by two divided and hostile regions - southern and central Africa - that may decide the future 
of the non-interventionist norm for the whole continent. In October 1998, these subregional 
blocs were largely characterised by deep cleavages between friends who had turned enemies 
and by a reconfiguration of military defined power. Dissatisfied with his failure to ensure 
security in the east region of the DRC, Kabila’s former friends, Rwanda and Uganda were 
accused of sponsoring armed conflict to remove him from power despite having supported 
Kabila in overthrowing Joseph Mobutu a year earher. In addition, a rift developed between 
the pro-Kabila camp (Angola-Zimbabwe-Namibia) and South Africa who rejected a military 
solution to the crisis in the DRC. The fissure between the Angola-Zimbabwe-Namibia axis 
and South Africa could become serious. There is real potential that, in the months and years 
to come, fraternal squabbles between South Africa, Zimbabwe, (both vying for regional 
power status in the south), Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC will lead to an open and 
devastating confrontation in central and southern Africa. More important, we may see a 
return to classic style geopolitics were the interests of the powerful may lead to antagonism
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and heavy military exchange. Such an outcome may surely undermine the non­
interventionist norm in intra-African affairs. More important, if central and southern Africa 
and in particular the Great Lakes region explodes (again) - or even as we have suggested 
spreads further - any hope of African unity on any scale will be lost for more than a 
generation; the door will be open wide for non-African intervention, so African exclusivity 
will also be lost and Africans will be left with the possibility of some form of neo­
colonialism - more likely in the form of a trusteeship. However, another possibility is that 
Africans could, because Western governments are unwilling to directly intervene in African 
conflicts, be effectively abandoned to their fate.
The African continent is again on the move as it enters the twenty-first century and 
the above speculations are just that - speculations. What this thesis suggests to students of 
International Relations is that there has been a slow build-up of interventionist practice 
among African states. Yet, bearing in mind the events in the DRC in 1998, this thesis has 
also demonstrated the extend to which some African states (e.g. pro-Kabila states) will 
employ interventionist tactics in the pursuit of a non-interventionist strategy. The response 
of the pro-Kabila states to the conflict in the DRC demonstrated that nothing is clear cut for 
those who seek to understand the central dynamics of the non-interventionist norm on the 
African continent. This is quite in keeping with the history that has been outlined in this 
study.
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APPENDIX I
TABLE OF INTERVENTIONS BY AFRICAN STATES IN INTERNAL
CONFLICTS
Date
1960-1966
Internal Conflict 
Congo-Leopoldville^
1964
1967-1970
Tanganyika
Nigeria
1970 Guinea
1972-1973
1972
1975-1979
Sierra Leone 
Burundi
Angola
Intervening State 
The following states were 
part of ONUC: Egypt, 
Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Senegal 
and Mali. In 1964 the 
following states supported 
the rebel group, CNL: 
Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, 
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda
OAU force (Nigeria)
Reports are not clear, 
although it is suggested that 
Egyptian pilots were used by 
the Nigerian Air Force
Various Afiican states were 
said to have supported 
President Touré against the 
mercenary invasion, no clear 
records of who they were.
Guinea
Zaire (Tanzania initially 
provided military assistance 
to the government)
Guinea (1976?), Zaire (in 
support of FNLA). The 
following gave assistance, 
although not clearly defined, 
to MPLAin 1975-1976: 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone
 ^ Conflicts in bold-face type are discussed in this study.
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1975-1978
1976-1979
1977-1978
The Comoros Island 
Mozambique 
Zaire/Shaba I and n
1977
1977-1978?
1977-1979? 
1979 
1979
1978-1981
1978
1979
1979
1979-1980
1980 
1980
1980-1981
1981-1982
Benin
Sao Tomé Principe 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Liberia 
Uganda
Chad
Central African Empire
Liberia
Chad
Chad
Chad
The Gambia 
Chad
1982
1983
Mozambique
Chad
Tanzania
Tanzania
Angola. The following took 
part in the Pan-African 
Intervention Force: Central 
African Empire, Gabon, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Morocco, Senegal 
and Togo
Guinea
Angola and Guinea-Bissau
Tanzania
Guinea
Guinea
Tanzania (Libya in support of 
the Idi Amin government)
Libya
Zaire
Guinea
Nigeria
Libya
OAU Neutral Force: Congo- 
Brazzavile
Senegal
The following states took 
part in the OAU Inter- 
African Force: Kenya,
Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire
Zimbabwe
Zaire and Sudan
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1985
1990-1997
Mozambique
Liberia
1993 Sudan
1992-1993 Rwanda
1994
1994
1997 and 1998
1997
Lesotho
Burundi
Sierra Leone
Central African Republic
Zimbabwe
West African Peacekeeping 
Force - ECOMOG: Ghana, 
Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, 
Senegal until 1993, Sierra 
Leone, and The Gambia. The 
following went in as part of 
the UN operation 
(UNOMIL) in 1994: Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda
The Inter-Govemmental 
Authority on Drought and 
Development (Reports later 
suggested that Eritrea, 
Ethiopia and Uganda openly 
supported the Sudanese 
opposition groups in the 
north and south)
OAU Neutral Military 
Observer Group - NMOG: 
Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and 
Zimbabwe (later incorporated 
under the UN assistance 
mission in Rwanda - 
UNAMIR, 1993-1996)
Under the authority of 
SADC: Botswana, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe 
OAU Observer Mission 
(OMIB)
West African Peacekeeping 
Force, ECOMOG (Led by 
Nigeria)
The following states went 
under the Inter-African 
Monitoring Mission 
(MISAB): Burkina Faso, 
Chad, Gabon and Mali (later 
incorporated under the UN 
Mission in the Central 
African Republic -
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MINURCA, April 1998 and 
also included Egypt, Senegal 
and Togo).
1997 Zaire Uganda and Rwanda sent 
troops to assist rebel leader, 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila
1998- Democratic Republic of 
Congo Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe 
sent troops to assist President 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila. 
(Reports that Chad and 
Sudan also sent troops to 
assist Kabila). Rwanda and 
Uganda sent troops to assist 
the rebel movement.
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CASABLANCA GROUP*
Algeria (joined in 1962) 
Egypt (UAR)
Ghana
Guinea
Mali
Morocco
APPENDIX n  
Various African Groupings in the 1960s
BRAZZAVILLE GROUP**
Cameroun
Central Africa Republic 
Chad
Congo (Brazzaville)
Côte d’Ivoire
Dahomey
Gabon
Malagasy Republic
Mauritania
Niger
Senegal
Upper Volta
MONROVIA GROUP
Cameroun
Central Africa Republic 
Chad
Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Leopoldville)
Côte d’Ivoire
Dahomey
Ethiopia
Gabon
Liberia
Libya (withdrew in 1962)
Malagasy Republic
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somali Republic
Sudan
Togo
Tunisia
Upper Volta
1960.
* Also known as the ‘radical’ or ‘revolutionary’ group. These states were signatories to the African Charter at Casablanca on 7 June 1961.
** Later known as the Union of African and Malagasy States or ‘conservative’ group. These states were signatories to the Brazzaville Declaration on 19 December
Derived its name from the Conference held in Monrovia in 1961. These states went on to sign the Lagos Charter on 20 December 1962. These states were also 
known as the ‘moderates’ or the Inter-African and Malagasy States Organisation.
APPENDIX m
Declaration 
of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government 
on the establishment, within the OAU 
of a Mechanism for Conflict prevention,
Management and Resolution 
Adopted at the OAU 29^ Ordinary Session, 28-30 June, Cairo, Egypt 
Decision AHG/Dec.I (XXV Hi)
We, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in our
Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session in Cairo, Egypt, from 28 to 30 June 1993, having considered
the situations of conflict on our Continent and recalling the Declaration we adopted on 11
July 1990, on the political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the Fundamental
Changes Taking Place in the World, declare as follows:
1. In May 1963, when the Founding Fathers met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to found the 
Organization of African Unity, they were guided by their collective conviction that 
freedom, equality, justice and dignity are legitimate aspirations of the African peoples, 
and by their desire to harness the natural and human resources for the advancement 
of the Continent in all spheres of human endeavour. The Founding Fathers were 
inspired by an equally common determination to promote understanding between the 
African peoples and cooperation among the African States, and to rekindle the 
aspirations of the African people for brotherhood and solidarity in a larger unity 
transcending linguistic, ideological, ethnic and national differences.
2. The Founding Fathers were fully convinced that to achieve these lofty objectives, 
conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained.
3. It was with this overriding conviction, and also by the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Declaration of Human Rights, that our countries began on the arduous task 
of meeting the triple challenge of decolonization, economic development and 
maintenance of peace and security.
4. Today, thirty years later, we can look back with pride at the achievements which the 
Organization of African Unity has been able to make against heavy odds and many 
obstacles it has had to surmount.
5. The ranks of independent countries have been strengthened and the membership of 
the OAU has increased from thirty-two at its founding to fifty-two today. The 
frontiers in Africa have been pushed to the doors of Apartheid South Africa. And 
even there, significant progress has been made; and we have reasonable cause for 
optimism that we shall soon see the total eradication of the remaining vestiges of 
colonialism, racism, racial discrimination and apartheid.
6. We, however, continue to be faced by the daunting dual challenge of economic
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development and democratic transformation. Our countries have made tremendous 
efforts both individually and collectively to arrest and reverse the decline in our 
economies. Notwithstanding the many serious difficulties they have encountered, and 
the magnitude of what remains to be done, appreciable progress has been made in the 
social and economic fields.
7. The socio-economic situation on our Continent remains nonetheless in a precarious 
state. Factors including poverty, deterioration of the terms of trade, plummeting 
prices of commodities we produce, the excruciating external indebtedness and the 
resultant reverse flow of resources have combined to undermine the ability of our 
countries to provide for the basic needs of our people. In some cases, this situation 
has been further compounded by external political factors.
8. We do recognize, however, that there have also been certain internal human factors 
and policies which have negatively contributed to the present state of affairs on the 
Continent.
9. No single internal factor has contributed more to the present socio-economic 
problems on the Continent than the scourge of conflicts within and between our 
countries. They have brought about death and human suffering, engendered hate and 
divided nations and families. Conflicts have force millions of our people into a drifting 
life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, 
human dignity and hope. Conflicts have gobbled-up resources, and undermined the 
ability of our countries to address the many compelling needs of our people.
10. While reaffirming our commitment to the Declaration on the Political and Socio- 
Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the 
World which we adopted during the Twenty-sixth Session of our Assembly, in Addis 
Ababa, in July 1990, we renew our determination to work in concert in the search for 
speedy and peaceful resolution to all the conflicts in Afiica.
11. In June last year at the Twenty-eight meeting of our Assembly in Dakar - Senegal, 
we decided in principle to establish within the OAU, and in keeping with the 
principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organization, a Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution. We took that decision against the 
background of the history of many prolonged and destructive conflicts on our 
continent and of our limited success at finding lasting solutions to them, 
notwithstanding the many efforts we and our predecessors had expended. In so 
doing, we were also guided by our determination to ensure that Africa through the 
Organization of African Unity plays a central role in bringing about peace and 
security on the Continent.
12. We saw in the establishment of such a Mechanism the opportunity to bring to the 
processed of dealing with conflicts on our continent a new institutional dynamism, 
enabling speedy action to prevent or manage and ultimately resolve conflicts when 
and where they occur.
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13. Now, having considered the report on the Mechanism prepared by the Secretary- 
General pursuant to our decision on the principle of its creation, we hereby establish, 
within the OAU, a Mechanism for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in 
Africa.
14. The Mechanism will be guided by the objectives and principles of the OAU Charter; 
in particular, sovereign equality of Member States, non-interference in the internal 
affairs of States, the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member 
States, their inahenable right to independent existence, the peaceful settlement of 
disputes as well as the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism. It will also 
function on the basis of the consent and the cooperation of the parties to a conflict.
15. The Mechanism will have as its primary objective, the anticipation and prevention of 
conflicts. In circumstances when conflicts have occurred, it Avill be its responsibility 
to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the 
resolution of these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military missions of 
observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration may be mounted and 
deployed. In setting these objectives, we are fiilly convinced that prompt and decisive 
action in these spheres will, in the first instance, prevent the emergence of conflicts, 
and where they do inevitably occur, stop them from degenerating into intense or 
generalized conflicts. Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures, and 
concerted action in peace-making and peace-building will obviate the need to resort 
to the complex and resource-demanding peace-keeping operations, which our 
countries will find difficult to finance.
16. However, in the event that conflicts degenerate to the extent of requiring collective 
international intervention and policing, the assistance or where appropriate the 
services of the United Nations will be sought under the general terms of its Charter. 
In this instance, our respective countries will examine ways and modalities through 
which they can make practical contribution to such a United Nations undertaking and 
participate effectively in the peace-keeping operations in Africa.
17. The Mechanism will be built around a Central Organ with the Secretary-General and 
the Secretariat as its operational arm.
18. The Central Organ of the Mechanism shall be composed of the State members of the 
Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government elected annually, bearing 
in mind the principles of equitable regional representation and rotation. In order to 
ensure continuity, the States of the outgoing Chairman and (where Known) the 
incoming Chairman shall also be members of the Central Organ. In between Ordinary 
Sessions of the Assembly, it will assume overall direction and coordinate the activities 
of the Mechanism.
19. The Central Organ shall function at the level of Heads of State as well as that of 
Ministers and Ambassadors accredited to the OAU or duly authorized 
representatives. It may also seek, from within the Continent, such military, legal and 
other forms of expertise as it may require in the performance of its functions.
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20. The proceedings of the Central Organ shall be governed by the pertinent Rules of 
Procedure of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Central Organ 
shall be convened by the Chairman or at the request of the Secretary-General or any 
Member State. It will meet at least once a year at the level Heads of State and 
Government; twice a year at the Ministerial level; and once a month at Ambassadorial 
and duly authorized representatives level. The quorum of the Central Organ shall be 
two thirds of its members. In deciding on its recommendations and without prejudice 
to the decision-making methods provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, it shall generally be guided by the 
principle of consensus. The Central Organ shall report on its activities to the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
21. The venue of its meeting shall ordinarily be at the Headquarters of the Organization. 
Meetings may also be held elsewhere if so decided through consultations among its 
members. The provisional agenda of the Central Organ shall be prepared by the 
Secretary-General in consultation with the Chairman.
22. The Secretary-General shall, under the authority of the Central Organ and in 
consultation with the parties involved in the conflict, deploy efforts and take all 
appropriate initiatives to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. To this end, the 
Secretary-General shall rely upon the human and material resources available at the 
General Secretariat. Accordingly, we direct the Council of Ministers, in consultations 
with the Secretary-General, to examine ways and means in which the capacity within 
the General Secretariat can be built and brought to a level commensurate with the 
magnitude of the tasks at hand and the responsibilities expected of the Organization. 
In his efforts, the Secretary-General may also resort to eminent African personalities 
in consultation with the Authorities of their countries of origin. Where necessary, he 
may make use of other relevant expertise, send special envoys or special 
representatives as well as despatch fact-finding missions to conflict areas.
23. A special hind governed by the relevant OAU Financial Rules and Regulations shall 
be established for the purpose of providing financial resources to support exclusively 
the OAU operational activities relating to conflict management and resolution. It will 
be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the OAU, 
voluntary contributions from Member State as well as from other sources within 
Africa. The Secretary-General may, with the consent of the Central Organ, and in 
conformity with the principles and objectives of the OAU Charter, also accept 
voluntary contributions from sources outside Afnca. Disbursement from the Special 
Fund shall be subject to the approval of the Central Organ.
24. Within the context of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution, the OAU shall closely coordinate its activities with the African regional 
and sub-regional organizations and shall cooperate as appropriate with the 
neighbouring countries with respect to conflicts which may arise in the different sub- 
regions of the Continent.
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25. The OAU should also cooperate and work closely with the United Nations not only 
with regard to issues relating to peace-making but, and especially, also those relating 
to peace-keeping. Where necessary, recourse will be had to the United Nations to 
provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the OAU’s 
activities in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Afiica in keeping 
with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role or regional 
organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. In like manner, 
the Secretary-General of the OAU shall maintain close cooperation with other 
international organizations.
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